Trump 2.0? Argentina adopts anti-immigration policies mirroring US models

Argentina’s administration under President Javier Milei has significantly tightened immigration into the country during his time in office. This has included two major moves: First, an emergency decree introduced in October 2024 restricts access to asylum in Argentina. Second, the Executive Order Decree 366/25, issued in May 2025, limits permanent residency and citizenship as well as migrants’ access to public healthcare and education, while widening the grounds for deportation. Together, these measures significantly restrict migration, and activists say they are shifting Argentina’s immigration policy from one focused on regularising people to one focusing on criminalising them.

This article explores the similarities between these measures and the changes in US policies introduced since President Trump took office at the beginning of this year. It also discusses the impact of these initiatives on migrants and the criticism surrounding them.

Migration in Argentina

According to Argentina’s 2022 census, the country has an estimated immigrant population of about two million (1,933,463 foreign born persons). The country hosted an estimated 177,894 people in need of international protection – as defined by UNHCR, predominantly Venezuelans. Most of the migrants are from within the region, with Paraguay, Bolivia and Venezuela making up the largest number of migrants. As in other countries, the number of undocumented individuals is difficult to calculate, but the Milei administration claims, however, that over the last twenty years, 1.7 million undocumented immigrants have been allowed into the country, although the basis for this calculation is unclear.

Similarities to US migration policies

Argentina’s recent changes to migration policy in many ways mirror those of the current US administration under President Donald Trump. As in the US, the rhetoric around immigration has focused on security and the criminalisation of migrants. In the preamble to the October 2024 decree, issued to restrict access to asylum in Argentina, reference is made to “terrorist groups and international criminals, like Hamas and Hezbollah, have used different jurisdictions and abused the refugee regime to extend their networks,” similar to the way that the US administration has referred to criminal groups such as Tren de Aragua as justification for restrictive measures. In doing so, the Milei administration is playing on increasing public concern about crime. Crime rates in Argentina are lower than in much of South America, but had seen an upward trend through 2023 (when Milei was elected). Although in 2020, only 32% of Argentinians agreed or strongly agreed with the association of migrants with crime, according to a Latinobarómetro survey, this opinion appears to have increased, perhaps driven by the role of international drug trafficking in crime hotspots such as the coastal city of Rosario.

Yet, activists, such as Julio Villavicencio of the Jesuit Migrant Service, assert that there is no official evidence that criminals are exploiting the asylum system in Argentina. Activists also more broadly question a narrative that migrants cause instability and criminality, pointing out, for example, that only 6% of the Argentinian prison population is made up of foreigners. And further, those with criminal convictions were already subject to expulsion under the prior law.

The rhetoric related to the May measure was explicitly tied to the US. The adoption of the new measure was linked to the risk that some of the 1.25 million people who were allegedly expelled from the US would try to settle in Argentina. Rhetoric has also mirrored that of the US. Presidential spokesperson Manuel Adorni said, “It’s time to honour our history and make Argentina great again,” repeating Donald Trump’s key slogan – and the core of his political movement.

Another similarity is that anti-immigration measures have also been linked to efforts to reduce spending. Adorni claimed that migrant’s use of public hospitals had cost the system 114 billion Argentine pesos (USD 100 million in July 2025). Both administrations have also adopted similar language and approaches about cutting government spending, including the use of the iconic chainsaw, wielded by both Milei and prominent Trump advisor Elon Musk. The focus on the narrative that immigrants who should not qualify for benefits are draining resources can, in Argentina as in the US, be used to make the case that cuts to social services are focused on combatting abuse, rather than limiting access by deserving individuals.

As in the US, anti-immigration rhetoric has been deployed as an electoral strategy. In particular, the May measure was criticised by activists as a move to appease Milei’s political base ahead of a legislative election in the autonomous city Buenos Aires, which Milei’s candidate won. This election is also considered an important signal of what is to come in next year’s national legislative elections. This is despite quite different migration patterns.

The migrant population in Argentina makes up a much smaller share than in the US. In the US, immigrants accounted for about 14.3% of the population in 2024, the highest level since 1910, in Argentina the 2022 census estimated that 4.2% of the population was foreign-born, the lowest rate since record-keeping began in 1869. Official migration statistics show a decline in new arrivals since 2023. Net migration fell to 3,454 in 2024 – the lowest level since 2013 (apart from the COVID pandemic in 2020 to 2021).

However, according to data from 2022 and 2023, Argentinians tended to overestimate the number of migrants in the country more than people do in other countries, where  the foreign born population was estimated to be double the actual number. In Argentina, however, nationals estimated that migrants made up 28% of the total population, which is more than five times the actual number. Against the backdrop of increased worry about rising unemployment, this misperception may increase concern about migrant competition for jobs and provides a breeding-ground for Milei’s anti-immigration policies.

In this context, putting attention on the migrant population may be a strategic move to divert attention from pressing socio-economic issues and a lack of progress in these areas. In 2024, top concerns were poverty and low wages. The Argentinian administration may be turning to anti-immigrant rhetoric as a political distraction and scapegoat.  Although inflation has slowed, wages have not kept pace, meaning that purchasing power is declining for Argentinians who already cited low wages as a top concern. Although poverty (the top concern), is also reportedly decreasing, many say that life is getting harder, questioning the official statistics. Against this backdrop of economic anxiety and public skepticism, President Javier Milei has increasingly portrayed immigrants as sources of “chaos and abuse,” positioning them as convenient targets for public frustration. This narrative, echoed in recent migration policy changes, suggests a strategic effort to redirect blame for Argentina’s ongoing economic and social pressures.

Another motivator may be the relationship to the US. The similarities to US policies appear to be deliberate and may be partly motivated by President Milei’s broader strategy of positioning Argentina as a close US ally. This intention has become evident in his administration’s pursuit of a free-trade agreement with the US, the construction of a US Naval base in Argentina’s Tierra del Fuego, and efforts to have Argentina re-enter the US’s Visa Waiver Program.

Consequences for migrants

The measures have stark implications for migrants currently in Argentina and those aspiring to migrate there.

Reduced access to asylum

The October revisions to asylum law make asylum less accessible by reducing access to appeals, requiring notice of appeal within five days and referring all such processes to judicial rather than administrative courts. This means that asylum seekers need a lawyer to appeal, which in practice may be hard-pressed to find or afford. It also expands the criteria for exclusion from the “serious non-political crimes” embraced in international law to any “serious crime.” Because it is relatively common for oppressive regimes to bring politically motivated charges against opponents, the failure to exclude political crimes could potentially lead to the exclusion of a large number of asylum seekers. UNHCR estimated that this measure affected approximately 1,800 failed asylum seekers in 2024.

Limits to residence and stricter citizenship requirements

Under the May measure, temporary residence is reduced from 180 to 90 days. This means that migrants have less assurance of the durability of their stay, as renewals are not guaranteed. It also increases administrative burdens by requiring migrants to renew their residence permit more frequently.

The changes also add more requirements for obtaining permanent residency or citizenship. Applicants will need to show that they have been residents for two years without extended absences and do more to demonstrate this. Those seeking permanent residency must show that they have sufficient means to support themselves and that they do not have a criminal history in their countries of origin. These provisions are likely to reduce the number of migrants that can access naturalisation from its already low level – there had been only about 5,000 naturalisations in the last decade before the change.

Easier deportations

The modifications also make deportations easier by reducing the amount of time migrants have to appeal a deportation order from 30 to 15 days. The measure also allows for deportation in cases where there are “well-founded suspicions of crimes,” even if there has been no conviction. In this aspect, the measure mirrors the provisions of the recently passed Laken Riley Act in the US, which requires immigration detention of individuals solely based on an arrest or charge, not a conviction.

These provisions appear to already be increasing deportations in practice. A family of five Palestinians was deported in early July after arriving with valid tourist visas and other documents. The family was pressured to sign documents in Spanish, which they could not understand, confirming that they were “false tourists.” In another case, a 60-year-old Uruguayan who had been living in Argentina for 19 years and had two Argentinian children was arrested when he went to renew his temporary residence permit. He had received a suspended sentence in 2021 for “threats and disobedience,” which is the basis for deportation under the decree, although the law provides that only crimes with a penalty of not less than three years are the basis for deportation. The fact that he was detained at an immigration appointment is also reminiscent of a recent pattern of arrests under similar circumstances in the US. Activists say that it is emblematic of an expansion of deportations which mirrors the US.

Furthermore, even where crimes are non-violent, related, for example, to sex work or drug use, they can be the basis of deportation, as was highlighted by the detention of two trans migrants in June. Based on these cases, activist groups say that the policy changes are likely to particularly affect certain groups of migrants more than others, depending on how likely they are to come into contact with the police.

Limited access to healthcare and education

The May measure further restricts access to health care and education. Previously, access to both had been free, but now access for non-permanent residents will be subject to payment. Both sectors have faced heavy cuts as part of Milei’s austerity programme. Since taking office in December 2023, Milei has cut Argentina’s health care budget by an estimated 48%. Funding for education has also been slashed, and has been the subject of vast public debate, as Milei’s veto of a bill to ensure funding to universities in October 2024.

The May decree restricts migrants’ access to healthcare, requiring them to either pay directly for health care or retain private insurance. Migrants with chronic health conditions, already very vulnerable, are particularly hard hit. The measure may also change entrance procedures. Rights groups say that migrants can be required to show proof of private insurance or be returned at the border, although the Paraguayan Ministry of Migration said that this had not yet been implemented. This confusion highlights the bureaucratic hassles that the measure may cause, on top of exclusion from care. The measures on access to health and social services have also been criticised for pressing health workers and others not qualified to make immigration determinations to do so.

The decree also excludes those with irregular status from accessing tertiary education, breaking with a seventy-year tradition allowing free education to all. The measure builds on changes introduced by Milei last year that started to allow public universities to charge non-resident tuition. The impact of these measures on the overall budget of the education sector is likely small, given that only 3.9% of undergraduates were foreigners prior to this measure.

Criticism of the new immigration policies

Creating gaps in integration

Overall, the package of immigration reforms sends the message that immigrants are not welcome in Argentina. In response, migrants in Argentina have expressed concern about their future. The measures undermine immigrant confidence that they can create stable lives. The exclusion of youth from education is of particular concern for youth trying to build a life in Argentina.

Prioritising certain migrants

Even as the measure seeks to close doors on so many migrants, it has opened them for one category – the rich. The May measure introduced  Decree 524/2025, modifying the citizenship law and allowing for naturalisation without a period of residency for those who make investments of at least $500,000 in the country. This investment citizenship programme, which went into effect at the end of July, is also very similar to Trump’s $5 Million “Gold Card” Visa. Activists also noted that in other countries that have adopted such exclusively economic standards worries have been raised about the potential of such provisions to attract drug dealers and to increase money laundering.

Lack of due process

The measures have also been criticised for the manner of their adoption. As the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) put it, the new measures “cannot be established through an exceptional regime for certain people without Congressional debate,” particularly where they touch on rights. There are also criticisms about due process, saying that such changes require legislative action.

Rights groups have lodged legal challenges in response. In June, a judge rejected an appeal by rights groups challenging the asylum decrees as incompatible with due process, on the basis that there was no clearly defined beneficiary group. Rights groups are continuing to advocate against the measure, for example, by asking the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to urge Argentinian authorities to repeal the October decree on asylum.

The law itself also limits due process in immigration cases. For example, under the October measures, access to appeals was limited. Under the May measures, migration authorities, rather than a judge, will decide on citizenship applications. Those subject to deportation will have fewer opportunities to appeal. Taken together, the measures can erode due process for migrants, which in turn can facilitate attacks on other due process protections – for citizens as well.

Regional impacts

Countries in the region have not publicly reacted to the policy changes in Argentina. In Paraguay, the government has been criticized for failing to take sufficient action in response to the changes. For example Marta Guerreño López, leader of the National Network of Migrant Leaders says that the Paraguayan government should have talked to the Milei administration pointing out the tradition of migration and making special agreements.

Conclusion

The changes in migration policy in Argentina have implications for migrants in the country, mixed migration dynamics and the region more broadly.

The current measures infringe on the rights of migrants in the country, as access to asylum is being reduced and deportations are sped up. Thereby, the measures undermine Argentina’s commitment to international standards and regional solidarity. As rights organisations highlighted in their application to the IACHR, the measures threaten the principle of non-discrimination as well as the right to seek and receive asylum. They also run counter to the commitments made in the Los Angeles Declaration to promote regular pathways for migration, as well as to “recognise the positive contributions of refugees and migrants to the socio-economic development of host communities.”

Beyond the actual challenges that the measures impose on migrants’ integration by limiting access to healthcare, education and citizenship, the measures also have symbolic importance. While citizenship is an important legal protection, it is also a pathway to integration more broadly, allowing migrants to fully contribute to and participate in the societies they live in. If this is cut off, migrants will not have faith in their ability to integrate into the country.

These measures are also further fuelling the anti-immigration narratives that may impel further harsh measures. Such rhetoric is not new in Argentina. For instance, former president Mauricio Macri led a shift towards a more restrictive immigration policy and employed anti-immigrant rhetoric linking migrants to crime between 2015 and 2019. Yet, Milei’s administration is adopting a more explicit and harsher anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies, with migrants being seen as “competitors for resources”.

Measures stand in contrast to the country’s traditionally inclusive policies.  This may make Argentina less attractive for all migrants. The most talented and motivated may move on to other opportunities, depriving the country of their skills and expertise – a tendency that has already emerged in the US in response to the recent policy changes.

The measures in Argentina come in a context where solidarity for migrants is eroding in the region. Neighbouring country Chile has been tightening its immigration policy, extending border militarisation and planning to reform birthright citizenship. Ecuador cancelled a programme aimed at regularising Venezuelans earlier this year and is looking to pull out of a migration agreement with Venezuela that has been granting Venezuelan nationals access to temporary residency in Ecuador.

As more borders close, the pressure on countries with less restrictive migration policies increases. If the current trend of anti-immigration policies continues in the region, in addition to integration challenges in countries of destination, the region may soon face a growing population of migrants stuck in transit, with limited rights and uncertain futures. The way South American countries respond now will not only shape mixed migration but also define the region’s commitment to human rights, integration, and collective responsibility.