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Cuban mixed migration: US fuels departures and restricts access

Historically, the United States (US) has been the primary destination for Cuban refugees and migrants, with Cubans having enjoyed preferential access to legal permanent residence for decades. However, this has been replaced by restrictive and contradictory policies more recently. Over the last few months, the US has intensified political and economic pressure on Cuba, thereby increasing the drivers of migration from the island. Simultaneously, the US has been restricting legal pathways for Cuban migrants by imposing new entry barriers, introducing status changes, and implementing deportations. This has reconfigured the movements of Cubans in the Americas, turning Cuban mixed migration into a regional phenomenon for South and Central America.

This article analyses the changes in mixed migration of Cuban refugees and migrants in the Americas, the implications of these changes for new transit and destination countries, and their responses in terms of migration policies.

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Migración cubana: EEUU impulsa salidas y restringe el acceso

Cuban migration has primarily been driven by the country’s political and economic conditions, which have worsened since 2019 due to tightened US sanctions, the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, and a severe energy crisis. These drivers have remained constant, and more recently intensified, regardless of shifts in US immigration policy.

Between the 1960s and early 2000s, mixed migration from Cuba was heavily driven by a number of major events, such as the early 1960s exodus, the 1980 Mariel boatlift or the 1994 Cuban balsero (“rafter”) crisis. For decades, Cubans enjoyed swift access to legal permanent residence in the US, facilitated first by the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966, which allowed Cubans to become green-card holders after being physically present in the US for at least one year; and the “wet-foot, dry-foot” policy, under which Cubans arriving at a US land port without a visa would be admitted or paroled into the country and, hence, were protected from deportation. As a result, naturalisation rates of Cubans in the US were high, compared to other immigrant groups.

The historical preferential treatment for Cubans began eroding in 2017 when the US administration under former president Barack Obama ended the policy, meaning Cubans arriving without prior authorisation then faced removal and deportation like other foreign nationals. Nonetheless, the country’s economic and political context led to a new surge in Cuban migration since 2021. Recent estimates suggest that Cuba’s population dropped from 11 million to 8.5 million between 2022 and 2023 due to emigration. In 2025, Cubans ranked as the second-largest group of asylum seekers from the Americas, with 137,600 new claims filedglobally. The increase in irregular migration by Cubans to the US prompted the introduction of policies under the previous US administration, such as a new humanitarian parole process for qualifying Cubans, among other nationalities, in 2023 and the resumption of the previously suspended Cuban Family Reunification Parole Programme in 2022. The 2021 surge in Cuban migration has continued into the present. In recent months, growing US pressure on Cuba could further accelerate departures from the island. In early June, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that “the expansion of sanctions imposed by the US against Cuba is causing widespread harm to the population and endangering lives”. However, since 2025, US immigration policies have shifted abruptly in the opposite direction, dramatically narrowing the legal pathways available to Cubans seeking to enter or remain in the US.

Since taking office in early 2025, the current US administration has virtually closed all legal pathways for Cubans. On his first day in office, President Trump terminated the CHNV humanitarian parole programme for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans. By December 2025, the administration paused all immigration cases for Cubans, halting asylum filings, green card applications, naturalisation processes, and cases under the Cuban Adjustment Act. Also in December, the US announced the termination of family reunification programmes for immigrants from Cuba, among other countries; through 2024, some 59,000 people had received this protection.

Another measure has been ramping up deportations of Cuban nationals to Cuba, but also to third countries, mainly Mexico, and, exceptionally, African nations like South Sudan. According to data reported by the Cuban Ministry of Interior, 2,009 Cubans were deported to the island between February 2025 and April 2026, with the highest number of deportations occurring in November 2025 (371) and February 2026 (286). Cubans made up the largest share of third-country nationals deported to Mexico in 2025, with an estimated 4,353 removals occurring between January 2025 and March 2026 (another source cites 6,000 deportations for the same time period). The US administration has also expanded restrictions on travel and visas for Cuban nationals. A new travel ban limited the entry of Cuban nationals in mid-2025. Cuba was among several countries for which the US introduced visa restrictions earlier this year. Since January 21, 2026, Cuban nationals have to post $15,000 bonds in order to apply for visas. Cuba is also among the 75 countries for which the US suspended the processing of immigrant visas, deeming their nationals likely to become reliant on public benefits.

These changes in policies have left about 600,000 Cubans in the US in legal uncertainty and risk of deportation, including 110,900 Cubans who entered the country on CHNV Parole and over 500,000 Cubans on I-220A forms (an “Order of Release on Recognizance,” a document issued by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE – or Customs and Border Protection, releasing migrants from federal immigration detention into the US under specific conditions, such as attending court hearings and regularly checking).

In response to US restrictions on entry and legal residence for Cubans, countries across South America and Central America are increasingly becoming final destinations of Cuban mixed migration rather than mere transit corridors. This has been particularly the case for Costa Rica, Brazil and Uruguay. The factors driving the shift toward these countries as destinations vary. Costa Rica used to be a transit point on the route to the US. In light of entry restrictions to the US, many Cubans now choose Costa Rica for its relative economic stability, employment opportunities, and international protection. In January 2026, 94% of Cuban respondents surveyed by IOM’s DTM indicated Costa Rica as their intended destination. Brazil also emerged as a major new destination, largely due to its accessible, rights-based migration policies and visa-free transit options. Asylum applications by Cubans there nearly doubled between 2024 and 2025 (from 22,288 to 41,919), surpassing for the first time in a decade the number of claims made by Venezuelans in Brazil in the first half of 2025.

Uruguay has emerged due to its existing Cuban community. Cubans constitute a significant portion of Uruguay’s migrant community, accounting for 20% of the country’s foreign-born population in 2023. 14,959 Cubans arrived in 2025, compared to 5,870 in 2024. They also constitute the vast majority of asylum seekers in the country; as of mid-2025, 83% of asylum seekers in Uruguay (26,626 of 31,975) were from Cuba.

As destination countries have shifted, so have transit countries.  Traditionally, Cubans flew to Nicaragua and trekked north. Nicaragua suspended visa-free entry for Cubans in February 2026, a move that analysts suggest was either a direct response to US pressure or a cautionary decision by the Nicaraguan government to avoid sanctions. As a result, Cubans began flying into Guyana to reach Brazil; others are reaching Brazil via Venezuela, which also does not require a visa. Some also stay in Guyana.

These changes are also seen in Central America. Irregular entries by Cubans into Honduras plummeted by approximately 70%, dropping from over 64,000 in 2024 to under 19,000 in 2025. At the same time, Cubans’ northbound movements have not stalled completely, as sustained transit through Guatemala throughout 2025 showed.

Map 1: Main routes of Cuban migration in the Americas

While not a destination of choice, Mexico has become a de facto destination for many Cuban refugees and migrants. In addition to northward-bound migrants who ended up stranded in Mexico, the country has increasingly been receiving deportations of third-country nationals, with Cubans constituting the largest group. As a result of Cubans being stranded in Mexico, the country recorded almost 40,000 asylum applications by Cuban nationals in 2025.

As Cuban migration has shifted toward new destination countries, government responses have been mixed. When being elected, Costa Rica’s new president, Laura Fernández,  promised to implement stricter migration policies by reinforcing border controls, expanding the use of tracking databases, and increasing the immigration police force. Yet, earlier this month, the Costa Rican government announced a special category to regularise thousands of Nicaraguans, Cubans, Venezuelans, and Colombians who have been stuck in a legal limbo for years while waiting for a response to their asylum requests. This measure is expected to benefit about 10,000 people, while there were about 318,000 awaiting a resolution at the start of 2026, with nearly 29,000 new asylum seekers having arrived in the country in 2025 alone.

Brazil maintains an open policy, without having made any specific adjustments for the recent arrivals. In October 2025, Brazil adopted a new National Policy on Migration, Refuge, and Statelessness (Decree No. 12,657/2025). The decree sets out the guidelines, principles, and objectives guiding the Federal Government’s actions in the areas of migration, asylum, and statelessness. The policy constitutes a rare positive development in regional migration governance, positioning Brazil as a regional model for human rights-based migration policy. At the end of 2025, Brazil also created a new humanitarian visa programme. Since the programme is open to all nationalities, some Cubans might benefit.

Uruguay offers well-established systems to support refugees and migrants’ integration, including the National Integration Plan, which was approved in 2023. However, access to formal residency remains limited: MMC’s study on integration in Montevideo found that only 20% of the 260 Cuban respondents had secured some type of temporary or permanent residence, largely due to higher costs and stricter requirements resulting from Cuba’s non-membership in Mercosur. As a result, most Cubans rely on alternative legal statuses, primarily as asylum seekers. The Uruguayan government recently created the “Residencia por Arraigo“ (Residence permit based on ties to the country) programme, offering a new pathway for migrants who arrived legally but lack residency, enabling them to settle in the country permanently. About 20,000 refugees and migrants were expected to benefit from the programme, particularly Cubans.

Mexico has entered into an “unwritten” or informal agreement with the US to act as a de facto safe third country, accepting the deportation of thousands of third-country nationals, including Cubans. The conditions of this deal are unclear, as the Mexican President, Claudia Sheinbaum, has denied the existence of an agreement and has cited humanitarian reasons for accepting deportees; yet, pressure from the US most likely plays a role.

Mexican authorities typically receive deportees at northern border points, from where they are transported to southern cities like Tapachula (Chiapas) and Villahermosa (Tabasco). Unlike Mexican citizens who are deported, the Mexican government provides no reception infrastructure, shelter, or financial assistance for third-country deportees. Cubans are often released into the streets with little to no orientation. Furthermore, while Mexican authorities immediately expel other migrants across the southern border to Guatemala or Honduras, Cubans are simply released into Mexico. For Cubans, the only option to regularise their status in Mexico is to apply for asylum. Yet, access to asylum is currently hampered by funding-related backlogs, the introduction of additional requirements like digital pre-registration, and the de facto suspension of the Humanitarian Visitor Card (TVRH), which previously offered temporary legal status and work access.

The changes in US policies have various implications for Cuban refugees and migrants, both those in transit and those who previously settled in the US.

Between 2019 and 2023, approximately 500,000 Cubans were released into the US with an I-220A form rather than a humanitarian parole. This arbitrary bureaucratic distinction prevents them from adjusting their status to obtain permanent residency under the Cuban Adjustment Act and makes them subject to deportation.  Deported Cubans reported inhumane conditions in ICE detention centres, including overcrowding, insufficient food, contaminated water, solitary confinement, physical and verbal abuse and a lack of medical care or information about their cases. Between late 2025 and early 2026, the US also transferred some Cubans to the maximum-security military prison at the Guantánamo Bay naval base, with deportees thinking they were being deported to Cuba. They were held at Guantánamo for weeks in severe distress before eventually being sent back to the US and deported to Cuba.

In Mexico, Cuban deportees are stranded in cities like Tapachula and Villahermosa with virtually no access to shelter, healthcare, or work. Many report sleeping on the streets, going without medication, and being exposed to cartel violence. They are facing a legal limbo due to their lack of legal status in Mexico and an absence of Cuban consular support. The government lacks a presence in the south, and the Cuban embassy in Mexico City has reportedly been unresponsive to migrants’ requests. A recent report by Human Rights Watch documented the conditions faced by Cubans deported to cities in southern Mexico, finding that their options to regularise their stay are largely limited to applying for refugee status. However, accessing this system is made harder as deportees lack phones or email accounts, and face delays in obtaining appointments as well as practical difficulties in meeting requirements like periodic check-ins with authorities.

As more Cubans settle in South American countries like Uruguay, they may also face challenges to their integration in areas such as housing, employment, and consular support. In Montevideo, newly arrived migrants are effectively shut out of the formal rental market due to strict guarantee requirements, pushing them into overcrowded, precarious living conditions. Bureaucratic delays in revalidating foreign qualifications force many into informal, low-paying work. While other refugees and migrants face similar challenges, the Cuban government offers little to no consular support. Finally, increased US pressure on Cuba is exacerbating an already dire economic crisis, resulting in severe shortages of food, medicine, and basic necessities and continued blackouts on the island. If US pressure continues and domestic conditions deteriorate, Cuba could plunge into a major humanitarian crisis, which would be expected to drive new, large-scale migration movements throughout the Americas. This would most likely worsen conditions for Cuban migrants in host and transit countries, and force more to rely on irregular and unsafe routes.

The reconfiguration of Cuban mixed migration in the Americas reflects a deepening humanitarian crisis driven by the near-total closure of legal pathways to the US and the absence of adequate protection frameworks in transit and destination countries. Cubans deported to Mexico face inhumane conditions and challenges to regularise their status, while those settling in South American countries are likely to encounter barriers to integration.

Addressing these challenges requires coordinated action at the regional level to ensure a shared, rights-based response. Destination and transit countries should strengthen their asylum and refugee systems to ensure Cuban refugees and migrants have effective access to protection. National and regional bodies should press Cuba to fulfil its consular obligations toward its nationals abroad.

Charlotte Müller

Charlotte Müller is an external consultant and migration expert with Diversa, an AI and data services organisation working at the intersection of data, AI, and applied social research.