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Impacts of the Middle East conflict on East African refugees and migrants

The escalation of hostilities  in the Middle East – triggered by joint American-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 – has reshaped the region’s security landscape and intensified risks of displacement. A fragile ceasefire was announced  on  8 April, but this has not stopped Israeli attacks on Lebanon, while advancing towards full occupation of its southern region, and skirmishes in the Strait of Hormuz. Despite repeated assertions by the Trump administration that military objectives have been swiftly achieved, the current negotiations appear increasingly unlikely to yield a near-term breakthrough. 

This article examines the implications of the conflict for refugees and migrants from East and the Horn of Africa who reside in Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Many East Africans occupy low-wage, insecure positions with limited labour protections and minimal access to social safety nets, leaving them acutely vulnerable to political and economic shocks. The analysis also considers how the war may influence return dynamics among East Africans, as well as potential shifts in future irregular onward movement along the Eastern Route—across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen and beyond. 

Given the persistent scarcity of reliable data on mixed migration in the Middle East, and particularly in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC), this article seeks to highlight both the immediate and longer-term consequences of the conflict. The aim is to support policymakers and protection actors working to safeguard the rights and wellbeing of their citizens abroad at a moment of profound regional volatility.

All Gulf Cooperation Countries, while some more than others, depend heavily on foreign workers for their service-oriented economies. Al Jazeera, with data from Global Media Insight, estimated in March that about 35 million foreigners, which amounts to more than half of GCC’s 62 million inhabitants, are hosted by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This includes over one million Sudanese (with most in Saudi Arabia), over 400,000 Kenyans (including over 310,000 in Saudi Arabia, over 66,000 in Qatar, and 23,000 in the UAE), and over 340,000 Ugandans (including 160,000 in the UAE, 150,000 in Saudi Arabia, and 20,886 in Oman.  The number of Ethiopians in the GCC remains largely unknown, although it is undoubtedly large as demonstrated by the large numbers of Ethiopian nationals moving irregularly towards the Gulf via Yemen (often reaching more than 100,000 annually) and the large numbers deported on a regular basis by Saudi Arabia – an outdated estimate put this figure at half a million between 2017-2022. 

In Lebanon, IOM identified 164,097 migrants as of August 2025, of whom 40% Ethiopian (65,575) and 9% Sudanese (14,854). The female-to-male ratio varied strongly by nationality, with 98% of Ethiopians estimated to be female, compared to 12% of Sudanese. 

In countries in crisis and conflict, refugees and migrants within these countries are often forgotten, and lack the adequate support networks to help them cope, as the war in Sudan has demonstrated. This makes it particularly difficult for them to know where to go, how to leave, and how to seek assistance. Combined with their existing vulnerabilities, many remain trapped. As described by the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC), while refugees and migrants are resilient and resourceful, a variety of factors create particular vulnerabilities in the face of crises. In the GCC and Lebanon, language barriers, restrictions on mobility, irregular immigration status, confiscated or lost identity or travel documents, limited social networks, isolation, and attacks and discrimination are some of the factors that hinder their ability to access protection, move out of harm’s way, or otherwise ensure their own safety and wellbeing.  

Iran’s retaliations to the US-Israeli attacks, primarily targeting locations deemed of strategic American interest in the GCC, have hit (close to) populated areas known to host large numbers of East African nationals. While data on East Africans being directly affected by the conflict remains limited, on March 17^th, the UAE Ministry of Defence reported that 157 individuals had been injured by Iranian missile and drone attacks, with those injured including Ethiopian, Eritrean, Ugandan, and Comorian nationals. In more general terms, East African migrants in the GCC, of whom many are already vulnerable given their status in-country and/or their precarious job situation, are likely to face additional risks to their lives and their socioeconomic rights as a consequence of the conflict, with impacts including income loss, job insecurity, rising costs of living, and limited access to social protection. 

In Lebanon, indiscriminate Israeli attacks on densely populated areas in Beirut and other cities have left many displaced and looking for refuge, including migrant workers and refugees.

In Lebanon, indiscriminate Israeli attacks on densely populated areas in Beirut and other cities have left many displaced and looking for refuge, including migrant workers and refugees. In March, The New Humanitarian reported that undocumented Kenyan domestic workers were being turned away from shelters, which were said to be prioritising Lebanese citizens and registered refugees fleeing bombings in southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut. In 2024, at the height of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, there were also reports of cases where displaced Lebanese families left their domestic workers behind, unshielded from the war. Many migrant workers may not be able to produce documentation as they are often employed under Lebanon’s Kafala system, risking exploitation and confiscation of their passports by employers, while also not being able to leave the country without their employers’ consent. Some Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees have struggled to find safety, while some have sought refuge at Saint Joseph’s Jesuit Church in Beirut, where they have received essentials such as food, water, electricity, and mattresses. During the attacks, reports confirmed several migrants were killed, including two Sudanese nationals on April 5^th, and one Ethiopian on April 8^th. 

While in 2024 several East African governments mobilised resources to evacuate their nationals from Lebanon, it is unclear if these countries currently have the plans and resources to engage in similar large evacuations. Some exceptions were reported by Kenya and Uganda, with the Kenyan government confirming it had evacuated 15 nationals from Iran in March, and Uganda reporting it managed to successfully evacuate dozens of its students from Iran after they had been able to reach Türkiye overland. With limited air travel from and to the GCC and Lebanon, most East Africans are believed to have remained, with those in vulnerable or risky situations likely to experience an increased degree of involuntary immobility, not having the resources or documentation to return home. Those who continue working (or continue to have job prospects) could also be compelled to stay while they experience pressure to earn and send remittances to households in countries of origin. On the other hand, for those who have lost their jobs and are no longer in a position to send remittances, this could influence onward migration decision-making in countries of origin (see below). 

Contrary to other East African nationals, who engage mostly in air journeys, Ethiopians and Somalis continue to arrive in the GCC through (often irregular) overland and sea journeys along the Eastern Route, crossing the Gulf of Aden or Red Sea, and transiting through Yemen. The Eastern Route remains, in volume, the largest mixed migration route out of the African continent, and one of the world’s busiest, while the Gulf region is the most important destination region for Africans on the move. In 2025, IOM recorded 107,900 arrivals in Yemen. While many may aspire to move onwards towards Saudi Arabia or other GCC, a large number remain stranded in risky and vulnerable conditions in Yemen, without the resources to continue these onward journeys, or to return home. IOM recorded 132,300 individuals as stranded in Yemen in 2025. According to UNHCR, Yemen also hosts 61,240 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Somalia (38,541) and Ethiopia (16,143). 

Turning to the most recent data on the Eastern Route, according to IOM, arrivals in Yemen decreased by 12% in March compared to February, with no clear factor being attributed to this decrease. However, ripple effects across the region cannot be ruled out in the months to come, and future data on Djibouti and Yemen arrivals may reveal broader mixed migration impacts. Given the large volumes of people moving along the Eastern Route, this would in turn have implications for many already on the move.

 Insecurity does not tend to stop movement if needs among (prospective) refugees and migrants remain high

While movement contraints could already be felt by some in transit along the Eastern Route, there is currently no evidence that movements are (likely) to decrease in the short to medium term. Analysis of other conflict contexts demonstrates that insecurity does not tend to stop movement if needs among (prospective) refugees and migrants remain high, however rising costs could lead to those already on the move becoming trapped while finding themselves unable to continue their journeys or to return back to their countries of origin. Those becoming stuck in Yemen would be at particular risk of being kidnapped by criminal gangs or recruited by armed groups, and being subjected to forced labour and trafficking, primarily in Houthi-controlled areas. Rerouting towards other potential destinations appears unlikely for those already on the move along the Eastern Route, as the GCC have for the longest time been seen as the most viable destination by this group (also see above). 

Those who are already on the move may also become further reliant on smugglers, beyond the already common practice to engage smugglers to arrange the crossing of the Gulf of Aden or the Red Sea. As such, smuggling networks could benefit from the economic constraints felt by people on the move, leaving them trapped or without the resources to move, and resort to facilitating more dangerous and risky journeys to cut corners and save on (rising) costs. This would in turn further increase vulnerabilities among refugees and migrants, increasing protection risks on a route which is already characterised as highly exploitative. 

Additionally, an important ripple effect of the war in the Middle East is an already notable rising cost of fuel and fertiliser, as well as a general rising cost of living in East Africa spurred by the higher fuel and transportation costs. Another point to make here is that families and communities who are relying on remittances may further feel the pinch as those working in the GCC and Lebanon may have (temporarily) lost their jobs and would not be in a position to continue sending money, although evidence also exists of anti-cyclical remittances which are sent during economic downturns in the home country to act as stabilisers against shocks. In more general terms, the need to migrate among prospective migrants in East Africa will likely increase, while life at home for the most vulnerable increasingly becomes untenable.

At the same time, these shocks also reduce the means to afford migration. This may possibly lead to more involuntary immobility in countries of origin, where aspirations no longer match capabilities to make the journey. Therefore, as mentioned above, while conflict may not necessarily lead to a decrease in migration along the Eastern Route, rising costs could. Rerouting to other migration routes, if the Eastern Route would be considered too dangerous (while leading into conflict territory) and too costly, is not particularly likely, as most other migration routes intersecting East Africa, such as the Southern Route to Southern Africa and routes northwards to North Africa and Europe, are much more expensive and would be out of reach for those usually moving along the Eastern Route to the Gulf. These routes are also connected to different social networks and often do not overlap. 

While unlikely in the short term, there might be one scenario where rerouting, facilitated by smugglers, could take shape over time. Analysts have speculated that if the Houthis were to get involved and attempt to block the Red Sea Route, in addition to the Strait of Hormuz blocked by Iran, the sea crossing along the Gulf of Aden used by refugees and migrants would then become a battle ground. In such a scenario, crossings from the Horn of Africa to Yemen could temporarily become halted, while smugglers may look to devise alternatives. This could, for example, include facilitating air travel for parts of the journey, linking the hubs of Addis Ababa or Nairobi with destinations in the GCC. A second alternative worth monitoring are the increasing departures over the last years towards the Western Indian Ocean Route towards Mayotte, an overseas French department in the Indian Ocean, including from Kismayo, southern Somalia, and further south from the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts, as well as through air travel linking to transit in Comoros and Madagascar. However, there is currently no evidence which demonstrates a link between smuggling operations along the Eastern Route and the Western Indian Ocean Route. 

With the current fragile ceasefire in place, and the context rapidly evolving, it remains still early to tell what the full impacts of the conflict in Iran, Lebanon, and the wider Middle East are on East Africans already located located in these countries. Yet, while no different from other recent crisis and conflict contexts, refugees and migrants have remained largely invisible as a population, sometimes linked to their lack of documentation. In the first weeks of the conflict, most attention went to influencers and tourists who had become stranded in Dubai and other destinations in the region, while few words were said about the millions of refugees and migrants located in the GCC. Those in highly vulnerable situations would likely continue to be reliant on their governments to seek ways out of conflict areas, as many may not have the resources to return home without such support. 

If the ceasefire could lead towards peace efforts, the mixed migration consequences of this conflict for movements along the Eastern Route may be limited. If the conflict ends up being protracted, or the economic ripple effects continue being felt regardless of the conflict’s outcome, constraints to move may impact migration decision making in East Africa, with the potential for both those in countries of origin and on the move to experience increased vulnerabilities and involuntary immobility. Key stakeholders in the GCC and Lebanon should prioritise the monitoring of barriers to evacuation and return, exclusion from shelter and services, job and income loss, disruptions to remittance flows, signs of worsening involuntary immobility or strandedness, and/or more perilous journeys along the Eastern Route. 

Jim van Moorsel

Jim van Moorsel is the Research Coordinator with MMC Eastern and Southern Africa, specialised in qualitative migration research and migration policy and programming engagement.