Mixed Migration consequences of the war between Israel and Iran

Mixed migration consequences of the war between Israel and Iran 

On 13 June 2025, Israel launched large scale attacks on Iran, which led to an unprecedented escalation of the long-standing conflict between the two countries. Iran responded with retaliatory attacks on Israel, with occasional missiles and drones making it through Israel’s air defence system and hitting targets in Tel Aviv and other places in Israel. So far hundreds have been confirmed dead in Iran, and around 25 in Israel. 

US President Trump initially distanced himself from Israel’s surprise attack, but, after a few days of incertitude and conflicting information, on 21 June the U.S. joined the conflict, carrying out strikes on multiple Iranian nuclear sites. Tehran characterised the move as an act of war, and on 23 June, Iran launched a direct missile strike against the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which was intercepted.  

According to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and the White House, the motivation behind Israel’s and US recent attacks was to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, which they claim was at the ‘point of no return’ in its capability to develop nuclear weapons. Alongside this, both Netanyahu and more recently Trump have been vocal about their desire for regime change in Iran. 

On 23 June, shortly after the Iranian missile attack on the US airbase in Qatar, Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran had been reached, which shortly after was confirmed by both Iran and Israel. However, early morning on 24 June, Israel claimed Iran again launched missiles on Israel, which was followed by another attack on Iran by Israel. Trump immediately, in unequivocal terms, expressed his unhappiness about both sides allegedly breaking the ceasefire. After that, the office of the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, stated Israel will refrain from further attacks.   

The ceasefire agreement points to the possibility of de-escalation. However, the immediate violation of the ceasefire, the continuation of Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Gaza, after ceasefire deals were reached, as well as the Israeli desire for regime change in Iran, raise the question if and how long the ceasefire will last. Additionally, the war and Israel’s targeted attacks on a range of military leaders, may have weakened the regime in Iran pointing to a potential for domestic unrest and instability.  

In short, the situation in Iran and across the Middle East remains highly volatile and is changing almost by the hour. This preliminary analysis explores the potential mixed migration consequences of the various scenarios that may unfold as a result of the war between Israel and Iran. 

Iranians: internal displacement, possible refugee movements out of Iran and involuntarily immobility  

Internal displacement 

As in nearly every conflict situation, large-scale internal displacement is one of the most immediate consequences of the hostilities. 

The recent Israeli airstrikes on Tehran and other parts of Iran have spurred widespread civilian movement within the country. Early on, both Israel and US President Trump have warned Iranians to evacuate Tehran and thousands of Iranians have been fleeing Tehran and other cities that are under attack. There were traffic jams on the major roads out of Tehran and long queues to buy petrol, as thousands were leaving the capital and fleeing to the countryside to escape bombardment. 

However, this displacement may be temporary, as those who have left wait to see how the conflict evolves and whether the ceasefire will hold before deciding whether it is safe to return to their homes in the capital and other major cities.  

Potential for refugee movements out of Iran 

No mass exodus across international borders has been confirmed during the nearly two weeks of war, with only a small increase in crossings of Iranians into Türkiye, Armenia and Iraq reported so far. For example, in south-eastern Türkiye, 50-100 more vehicles than normal had been crossing the border with Iran. Since Iranians can travel to Türkiye visa-free and stay up to 90 days, the likelihood of large-scale irregular crossings is small. Authorities in Iraq’s Kurdish region say that they have seen Iranian Kurds arriving, but again in small numbers only.  

Depending on how the situation evolves, however, there remains a potential for large-scale refugee movements out of Iran. Currently and despite the recent ceasefire, airspace remains closed, making departure by air impossible, and the ability for Iranians to secure visas is limited. This likely means that if the situation escalates again, movements overland will be among the only options for most.  

Further, if the goal of regime change is indeed still pursued by Israel, there is a possible scenario in which the government of Iran will collapse and the country will descend into protracted chaos and continuing economic decline or even civil war. Indeed, contradicting an earlier statement in which Trump was referring to regime change, a day later he said he is not interested in regime change as it would mean chaos.  

However, if the ceasefire will not hold and/or if a scenario of regime change and accompanying chaos materialises, there is a likelihood that many Iranians will try to flee abroad. By comparison, at the peak of the Syrian civil war, a quarter of the population were living abroad as refugees and another quarter were internally displaced. At the time, Syria had a population of around 23 million people. Iran has a population of 92 million. Additionally, Iran today has a higher GDP per capita than Syria at the start of the Syrian civil war, a much more urbanized population, and a much bigger diaspora, estimated between 4- 8 million. This means Iranians would have much more resources (financially, as well as family connections) to flee abroad compared to Syrians. Obviously, this comparison needs to be treated with caution and many caveats, since the Iran-Israel war so far only lasted for a short period of time and there are no signs yet of widespread domestic instability, while the displacement of Syrians only reached the levels mentioned above after many years of civil war.   

The scale and direction of any large-scale movement out of Iran – if it would materialize – will crucially depend on the attitudes of its neighbours – especially Türkiye, Iraq, Armenia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whether these countries choose to keep borders open, facilitate reception, or actively deter entries will shape both the feasibility and geography of displacement. Türkiye, already hosting millions of displaced people, may become a key destination given the visa-free regime for Iranians. Middle East Eye reported that the Turkish government had developed potential migration scenarios and estimated that a full-scale war between Israel and Iran could push up to one million Iranian refugees towards the Turkish border. However, initial reports indicate that Türkiye is not willing to implement an open-door policy in the event of the arrival of large numbers of refugees. Pakistan, meanwhile, has sealed its border with Iran to prevent a potential influx of refugees. Iraq and Afghanistan, themselves fragile and host to internal displacement, may have limited capacity or willingness to absorb large numbers of Iranians. Moreover, the complex web of geopolitical tensions and deep-seated religious divides – particularly between Sunni-majority countries and Shia-majority Iran – adds a further layer of uncertainty. Past rivalries and regional security concerns may make some neighbours reluctant to welcome Iranian refugees, especially if political collapse in Iran fuels sectarian dynamics or proxy conflicts. This underscores that the possibility of outward movement cannot be assessed in isolation from regional politics and historic animosities. 

Onward movement of Iranians towards Europe 

In case of cross border movements, as usual, the majority of refugees would stay in neighbouring countries, such as Türkiye, Iraq, Armenia and Azerbaijan. As with internal displacement, people usually tend to wait and see as close to home as possible, within the region, how the situation evolves and whether they can return home, not least since there are now signs of possible de-escalation. Only several years into the Syrian war, did large numbers of Syrians decide to leave the region and move on towards Europe. So even in the case of large-scale refugee movements out of Iran in case the war re-starts, or the country will further destabilise, onward movements towards Europe are likely to remain relatively low at least for the foreseeable future. That said, there might be a slight increase in the coming months of Iranians seeking asylum in the EU.  

Involuntary immobility  

In any conflict or humanitarian crisis those who are unable to move often become a forgotten group – despite being among the most vulnerable. When the war started, many Iranians tried to find a safe place outside of the cities, however, others who needed to leave and wanted to leave, were constrained or unable to do so, as they did not have the resources and the price of travel skyrocketed; fighting became too severe and movement was dangerous and/or because they are vulnerable – or caring for vulnerable people, such as children, older people, or people with disabilities – and cannot make the journey. Forced immobility can be expected to rise in case the war re-starts, supply lines break down and food, water and fuel resources become even more scarce and expensive.  

Afghan refugees in Iran: trapped between conflict, borders, and deportations 

Another forgotten group in countries in crisis are refugees and migrants already in the country. Many refugees and migrants caught up in the conflict may not have support networks, most already struggle to get by and might not have the option to leave or go home (especially in the case of refugees). The exception are foreign diplomats and aid workers, primarily from western countries, who are often quickly evacuated; indeed, thousands of foreigners have been evacuated in from Iran, as well as from Israel. 

One particularly vulnerable group in Iran are Afghan refugees. Though numbers vary, it is estimated approximately 4.5 million Afghan refugees live in Iran. The situation of Afghans in Iran is precarious with many lacking legal status and relying on informal work. They are only allowed to buy food at highly inflated prices and banned from leaving Tehran and need permission to move between provinces. Rising inflation and disrupted markets in Iran is likely to further impoverish Afghans, leaving many without the resources needed to flee in case of renewed fighting or further instability, while returning to Afghanistan is not an option either.  

This situation comes on top of the mounting weaponization of anti-Afghan sentiment by politicians within the country and the ramping up of mass deportations. In 2024, Iran deported 750,000 Afghans and announced a plan to deport up to 2 million by March 2025. It is unclear how the recent war and continued tensions will impact the ongoing deportation efforts by the Iranian government, but it is feasible that the Iranian government might somehow use Afghan refugees as a foreign policy tool, for example accelerating deportations to demonstrate domestic strength (or to reduce economic stress) or enabling Afghan refugees to actually move on to put pressure on other countries in the region and the EU. Sources on the ground mentioned to MMC that, after a brief pause in the arrests and deportations of Afghans in Iran during the initial days of escalation, these have now resumed aggressively in multiple Iranian cities, targeting both documented and undocumented Afghans. Additionally, some local Iranian media and online platforms have circulated unverified claims accusing Afghans of collaborating with Israel or providing intelligence, and some state media have broadcasted interviews with some Afghans confession to collaborating with Israel. Such rumours are obviously fueling anti-Afghan sentiment and increasing hostility, further compounding the already difficult situation for Afghans in Iran.  

Smugglers are reportedly trying to exploit the situation of Afghan refugees in Iran, by telling them the border with Türkiye is now open for Afghan refugees, even while the border remains closed for Afghans and is only open to Iranian citizens with valid passports. A recent MMC study estimated the market value of smuggling Afghans to Türkiye to be worth USD 178.4 million per year already before the war.  

In addition to the dire situation Afghan refugees find themselves in, in Iran, they have also faced severe risks, violence and pushbacks, both while trying to enter Iran – which has also been a major transit country for Afghans trying to reach Türkiye and Europe – and while trying to enter Türkiye from Iran. The situation in Afghanistan itself is dire and prices of Iranian imports have surged, while funding cuts and suspension of USAID operations by the Trump administration has further compounded the humanitarian crisis, leaving thousands without access to housing, psychosocial support, or job opportunities. This ‘perfect storm’ could potentially further increase the number of Afghans trying to enter Iran, despite the current situation. 

Simultaneously, even though many are too afraid to return to Afghanistan, sources on the ground told MMC that the situation at the border between Iran and Afghanistan is chaotic, with many Afghans – especially families – trying to leave Iran.  

Spillover risk and the prospect of wider displacement in the region 

Tensions remain high across the region, even more so after the U.S. involvement. If the situation rapidly escalates again, conditions could quickly lead to new displacement or mobility disruptions. In Iraq, Iran-aligned militias have threatened retaliation against ‘U.S. interests’ in the region. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, Hezbollah has expressed their support to Iran but has so far refrained from full engagement in the conflict. Further afield, in Yemen, the Houthis’ involvement through missile launches toward Israel and their threats to target American vessels increases the risk of reprisals in a context already marked by displacement and humanitarian crisis. 

In the event of another escalation, the risk of further destabilisation in the region remains high. U.S. military installations and diplomatic missions across the Middle East – in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, the Gulf states, and even beyond – could become targets of asymmetric attacks by Iranian proxies or affiliated groups. Such retaliation would not only endanger American personnel and regional allies, but also create new outbreaks of violence that could spark localised displacement or lead host governments to crack down on perceived threats. This would further impact already vulnerable populations, including migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons.  

Moreover, heightened hostilities could trigger further militarisation of border areas and deepen securitisation policies across the region, curtailing cross-border movement and undermining humanitarian access. The entrenchment of such dynamics could set in motion longer-term displacement trends, especially if insecurity escalates in areas with fragile governance or unresolved communal tensions. Border closures, airspace restrictions, and tightened security measures risk impacting mobility and could further disrupt both migration pathways and humanitarian access across the region. 

The potential response of the EU and Türkiye 

Each possible scenario will have different short- and longer-term implications for migration and displacement across the region. The European Union is likely to monitor the situation closely, particularly due to concerns about the potential onward movement of large numbers of Iranian refugees, akin to the 2015/16 large-scale arrival of Syrian refugees along the Eastern Mediterranean route. In response, we can expect an intensification of the EU’s already close partnership with Türkiye, as well as with other countries in the region, aimed at ensuring the containment of people within the region.  

While Iranians until now can enter Türkiye visa-free, it remains to be seen if this will continue in case large numbers start to arrive. Meanwhile the border remains closed for Afghan refugees, who can only enter by using smugglers. While many, most likely most, Afghan refugees will be trapped inside Iran, the increasingly dire situation in Iran, might push more Afghans towards Türkiye, further elevating the human smuggling market.  

The role of Türkiye will be crucial, and this dynamic will give the Turkish government renewed leverage in its relations with the EU. As before, Ankara may use migration control as political currency, seeking financial aid or political concessions.  

This evolving situation is also taking place in an environment of severe budget cuts in foreign aid, first and foremost by the United States, while also many European donors are preparing for budget cuts in foreign aid to accommodate for the increased expenditure on military defence. As such, funding to support refugees and displaced people within the region might be much more restricted than previously.  

Conclusion 

The situation remains fluid and volatile, with the potential for rapid shifts depending on military, political, and diplomatic developments. While a temporary ceasefire has been declared, hostilities have also resumed intermittently, and tensions remain high both within Iran and across the wider region. Each possible trajectory, from a sustained de-escalation to renewed conflict or political destabilisation within Iran, would have significant but distinct implications for mobility. 

In this context, further population movement is not a hypothetical scenario but a viable possibility, one whose scale, direction, and nature will depend on the choices made not only by Iran, Israel, and their allies, but also by regional governments and the international community. Monitoring these dynamics through a mobility lens remains critical in the days and weeks to come.