Veteran UN staffer Vincent Cochetel discusses the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on migration dynamics and European policies and posits ways out of the shortcomings of current asylum management.
Vincent Cochetel has worked for UNHCR for more than three decades and currently serves as its special envoy for the Western & Central Mediterranean situation. For most of 1998, he was held hostage in North Ossetia, where he was in charge of the UNHCR’s office. Before joining the UN’s refugee agency he worked for the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights.
The number of people coming to Europe irregularly in 2020 amid the growing Covid-19 pandemic was only about 25% fewer than the year before. Does this speak to the determination of those on the move, or that of their smugglers, or to Europe’s political and physical inability to stop irregular migration?
I think it’s a combination of everything, and as we see now, the pandemic is really hitting more North African countries harder. You see, again, an increase in terms of departure, mainly from Tunisia, Libya, and the West African maritime route. It just shows that traffickers and smugglers are not at all affected by Covid-19. On the contrary, this has offered them new business opportunities to circumvent land border closures and lure people into those dangerous routes, and states are slow to react.
You recently used the term “human trafficking” in relation to smugglers and/or facilitators. As you are aware of the international definitions of smuggling and trafficking, I assume you do this deliberately?
I call them human traffickers because what started often as a consensual business relationship to move from one place to another, at some stage is involving coercion and violence. The closer you move to the border with Libya, with Egypt, Morocco, or with Algeria, you are more likely to be exposed to some form of abuse. So while there is a difference in international law, and it requires a different response, in reality, the smugglers turn into traffickers when they move in some directions.
Despite widespread concerns early last year about how Covid-19 would affect refugee camps and refugee communities, the impact has actually been very limited. Why is that?
I think the response has been pretty good, even with the shortcomings in term of assistance, and it’s easier to monitor a camp environment then when people move to urban areas. I don’t think we have data to support any assumption or any affirmation when it relates to urban refugees, but indeed in camp situations, the impact has been low.
At the policy level, to what extent has Covid-19 been used as a pretext by governments to restrict cross-border movement and refugee resettlement in the last year?
It has affected safe mobility pathways for refugees, resettlement has gone down. Of course, we have to acknowledge the concern of resettlement states, so it’s not a surprise, but some countries have shown that it was possible to manage health protocols and continue refugee resettlement. Now, many states have used Covid-19 indeed to close their borders, not to allow rescue, to refuse disembarkation of people in distress at sea, and that’s a shame. And when I say it’s a shame, I mean, we understand we have to protect the communities, host communities, but some countries have shown that it can be managed. And other countries have not even tried to manage it.
As a refugee coordinator with the UNHCR you expressed concern that the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement violated the ban against mass expulsion in the European Convention on Human Rights. Do you still hold that view?
I think at that time it carried the risk of mass expulsion because the agreement was based on the assumption that a return [of refugees and migrants from Greece to Turkey] would lead automatically to a restoration of effective access to protection in Turkey, and I don’t think that this assumption could have been made at that time, nor could be made today.
Covid-19 has offered smugglers and traffickers new business opportunities to circumvent land border closures and lure people into dangerous routes, and states are slow to react.
Migrants and refugees continue to lose their lives in the Mediterranean, while the search and rescue capacity remains very low, with the EU ending official assistance to refugees and migrants, and some states hindering the work of the NGOs. What are the conflicting policy positions around this, in your understanding?
Everybody recognizes that saving lives is important, but no one wants to be assuming the responsibility for disembarkation because the solidarity component of the future pact on asylum and migration is just not there. But I would not say that there is a shortage of rescue at sea. If you look at Spain, for instance, what they do in the Western Mediterranean, they are assuming a lot of responsibility in terms of rescue at sea, so they have demonstrated that if a state wants to do it, it can do it—it can be managed. The problem is more the Central Mediterranean Sea at this stage or the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to some extent. Operation Sophia is finished, there is no more naval operation to rescue people, states have disengaged from that, to a large extent, but you still see Italy undertaking rescue, onboarding of people rescued by other ships, putting people on quarantine boats etc. So it’s not that Italy has stopped altogether rescue at sea efforts; they do that, but they don’t go so far in the international waters anymore.
From a rights perspective, do you see contradictory or contested policies in the EU’s upholding of certain values and ethics while reportedly turning a blind eye to multiple member states implementing pushbacks and violations of asylum seekers’ rights?
They don’t necessarily turn a blind eye, but yes, they are a bit selective in their condemnation of some of the pushbacks, and we all agree we need a lot better border management for everyone, for host communities, for migrants, for asylum seekers, but it has to be done in a way that is protecting refugees. Some states demonstrate even during Covid-19 that it is possible, and others have relinquished their obligation. But a regime of sanction for lack of solidarity will never work and could undermine the public support for asylum procedures in Europe. So you have to use a mix of incentives, encouragements, that makes the system work.
What about the huge increase in allocation for Frontex spending and member states fortifying their own borders? Are they preparing for what they expect to be a difficult, long-lasting future vis-a-vis mobility, and the necessary exclusion that they’re trying to implement?
Well, there are definitely some strikes at the external border of the European Union that are a concern to states and the European citizens, and they need to be addressed. Yes, Europe has stated in many ways and forms that nothing like we had seen in 2015 would be seen again, that we are better prepared today. The easy quick fix was to develop the capacity of Frontex, and have the standing border guard corps, but at the end of the day, some responsibilities still belong to states, and you need solidarity, you need fast screening at borders, and this is not yet happening.
How do you account for the very low appetite of OECD countries to accept refugees? 2020 was the lowest on record, I think. Are we facing a widespread refugee or displacement fatigue, or are other factors at play? Will it get better or worse?
We see some fatigue, we see some questioning of the fundamentals, regarding the right to seek asylum. And you have some variation there, where a lot of states are saying, “Yes, asylum is important,” but in the region of origin, not on our doorstep. There is a lot of concern about secondary movements by land, and primary movements by sea, but that’s a bit unfair, because that leaves the European responsibility at the external border of the European Union. Within public opinion, I think what is important is to demystify the numbers, debunk some of the myths, and talk about numbers: when you look at the numbers of crossings last year, for the Mediterranean, for Central Western Mediterranean, 70,000 people tried to cross the sea; only half of them succeeded. This is the same number of people that cross from Ethiopia to Sudan in [just] two months. Because people on boats are very visual it’s a political drama every time. There’s a lot of instrumentalisation around it. But if managed, it’s possible. If managed with quick processing, a bit of return, a bit of entry and integration, then that works. But I see many European opinions are confused, and many people have lost trust in their state’s ability to really manage it.
You have spoken about countries of origin taking responsibility as well, especially for economic migrants, and allowing unconditional deportations of failed asylum seekers and irregular migrants.
In the European Union, only 30 percent of the people who get a final negative decision on asylum will actually return to their country of origin. And within those 30 percent only a third accept to do so voluntarily. Many countries of origin are just dragging their feet. They refuse to identify their nationals and sometimes they think it’s a good thing to keep people illegally in Europe, that they will be given some residency over time. And there is no benefit for them to take those citizens back. At the same time those countries are calling for more legal migration pathways. You can’t have it all, it has to work both ways, for countries of origin, for host countries, for countries of destination. And if we want it to work, we need to improve the trust level in that dialogue on migration management. Right now it’s just not there.
Last year 70,000 people tried to cross the Central Western Mediterranean Sea; only half of them succeeded. This is the same number of people that cross from Ethiopia to Sudan in two months.
In 2019, you referred to the “radicalisation” of the migratory dreams and demands of some migrants and refugees. What did you mean?
What I said about a specific situation led to a controversy because “radicalisation” is a term often used about religion and faith, so maybe the word was not well chosen. But what I see is that some people have embraced the dreams that have been sold to them by smugglers, traffickers, diaspora, or relatives, and they will not even consider [other] options available to them. In Tunisia, which does not offer, for instance, a perfect protection space, we try to get work permits for people, we obtain work permits, and people just don’t want to work. This is not the sort of work they want. That work is not good enough for them. The objective is to go to Germany, to Sweden, to France, etc. The system can’t work like that, because first of all, it’s not fair. When you look at the gender distribution of irregular movements to Europe, you can’t say you have a fair system here. So we need to have this management of expectations with asylum seekers on the move, or migrants on the move.
We need to improve the trust level in the dialogue on migration management. Right now it’s just not there.
Do you think the presence of the economic migrants is doing a lot of damage to the asylum system, making it unable to function?
There are many drivers that lead people to choose to leave their country; nobody does it for the fun of it, that’s for sure, and everybody has a right, equal rights, and response must be different. Obviously, because of a lack of other channels, migrants are “forced”, when they arrive in Europe, to apply for asylum because there is no other channel for regularisation, or [they] try to get a work permit.
And of course, that blocks the asylum system, that leads to a dysfunctioning of the asylum system. I remember being in Pozzallo, in a hotspot in Italy, just 48 hours after the arrival of a large group of people. I spent six hours there. Talking 10, 15 minutes with individuals, one after the other, it was very clear why the people were moving. For 85 percent of the people, you could decide why they are moving (clear migrants or refugees); for the others, it was more complicated. But why put someone in an asylum system that is going to last three years with lots of misery associated with that, and social/labour exploitation? Why put people in an asylum system when at the end of the day, we know the result will be negative? There has to be a better way to manage that, so I think insisting on return, but return with reintegration, individual and community-based reintegration that addresses the development needs of the communities where those people come from, makes a lot of sense. It should lead, in the longer term, to a win-win, maybe not for the specific individual, but it will lead to a win-win in terms of asylum/migration management.
Perhaps it’s a kind of loophole migrants fully understand and utilise irrespective of the eventual negative outcome of their asylum claim?
Yes, but it’s a social cohesion time-bomb. Because the tolerance for that is reducing in Europe, to start with. The level of exploitation of these people is something that we also need to consider, and if at the end of the day your neighbour in Europe is not able to make the distinction between who is who, who has the right to stay, and who should not stay, and maybe assisted to return to his country, well, the door is going to shut. Some people say, “Legal migration pathways will lead to more irregular migration.” I don’t know, I’m not an expert. But for the time being, we talk about legal migration channels and not many exist in reality.
A UNHCR colleague of yours wrote in 2019 that a person should apply for asylum in the territory they are in, that they cannot withhold their asylum claim in the hope of getting a better offer somewhere else. Do you stand with that position or do you take a different one?
I stand by that position, but of course there could be special circumstances, in particular, lack of effective protection in the first country of arrival, language or family relationships or previous education in another country that could lead to another solution than seeking asylum in the country where they have arrived. There could be exceptions to that. But as a principle, yes, people should try to seek asylum and enjoy asylum where they are. First of all, because it will be easier to go back home when/if the situation changes in the country of origin. Two, there is lot of exploitation and abuse related to secondary movements. We see broken people.
How much do they have to suffer? We have documented those routes in Sudan, Mali, and in Algeria; people suffer a lot, and we can’t ignore that human rights dimension whether they are refugees or migrants. Many of them are already broken individuals when they arrive in North Africa.
In the Balkans, North Africa, Central America, Bangladesh and elsewhere, some refugees take the matter into their own hands: they get themselves into countries, apply for asylum and effectively jump the refugee queue, often successfully. Is that OK?
In general, I don’t like queue jumping, but I understand the motivations of these people. Some are more resilient, some are less risk adverse, some will try everything because also despair is a strong driver. What I’m concerned about is that the demographics of irregular movements—in particular to Europe, but that’s the same for North Africa—is not gender neutral, whereas persecution, human rights abuses, are gender neutral or sometimes even women and children are more exposed, but then the opportunity to move is not the same for men and women. At some stage, you need to have those safe pathways that bring the gender corrector that is necessary. Why? Because firstly host communities prefer to see families rather than single men, they are more comfortable in terms of integration. Second, single men don’t integrate very well when their family is not around. And again perceptions by host communities matter. So I think we need to keep that in mind, that if there has to be strengthened legal pathways for refugees and some categories of migrants, they have to bring in that gender dimension, in my view. It will generate more public support.
You’ve often said that if the refugees and migrants reach Libya, it’s already too late. Please explain.
In Libya, what we can do is extremely limited in terms of activities and the nationalities of the people we are authorised to work with. When you’re looking at the routes leading to Libya, most of the people leaving, again, are not leaving for the fun or for just better economic prospects. The Sahel is exploding, so people will continue to move, but we need to create the conditions where the people are not forced to move, that they have the choice to stay, and, on that we need the sort of activities that bring some stabilisation value in those host countries. Today, if you are an 18-year-old refugee from Darfur [living] in Chad, you don’t get food assistance because the perception is that you should be self-sufficient, you need to fend for yourself. So the youth are not targeted by programmes at all and also often don’t have access to secondary education or vocational training, or no legal access to the labour market in many cases. In the case of Sudan, some can’t leave the camps. People who are in those conditions will continue to leave. Now, if you are talking about social economic inclusions of those people, with smart programming, many will consider staying rather than embarking on those dangerous journeys. So I think that’s where we need to focus, on programmes that have a stabilisation value in the country of first asylum.
If there have to be strengthened legal pathways for refugees and some categories of migrants, they have to bring in a gender dimension. It will generate more public support.
That applies to refugees. What about migrants?
When I’m talking about migrants, of course, it’s better if they can stay at home, but there it’s something else: it’s governance, it’s development, it’s mitigating the impact of climate change, it’s all the drivers combined, and that’s maybe more complicated to address than the root causes of forced displacement because of war or persecution, because if you fix that by peace, many will return home, even if the conditions are not ideal.
What’s the next decade going to look like in respect to refugees, resettlement, and mixed migration? Are you optimistic?
No, pessimistic. In the sense that some of the mega crises, for example in the Sahel and around the Lake Chad Basin, are not solved and we know by now that the military response cannot be sufficient. So these crises are building on other root causes, which are already causing intercommunal problems. The impact of climate change, the issue of access to land and water will be further instrumentalised by extremist groups. From West Africa, right across to the East and Horn of Africa, we’ve seen it’s very fragile, in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Chad, Libya. It’s complex. But I also think Europe will get better at coordinating its response. For example, the start of the EU’s Team Europe approach linking the four key issues of security, migration control, humanitarian aid, and development. I think it’s a bit more focused, a bit less disconnected. Will that be sufficient? Well, it will help to better manage some of the flows coming to Europe, but it won’t prevent the displacement in Africa. “
We need to focus on programmes that have a stabilisation value in the country of first asylum.
