Essay

The ‘year of elections’, 2024, saw pivotal votes across multiple countries with the migration issue high on the agenda. Far-right or ‘nation-first’ parties made significant electoral gains with varying access to policymaking in Europe, the Americas and beyond. These parties and leaders emphasise sovereignty and seek to prioritise in-groups over out-groups in every policy area. They not only politicise migration as a cultural issue, but also link it with other issues that constitute important priorities to voters, including crime, the economy, access to jobs and public services, health and housing. Much of this rhetoric has, and continues to be, translated into policy: for example, Donald Trump’s campaign in the US against irregular immigration culminating in often indiscriminate arrests and deportations, but also a series of European initiatives allowing for outsourcing of asylum processing or the creation of ‘return centres’ in third countries, including Italy’s agreement with Albania and the UK’s now cancelled Rwanda plan.

Collage of photos from 2024 election campaigns around the world. The collage was created as the cover of the Mixed Migration Review 2024 based on photos used in the Review.

While the far-right became emboldened in 2024, its rise is not new, but rather the culmination of a more than decade-long development which is now, in many ways, becoming a global phenomenon. The further consolidation of this trend in a series of elections taking place in 2025 suggests the systemic entrenchment of the far right and a subsequent strengthening of the vicious circle between anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. Few developments that have taken place in 2025 could suggest some possible stalling or reversal of this trend, for example election results in Australia and Canada. The broad trend, nonetheless, remains: the far right’s politicisation of migration as a threat to the cultural, economic and social fabric of our societies continues to fuel anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies across the globe.

This essay discusses the consequences of the rise and systemic entrenchment of the far right in the aftermath of 2024. Its aim is threefold: to offer an overview of why and how the far right politicises immigration; to discuss the extent to which anti-immigrant attitudes drive the success of these parties; and to assess the extent to which far-right election platforms have transformed into action.

During the many elections that took place around the globe in 2024, far-right parties made significant electoral gains at the local, national and European levels, increasing their support across many – if not most – member states in the June 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections. In July, UK’s Reform party achieved 14.3 percent of the vote, while France’s Rassemblement National (RN) gained a whopping 33.1 percent during the first round of France’s snap parliamentary election. In September, Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) emerged first with 28.8 percent of the vote and, in November, Donald Trump regained the presidency of the United States defying some poll predictions and defeating Kamala Harris’s campaign which focused on safeguarding democracy. Elsewhere in the Americas, voters in El Salvador had elected Nayib Bukele to the presidency for the second time a few months earlier, while Javier Milei was elected president in Argentina at the end of 2023. This trend was followed in some elections that have taken place during 2025 so far: in February 2025, Germany’s AfD obtained 20.8 percent of the overall vote share and 152 seats in the German parliament, continuing a rising trend observed in regional elections, for example in Thuringia and Saxony, a few months earlier. In Poland, supported by the Law and Justice Party (PiS), Karol Nawrocki won the Polish presidency with a narrow majority of 50.89 percent of the overall votes. In sum, far-right parties and leaders who vilify immigrants are becoming the norm. In Europe, one struggles to find a country with no far right. In Asia, far-right gains in countries such as India and Japan suggest this is fast becoming a global phenomenon.

Graphic 1. Far-right vote share in selected countries/elections in 2024 and 2025.

The issue is not just the vote share these parties and leaders receive, which fluctuates across country and across time, but rather their entrenchment in the system, their influence on other political parties even when not in power and their access to office. Parties such as Italy’s Lega and Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FPÖ), Orban’s Fidesz, the Finns Party (PS) and the Polish Law and Justice (PiS), as well as leaders such as Trump, Bukele, Milei and Mohdi have either held in the past, or continue to hold, government positions. This emboldens them and makes them increasingly politically relevant, as they can implement their anti-migrant policies and influence the programmatic agendas of other parties. The proliferation of affective and toxic anti-immigrant narratives is often followed by the implementation of practices that indiscriminately target migrants. A good example is Donald Trump’s second term, which has seen him act more emboldened and extreme than during his first.

While the results of the Canadian and Australian 2025 elections suggest a possible swing away from the far-right in some instances – with some attributing this, at least in part, to the “Trump effect” – the main political trend is against migration; and while strict anti-migrant rhetoric and policies originate predominantly from the far right, mainstream parties seeking to compete electorally with them increasingly also engage in anti-migrant politics. The British Conservative party’s obsession with sending migrants to Rwanda, for example, as well as Greece’s systematic engagement in arbitrary practices which include illegal arrests and forcible deportations are just two cases suggesting that centre-right and far-right politics may converge, often based on the flawed assumption that tough immigration measures will ‘win back’ support from the far right.

Given their commitment to nationalist principles, far-right parties draw on a purported distinction between an in-group and out-group and emphasise the need for a non-negotiable prioritisation of the in-group in all aspects of society. This suggests they are ideologically aligned to immigration scepticism: the exclusion of immigrants, who they frame as a threat to the various dimensions of national homogeneity and cohesion, is their signature argument. Competing in a political climate that emphasises ‘new’ issues such as migration, which far-right parties ‘own’, given their ideological affinity to nationalism and association with immigration-related issues over time, benefits them electorally.

Far-right parties increasingly frame their anti-immigrant narratives in more palatable or ‘normalised’ language, utilising seemingly inclusive or ‘civic’ forms of nationalism. For example, instead of framing exclusion in racialised terms, these parties often present immigrants as ideologically opposed to liberal democratic values. This mostly applies to far-right parties in Western Europe, where migration is a highly salient issue and the far right tends to justify the distinction between natives and immigrants on ideological rather than biological criteria of national belonging. The French RN, for example, rejects immigrants through a narrative that places them within the framework of a broader value conflict: as enemies of liberty, democracy and European values. At the core of this ‘normalisation’ strategy lies a purported rejection of Islam along secular lines. Similarly, in The Netherlands, Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party (PVV) also builds its exclusionary Islamophobic agenda using purportedly inclusive narratives that centre on liberal democratic values. Beyond Western Europe, the picture is more complicated. In Central-Eastern Europe, where migration levels are generally lower, far-right parties adopt predominantly ethnic nationalist strategies and attempt to mobilise voters against internal minorities such as refugees and the Roma community. In Latin American countries, which face significant emigration and where immigration is not (yet) a highly salient issue, far-right parties place less focus specifically on immigrant exclusion. This, however, is gradually changing. Chile’s far-right candidate José Antonio Kast, for instance, already framed his 2021 presidential campaign around the need to contain irregular immigration, proposing the construction of a ditch to keep undocumented migrants out.

Furthermore, as far-right parties become increasingly entrenched, their anti-migrant narratives also become bolder and often indiscriminate. Immigration becomes progressively used as a catch-all term that defines the in-group so narrowly as to exclude a broad range of individuals such as those with country citizenship if born by immigrant parents, born abroad or who are not white. Examples include the UK Reform party’s claims that the “foreign born” take away housing or RN’s narratives during terrorist attacks in France framed against native-born citizens. These types of narratives target both regular and irregular migrants; while many of the policies they advocate relate specifically to irregular migration, their narratives often don’t specify, using the term to exclude as broadly as possible instead.

Graphic 2. Far-right anti-immigrant narratives

The increasing salience of immigration on the one hand and far-right party normalisation strategies on the other make these parties more broadly appealing to voters. However, it is worth noting that immigration is only one part of a more complex story of electoral success. First, anti-immigration attitudes are neither the only nor the predominant driver of far-right support. Second, immigration itself is a multi-faceted concept: while some voters may oppose immigration for cultural reasons, others are driven by economic concerns, fearing immigrants as competitors in the labour market.

This suggests that people vote for the far right for many reasons. Indeed, the far-right voter base is much more diverse than we might initially assume. Some far-right voters display strong cultural concerns over immigration and others with the economy, while others yet do not report significant immigration concerns at all but vote for the far right as protest for social-, economic- and status-related reasons. This means that the cultural grievance story captures the motives behind some, but not all (or even most), supporters of far-right parties.

Graphic 3. Distribution of immigration concerns as a percentage of far-right electorates

To visualise the breadth of the far-right electorate, suppose two broad types of voters. First, those driven by ideology, who oppose immigration on principle. These ‘nationalist’ voters are likely to identify more fully with the far-right platform and are mainly driven by a principle ethno-cultural opposition to immigration. They are the far right’s core voters. Second are the protest or peripheral voters who tend to support the far right as a way of expressing their discontent and punishing the establishment. Their opposition to immigration may be contingent as they are primarily concerned with its economic impact; or immigration may not be a salient issue for them. Peripheral voters are more often opportunistic rather than ideological and are less loyal to the far-right. European peripheral far-right voter groups include voters who are likely to support the prioritisation of the in-group on economic grounds, but who do not necessarily identify with the other nationalist elements of far-right party agendas; voters who are exposed to high social or economic risks and are in need of welfare provision; voters who have experienced downward class mobility; voters who are discontent with the democratic process; and/or those who reside in rural or peripheral areas which are economically dependent on old industries and/or have incurred actual or perceived losses from climate change measures.

Voters with strong cultural concerns – the far right’s core ideological voters – are a relatively small group numerically. The largest group of far-right voters are protesters – peripheral voters driven by discontent. What these parties have managed to do, quite successfully, is to forge electoral coalitions between these voters. The important distinction between galvanising the core constituency and mobilising a broader public explains why individuals with different preferences may vote for the same party. As successful political parties often obtain electoral support from a broad range of voters, major far-right electoral potential is associated with a mobilisational capacity beyond these parties’ core voting groups. By directly associating a range of citizens’ concerns with immigration, these parties increasingly propose broad-ranging solutions which have allowed them to extend their appeal beyond their secure voting base to a range of insecure groups, including both working-class individuals and individuals who can suffer from relative deprivation.

The rise of the far right is not new. We may recall instances of far-right party electoral successes in the 1990s and early 2000s, for example the Austrian FPÖ, the then French Front National (FN) and the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). This phenomenon, however, has intensified since the mid-2010s. What is new within this latest far-right wave is the breakdown of the cordon sanitaire, i.e. the policy of marginalising far-right parties, and the level of entrenchment of these parties in their respective systems as many of them are now in positions to make and implement long-lasting policies. Also new is the global reach of the far right. While immigration is not a salient issue in many societies now experiencing the rise of far-right parties such as Latin America, India and Japan, the salience of the immigration issue is rising. Similarly, the tightening of immigration policies is a long-standing political issue which has intensified in recent years. In the aftermath of 2024, much of the toxic, indiscriminately anti-immigrant rhetoric of the far right continues to be translated into policy, as we are witnessing a further shift towards, and consolidation of, the acceptance of systematic illiberal migration practices in the European Union and beyond.

Far-right election platforms result in overall more hardline stances on immigration for two reasons: first, because so many far-right actors are in positions where they can make and implement policies themselves; and second, because they drive, to a great extent, the actions and policies of their competitors. As a result, in the aftermath of 2024, the main features of migration policies and practices have included the continuation and systematisation of hardline positions on border controls, calls for reduction of the number of migrants, the prioritisation of natives in welfare provisions and the overall questioning of the integration of migrants. Many restrictive policies adopted and implemented in the US and Europe tend to be specifically targeted towards irregular migration, such as the ‘stop the boats’ movement and the securitisation of borders from undocumented migrant entry. In practice, however, these measures are often implemented with a disregard for economic, humanitarian and international obligations, undermining the rule of law and resulting in indiscriminate arrests, deportations and the placement of migrants and refugees in pre-removal detention centres with questionable legality. In the aftermath of 2024, such practices have become increasingly mainstreamed and accepted. In addition, there is also an increased focus on policies aimed at further curbing regular migration, for example by limiting work visa pathways and raising skills and salary thresholds. While these can be more balanced and comprehensive, the underlying theme is often the same: immigration is bad and needs to be contained.

Examples abound. In the US, Donald Trump has supported and introduced substantive restrictions on entry and on the rights of ‘aliens’ residing on US territory and has embarked on a massive campaign against irregular immigration characterised by tighter restrictions on asylum and refugee resettlement and aggressive detention and removal practices. These measures serve as a continuation of his first administration hardline measures, for example the ‘Muslim ban’, which restricted US entry to individuals from many Muslim-majority countries and the ‘family separation’ policy, which resulted in the separation of a large number of migrant children from their families.

In Europe, too, we have observed an increasingly restrictive environment both at the EU and national levels, largely because of pressures exerted by the increasingly popular far right. The EU’s New Pact on Migration, which encompasses a set of rules managing migration and asylum, highlights “securing external borders” as its first pillar. In May 2024, 15 EU member states called for a strengthening of the implementation of the pact and measures dealing with irregular migration in Europe. In June 2025, nine European Union member states signed an open letter calling for a reinterpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights to facilitate the expulsion of ‘foreign national criminals’. Many member states have followed suit in their domestic policies: in Sweden, several measures have further restricted the rights to residency and citizenship and the minimum salary requirement was doubled in October 2024; in France, a new law adopted in January 2024 simplifies the procedures for expelling delinquent foreigners. Denmark, too, has moved to a stricter policy structure, with support for restrictions coming from across the political spectrum, while in Germany the implementation of stricter border controls has meant turning away some asylum seekers at the border, potentially breaching the country’s legal obligations. In the Netherlands, tough asylum policy changes are likely to continue to go through despite the collapse of the Dutch coalition government in June 2025, suggesting the dispute over asylum policy initiated by Geert Wilders may have been less about policy and more about procedure.

In the UK, the Labour government is pressured to address immigration, significantly squeezed both by the electoral rise of the far-right Reform party, as well as perceptions that the public wants the immigration question addressed. The new ‘one in, one out’ deal between UK and France, which remains a salient and polemical political subject for the UK, can be interpreted as an attempt by the Labour government to ‘stop the boats’ and limit migration effectively in ways that the Conservatives failed to do. Indeed, the government is introducing a series of immigration reforms aimed at controlling Britain’s borders, focusing not only on tighter controls for irregular migrants, but also lowering entry numbers of regular migrants by increasing skills thresholds. New rules rolled out from a white paper published in May 2025 include a rise in the threshold of skills and salaries as well as a limiting of the list of occupations which grant access to the immigration system. These reforms are designed to support high-skilled migration and occupations that may be considered as key to Britain’s industrial strategy and infrastructure and to limit the UK’s reliance on overseas lower-skilled recruitment.

The systemic entrenchment of the far-right, and the continued normalisation of its rhetoric in mainstream politics contribute to the protraction and embeddedness of hardline stances on immigration. Restrictive environments, arbitrary removal practices and worthiness debates that extend beyond irregular migration and asylum to include skilled workers and the integration of regular migrants dominate political debates in Europe and beyond.

Following a series of electoral victories in 2024 and 2025, far-right parties are emboldened. Many are now in power, while others compete as credible contenders for power, exerting significant pressures on their political competitors. They often also copy each other and are increasingly making systematic efforts to create transnational links. As far-right influence increases, these parties continue to weaponise migration for political gain, in conjunction with other issues, such as the economy, housing, the quality of public services and access to jobs, which allows them to extend their electoral base beyond their traditional constituencies.

Given this climate, we are likely to continue to see the far right’s impact on a broad range of restrictive migration policies and practices. However, this trend is not without its limits. First, we are seeing voters in some countries, for example Canada and Australia, draw away from the far right towards more centrist or liberal parties. While this could be important in stalling or reversing the far-right trend towards democratic backsliding, as noted above, centrist parties, in some instances, also implement restrictive migration policies or, at least, do not offer strong leadership in terms of positive migration policies. Although resisting the far-right trend is important and counter movements may be emerging, we need strong positive narratives which posit solutions to the multiple challenges facing voters. Such narratives should offer a balanced account on migration which also focuses on its positive consequences while addressing the challenges and various valid concerns around migration and, in particular, irregular migration, in a rational and humane manner. Mainstream parties should not cave into far-right pressures on the flawed assumption that this will sway voters towards them and away from the far right. Research is clear on this: copying the far right is rarely a successful strategy. It can be costly for mainstream parties, who may attract some far-right voters by accommodating restrictive immigration policies but will likely end up alienating many of their own voters. In addition, ‘copycat’ strategies will likely increase the salience of migration as a negative issue, thus further inflating far-right party support as, ultimately, voters always prefer the original to the copy. Even in Denmark, which is sometimes referred to as a successful case of a copycat strategy, new research shows that the Social Democrats (SD) could have won policy support for a pro-immigrant platform by framing their messaging in moral terms, illustrating the role powerful moral language can play.

Second, powerful demands for foreign labour and debates over skilled immigration can divide far-right movements. There is already some disagreement within Trump’s administration about skilled visas, for example. In addition, many of the strict measures that are being implemented have not necessarily proven effective: smuggling networks remain active; English Channel crossings are persistent; and some routes, such as the Eastern Mediterranean, have actually seen an increase in irregular arrivals. In early July 2025, for example, Greece reported a record number of arrivals from Libya to Crete. These developments suggest that tough measures may require a re-think, and highlight the need for a comprehensive, balanced strategy that also focuses on the positive dimension of migration and emphasises legal pathways.

Third, the geopolitical environment is volatile. Trump’s foreign policy decisions and his tariff regime have amplified Europe’s geopolitical vulnerability. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it could strengthen the Eurosceptic narratives that far-right parties thrive on and embolden the far right even more. Any formal EU-US deal will have to be supported by all member states, each of which has differing interests and levels of reliance on US exports. As a result, dissent could further divide the EU and hamper member state solidarity. On the other hand, Trump’s aggressive tactics could make EU membership more appealing and trigger a divergence between Europe and the US. Either way, the political climate is one that disfavours immigration. The trend towards far-right politics is strong and there are critical elections to come.

Daphne Halikiopoulou

Author

Daphne Halikiopoulou (PhD LSE) is Chair in Comparative Politics at the University of York. She is interested in party politics and voting behaviour with a focus on the far right, populism and nationalism in Europe. She is a member of the PopuList team, joint Editor-in-Chief of the journals Nations and Nationalism and Political Studies, and co-editor of the Springer book series in Electoral Politics.