Report

While Africa has a longstanding history of migration, driven by economic opportunities and social connections, the increasing spread of conflict across the region has also given it added urgency as a coping mechanism. From Mali to Sudan, millions of people have been forced to flee violence in their own countries and seek safety elsewhere. Millions of others remain internally displaced, unable to return home or move on. Across the region, the intersecting factors of conflict, climate change, weak governance and poverty are driving migration and displacement.

The increasing securitisation of migration within Africa, however, from heightened border controls and surveillance to mass arrests and deportations, is reinforcing the threats many migrants already face within their countries of origin. Instead of offering them protection, many host and transit countries are subjecting them to further abuse, sometimes with lethal consequences.

The total number of migrants travelling from Africa to Europe irregularly by land and sea, having increased year-on-year between 2021 and 2023, fell sharply in 2024. This overall reduction was attributable to movement more than halving along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy that year, even as more migrants reached Spain (primarily through the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands). The picture changed in 2025, however, with movement to both Italy and Greece (Crete) picking up while, at the same time, journeys along the Atlantic route declined. Though the European border management agency Frontex reported a continued reduction in irregular migration into Europe overall in the first seven months of 2025, migration from Africa specifically appears to have increased compared to 2024, though levels remain lower than in 2023. This is because, while arrivals in Italy and Spain combined are comparably less, this reduction has been more than balanced out by the emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean route – specifically from Libya to the Greek islands of Crete and Gavdos – as a major entry point.

The Central Mediterranean route to Italy, predominantly from Libya and Tunisia, remains the most popular migratory pathway from Africa to Europe. Nevertheless, numbers fell substantially in 2024 to 66,617 arrivals, a drop of 58 percent compared to 2023 (157,651). Numbers have picked up again in 2025, with 36,406 registered sea arrivals, almost 9 percent compared to the same period in 2024. The most represented countries of origin among sea arrivals in Italy were Bangladesh (32.4%), Eritrea (14.5%), Egypt (11.8%), Pakistan (8.7%) and Ethiopia (4.8%) (sources: UNHCR, MMC). While Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals are increasingly using Libya as a transit point to Europe, the proportion of Tunisians reaching Italy has fallen markedly, likely the result of tighter border security. Moreover, for the first time in many years, East African countries are among the most common countries of origin, comprising nearly one-fifth of the total. This phenomenon is also evident along other routes, with reports of a sudden increase in the number of East African nationals flying to West Africa to attempt the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands and Balearics.

Graphic 1. Central Mediterranean route: 2025 sees slight uptick in arrivals

Most represented countries (Jan – Sep 2024 and 2025)

North African embarkation points have shifted from year to year between Libya and Tunisia, generally in response to changing security conditions in each country. Libya, having been briefly overtaken by Tunisia in 2023, has, since 2024, re-emerged as the most common country of departure for Italy.This is likely due in part to Tunisia’s increased maritime surveillance and anti-migrant crackdown. In the first seven months of 2025, at least 666 people died or disappeared during the crossing to Italy, compared to 1,032 people in the same period in 2024. Though lower, this still translates to an average of more than three fatalities every day along the route. One factor in the high death toll is the rollback of search and rescue operations, with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) blaming the reduction in migrants rescued by its boat Geobarents on the implementation of restrictive legislation at the beginning of 2023 that severely constrains the ability of humanitarian vessels to operate.

The Atlantic route, connecting much of the West African coast to the Canary Islands, has seen a resurgence from late 2019, quickly superseding the Western Mediterranean route as the primary entry point to Spain. The number of migrants travelling along this route climbed steadily in 2023 and again in 2024, peaking at 46,843, before falling dramatically during 2025. Between January and the end of July, a total of 11,614 migrants reached the Canary Islands – just over half (52%) the number in the same period in 2024 (22,035). The reduction in movement during 2025 is largely the result of a concerted crackdown by authorities in Mauritania, including not only maritime interceptions but also raids and deportations. The operation, involving the interception of tens of thousands of foreign nationals in the country, took place in the shadow of a new partnership agreement between Mauritania and the EU.

The most represented countries of origin along this route are conflict-affected Mali, where deteriorating conditions continue to drive migration even in the face of the new restrictions, followed by Senegal and Guinea. The journey has evolved over time to encompass new embarkation points, with Senegal superseded in 2024 by Mauritania as the most popular country of departure, though this may change again in the wake of the recent crackdowns there. However, there have even been reports of boats beginning their journey from as far south as Guinea-Conakry. These greater distances create additional dangers on what is already an extraordinarily perilous journey: this was highlighted at the end of August, when a boat originating from The Gambia capsized off Mauritania, resulting in at least 69 deaths. While International Organisation for Migration (IOM) data shows that at least 207 people died or disappeared along the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands in the first seven months of 2025, this is likely an underestimate. According to figures from the NGO Ca-minando Fronteras, for instance, as many as 1,482 fatalities occurred in the first five months of 2025 alone. The risks of the route were highlighted in April by the discovery of a boat with the bodies of 13 migrants, many with Malian documentation, in St Kitts and Nevis. The next month, another boat washed up in St Vincent and the Grenadines with 11 bodies, also apparently originating from Mali. It is likely that both vessels were heading towards the Canary Islands but were instead swept by currents across some 6,000 kilometres of ocean to the Caribbean.

The Western Mediterranean route covers a number of land and maritime connections from Morocco and Algeria to Spain, including the towns of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast, as well as the southern coast of mainland Spain and the Balearics. After peaking in 2018, the route has stayed comparatively stable in the ensuing years, with almost identical numbers of crossings in 2023 (17,208) and 2024 (17,475). However, in the first seven months of 2025, it has seen the highest relative growth of any route, with 9,025 maritime and land arrivals – an increase of 16 percent from the same period in 2024 (7,755). In terms of deaths and disappearances, according to IOM, 152 people died or disappeared along the Western Mediterranean route in the first half of 2025, compared to 330 during the same period in 2024. However, fatalities along this route are significantly under-reported. According to estimates by Ca-minando Fronteras, for instance,383 fatalities occurred in the first five months alone.

While overall numbers remain low, much of the growth along the Western Mediterranean route as a whole is due to the sharp rise in movement towards the Balearic Islands, with more than 4,300 arrivals between January and mid-August 2025 – around 77 percent more than the same period in 2024. The recent uptick in movement to the Balearics, predominantly from Algeria, has swiftly overwhelmed local capacity to respond, raising fears that it could develop into a prolonged and deadly crisis. Despite recent media coverage, this emergency was months in the making, with almost 6,000 migrants reaching the Balearics during 2024 – close to a sixfold increase compared to the previous year. Crossings from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta have also risen significantly during 2025, with more than 2,400 by the end of August: from late July, in particular, increasing numbers of migrants in large groups have attempted to enter by swimming across the border.

Until recently, the crossing from the North African coast to Greece has not been a major route for irregular migration from Africa to Europe. However, this changed significantly during 2025, with the previously marginal route between Libya and the Greek islands of Crete and Gavdos gaining considerable traction during the year. As of 24 August, 11,466 migrants – predominantly Egyptians, Sudanese and Bangladeshis – had arrived there. Even before, however, the route was already gaining traction, with around six times the number of arrivals in 2024 than the preceding year.

The increase in movement between Libya and Crete has led to tensions, highlighting the precarity of the EU’s partnerships and cooperation with authorities in Libya in the current geopolitical context. One underlying source of friction is the contentious 2019 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Libya and Türkiye relating to maritime oil and gas exploration that overlooks Greek and Cypriot claims over some of the areas in the agreement. This has prompted some to speculate whether Libya is seeking to ‘weaponise’ migration against Greece and the EU – though, in practice, the internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli is not in control of the eastern part of the country from where the majority of boats are embarking towards Crete. This, instead, falls under the aegis of the opposing, Russia-supported Government of National Stability (GNS), whose relationship with the EU is far from harmonious: in July, a senior EU delegation who arrived in eastern Libya were deported shortly after their arrival, reportedly because they refused to be photographed with GNS ministers. Greece responded to the increasing number of arrivals from Libya by first threatening in June to send warships to intercept migrant vessels, before rolling out, in early July, a three-month suspension of asylum applications from those who had embarked from North Africa (see also Keeping Track in Europe).

While the dangers of the maritime crossings to Europe are well documented, the land routes connecting migrants to the North African coast involve their own risks. Thousands of migrants have died or disappeared in the Sahara Desert over the past decade, including 259 in the first five months of 2025 alone, according to IOM data. Furthermore, the situation in host countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt has also deteriorated, as authorities have actively targeted migrants, particularly nationals of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, for arrest and deportation. These conditions leave many migrants with a stark choice: either return to their country of origin, despite the challenges they may face there, or risk the perilous Mediterranean crossing to Europe.

Because, in many cases, these actions are being carried out against the backdrop of the EU’s ‘partnership frameworks’ around migration management with a number of North African countries, the EU has been accused of implicitly encouraging these abuses – even if these actions are not specifically mandated in the agreements themselves. With regard to the increasingly violent enforcement of Morocco’s borders, for instance, a recent report argued that “the externalisation of European border control has created incentives to support these practices.”

Though many migrants use Libya as a country of transit en route to Europe, it nevertheless hosts a sizeable and diverse migrant population, estimated at 867,055 as of March-April 2025 – around 20 percent higher than the total a year earlier. Of these, the largest groups are from Sudan (33%), Niger (22%), Egypt (19%) and Chad (10%). While migrants from many of these countries frequently engage in circular migration, working seasonally in key sectors such as construction, the Sudanese population has not only increased but also become more settled since the outbreak of conflict in Sudan, with far fewer choosing to return voluntarily.

This growth has occurred despite the continued abuse and mistreatment of migrants across the country, both in the areas governed by the Tripoli-based GNU and the eastern parts of the country under the control of the GNS. The vulnerability of migrants in Libya was underlined in February 2025 when, following a raid on a human trafficking camp in south-eastern Libya, the bodies of as many as 100 migrants were discovered in two mass graves. In March, false rumours that the GNU had agreed to resettle migrants in Libya from other countries prompted a surge in hate speech, public protests and arrests, and culminated with the announcement by the GNU’s Interior Minister of plans to deport 100,000 migrants from the country every four months. Both the GNU and the GNS have carried out mass deportations in their respective areas of control, with the former expelling hundreds of Nigeriens across the border into a remote and dangerous desert area, while the latter has forced large numbers of Sudanese nationals back into Sudan, despite the ongoing conflict there.

As part of its long-standing arrangement with the EU, the Libyan coastguard continues to apprehend and return large numbers of migrant vessels headed towards Europe, with as many as 15,000 interceptions between January and late August 2025. This is despite the fact that the majority of those returned to Libya are transferred to detention facilities where they are at risk of being subjected to torture, sexual abuse and extortion. In a context of widespread institutional corruption, Europe’s provision of financial assistance also appears to preserve a dynamic of partial enforcement, whereby Libyan officials will work with smugglers to allow some boats to continue their journey while intercepting others to satisfy the EU. This, therefore, perversely incentivises an approach where some, but by no means all, migrants are intercepted. The EU’s partnership with Libya has remained controversial, given its track record on human rights, and attracted further controversy on 24 August when the Libyan coastguard (using an EU-financed vessel) fired on the humanitarian boat Ocean Viking, causing significant damage in the process. Though the attack was criticised by the EU as “worrying” and by Frontex as “deeply concerning”, it is not clear whether any concrete action will be taken in response (see also Keeping Track in Europe).

Since 2023, Tunisia has become markedly more hostile towards its predominantly Sub-Saharan migrant population, driven in part by the public vilification of these groups by senior government officials. Besides tightening its borders, it has launched repeated drives to arrest and deport migrants, including those apprehended at sea. In March 2025, in one of the largest incidents of its kind,Tunisian authorities intercepted more than 600 migrants over the course of 24 hours and reportedly expelled hundreds of them into Algeria and Libya. While Tunisia has also promoted “voluntary repatriations”, with around 3,400 reported in the first five months of 2025 alone, critics have argued that migrants have little freedom of choice in the hostile environment created by the government. Conditions, they argue, have intentionally been made so difficult that Tunisia is becoming increasingly unviable for migrants to travel through or live in.

A case in point is the large-scale destruction of dozens of migrant camps carried out near Sfax, beginning in April. The destruction of these informal settlements, built on private land and accommodating more than 20,000 people, was justified by authorities as necessary for “health and security”, given growing tensions in the area between migrants and locals. Nevertheless, for thousands of migrants this latest phase of displacement has only added to their desperation and uncertainty. While the government claimed that the evictions were carried out peacefully and in line with human rights standards, activists argued that the use of bulldozers and incineration of personal belongings tell a different story.

In Algeria, there have been positive signs of progress reforms around immigration, with public discussions around the potential regularisation of the country’s undocumented migrant population in April. If implemented, this would be an unprecedented step that could significantly strengthen protections for this vulnerable group. At present, against a backdrop of increasing racism and hate speech, Sub-Saharan migrants are at particular risk of being targeted. Large numbers continue to be deported into Niger, with around 16,000 migrants expelled across the border between April and the beginning of June alone. Dumped in the desert in an area known as Point Zero, these deportations are frequently accompanied by violence and mistreatment, with a number of migrant deaths reported during the recent crackdown.

The geographic position of Egypt at a converging point bordering North Africa (Libya), East Africa (Sudan) and the Middle East (Gaza) contributes to its complex mixed migration landscape as a country of origin, transit and destination. Besides the fact that thousands of Egyptians continue to migrate to Europe, Egypt’s large refugee population – including an estimated 1.5 million Sudanese nationals since the outbreak of civil conflict in 2023 – likely contributed to the EU’s brokering of a EUR 7.2 billion deal in 2024, including EUR 200 million specifically earmarked for migration management. Despite repeated calls for human rights safeguards and clarity on how the provisions will be implemented in practice, it remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms, if any, will be in place to prevent abuses.

Egypt has long practiced a non-encampment policy towards its refugee population, allowing them to settle in urban areas rather than confining them to camps. However, in a context of anti-refugee sentiment targeted particularly at the large number of recent arrivals from Sudan, established rights to education and health services have become increasingly difficult to access. Since 2023, the government has implemented a series of restriction policies that have not only made life in Egypt more difficult for the Sudanese already there, but also made it almost impossible for many Sudanese to enter, forcing them to engage smugglers to cross the border. Of particular concern is the adoption of a new Asylum Law in December 2024, despite its potential as the first dedicated asylum legislation in North Africa for creating a more coherent protection framework for refugees. With its opaque security provisions and broad powers, there are fears it could, in practice, be used to roll back existing rights and provide a pretext for authorities to detain and deport anyone deemed to have entered the country illegally. However, as of August 2025, the bylaws outlining how the law will be implemented have yet to be published, nor have any meaningful consultations with civil society or UN agencies been conducted to inform how the legislation should be operationalised.

One positive development, however, was the Egyptian government’s announcement, in April, that it would be extending the refugee residence permits from six to 12 months, providing registered refugees and asylum seekers from Sudan and other countries with a measure of greater stability. While improving security conditions in some areas of Sudan during the year have encouraged some refugees to return (though some observers have questioned how ‘voluntary’ many of these returns have been in practice) other Sudanese in Egypt remain at risk of deportation.

Across the East and Horn of Africa region, millions of people are displaced within their countries or living as refugees in neighbouring states, often in acutely challenging conditions and with little or no access to assistance. Many of these crises are the product of intersecting challenges around conflict, climate and humanitarian collapse, in some cases drawn out over many years. In Somalia, for instance, protracted insecurity, food shortages, flooding and an extended, multi-year period of chronic drought, have contributed to a situation where more than 3.5 million people are internally displaced and 6 million in need of assistance. The re-emergence of crises, such as growing insecurity within Ethiopia’s Tigray region, also threatens to intensify pressures across the region. After fighting broke out in 2020 between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), resulting in the deaths of an estimated 600,000 people, a ceasefire in 2022 formally ended the fighting. However, recent reports of renewed tensions have raised fears that the conflict could reignite, potentially drawing Ethiopia into hostilities with neighbouring Eritrea and creating further instability elsewhere.

Discrimination and persecution also contribute to displacement within the region. While the role that ethnic and religious identity can play in driving migration is relatively well known, particularly in conflict-affected contexts, it is also the case that sexual and gender minorities are moving to different countries in response to the increasingly inhospitable environment towards LGBTQI+ groups. This is especially evident in Uganda, where a raft of exclusionary legislation – the harshest in the world, including the death penalty for some same-sex acts – has left gay, bisexual and transgender individuals vulnerable to violence and arrest. Many end up having to move to the relative security of Kenya, though they continue to face significant challenges as a result of intersectional discrimination relating to their status as both migrants and LGBTQI+ individuals. This impacts on their ability to integrate or access housing, employment and health care. In addition, Kenya’s protracted asylum processes have even pushed some LGBTQI+ migrants to leave for other countries, including South Sudan, despite ongoing insecurity and the existence of heavy criminal penalties for homosexual acts.

Since the outbreak of conflict in 2023, the situation in Sudan has developed into the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. At the end of January 2025, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was at a peak of almost 11.2 million, a figure that includes the roughly 2.7 million IDPs already in the country prior to the war – many of whom have themselves been displaced again by the fighting. In the ensuing months, however, the total number of IDPs reduced by 13 percent to around 9.9 million by the end of July, reflecting the return of over 1.1 million IDPs to their homes in Khartoum,Al Jazira and Sennar states after the Sudanese army regained control of these areas. Much of this displacement has taken place in South, North and Central Darfur states, with IDPs also concentrated in these areas, though the largest source of displacement was from Khartoum, with more than 3 million IDPs originating from this state. In addition, as of late July, around 320,000 refugees had returned from abroad, primarily Egypt and South Sudan, either with a view to remaining there or to assess security conditions. In most contexts, the situation for returnees remains extremely fragile, with limited services, supplies or humanitarian assistance available: in many cases, return is driven by the lack of a better alternative, given the difficult conditions in IDP-hosting areas. Some returnees may end up being displaced again in future, unless the situation urgently improves.

Though the current conflict is shaped by historical fault lines of violence and displacement, its scale and intensity are unprecedented. While previous outbreaks have occurred primarily in rural areas, the war began in the country’s capital and led to the rapid collapse of key governance functions. Besides the destruction of numerous urban centres and displacement camps, the conflict has also disrupted the country’s vital agricultural sector by forcing farmers to flee their farmland. In North Darfur, famine was officially declared in August 2024. In West Darfur, where fighting has been especially intense, total crop failure has occurred as a result. In this context, in the worst-affected areas, the majority of both displaced and host households are unable to secure sufficient food for their families. Access to clean water and health care is also severely limited, with the added threat of widespread sexual violence for women and girls in particular. Against a backdrop of chronic underfunding and shrinking humanitarian assistance, the toll has been acute, with more believed to have died from hunger and disease than the fighting itself, including many children as a result of malnutrition.

Graphic 2. Sudan: conflict exodus 2023-2025 (up to September 2025)

In addition to the IDP population, as of August 2025, almost 4.1 million civilians are currently living outside Sudan as a result of the conflict, including around 830,000 refugee returnees who have been forced to move back to their countries of origin. The largest numbers of displaced civilians are in Egypt (1.5 million), South Sudan (1.2 million, including 803,000 South Sudanese returnees as well as 389,000 displaced Sudanese), Chad (877,000) and Libya (323,000), with smaller numbers in Uganda, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic. Conditions in these countries, many of which are contending with their own challenges around insecurity and displacement, vary considerably. The situation for displaced Sudanese in South Sudan, for instance, is complicated by the simultaneous return of large numbers of South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers as well as weak governance, conflict, poverty and growing social tensions with local communities.

In Egypt, on the other hand, Sudanese have in the past benefitted to some extent from the long-standing ties between the two countries. Many arrivals have been allowed to settle, albeit in highly precarious conditions, in urban areas such as Cairo, Alexandria and Aswan. However, as discussed earlier, there are signs that the environment is becoming increasingly inhospitable. The difficult situation in Egypt has reportedly driven some Sudanese to move on to Libya to join the significant numbers who had already crossed into the country direct from Sudan. Here, in a context of rising anti-migrant sentiment, Sudanese face the risk of abuse and deportation. Many end up attempting the Central Mediterranean crossing into Europe, as can be seen from the uptick in the number of Sudanese reaching Italy and even the Greek island of Crete during the year.

The economic and political challenges within the region, in particular Ethiopia and Somalia, continue to drive tens of thousands of migrants every year to cross the Gulf of Aden from the coast of Djibouti or Somalia to Yemen. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, over 37,000 migrants were tracked making the journey, though the actual number is likely to be higher. The route remains the most used on the continent despite the considerable dangers involved, with 448 deaths or disappearances recorded by IOM between January and the end of August 2025. This included, among other incidents, the March capsizing of two boats in poor weather that led to at least 180 deaths. In August, another tragedy occurred, when a boat carrying 154 Ethiopian migrants capsized off the coast of Yemen, leading to at least 68 deaths and 74 people missing. The risks are often compounded by the unscrupulousness of the smugglers controlling the route in their attempts to avoid detection. In June, for instance, after a boat with 150 migrants on board was intercepted by smugglers, the passengers were forced to swim back to the shore, resulting in at least eight confirmed deaths and many others missing.

The dangers for migrants persist once they reach Yemen, with many abducted and held for ransom by criminal groups on arrival. In Yemen’s deteriorating humanitarian context, the product of widespread poverty and more than a decade of civil conflict, migrants are especially vulnerable. This was illustrated in April, when a detention centre near Sana’a was bombed during a US military strike, killing at least 68 migrants and wounding many others. Thousands of migrants end up stranded in Yemen, unable to move on or to make the perilous journey again in reverse back to the Horn of Africa, with some ultimately choosing to undertake voluntary returns to their countries of origin.

Those who manage to cross Yemen to the Saudi border, on the other hand, face further threats, as evidenced by numerous reports documenting torture, sexual abuse, mass killings and executions by Saudi security forces. Despite international condemnation, these gross human rights violations continue to be reported. MMC continues to receive testimony from Ethiopian migrants who have attempted to cross into Saudi Arabia from Yemen, confirming these targeted killings by Saudi security forces continue until today. Migrant workers in Saudi Arabia are also regularly exploited by their employers and at constant risk of being apprehended by authorities, with almost 24,000 deported to Ethiopia or Yemen in the first quarter of 2025 alone. Tens of thousands more were expelled in the ensuing months (see Keeping Track in the Middle East)

Extraordinarily, around one in four people who live in extreme poverty globally are based in West and Central Africa. In addition, close to three-quarters of the entire regional population are in fragile, conflict- and violence-affected countries. The region as a whole has been beset by insecurity, humanitarian crisis and environmental strain, creating significant tensions that have frequently developed into communal conflict and violent extremism. Many countries are grappling not only with their own internal struggles, but also with the pressures coming from hosting large refugee populations from neighbouring countries, alongside being vulnerable to the possibility of further cross-border displacement as conflicts elsewhere intensify. An uptick in fighting in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for instance, pushed around 119,000 people to flee into Burundi by the middle of the year, with many – caught between conflict in DRC and impossible living conditions in Burundi – forced to move back and forth across the border multiple times (see Thematic snapshot DR Congo’s endless war: how protracted conflicts impact mixed migration dynamics in 2025). At the same time, the rollback of development assistance by many donor countries has left vulnerable populations in even greater precarity. Of the 10 most neglected crises in the world ranked by the Norwegian Refugee Council for 2024, including eight in Africa as a whole, four were in West and Central Africa: Cameroon (the highest-ranking country), Burkina Faso, Mali and DRC.

The Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) continues to be wracked by the intersecting crises of conflict, climate change, poverty and political upheaval. As of April 2025, there were an estimated 5.9 million IDPs and 2.1 million refugees and asylum seekers – a rise, respectively, of 6 percent and 20 percent compared to the total in January 2024. This continues a year-on-year deterioration which has seen the number of IDPs triple in Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger between 2020 and 2024, while the number of refugees has doubled over the same period. Within this region, mixed migration occurs in both directions, as civilians are displaced across borders between different countries in response to crises and insecurity.

Though the primary driver of displacement in the region is the proliferation of insurgent and jihadist groups, drought and desertification have also created growing competition over resources between herders and pastoralists, frequently tipping into deadly conflict and creating widespread hunger. Flooding, meanwhile, drove the displacement of almost 1 million people in the region. Alongside forced displacement, restrictions on movement such as curfews, checkpoints, unexploded ordnance and banditry all contribute to the vulnerability of many communities,who end up being trapped in conflict-affected areas. Despite the severity of the crisis, much-needed humanitarian assistance on the ground remains sparse, with just 16 percent of the USD 4.9 billion needed to reach the most vulnerable groups in 2025 received as of early August.

In Burkina Faso, almost 2.1 million – close to 10 percent of the population – are currently displaced internally. While, by the end of 2024, around 1 million IDPs had reportedly returned to their areas of origin, pointing to an apparent improvement in the security situation in some regions, the number of IDPs overall in the country continued to climb during 2025, with others forced across the border into Mali and Niger – though, at the same time, nationals of both countries entered Burkina Faso to seek refuge there. The fighting has only intensified in recent years, with thousands of civilians killed. Many of these atrocities overlap with deep-seated ethnic and identity-based animosities, meaning particular communities may end up being targeted.

The crisis in Mali has also deteriorated further, amid deepening conflict between the military government and armed groups, particularly in the north and centre of the country. While the large majority (over 90%) of displacements is the result of the conflict, environmental disasters also play a role, causing catastrophic economic and infrastructural damage. In addition to more than 402,000 IDPs, as of 31 December 2024, there are also now more than 140,000 refugees – compared to fewer than 67,000 in January 2024 – primarily from Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania. While the majority of Malians displaced by the conflict are taking refuge in or near Mbera refugee camp in the Hodh El Chargi region of Mauritania, thousands are also attempting to move on to Europe via the Western Atlantic route, with Malians now accounting for the most arrivals of any country in the Canary Islands.

Niger’s location means it not only has a pivotal role in the Central Sahel crisis – as of the end of July 2025, it had almost 460,000 IDPs and more than 429,000 refugees and asylum seekers, the majority displaced from neighbouring conflict-affected areas, including Mali and Nigeria – but also as a country of transit for tens of thousands of migrants heading northwards towards Libya. This is despite the ongoing challenges in Niger itself, spanning insecurity, environmental instability and widespread poverty, which have contributed to food shortages, school closures and disease outbreaks. There is also significant internal circular movement among migrants who travel from the more impoverished areas of the country to look for opportunities in artisanal gold mines in the region.

The effects of climate change and environmental degradation are especially acute in the Lake Chad Basin, an area spanning Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. In a context of growing scarcity, the region has become increasingly unstable in recent years, due to intercommunal conflict and the presence of various armed groups, including Boko Haram. In the first half of 2025 alone, 263 security incidents occurred that took the lives of at least 329 people. The internally displaced population, while falling by 6 percent in the same period, still numbers 2.9 million, with another 330,000 refugees – a group that has, conversely, risen by 23 percent in the first six months of 2025. While military campaigns have had some success in disrupting militants, their operations have frequently come at a high cost to local communities and, on their own, are insufficient to address the underlying drivers of conflict.

Graphic 3. The impact of armed insurgency and conflict in the Lake Chad Basin (as of June 2025)

In Nigeria, around 3.5 million people are forcibly displaced, including a majority of IDPs but also refugees, asylum seekers and refugee returnees. Alongside conflict, flooding is a major cause of displacement: in the war-affected Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states in the north-east, for instance, almost 1.2 million people were displaced during 2024 by flooding. Chad faces similar pressures of violent insurgency, climate change and deepening poverty, exacerbated by the conflict in neighbouring Sudan. By late August, almost 877,000 refugees had arrived in the country since April 2023, increasing the total displaced population in Chad to almost 2.1 million. By the end of 2025, the number of new arrivals is projected to come close to 1 million, placing further strain on the already desperate situation of displaced Sudanese in the eastern region, as well as local communities. Sudan’s cholera epidemic also appears to be spreading to Chad, with an increasing number of cases reported in refugee camps there. As in Nigeria, repeated flooding is also a major concern, affecting nearly 2 million people in 2024 and continuing to drive displacement and loss of livelihoods in 2025.

Cameroon is also contending with protracted insecurity and conflict in the Far North, where Boko Haram militants are also active. The combination of internal displacement and the influx of large numbers of refugees fleeing conflict from neighbouring countries in the region has served to deepen destitution levels in the region, with almost three-quarters of the population having limited access to social services and living in a state of chronic poverty. In addition to the more than 410,000 refugees the country hosts, primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria, there are nearly 1 million IDPs, split almost evenly between the Far North (476,000) and the Anglophone North-West/South-West regions (493,000). The latter is the product of the protracted conflict between the Cameroonian military and the Ambazonian separatists that first emerged in response to the government’s violent crackdown in 2016 on protests against the perceived dominance of the French-speaking population. Since then, at least 6,500 people have been killed so far in the violence, though the actual number may be substantially higher.

The Southern Africa Route, running from the East and Horn of Africa to South Africa, has become more popular in the past two decades. Various estimates suggest that between 10,000 and 20,000 migrants, predominantly from Ethiopia, risk their lives every year to travel irregularly through Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The journey, lasting anything from a month to a year, has only become more dangerous with the steady entrenchment of smuggling organisations in the region. The vulnerability of those attempting the route is exacerbated by the fact that authorities are increasingly focusing their efforts on enforcement, with at least 6,000 migrants from the Horn of Africa currently in detention in various transit countries, some for extended periods. Raids and apprehensions in different countries along the route continued during 2025, including the rescue of dozens of young Ethiopian trafficking victims by South African security forces in May. This was reportedly one of a number of similar incidents in recent months that highlighted the vulnerability of migrants even once they reach South Africa.

Irregular migration to Mayotte has attracted increasing attention in recent years. Though much of this movement originates from the neighbouring island of Comoros, in practice, arrivals are not only Comorian nationals but also made up of Burundians, Congolese, Malagasy and Somalis. While migrants originating from the Great Lakes typically travel overland through Tanzania and on via Comoros to Mayotte, many Somalis depart by boat from Somalia to Comoros or even directly to Mayotte. The route between Comoros and Mayotte is very hazardous, with at least 69 deaths and disappearances recorded during 2024. This included, at the beginning of November 2024, the deliberate capsizing of a boat by traffickers off the coast of Comoros, resulting in at least 25 fatalities. A similar story emerged later that month when two boats, carrying 75 passengers between them, were abandoned by their smugglers and left to drift in the ocean, with 28 of those on board dying of thirst and starvation before they were rescued.

The situation has led to increasing tensions between Mayotte and Comoros, as well as large-scale raids and public protests against migrants among local Mahorans. In December 2024, following the deportation of DRC nationals in October, the French interior minister Bruno Retailleau went so far as to accuse Comoros of actively enabling irregular movement to the island, “pushing populations towards Mayotte to create a kind of illegal occupation” – a situation that meant “we have to change the rules”. This mood was reflected in the subsequent passage of a bill by France’s parliament in April 2025 that restricted birthright citizenship for children born in Mayotte, effectively suspending the otherwise nationwide “right to soil” enshrined in the constitution. Though justified by its proponents as removing a key lure for irregular migrants to attempt to reach Mayotte, its critics argue that it is serving to normalise far-right policies.

Mayotte suffered a devastating cyclone in December 2024 that left hundreds of people dead or missing, with its informal settlements worst affected. Despite advance warnings, many migrants reportedly stayed clear of shelters out of fear that they might be deported. While the disaster appears to have mobilised further measures to tackle irregular migration, insufficient attention has been paid to the needs and vulnerabilities of the undocumented population: despite being among the most affected, the informal settlements where many are concentrated were reportedly sidelined during early relief efforts. There is also little in the way of public acknowledgment of the factors driving movement from Comoros and, more broadly, the East and Horn of Africa, meaning migrants will likely continue to attempt the journey, despite the risks involved.

In April 2025, as part of a package of support to Mayotte to assist its recovery in the wake of the cyclone,French president Emmanuel Macron announced a new programme known as Iron Wall to prevent crossings from Comoros. This, potentially, has troubling implications for migrants, given the frequently violent interceptions that have been carried out on boats in recent years. An investigation published by Lighthouse Reports in September 2025 documents at least 24 deaths between 2007 and 2025 as a result of the French security forces intentionally encircling, striking or capsizing migrant vessels. This included the ramming, in July 2025 of a small boat carrying 27 passengers, including children, with one witness reporting that he saw an elderly man and teenage girl drown in the wake of the collision.

Peter Grant

Author

Peter Grant is a researcher, writer and editor specialising in migration, urban development, and climate change