Interview

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze is the Head of Special Projects in the Office of the Executive Director at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). A strategist and international law and human rights expert, Ottilia promotes human security in Africa by advancing peace, accountability, the rule of law and justice. Her areas of interest include emerging security threats, international criminal justice, international human rights law and migration trends and policy.

When I started at the ISS in early 2009 the conversations on migration happened very much on a national level, with individual countries dealing with domestic challenges in terms of regulating irregular migration. In my mind, it was an issue that countries sought to address administratively. Let’s take South Africa, for example. In 2008, we witnessed one of the largest, until then, bouts of anti-foreigner sentiment and violence which resulted in close to 70 people being killed in May of that year. The economic crunch and increased movement of people from neighbouring countries, particularly Zimbabwe following their election, provoked these acts of violence. So the sentiments, even then, were very insular. The response, then, was to look to what administrative tools the South African government had to respond to a challenge that wasn’t of their creation. What they chose to do in 2009 was to implement a special exemption permit that allowed people who had entered South Africa irregularly or who had overstayed to effectively be regularised.

Fast forward to 2014, just five years later, we started seeing the increase in migrants – particularly those forcibly displaced by violence and conflict in the Middle East – towards Europe. Then the discussions on migration were no longer just happening on a national level, they started to take on a regional lens. This was not limited only to movement out of Western Asia, but also, increasingly, movement out of the African continent. So much so that, at least on the European side, we saw the Valletta Summit, for example, and efforts to address migration as a collective responsibility among countries. A decade since then, we see a resurgence of a national-level response, but within a more regional and global lens.

The current migration discourse centres on the views and the perspectives out of Western Europe and North America. Yet migration is very much a topic that requires to be addressed on a global scale.

Unlike Europe, African countries like Uganda have not used the language of crisis when it comes to people moving. Instead they have used the language around ‘administrative challenge’ when dealing with a large inflow of people for which they were not prepared.

I’d almost want to de-link these two issues. In Europe, reference is made to a migration crisis. This was the result of a continent struggling to absorb a million people at the time. Meanwhile, a country like Uganda, together with Ethiopia and Kenya combined, were hosting close to three million forcibly displaced people with far less resources. These are smaller countries geographically but also economically, with no choice but to find a way to address what they saw as an immediate refugee crisis. They continue to host people forcibly displaced out of South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and those fleeing repression in Eritrea. However, they have not used the language of crisis when it comes to people moving. Instead, they have used the language around ‘administrative challenge’ when dealing with a large inflow of people for which they were not prepared.

The language we have seen coming out of Europe and North America, though, makes it seem as if they are receiving the largest numbers of people entering their countries. In particular, when you go into the data, you see that the number of regular and irregular African migrants into Western Europe is far lower than that of those coming from Eastern Europe or Asia into Western Europe. The approaches that have been used in responding to this – including the externalisation policies stretching into North Africa and into the Sahel – can often be seen as excessive in focus and attention, so much so that they actually overshadow real and much needed efforts to ensure stability.

I’ll use the example of Niger. In July 2023, these externalisation policies and the increase in securitisation enabled a military junta to garner support from its local population. Importantly, Niger is the youngest African country with a median age of just under 15 years old and with challenges around employment and development, but also around stability and security. Two of the laws that the junta aimed to repeal first were instruments related to trafficking and smuggling of persons. This was not necessarily because they thought that smuggling and trafficking of persons should be legalised, but because in a number of communities, including in areas like Agadez, for example, it had become a means to gain income – a lucrative economic activity.

When you look at the numbers of people that migrate out of Niger compared to their neighbouring countries, they are far less. Niger was and remains a transit zone. But there was concern that the way in which the externalisation policy was being implemented, particularly out of the EU, was affecting the livelihoods of people who were engaged in transporting people, selling life jackets, offering guidance, etc. But this is not in itself a solution, because what you don’t want is an over-securitised policy to result in further criminal activity or the destabilisation of a country within its region and within the broader African context.

Yes, very often. What we have seen is an increase in nationalistic language, not limited only to migration, but migration being used as an easy win politically. We can talk about identity and all those other issues, but I argue it’s because migration is the one thing that is almost easier to address. If you have people who can be deported, and if you can say we would be in a better place, we would have less crime, ‘We would have less violence if they were sent home,’ this resonates with the population as they would then be able to attribute their societal ills to a particular demographic. However, research has shown that often the criminal elements within societies are not singularly migrant communities; but the more restrictive your policies are in terms of accessing the job market or accessing social security, the more likely people are to use irregular pathways to enter.

Ironically, the consequence is also that people who would otherwise follow legal pathways and work in legal sectors almost have no choice but to either work without work permits because the process is so difficult and expensive, or work in the parallel market, so to speak. It’s almost: how do you address what society challenges are, without making it about the migrants themselves? And what are those challenges? It’s crime, it’s violence, it’s issues around integration, but it’s also employment. These are key challenges that we see, not only in Europe and in North America but, as I mentioned earlier, in African and Asian countries, too. But it’s easier to attribute those social ills to the people who you can easily (or more easily) get rid of in your society, whether through deportation or through detention.

It’s easier to attribute those social ills to the people who you can easily (or more easily) get rid of in your society, whether through deportation or through detention.

My view, and this is using the South African example, is that it has to be done on multiple levels. I know saying all of society can seem quite trite, but it should be addressed across government departments, because often migration is dealt with by the ministry responsible for the interior or Home Affairs and, in some cases, with the police as well as defence. But the kinds of conversations that need to be had must involve the ministries responsible for socio-economic issues as well, such as those ministries responsible for education, or health, those dealing with questions of inclusion and integration, because if you have just a security cluster talking about migration, your outcomes will be security cluster-focused. The South African government has tried to have a constructive conversation through a migration and urbanisation platform that is steered through the statistics department, together with Home Affairs and social development and the ministries for international relations.

In the context of South Africa, the most integrated communities are also those where violence flares up, because these are also the spaces in which the socio-economic disparity is most stark. It’s not unusual for some migrant groups to do very well in business, resulting in them hiring other migrants and people from the local community. Take Italy, for example, where far-right groups got great support in communities where the people who are picking tomatoes are predominantly West African migrants. So you have a recognition in that community that you need this labour to be able to actually continue and sustain your business but, at the same time, they’re confronted with challenges when it comes to how to integrate migrants effectively beyond their utility in the economic sector. It is that conversation, I feel, that lends itself to a nationalistic contestation, because nationalism then uses the language of identity as the basis on which you start to exclude people.

In Europe, countries with aging populations like Germany have identified a need for labour, and they are looking at different sectors to identify where they need this labour. Just recently, though, they indicated that there is still no uptake [by migrants of available roles] and they’re puzzled as to why this is. So they’re adjusting their language requirements and entry into sectors because they are targeting professionals who already have the tertiary skills they need. I’ll use myself as an example: if you are a professional that already possesses tertiary skills, you also have freedom of mobility and freedom of choice. Where I choose to live is my choice, whereas a number of people who are lower income end up living in areas which they may not have otherwise chosen, so to speak. That is where the gap is. If you need skilled labour, there has to be an investment in skilling that labour, rather than expecting people with skills to be the ones who apply for the visas to come and service your industries.

I do think one of the under-explored aspects is, of course, Europe’s need for labour. And how do you ensure that the people you need are accommodated? What kind of spaces are you creating for them? We are seeing private companies think about this more, instead of importing a labour force, so to speak, they are outsourcing in the countries where people are. But we’re not seeing this in a more concerted national-level approach. Individual companies are adjusting how they employ and where they employ from over anything else, but this shouldn’t happen on such an ad-hoc, individual basis.

In April 2015, the late Zulu king Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, made really Afrophobic and racialist remarks, specifically around people who had migrated into South Africa from Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The consequence was another bout of xenophobic violence, particularly in the township areas. At the time, I wrote for foreign policy around the best way to understand why we have the kind of violence targeting African foreign nationals and sometimes foreign South Asian nationals. It is rooted in a history where Black wealth was questioned and seen with suspicion and White wealth was presumed. This is a history of apartheid, unfortunately.

These tensions are a result of people querying why these people are living within our communities: ‘How are they – as black, foreign nationals – able to establish businesses and send their children to school when I am not able to do so?’ These questions are not raised in respect of foreign nationals from Europe because it is presumed that they already wield some degree of privilege. In the past, I’ve used the example of ownership of businesses within the South African formal and informal economy. Most of your local franchise-type grocery stores are, in fact, owned either by foreign nationals or by dual foreign and South African nationals of Portuguese, Greek and German descent. These shops are rarely attacked. The shops that are attacked in communities are the small neighbourhood ‘tuckshops’ known as ‘spaza shops’ owned by Somali and Ethiopian nationals. This is happening because of that history of apartheid and dispossession, because the ways in which we regard society have unfortunately been tainted by a history in which one race was privileged.

This is illustrated, at the moment, by the discourse around the white Afrikaners who have been granted refugee status in the US at a time when the US has frozen all other refugee pathways. Because, for South African nationals, the question is: ‘How can the most privileged be the ones who are getting refugee status?’ Because white wealth is presumed. So you almost have to prove that you’re disadvantaged as a white person in South Africa, but you don’t have to prove that you’re disadvantaged as a black national. But then, that is where the challenge and the contestation come in within communities saying, ‘How are you able to access services, health, education and other forms of service delivery when I, as a South African national, am struggling to get treatment, struggling to get my children into school and unable to open a business? It must be because of something other than your own hard work.’

The decision by the US to roll back a number of its refugee resettlement arrangements, but make an exemption for Afrikaners out of South Africa is an attempt at reframing how we look at refugee protections – where the decision to protect is informed by one’s own interest, rather than by the need for protection of refugee communities. That in itself erodes the very foundation of conventions intended to ensure the protection of people considered most vulnerable because they’re fleeing persecution, forms of conflict and so forth.

That’s a difficult question because, for example, the decision by the US to roll back a number of its refugee resettlement arrangements but make an exemption for Afrikaners out of South Africa is an attempt at reframing how we look at refugee protections – where the decision to protect is informed by one’s own interest, rather than by the need for protection of refugee communities. That in itself erodes the very foundation of conventions intended to ensure the protection of people considered most vulnerable because they’re fleeing persecution, forms of conflict and so forth.

Will we see, in this geopolitical moment, amendments to the refugee system? I don’t think so because I don’t think there is sufficient consensus among countries to even consider revising particular texts – not only on refugee protection, mind, but also on regular movement. We’ve seen this with countries making very little reference whatsoever to both the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. I think that, if there was any effort to amend right now, it would in fact undermine the protections that we’ve had for close to 80 years. It would reduce and restrict the criteria for people to even be considered asylum seekers, let alone be granted refugee status. To phrase this notion in a more positive way, I’d prefer to say the current framework is a good framework that ensures protections for multiple categories of people, rather than a phrasing that suggests narrowing it down in any way. We can’t and shouldn’t allow any dilution.

A lot of the research that we’ve done at the ISS, but also coming from other organisations, shows that people who are displaced as a result of climate impacts often list climate among a basket of reasons that triggered them to move. So you find, for example, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin are regions which have been affected by climate change. These include the reduction in the size of the Lake Chad Basin and the increase in drought-like conditions with cycles of heavy rains resulting in flooding.

And yet most of the community has stayed put. What has often led to some people starting to move has been a combination of climate change, its direct impact on their livelihoods and the existence of conflict. So my response here would be that, yes, we have to be very clear that there are people for whom there is no choice but to move because the living conditions have become near-impossible for them. Do we need to define a new and special category that fits into this? I would argue that this may only apply to certain Pacific Island nations in which the very existence of their countries is directly impacted. But it may not extend to, for example, people that are displaced in countries like Mozambique and Malawi as a result of constant cycles of cyclonic activities because, when asked for their reasons for moving, climate is oftentimes third, if not fourth, among their mobility drivers, while the primary reason is livelihoods. For now, then, I would argue that there needs to be almost a separate legal mechanism that recognises this particular vulnerability.

We are also facing an immobility crisis, where people remain because they can’t afford to move. When you look at how much people are paying to relocate legally or to be transported irregularly and smuggled across borders, the majority of them, particularly in Africa, can’t afford that.

The final point I did want to make, which is one that is often under-discussed, is that we are also facing an immobility crisis, where people remain because they can’t afford to move. When you look at how much people are paying to relocate legally or to be transported irregularly and smuggled across borders, the majority of them, particularly in Africa, can’t afford that. In areas affected by climate, the language used has often been a language of resilience. But when you speak to rural communities, as we recently did whilst conducting some interviews in Malawi about whether or not they choose to stay, their answers actually tell you that it’s not that they are resilient, it’s that they cannot afford to move. So, if you don’t have the necessary tools to address development challenges, socio-economic inequality, as well as the triggers of conflict, you might find that people don’t move, not because they don’t want to, but because they simply cannot do so. They also recognise that, if they could, they would be moving into communities which are increasingly hostile to migrants, so they don’t want to relocate when they know that this could be putting their family at greater risk.

If you don’t have the necessary tools to address development challenges, socio-economic inequality, as well as the triggers of conflict, you might find that people don’t move not because they don’t want to, but because they simply cannot do so.

Yes. What we have to face and what’s to come is on two fronts. The one is what you speak about, which is climate. I live in Southern Africa. Here, temperature increases are the highest, with summer periods getting increasingly longer and winters getting increasingly colder across the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. The second challenge is that, by 2050, Sub-Saharan Africa will have almost doubled its current population. We’re looking at 2.4 billion people, right? Where are we going to go?

Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa – particularly coastal cities, ironically – are becoming increasingly overpopulated. People are moving to the places where they think they will be able to get more economic opportunities, even as sea levels rise. So, what kind of impact will this have for Lagos, for example, which is already a highly densely populated city to begin with, or Dar es Salaam on the eastern coast? How are we thinking and planning for this future? Unfortunately, we are currently in a space where there’s an increase in climate change denialism, even as I’ve been speaking to people in Europe who, for the first time in their lives, experienced temperatures over 40 degrees Celsius. You only need to speak to people anecdotally to recognise that this is not a conversation for the future. This is a conversation that we need to be having now. And if we wait for 10, 15, 20 years, I don’t think we will be able to manage the number of people impacted, those who can’t move and those who are displaced.

I would also like to make one final point. At the recent Berlin Climate Mobility Forum, a number of the ministers from the island nations of Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Fiji and the Maldives raised alarm on the urgency to act. For them, this is not just a planning issue. For them, this is an existential issue around whether or not their countries will even exist given the sea level rise, and which countries will be able to absorb their populations. We need to have mechanisms in place which deal with the level of displacement which could come as a result of rising sea levels and cyclonic activities.

I think we’ve got so many challenges, some of which have a direct impact on how we deal with questions of migration. We’re not in a great moment, I can’t spin this. It’s not looking good and I’m certainly not optimistic.