Thematic Focus

Of the many conflicts and crises currently taking place globally, the situation in Myanmar is arguably one of the most under-reported. However, the country is experiencing protracted conflict, military oppression, punitive tax policies against its overseas migrant population and the effects of climate change and natural disasters. Characterised by the UN as a “polycrisis”, all these factors have increasingly become major displacement and migration drivers, generating large and complex mixed migration dynamics in the Southeast Asia region.

Four years after the 2021 military seizure of power, in which the Tatmadaw ousted and imprisoned elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) colleagues, the military continues to fight its own population on many fronts, despite effectively controlling only 21 percent of the territory.

Before the military coup, approximately 1 million people within Myanmar were already in need of humanitarian aid, but now the figure has exceeded 18 million – around one third of the population – with more than 3.5 million of them being internally displaced. Importantly, migration dynamics post-2021 are not happening in a vacuum. For decades, Myanmar’s instability and its history of persecuting minorities – particularly, Rohingya – drove people into exile across the region. Bangladesh, for example, continues to host nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees, while Thailand is home to over 2 million Myanmar migrant workers (plus many more with irregular status) and Malaysia remains a key destination for both asylum seekers as well as those seeking employment. Another prominent destination – as well as transit country – is Indonesia, which has been receiving scores of boat arrivals in recent years. The current movements, therefore, essentially compound a larger, long-standing migration and displacement situation in the South and Southeast Asia region.

In 2025, Myanmar’s de facto authorities introduced new laws around taxes and remittances, largely as a way to obtain regular cash injections that could bolster its insufficient finances. According to these, regular migrant workers must return at least 25 percent of their monthly earnings via official channels that are recognised by the de facto authorities, while also paying between 2 and 25 percent of taxes on foreign income. Essentially, migrant workers are taxed twice, while also having to pay income taxes in their host countries. These financial constraints could push thousands into economic instability, as well as deter people from pursuing regular mobility pathways, as the taxation laws only apply to documented migrants. The millions of Myanmar nationals working in precarious employment in Thailand and other countries in the region are particularly targeted by this.

Compounding this, the Tatmadaw introduced new conscription policies in 2025, mandating men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve in the military. While likely driving outward migration from Myanmar for those who wanted to escape military conscription, returning home becomes almost impossible for migrant workers, due to insecurity and forced conscription. This results in migrant workers being increasingly pushed into irregular types of work – leading to irregularity and exacerbating their vulnerabilities.

Among the 3.5 million IDPs living in Myanmar, an estimated 619,429 are Rohingya living in Rakhine State, where fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA) has raged ever since the military seizure of power. The persecution of this minority Muslim community has been long-standing and, in 2017, a military offensive resulting in violations that are widely regarded as genocide forced more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee into Bangladesh, bringing the total refugee population there to nearly 1 million. Those left behind in Rakhine continue to face ongoing persecution and are routinely confined to IDP camps, where they face severely restricted freedom of movement and little access to education, health care or livelihoods, while also being effectively stateless.

At present, approximately 1 million Rohingya refugees live in the camps in and around Cox’s Bazar, in Bangladesh. These remain some of the largest and most densely populated refugee camps in the world and living conditions are dire: international funding cuts mean that food rations have been slashed, while services such as health care and education are almost non-existent. Similarly, opportunities for livelihoods are extremely scant. For these reasons, some Rohingya have attempted to leave these camps, moving onwards via boat to reach countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

In January 2025, the Malaysian coastguard announced that it would be doubling patrols to locate more boats carrying people from Myanmar, after detaining almost 200 on a northwestern island a few days prior to the announcement. Malaysia is also working with the Thai coastguard to intercept boats from Myanmar. Those who manage to reach Thailand are deported back to Myanmar, where they are routinely conscripted to join the junta’s armed forces. In this complex and layered scenario, issues such as crime, violence, smuggling, human trafficking, sexual assault and murder are rife.

In India, despite the country being publicly condemned for its decisions and actions on this, Rohingya refugees are regularly deported. May 2025, for example, saw a total of 140 Rohingya refugees pushed back by Indian authorities in two separate incidents, including one during which dozens of them were effectively abandoned at sea after being provided with life jackets.

Aceh, Indonesia, 19 November, 2023. A boat carrying 220 Rohingya refugees lands on the Aceh coast. Arrivals like this have continued into 2024 and 2025, as Rohingya refugees flee worsening conditions in Myanmar and overcrowded camps in Bangladesh, facing perilous sea journeys in search of safety.

Persecution, conflict, forced conscription and taxes are not the only pressures facing the Myanmar population in 2025. With Myanmar being one of the most climate-vulnerable countries globally, natural disasters – such as cyclones, floods and landslides – and global warming are also becoming powerful drivers of displacement.

In March 2025, an earthquake killed nearly 4,000 people, injured 5,000 and left a further 6 million in urgent need of humanitarian aid. Described as “the strongest [earthquake] the country has experienced in a century”, the catastrophe displaced tens of thousands of people. In the aftermath of the quake, the Tatmadaw “intensified attacks instead of facilitating relief”, thus worsening an already desperate situation. This behaviour also led some international analysts to note that this was an attempt to “weaponise” humanitarian aid by blocking or stealing resources at a time of crisis. Crucially, these two crises “interact … in a mutually reinforcing manner”: on the one hand, the ongoing conflict impedes environmental efforts while, on the other, the effects of climate change generate more instability which, in turn, worsens the conflict.

Despite Myanmar’s crisis being poorly covered in mainstream media, the country is experiencing a convergence of grave issues, such as conflict, forced conscription, punitive taxes, aid cuts and extreme climate events. These are progressively becoming compelling migration and displacement drivers in the region, with the likelihood of growing numbers opting for irregular routes in the face of migrant worker taxation and the absence of formal pathways.

Despite the protracted nature of the crises, regional responses, particularly from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have so far been limited. ASEAN, for example, maintained its principle of non-interference, which prevented the establishment of a coordinated and structured approach to supporting Myanmar and tackling mixed migration in the region.

Funding is another major factor adding to Myanmar’s crisis. With protracted cuts to international aid, millions of Myanmar nationals – as well as services and facilities sustaining the population – are at increased humanitarian risk, threatening not only the stability of the country but of the region as a whole.

Unless both local and global actors reinstate the necessary aid and circumstances in Myanmar improve on all fronts, the situation in the country is likely to deteriorate further, continuing to push vulnerable people into treacherous migration journeys outside legal pathways.