Migrant smuggling and risks on journeys to the Canary Islands
Evidence from the Atlantic Route
This paper examines migrant smuggling dynamics and protection risks on irregular journeys to the Canary Islands, based on 1,216 surveys conducted with migrants and refugees in Mauritania and Spain between March and September 2025, complemented by 11 in-depth qualitative interviews. Findings document the realities of the Atlantic crossing, the diversity of smuggling arrangements, and the conditions that drive people toward irregular routes. The paper calls for protection-sensitive, route-based programming and access to regular migration pathways.
Refugees and migrants arriving in Spain were much more likely to say they left because of violence (29%) or human rights concerns (28%) compared to those in Mauritania (7%). The dangers of the journey are widely known: however, when legal pathways and meaningful future prospects are absent, these risks are weighed against the certainty of harm at home, making high-risk movement a perceived necessity rather than a reckless decision.
Maritime crossings to the Canary Islands primarily embark from Morocco (41%), Mauritania (30%), and Senegal (24%). A smaller number embarked from further south: 12 from Gambia, 5 from Guinea-Bissau, and 3 from Guinea, reflecting a trend toward longer routes to bypass heightened surveillance along northern coasts. Indeed, one in three embarkations left from countries south of Mauritania. More southerly embarkation points extend the time spent at sea and increase the dangers of the Atlantic crossing.
71% of those interviewed in Spain identified at least one location as dangerous along their journey. The Atlantic crossing remains the most dangerous, with the majority (64%) fearing death during the maritime crossing; but respondents also perceived risks in other locations, with Algeria being frequently reported among those who transited the country.
While 40% of those who arrived in the Canary Islands used a smuggler for a portion of the journey, 16% did not use a smuggler, highlighting the existence of “self-organised” irregular journeys in especially among fishery communities.
Around half of those who had considered migrating regularly said they resorted to irregular journeys with a smuggler because of the financial barriers to regular migration, or after a visa denial.
Smuggling dynamics vary along the route: smuggling networks in Senegal and Gambia appear less systematic, compared to more organized structures operating from Morocco and Mauritania.
There appears to be a link between smuggler use and perceived risk: respondents who did not use a smuggler on the Atlantic more often reported the Atlantic as dangerous, suggesting that smugglers may play a risk-mitigating role in these journeys.
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