
Amid major changes to U.S. immigration policy in 2025, return migration across Latin America is surging—raising urgent protection and humanitarian concerns.
Beginning on his first day in office, President Trump introduced sweeping changes to the US immigration system intended to fulfil his campaign promises to cut immigration and deport irregular migrants. Measures have included the expansion of expedited removal; deportations to various countries; the suspension of access to asylum, including all refugee resettlement programs, and other protections (namely humanitarian parole and temporary protected status); the criminalisation of irregular entry; and the militarisation of the Southern Border.
These measures have reshaped mixed migration dynamics in the region. Currently, few migrants are travelling towards the US. In February, March, and April 2025, US Border Patrol only apprehended a monthly average of 7,971 immigrants at the Southern border—a 94% decrease compared to the same period in 2024, when the monthly average exceeded 135,000. The ‘encounter’ figures from these three months are the lowest recorded since the 1960s. This pattern has been mirrored along the route. In April 2025, the government of Panama reported only 73 crossings through the Darién in April 2025, while Colombia registered just 34 migrants with irregular status in Turbo and Necoclí—likely travelling northwards. This represents a sharp decrease compared to the same period in 2024, when Panama recorded 29,259 crossings and Colombia detected 27,857 people.
Many migrants who were travelling to the US have experienced abrupt disruptions to their journeys, leaving them stranded in Mexico or Central America and compelled to reconsider their plans. Broadly, they face two main options if they do not want to stay in the country they are in: attempting irregular entry into the US, despite significant barriers, or setting out toward a new destination. Thus far, attempts to cross into the US appear relatively limited. Instead, a considerable number of Latin American migrants en route through Central America or Mexico have begun return migrations in a north–south direction. For instance, Colombia recorded 7,592 migrants entering the country from Panama during the first four months of 2025—an uncommon pattern in previous years. Returnees’ destinations include their countries of origin, places of prior residence (where they had previously settled) or third countries.
To better understand these self-initiated returns, MMC undertook research focused on who is moving, why, how, and their long-term intentions. Through the 4Mi Return Survey, MMC interviewed 479 migrants moving southwards in Costa Rica (245), Colombia (154), and Mexico (80). Except for one person from Nepal, all respondents were from the region, mainly Venezuela (63%), Colombia (17%) and Ecuador (11%). This article highlights the findings from this research, which forms part of a joint report by MMC and the ProLAC initiative on migration dynamics and protection risks in north-south return movements in the Americas.
(Note: 4Mi uses a purposive sampling method, and so the results should be considered illustrative of mixed migration dynamics rather than statistically representative.)
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Immediate effects for migrants
The US changes in immigration policies have impacted migrants in destination and transit. Migrants in the US have faced the loss of their protected status, detention, deportation, and family separation. By late April 2025, the Department of Homeland Security reported that deportations had already exceeded 142,000 since January 20, 2025, even though available data are not precise. Despite the US administration’s rhetoric around “mass” deportations, so far, it appears that numbers remain lower than last year due to the reduced arrivals. Analysis by experts from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) suggests that “[the US administration] appears on track to deport roughly half a million people this year—fewer than the 685,000 deportations recorded in fiscal year (FY) 2024 under President Joe Biden.” ewer new arrivals also mean that a larger percentage of deportations are people who have been in the US for longer and are more established in their communities.
For those not (yet) directly affected by these measures, they have created an environment of fear.
“ I completed the CBP procedure and had my appointment scheduled for January 26, but it was cancelled and I couldn’t enter [the US]. The issue is that I don’t feel safe returning to Colombia because the guerrilla is persecuting me, and I don’t want to stay in Mexico because I don’t know anyone.”
– Testimony by a 4Mi survey respondent. Man from Colombia (32 years old) who was in Mexico at the time of the interview (translated from Spanish).
Note: The CBP One application allowed migrants to apply for regular entry to the US; the current US administration disabled the app.
At the same time, the changes in US migration policy have severely affected those in transit toward the US. The closure of the CBP One app cancelled 30,000 appointments of migrants waiting to enter the country to apply for asylum and affected many others already in Mexico, who were planning to schedule an appointment. Migrants were left without options for regular entry, forced to reconsider their plans and left with great uncertainty about their future options.
“ Oh, [the policy changes] affected me so much. That was the worst. I had an appointment for January 25th. It destroyed me. I feel bad for not achieving what I was going to do.”
– Testimony by a 4Mi survey respondent. Woman from Venezuela (37 years old) who was in Costa Rica at the time of the interview (translated from Spanish).
The measures directly influenced the decision-making of migrants. Among the 479 respondents, a large percentage identified the suspension of regular migration mechanisms in the US (85%) and the perception that migration is no longer possible (67%) as reasons for leaving (migrants could list more than one reason). About a third of respondents indicated that fearing deportation was a reason to return or to have returned.
Figure 1. Reasons why refugees and migrants returned or were returning
“For what reasons are you returning/did you return?” n=479; Multiple choice (only the eight most frequently mentioned options are shown)
Routes of return from North and Central America to South America
Most (62%) of those interviewed across all three locations (n=479) began their return journeys in Mexico. Others departed from other Central American countries, most commonly Costa Rica (22%). Most of them (74%) had stayed less than six months in the country that they left.
Many travelled from Mexico, through Central America to Panama, using the same routes previously used for migration to the north. Respondents travelled back by a combination of buses, walking and hitchhiking. They tend not to face major obstacles at borders between Mexico and Costa Rica.
There were three possible routes from Panama to Colombia: overland through the Darien or by sea, either on the Pacific Ocean side or the Caribbean Sea side. Among the 154 respondents interviewed by 4Mi in Colombia, 73% had travelled along the Caribbean Sea route, 22% of respondents had crossed the Darién Gap, and only 5% used the Pacific Sea route.
Map 1. Main north-south land and sea return migration routes across the Americas
Migrants are exposed to multiple risks and abuses during the return journey
On the southbound journey, migrants find themselves having to choose among hazardous options. Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador) continue to face a strong presence of organised crime, exposing migrants to constant risks of kidnapping, extortion, and robbery. Between Panama and Colombia, the Pacific is dominated by criminal groups with little available data; the Darién route is extremely dangerous, with high risks of violence, extortion, and death; and the Caribbean Sea route is costly and prone to shipwrecks.
The Darién Gap has been an extremely dangerous migration route in LAC for years
Returning through the Darién Gap implies significant risks for migrants. For years, it has been a perilous migration route in the region. In 2024, MMC data, collected through surveys with 518 migrants in Costa Rica, showed that 96% of respondents reported the Darién Gap as the most dangerous part of their journey, compared to 86% in 2023. Many faced serious hazards and human rights abuses. The landscape itself is a threat. Temperatures can reach 35 degrees Celsius with high humidity, straining the body’s ability to cope. The jungle is thick, home to dangerous wildlife and easy to get lost in.
The risks of injury, illness, and even death are ever-present, particularly for children. Sexual violence is also a persistent threat. Numerous reports describe sexual assaults, many of which are committed under the pretext of searching for hidden money or belongings. MMC data show a continuous increase in sexual violence against women since 2022, with 46% women respondents having experienced sexual violence in 2024 (an increase of 17 percentage points compared to 2023 and 31 percentage points compared to the period of July–September 2022).
The awareness of these dangers, combined with the fact that costs are comparable to the Caribbean maritime route, likely contributes to the lower percentage of migrants choosing this route.
Sea routes expose migrants to new dangers
The maritime routes, too, hold dangers. On February 22, a small fishing boat transporting migrants capsized. Most were rescued, but an eight-year-old Venezuelan girl died. Migrants reported to MMC that the boats are precarious and lack safety standards. Many were aware of the dangers but still saw this route as safer than the Darién alternative.
Similar dangers have been found on the Pacific route. Like on the Caribbean route, 4Mi respondents mentioned that shipwrecks are not uncommon. The area is controlled by armed groups, which can increase the risk of violence, trafficking, recruitment, and other abuses.
Future plans
Most (59%) of the respondents intended to return to their countries of origin. However, Venezuelans, the most common nationality interviewed, were about as likely to return to Venezuela (50%) as to go elsewhere. Colombia was the intended destination for the highest number of migrants, receiving a large number of both Venezuelans and its own nationals. Out of the 100 non-Colombian respondents who were going to Colombia, 57 had lived there before.
Most of those returning to their countries of origin were unsure about their medium-term plans; 67% of Venezuelans returning to Venezuela and 51% returning home to other countries said that they hadn’t decided yet about potential movements over the next 12 months. These findings seem to indicate that most are assessing their options in the face of the changing circumstances, but many Venezuelans are particularly reluctant to return to their country of origin, given the continuing political and economic turmoil.
Assistance and regular pathways are urgently needed
As migration dynamics in the region shift—at least temporarily— new policies and actions are required to address the needs of migrants.
Although many migrants are now managing their own movements, the fact that they are making their own arrangements does not mean that their movement can be considered voluntary, given the massive restrictive measures that have been introduced to pressure them change course and return. Furthermore, the suspension and termination of US funding has severely disrupted humanitarian aid for migrants in the region, limiting the ability of humanitarian organisations and government institutions to provide support to (stranded) migrants in transit and destination.
Need for protection and humanitarian assistance for migrants en route
Protection and humanitarian assistance are needed both en route and at migrants’ destinations. The presence of migrants along routes that previously were not on the north-south route or that had only points of quick transit but are now places where migrants stay for a while until deciding where to go or accumulating the necessary resources, particularly on the Caribbean route from Panama to Colombia, has been overwhelming the sparse resources of small towns.
En route, migrants on return journeys may face heightened vulnerabilities, particularly if they never arrive at their destination, as is the case for migrants who had aimed to reach the US. The cost (and often debt) they incurred to afford their journey north limits their financial means on their journey south, forcing them to take riskier routes. In addition, migrants travelling south may still suffer from the effects of their journey north. Needs, such as medical assistance, food and cash, especially if unmet, may make returning migrants more vulnerable. Unmet medical needs can undermine the capacity to meet physical challenges. Without money or valuables to offer, migrants may face a greater risk of physical or sexual violence.
Medicins du Monde reported that returning migrants had urgent physical and mental health needs when arriving in Colombia, “showing signs of anxiety disorders and generalised depression due to the frustration of returning and the conditions of migratory transit” […] first-degree sunburns, lower back pain, and muscle aches associated with prolonged boat journeys, due to sun exposure, vibrations, sustained posture, and physical exertion” (translated).
“ The truth is, [the US policy changes have] greatly impacted us because my wife is currently pregnant, and we haven’t been able to access sufficient services due to the fact that some NGOs are no longer operating.”
– Testimony by a 4Mi survey respondent. Man from Venezuela (26 years old) who was in Peru at the time of the interview (translated from Spanish).
Need for assistance at migrants’ destinations
At return destinations, assistance is lacking to support migrants’ reception and (re)integration. While several countries have put specific initiatives in place such as the “national well-being card” in Mexico, the “Brothers and sisters return home” programme in Honduras or “Return Home” in Guatemala—these are generally open to citizens from these countries but not for nationals from third countries, leaving the latter group without specific assistance. In addition to reception assistance which is currently provided often in the form of vouchers or in-kind assistance, even for citizens, longer-term solutions, such as development and employment opportunities are needed to address structural issues and the reasons why migrants left in the first place.
For instance, recent 4Mi interviews with Colombian migrants show that economic reasons and violence drive emigration: 74% of the 491 respondents cited economic reasons, while 62% of all respondents left the country due to violence, insecurity, and conflict (respondents could indicate multiple reasons). (Re)integration will likely be challenging as these factors persist. (See section 4.2.3. of the joint report for a detailed analysis of the risks and conditions of return to Colombia and other destination countries in the region by the ProLAC initiative.)
Assistance is also particularly important as migrants return with little or no preparation.
Need for regional cooperation
States in the region committed to facilitating a safe, dignified, and voluntary return, supporting reintegration, and promoting regular pathways and international protection for migrants in the Global Compact for Migration and the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection. Although commitment to those principles appears to be waning, particularly in the US, the needs are not, as the need for assistance in transit and destination countries shows. In addition, besides citizens returning to their country of origin, the current north-south return dynamics include migrants choosing to go to a country different from their country of nationality; they need access to regular entry and to regularisation mechanisms in their country of destination.
In this context, there is a need for regional cooperation with or without the US. Many countries in the region are under pressure to enter into bilateral agreements with the US, and the regional frameworks set up by the LA Declaration could provide a frame for making a stronger regional deal rather than weaker individual ones. While the US initiated the Los Angeles declaration under former President Joe Biden, it still provides a valuable framework for regional cooperation in the current context. The Declaration was remarkable because it adopted a “hemisphere-wide approach to managing migration”, shifting the focus away from the US-Mexico border only. With current return dynamics encompassing a large part of the region as origin, transit and destination countries, and shifting, this approach continues to be relevant. The common language and ideas agreed upon in the Declaration by 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama, could provide a basis for reinforcing regional cooperation.
Although relatively few of the migrants (interviewed through the 4Mi return survey) had concrete plans to re-migrate in the near future, the majority were undecided about their next steps. This indicates they are waiting to see how efforts to integrate or re-integrate at their destinations proceed. It also suggests there is openness to stay, and that integration support might be particularly impactful.
Conclusion
The new US administration’s migration policies have impacted mixed migration in the Americas. The self-initiated returns discussed in this article occur alongside other dynamics that raise concerns for the protection of migrants, particularly deportations and migrants stuck in transit countries. In a statement in mid-May, the UN Human Rights Chief raised human rights concerns about deportations from the US, especially concerning migrants who were deported to El Salvador.
There has also been an increase in the number of people stranded in transit countries due to the inability to continue their journeys northward. As analysis by the ProLAC initiative (see joint report) shows, this situation has exposed refugees and migrants to greater protection risks, stemming from the lack of migration documentation, scarcity of economic resources, and widespread insecurity in the various countries where they are located.
Regarding the north-south movements, the medium- and long-term effects of these measures are yet to be seen. Previous crackdowns created temporary drops in the number of arrivals but did not lead to a reduction in border arrivals in the longer term. There is good reason to believe return movements will continue for now, but might cease as migrants redirect their movements to other destinations. Particularly extracontinental migrants also still seem to be trying to reach the US by sea despite the restrictions, as increased interceptions by the coastguard in California reported earlier this month suggest. Dynamics and routes are rapidly changing, as migrants continue to react to the measures and governments in the region adapt their approaches. For instance, on May 13, the Panamanian migration authority announced that Colombian, Ecuadorian and Venezuelan nationals with residence in Panama could receive orientation for their return to Colombia; whether and what assistance would be provided remains unclear. Therefore, monitoring these north-south movements over the following months remains imperative.