



Mixed
Migration
Centre



MMC Middle East
QUARTER 2 2019



A large, semi-transparent photograph of a young girl with long dark hair, wearing a black coat and blue jeans, standing in a dry, rocky field. In the background, there is a dense urban sprawl built on hills, with many buildings and some temporary structures like tents or tarpaulins. The sky is clear and blue. The overall scene suggests a refugee camp or a displaced population area.

Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Middle East

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Middle East region (ME). The core countries of focus for this region are Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and Turkey. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

The Mixed Migration Centre is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration.

For more information on the MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

“Mixed migration” refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly, and wholly, or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

Front cover photo credit:

Dara Al-Masri / DRC (2017)

A girl walks in an Informal Settlement in Zahle, Lebanon. January 2017.

SUPPORTED BY:



Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Middle East

Quarter 2 - 2019

Key Updates

- GCC migrant labour:** In June, the Organisation of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC–Africa), the umbrella body of all Trade Unions in Africa, launched a campaign across ten countries to highlight abuses against Africans in the GCC.
- World Refugee Day:** 20 June marked the World Refugee Day and the start of UNHCR's Regional NGO consultations in Amman. UNHCR's consultations are envisioned to feed into the upcoming Global Refugee Forum in December 2019.
- Arrivals in Greece:** [17,823](#) new arrivals to Europe via land and sea have been observed this quarter. Via Eastern Mediterranean route specifically, there was an increase in new arrivals to Greece via sea (from [5,241](#) in Q1 to [7,622](#) in Q2) and decrease via land (from [2,801](#) to [2,421](#)). The number of people crossing via land is much lower than the [6,866](#) in the second quarter in 2018 (a 65% decrease). Via sea, the difference is smaller as there were [8,387](#) arrivals in Greece in the second quarter of 2018 (9% decrease).
- Eastern Mediterranean:** As was the case in [Q1 2019](#), nationals from Afghanistan and the Middle East continue to be among the most common nationalities crossing the Eastern Mediterranean Sea into Greece. Most of the total [7,017](#) sea arrivals in Greece originate from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Occupied Palestinian Territories.
- Arrivals in Turkey:** A total of [83,163](#) arrivals in Turkey were recorded during the this quarter. The [majority](#) are from Afghanistan (38%), Pakistan (18%), Syria (8%), and Iraq (4%). As reported by the Turkish Coast Guard, the number of people who were apprehended/rescued in all seas surrounding Turkey increased from [4,316](#) to [8,640](#) this quarter (100% increase).
- Missing refugees and migrants:** This quarter, [233](#) people have gone missing or died while crossing the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean Seas, compared to [351](#) in the previous quarter. [37](#) people were recorded missing or dead in the Eastern Mediterranean, compared to [136](#) in the Central and [60](#) in the Western Mediterranean Seas.

Overview of arrivals this quarter*



*Arrows on the map only relate to key updates and do not represent mixed migration flows within and out of the region.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Middle East

UNHCR held the Regional NGO Consultations in Amman

On 20 June, [World Refugee Day](#), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi opened the UNHCR Regional NGO Consultations in Amman, Jordan. It was the first regional NGO consultation organised by UNHCR, the MENA Civil Society Network for Displacement, and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in preparation of the UNHCR Global NGO consultation in Geneva in July and the upcoming Global Refugee Forum in December 2019. The event saw the participation of over 100 NGOs representatives from North Africa, the Middle East and the GCC. One of the panel discussions focused on ways in which the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) offer elements that may be relevant to building protection and solutions strategies that address the needs of those in mixed migration flows.

Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa remained robust in 2018

In April 2019, [KNOMAD](#) reported that annual remittance flows to low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) are likely to reach US\$550 billion in 2019, compared to \$529 billion in 2018. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, **remittances grew** by about 9.1% in 2018 (2017 saw 10.6% growth). While remittances to Egypt increased by around 17%, remittances to Jordan declined by 1.4% in 2018. Remittances to Lebanon grew around 1.8%. Overall, the growth of remittances to the region is expected to continue beyond 2018, albeit at a slower pace of an average of around 3%.

The cost of sending \$200 to the MENA region declined slightly in the last quarter of 2018, from 7.4% in the same quarter of 2017 to 6.9%, bringing the costs of sending remittances to the MENA region close to the global average of 7%. **Costs vary greatly** across corridors as the cost of sending money from high-income OECD countries to Lebanon continues to be “in the double digits” whereas sending money from GCC countries to Egypt and Jordan remained below 5% in some cases (e.g. from the UAE and Kuwait).

[KNOMAD](#) was also able to report on **remittance outflows**, which usually gets less attention than data on inflows. In 2017, the largest remittance-sending countries are the United States (\$68 billion), the United Arab Emirates (\$44 billion) and Saudi Arabia (\$36 billion). However, nationalization policies in the GCC countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia, have seen shrinking employment opportunities, which may lead to a reduction in remittance outflows. About 3.9 million migrants were deported from Saudi Arabia between March 2011 and August 2018, at an annual average rate of over 500,000. Especially South Asian foreign nationals have been affected as indicated by a drop in employment from India (-15%), Pakistan (-30%), and Bangladesh (-37%) in 2018.

Call on Lebanon to end sponsorship system and extend labour protection to migrant domestic workers

On 24 April, [Amnesty International called](#) on Lebanon to end the [kefala sponsorship system](#). Lebanon is home to [over 250,000](#) domestic workers who mainly come from African and Asian countries and work in private homes based on sponsorship. According to Amnesty International, the **kefala system** increases workers' risk of labour exploitation, forced labour and trafficking. Domestic workers in Lebanon are excluded from the labour law which leaves maids, nannies and caretakers at the mercy of their employers. In its [report "Their house is my prison"](#), Amnesty presents some of its findings from a survey among 32 domestic workers in and around Beirut, and reported many instances of **abuse and exploitation**, including workers not being allowed to leave their employer's house, being locked in, confiscated passports, not being allowed a single day off a week, revoked or decreased salaries, physical abuse, humiliating treatment, deprivation of food, having to live in living rooms, storage rooms, kitchens or balconies, forced labour and human trafficking. Six respondents said they had contemplated or attempted suicide because the abuse was taking a toll on their mental health.

Mixed Migration flows from Ukraine to Israel lead to diplomatic tensions

Ukrainians have increasingly been coming to Israel since 2010, when the government cancelled the requirement for [entry visas](#) for Ukrainian citizens. However, since the conflict started in Ukraine in 2014, an increasing number of Ukrainians have been applying for asylum in Israel. Based on data from the Israeli Immigration and Population Authority, 6,680 Ukrainian citizens submitted [asylum requests](#) in 2016. In the same year, 5,700 Ukrainian citizens were deported back to Ukraine because of working in Israel and "violating" their entry visa. In 2017, [7,700 Ukrainian citizens applied for asylum](#) while 8,453 Ukrainians who arrived at Ben Gurion Airport were [sent back](#). In 2018, 1,765 asylum applications were submitted, and 7,730 Ukrainian citizens were returned to Ukraine.¹ According to 2017 data from the [UN Population Division](#), there are around 168,000 Ukrainian migrants in Israel.

The authorities estimate that around 15,000 Ukrainian migrant workers are currently without a work permit in Israel. According to Attorney Alex Cohen, "Not one of the thousands who submitted applications for refugee status is truly a refugee" because they come from "(...) regions that are very far from any battles and there is no mortal danger." The return of Ukrainian citizens has led to allegations of unfair treatment of citizens. **Citizens from Israel have been detained** at the airport in Ukraine and **Ukrainians have been detained** at the airport in Israel. This has led to diplomatic tensions between Israel and Ukraine. According to [Al-Monitor](#): "[S]ince [February](#), Israel and Ukraine have been waging a vengeful and ruthless war on the backs of tourists from both countries, who are intentionally detained at border crossings, harassed for hours and sometimes even deported back to their countries. The peak of the crisis occurred March 7, when top municipal officials from Kiev were detained at Ben Gurion Airport".

¹ It is not clear how many cases have been approved, but 7,857 cases were still open and pending a decision at the end of 2018

The Ukrainians who want to settle in Israel seem to be motivated by a multiplicity of factors, including **conflict and the poor economy in Ukraine**. With an established Russian-speaking culture in Israel, there are Ukrainians who prefer to go to Israel rather than to EU countries. There are claims that the inflow of Ukrainians has not only led to Ukrainians working illegally but also to an increase in sex trafficking, which Israel is trying to combat by returning people at the border.

Syrians working in the agricultural business struggle to sustain livelihoods in Turkey

On 29 April, the [New York Times](#) reported that on Turkish farms – which produce 70% of the world's hazelnuts for Nestlé, Godiva and Nutella - Syrians cannot earn a living wage. A growing number of seasonal hazelnut workers are Syrian refugees, but few have work permits, which means that the **majority lack legal protection**. Turkey's Labour Code does not apply to agricultural businesses with fewer than 50 employees, so much of the policing of this crop falls to independent confectionery companies. Nearly every farmer offers the minimum wage, and this will not keep a family above the country's poverty line. According to the New York Times, pay is cut further by middlemen, known as *dayibasi*, who connect workers to farms and often pocket more than a 10% cut of wages.

Forced returns from Lebanon

Human Rights Watch and four other groups [alleged in a report](#) on 24 May that staff at Lebanon's General Security Directorate summarily **deported at least 16 Syrians** after forcing them to [sign](#) "voluntarily repatriation forms." At least five of the 16 were registered refugees, and at least 13 "expressed their fears of torture or persecution if returned to Syria," Human Rights Watch said in a statement. The Lebanese security Directorate "categorically [denies](#) it forced any Syrian to sign any form". While large-scale mass-return campaigns have not started, it is clear that the [rhetoric in Lebanon](#) is moving in that [direction](#).

Iraq frees 45 Bangladeshi workers held in central Baghdad

On 25 April, Iraqi police [announced](#) the liberation of 45 Bangladeshi workers who had been held in the centre of Baghdad. The policy said that the workers were held captive by a Baghdad-based labour company that was allegedly planning to exploit them in the future. Two Iraqis and four Bangladeshis were arrested for their suspected involvement in the detainment of the workers.

Dozens of Syrian refugees evicted from a riverside refugee camp in Lebanon

Lebanese authorities [demolished a riverside refugee camp](#) and evicted at least 50 Syrians, including children, on 27 April. A [video](#) of the demolition was posted on Twitter by the Litani River Authority (LRA). According to the LRA, the demolition was because refugees were throwing waste into the river or onto agricultural lands, blocking irrigation canals. The UNHCR [reports](#) that it is in touch with the affected families and following up on their needs. The director of research at the Issam Fares Institute [suggested](#) the LRA's approach "feeds the **narrative that the refugees must go**, that they are burdening our resources (...)" Lebanese authorities have "been restricting movements of Syrian refugees, closing shops run by them and much more", he [said](#). "All of this needs to be seen in the big picture of creating a hostile environment for Syrian refugees to push them out, even if conditions for their return are not yet favourable."

Syrian displacement in the Middle East

The Middle East hosts around [5.6 million Syrian refugees](#)² and around [5.9 million Syrians internally displaced](#) in Syria. In 2019 (as of 31 May 2019), there were [35,509](#) verified³ refugee return movements from Jordan ([13,118](#))⁴, Turkey ([10,763](#)), Lebanon ([8,512](#))⁵, Iraq ([2,932](#)) and Egypt ([184](#)). UNHCR [estimates](#) that 10% of Syrian refugees need resettlement and meet the criteria. This means that 563,506 (registered) Syrian refugees need resettlement. However, available data from the first five months of 2019 indicate that [14,631](#) Syrian refugees have been submitted for resettlement, whereas in the same period [9,636](#) (66%) actually departed for resettlement.


² This includes an estimated 35,713 Syrian refugees in North Africa.

³ The numbers reported are only those monitored/verified by [UNHCR](#) and do not reflect the entire returns.

⁴ The figures following the re-opening of the border in October 2018 are tentative. UNHCR identifies returns based on departure lists regularly obtained from the Government.


⁵ Data includes only those verified by UNHCR, General Security reported additional figures from their Group Returns and of these a total of 740 individuals were not known to UNHCR.

Syrian displacement, resettlement and spontaneous return in 2019*



Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries⁶

Updates on foreign nationals in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries



6 The movement of refugees and migrants from the Horn of Africa through Yemen and towards the Gulf Countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, is covered in the [Quarterly Mixed Migration Updates by the MMC East Africa & Yemen](#) and therefore not included here.

African trade unions address exploitation of African migrants in the Gulf

The Organisation of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC–Africa), the umbrella body of all Trade Unions in Africa, [published a study](#) in 2018 highlighting **the range of abuses** migrant workers from Africa face in the GCC states, including unscrupulous recruitment agencies and fees, a lack of "decent wages" and an inability to access justice.

In June, the African trade unions launched a campaign across ten countries to highlight these abuses. The FCT council of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and the National Trade Union Network on Migration [held a rally](#) at the UAE embassy in Abuja for the **protection of the rights of African migrant workers** in the GCC states. They also called for a halt to or genuine reform of the kafala sponsorship system; decent wages and working conditions for African migrants, especially domestic workers; access to justice where the rights of migrants have been violated; enjoyment of labour rights, including right to freedom of association; the removal of exit visa for migrant workers; and a review of the [Abu Dhabi Dialogue](#) (ADD) to include African Governments as partner members and not as "invitees", and also involve non-state actors such as trade unions.

'Policy reforms may improve the protection of migrant workers in the GCC states'

In its 2018 review of Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, [Amnesty International](#) said there had been **positive legislative developments** in Qatar and the UAE with respect to migrant labour and/or domestic workers. However, there are still migrant workers who face exploitation, including in countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman and Saudi Arabia. For a large part this is due to the [kefala sponsorship system](#) which restricts migrants from accessing their human rights as the sponsor usually maintains control and power over the migrant workers - including entry, visa renewals, labour mobility and in some cases exit from the country.

Qatar issued a new [Labour Law](#) that allows migrant workers to leave the country without seeking their employers' permission. It has been hailed as [a milestone for migrant workers](#) but there are limitations as the law does not cover 174,000 domestic workers in Qatar.

The **UAE** introduced labour reforms which may improve the situation of migrant workers. The regulation and process on recruiting domestic workers may also come under greater scrutiny with a newly created [labour inspection and coordination department](#) that targets high risk employment and strengthened protection. In the UAE, as in Kuwait, the directorates of domestic workers' affairs were transferred from the Ministries of Interior to the Ministries of Labour, underlining the importance accorded to equal rights for this category of workers. Also, some workers might be allowed to work for various employers and have a new low-cost insurance that protects them in the event of job loss.

Kuwait [introduced](#) Law 69 to establish a government shareholder company that organizes the recruitment of domestic workers. Kuwait also announced the first minimum wage for domestic workers in the Arab States.

Saudi Arabia is taking steps to develop a federation for the workers' committees and new regulations were also announced to ensure a "comfortable" working environment for women, such as equal pay and regulated working hours. There are also plans to make the sponsorship system more flexible and allow some migrant workers to transfer from one sponsor to another.

Kuwait and Cambodia begin to apply a decade-old MOU for labour migration

[Cambodia](#) is going to send migrant workers to Kuwait for the first time, although the two states signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2009. The two countries agreed a target of **5,000 workers**. Human rights activists and labour organizations are deeply concerned about the plan as several Cambodians have [reported](#) abuse and exploitation in other countries in the Middle East. In the past two years, at least six women have returned home with stories of exploitation and abuse. Human rights organizations have been warning of **the risks of sending workers** to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Kuwait for years. In 2011, Cambodian recruitment agencies decided not to send maids to Kuwait out of fear they would be abused. While Kuwait has a [questionable reputation](#) for protecting migrants, the Cambodian Labour Minister Ith Sam Heng [said](#) that "If the working conditions are good and with a reasonable minimum wage, the [Cambodian] government will send more workers in the coming years."

Saudi Arabia releases mobile app to approve the movement of women and migrant workers

Saudi Arabia developed and released the mobile app [Absher](#), which can be used by male guardians to approve the **movement of women**. The app also operates as a [government e-service](#) for renewing passports or obtaining ID cards. As [Human Rights Watch](#) explains, Saudi Arabia requires women "to have a male guardian – usually a father, husband, brother, or even a son – to obtain a passport, travel abroad, marry, undertake higher education, or be released from prison." The app makes it possible for male guardians to allow or refuse women to travel abroad or obtain a passport. While the app does not track women's movement in real time, it does keep [a record](#) of their trips in and out of Saudi Arabia.

The app also enables employment sponsors to control **whether foreign workers and their family members can leave the country**. As part of the [kefala sponsorship system](#), Saudi is the only country in the region that maintains a requirement that all migrant workers must request an exit permit from their sponsor to leave the country. The employer can approve or deny exit visas and specify when the migrant workers needs to return to the country. This practise also [violates people's right](#) "to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country", as provided under the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](#) (UDHR). It also goes against the [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women](#) (CEDAW), which was ratified by Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia releases Indonesian maids sentenced to death for ‘witchcraft’

Two Indonesian maids have been [released](#) after serving 10 years in prison for witchcraft. Activists have been [demanding](#) the **release of the domestic workers** and staged protests during King Salman Bin AbdulAziz's visit to Jakarta in 2017. In 2018, the Indonesian government filed a formal complaint to Saudi Arabia after an Indonesian domestic worker was executed in October without informing family or consular staff. The domestic worker was sentenced to death for killing her employer, which she claimed was self-defence because of rape. There are currently 11 Indonesians on death row in Saudi Arabia.

Indonesia has long complained about the treatment of its workers abroad and in [2015 introduced a ban on new domestic workers from migrating to 21 Middle Eastern countries](#), including Saudi Arabia. However, in October 2018, following improvements in bilateral cooperation, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia [signed an agreement](#) for more than **30,000 new worker visas**.

900 migrant construction workers have been without pay in Dubai for 10 months

On 3 April, [The National](#) reported that about 900 Indian and Bangladeshi construction workers in Dubai had been **without pay for 10 months**. The Indian consulate and the Bangladesh embassy have been working with labour ministry officials to convince the employer to make the payments so the workers can return home. However, the company says they do not have the money to pay the workers. The government has warned that it will shut down the company if it fails to pay and encouraged workers to report issues to the authorities.

Indian domestic workers face difficulties in the GCC

The Indian website [The Citizen](#) reported on the situation of Indian workers in the Gulf. According to The Citizen, Hyderabad, a city in the south of India, has emerged as an epicentre for “unscrupulous local agents (...) who target women from the economically weaker sections of society and lure them into promising jobs. Once they reach their destination their passport is confiscated by kafeels, and then begin the horrors of slavery.”

Nepali embassy in Qatar repatriates workers brought to the country by fraudulent visa schemes and recruitment agents

The [Kathmandu Post](#) reports that the Nepal embassy in Qatar has received **requests from migrant workers to be repatriated**. The workers say they were lured to Qatar with false promises of free movement between jobs and made to pay "hefty amounts" in recruitment fees. Allegations were made that recruitment agencies and company employers colluded to promise lucrative employment and no objection certificates (NOC) permitting migrant workers to change employer freely through a so-called 'Aazad Visa'. However, these types of arrangement and visa do not exist. The [16 Nepali workers](#) who were stranded in Qatar for months without jobs were victims of the same scheme. Following these reports, the government came up

with a [directive](#) that better protects Nepalis working abroad. Before leaving Nepal, recruiting agencies and foreign companies need to have their work demand letters approved by the Nepali embassy in the country of destination. According to the [Himalayan News Service](#), Nepal is also finalising a draft MoU on a bilateral labour agreement with Oman, and revising a **labour agreement** with the UAE.

Public institutions in Qatar pledge fair recruitment of migrant workers

On 21 May, [ILO reports](#) that key public institutions in Qatar [pledged](#) support to ensure **fair recruitment of migrant workers in Qatar**. One of the commitments is to make sure that "No worker should pay to get a job": that recruitment fees and costs are not transferred to workers and that workers remain debt-free upon arriving in Qatar. There is a plan to establish a quarterly working group meeting of public sector actors to develop policies and tools to help address the problem of workers paying fees, and deception at the recruitment stage. These meetings will be facilitated by the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs and start in July 2019.

650 migrant workers stranded in camps in Oman


On 25 April, [Migrant-Rights](#) reports that one of Oman's richest construction companies left 650 migrant workers stranded in camps and without wages for the [past 10 months](#), and withheld their passports. Most of the migrants are from India, with a few from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Migrant-Rights reports that most of their visas have now expired and that they do not leave the camps for fear of arrest, even though it is the company that has not renewed the work permits.

Mixed Migration to Turkey and Europe

Refugees and migrants continue to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe

In the second quarter of 2019, there have been [17,823](#) new irregular arrivals to Italy, Spain and Greece via land and the three Mediterranean Sea routes compared to 15,624 in the previous quarter. Focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean route specifically, there has been an increase of new arrivals to [Greece](#) via sea (+2,381 or 45% increase) and decrease via land (-465 or 16% decrease) compared to the previous quarter. As the numbers of arrivals usually tend to be lower around wintertime and Q1 each year, this overall increase was anticipated. When comparing arrivals to Greece in Q2 2018 and Q2 2019, we see a decrease, which is especially high regarding the arrivals via land (-4,445 or 65% decrease), although there was also a decrease in the numbers of arrivals via sea (-765 or 9% decrease).

Number of arrivals by Mediterranean route



Mediterranean route arrivals

	2018 Q1	2018 Q2	2018 Q3	2018 Q4	2019 Q1	2019 Q2
<u>Greece (sea)</u>	5,330	8,387	8,181	9,075	5,241	7,622
<u>Greece (land)</u>	2,578	6,866	3,948	4,146	2,886	2,421
<u>Italy (sea)</u>	6,296	10,281	6,647	2,346	524	2,231
<u>Spain (sea)</u>	3,385	11,681	21,954	20,351	6,973	5,549
<u>Spain (land)</u>	1,615	1,259	2,098	1,785		
Total	19,204	38,474	42,828	37,703	15,624	17,823

In 2019, with data from 31 May 2019, the most common nationalities among sea arrivals in Greece are Afghans (34%), Syrians (15%), Iraqis (12%), Congolese (11%), and Palestinians (11%).

Based on [available data from the first four months of 2019](#), 387 Syrians and 224 Palestinians also arrived in Spain via land (Ceuta and Melilla) and sea. No other nationals from Middle Eastern countries were recorded on this route.⁷

Via the Central Mediterranean route, based on [available data from the first five months of 2019](#), Italy received 165 people from Iraq and 2 from Syria. No other nationals from the Middle Eastern countries have been recorded along this route.⁸

Crossing the Eastern Mediterranean remains dangerous and deadly

During the second quarter of 2019, [233](#) people went missing or died while crossing the Mediterranean Sea. [37](#) people were recorded missing or dead in the Eastern Mediterranean, compared to [136](#) in the Central and [60](#) in the Western Mediterranean. Due to the [challenges of collecting information](#) about these people and the contexts of their deaths, the true number of fatalities is likely much higher. Information on the fate of those who went missing, died or were apprehended/survived crossing the Eastern Mediterranean is mainly coming from the Turkish Authorities (more on in the sections below).


[On 3 May](#), nine people, including five children, dead after their boat sank off the north-western coast of Turkey. Three people, including a suspected migrant smuggler, went missing and have probably drowned. Five others survived.

⁷ The majority of arrivals via Western Mediterranean route are from countries in Africa, such as Morocco (2,007), Guinea (1,314), and Mali (1,215).

⁸ Most arrivals via Central Mediterranean route are from Tunisia (347), Pakistan (232), Algeria (201), and Bangladesh (145).

[On 11 June](#), seven people drowned when a rubber boat capsized in the sea area of Pamfyla, Lesvos. The rescue operation took 4.5 hours and was led by forces from the Hellenic Coast Guard, Frontex and the Hellenic Air Force. According to the Hellenic Coast Guard, the four women, two young girls and one man were rescued from the water unconscious and [rushed](#) to the local hospital, where their deaths were confirmed. The boat was carrying a total of 64 migrants and refugees, among them 57 survivors. Most survivors came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while some originated from Cameroon and Angola.

Number of dead and missing at sea



Dead and missing at sea

	2018 Q2	2018 Q3	2018 Q4	2019 Q1	2019 Q2
Central Mediterranean	592	307	33	205	136
Eastern Mediterranean	29	83	56	14	37
Western Mediterranean	165	174	335	132	60
TOTAL:	786	564	424	351	233
CUM TOTAL Per Year:	1,289	1,853	2,277	351	584

Refugees, foreign nationals and arrivals in Turkey

As of 13 June 2019, according to the latest available figures from the Turkish Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), more than 4 million foreign nationals are present in Turkish territory and seeking international protection. Most are Syrians ([3,614,108](#)) who were granted temporary protection (TP) status. According to UNHCR there are [368,230⁹](#) asylum-seekers and refugees from Afghanistan (170,000), Iraq (142,000), Iran (39,000), Somalia (5,700) and other countries. In addition, as of 16 June, there are [998,714](#) foreign nationals with residence permit holder status, including those who have humanitarian residency. No breakdown of residence permit holder by nationality is yet available for 2019, but in 2018, [104,444](#) Iraqi and [99,643](#) Syrian nationals were among the majority residence permit holders in Turkey. Out of a total of [85,840](#) work permit holders, [16,783](#) were Syrian.


The number of readmitted migrants and refugees to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement increased by 34 this quarter, bringing the total to [1,875](#) since March 2019. The majority are from Pakistan (718), Syria (351), Algeria (194), Afghanistan (110), and Bangladesh (103). [UNHCR reported](#) that of all those returned, 45% did not express a will to apply for asylum or withdrew their will to apply for asylum, or their actual asylum claims, in Greece.

A total of [83,163](#) arrivals in Turkey were recorded during the second quarter of 2019, which is an increase from the first quarter of 2019, when [50,059](#) arrivals were recorded. As per 26 June 2019, this brings the total for this year to [137,035](#). If this trend continues for the next two quarters, the total number of arrivals for 2019 will most likely be in line with the arrivals in 2018. The total number of arrivals in Turkey was 268,003 in 2018, 175,752 in 2017, 146,485 in 2016.

As of 26 June 2019, the majority of arrivals are [from](#) Afghanistan (39%), Pakistan (16%) and Syria (9%). When comparing the data from both quarters, the country with highest increase in absolute numbers is Afghanistan (+13,249 or 67%), but the country with the highest relative increase is Pakistan (+8,773 or 126%).

⁹ [UNHCR ended the registration process](#) in Turkey on 10 September 2018 and is expected to be carried out by the Turkish authorities.

Nationalities of arrivals in Turkey in 2019



In the second quarter of 2019, the Turkish authorities apprehended [2,167](#) smugglers, compared to 1,609 in the previous quarter. This brings the total number of apprehended smugglers to [3,776](#) in 2019. The total number of smugglers captured in 2018 was 6,278, 4,641 in 2017 and 3,314 in 2016.

[42](#) victims of human trafficking have been identified in Q2. This brings the total to [71](#) in 2019. The total number of identified victims of human trafficking was 134 in 2018, 303 in 2017 and 181 in 2016.

[8,640](#) people were apprehended/rescued in all seas surrounding Turkey, whereas the total of the previous quarter was [4,316](#). These people were captured during a total of [262](#) operations, compared to [119](#) in the previous quarter. [16](#) 'Organisers' were apprehended at sea, compared to [9](#) in the previous quarter.

In [April](#) and [May](#), as reported by IOM based on data from the Turkish Coast Guard, the top five nationalities of apprehended/rescued migrants and refugees are Afghan, Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, Congolese.

On [25 May](#), the Intelligence Agency and the Turkish Police arrested 20 members of an international migrant smuggling organisation. At least 569 migrants and refugees were also apprehended.

[Early June](#), the coast guard intercepted 60 mainly African migrants and refugees trying to reach the Greek islands off the coast of western Turkey's Izmir province. 16 others were rescued as their boat was sinking. Among them were women and children from Afghanistan and Iran.

Mid-April, the [Turkish Coast Guard](#) rescued 43 migrants and refugees off the coast of the north-western Edirne province. Among them were children. Separately, 51 refugees and migrants trying to cross the Aegean to Lesbos were apprehended/rescued when their boat got into trouble.

[In May](#), 37 refugees and migrants from Afghanistan and 13 from Pakistan were detained in Van province after having crossed into Turkey via land. Also in Van province, police forces detained 221 people who entered Turkey illegally. Three people smugglers were also arrested. In the southern Hatay province, border forces held 85 people who had crossed illegally from neighbouring Syria. Two people were arrested for people smuggling.

Reports of human trafficking, exploitation and abuse along the Eastern Mediterranean route

Between January and October 2018, [IOM](#) collected data from 2,381 refugees and migrants in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Montenegro and North Macedonia, to better understand human trafficking, exploitation and abuse along the Eastern Mediterranean route. Ten percent reported at least one and 1% reported at least two instances of human trafficking, exploitation and abuse. Men were more likely than women to report least one of the five exploitative practices¹⁰ indicators (11% versus 7%, respectively). Four percent of respondents reported having suffered from physical violence during the journey. The most frequently cited violence was a beating. 36% of all violence was reported to have occurred in Turkey (Izmir, Istanbul, and the border with Syria and Iran), followed by Greece (17%) and North Macedonia (10%). Although not more than a handful, there were respondents who reported that they had worked or provided services for someone during their journey against their will or without receiving the expected payment. There were also respondents who received threats of sexual violence or were approached by someone who offered an arranged marriage.

[IOM's](#) study also provided contextual data on the profiles of respondents travelling along the three routes. Those who travelled along the Eastern Mediterranean route were slightly older (27 years), less likely to travel alone, more likely to have completed tertiary education, and also more likely to be unemployed compared to those travelling along the other two routes.

¹⁰ Events captured by the five indicators were reported to have taken place primarily in Turkey (44% of all reported incidents) and Greece (35%). 6% of respondents reported North Macedonia, 2% reported Montenegro and the rest reported other countries.

Refugees and migrants increasingly attempting to reach the EU through Cyprus, where they lack job opportunities

Cyprus is an increasingly popular entry point for migrants and refugees. [IOM](#) reported 1,078 arrivals in 2017, 1,268 in 2018 and as of 30 June 2019, 2,504 in 2019. If this trend continues there will be four times as many arrivals in 2019 compared to 2018. From Cyprus, many try to cross over land from the Turkish-controlled to the Greek part of the island. On 23 April, Cyprian police stopped [37 refugees and migrants](#) who tried to cross this border. According to the head of Nicosia Migrant Centre, many arrive in Cyprus [unintentionally](#): “the migrants find themselves here because of the smuggling routes. The smugglers drop them off here and say, ‘this is Italy go’ or ‘this is Europe go’. They don’t ask which country in Europe; they assume they are on the mainland”.

In Cyprus, **many struggle to access the labour market** even though an October 2018 ministerial decision states that asylum seekers should be given access to the labour market one month after filing their asylum application. [The reality is very different](#). One of the challenges is finding a valid rental contract, which is often the first hurdle asylum seekers must overcome because they cannot register at the labour office or receive the benefits without an official rental contract. Another challenge is that asylum seekers are only allowed to work in low-paying jobs in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, waste management, wholesale trade repairs, building as well as outdoor cleaning (car washes), food delivery and leafleting. An additional problem is the amount of paperwork that is required from employers who plan to employ an asylum seeker. On 16 April, [100–170 asylum seekers protested](#) against poor job prospects and exploitation in Cyprus. They demanded full access to the labour market.

Nationals from Syria lodged the most applications for international protection in the EU+ in April 2019

In April 2019, as reported by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), [EU+ countries recorded](#) some [54,640](#) applications for international protection. This is a 7% (4,100) decrease compared to the previous month but up by 9% compared to a year ago in March 2018. The decrease was partially due to fewer working days in several countries as well as some missing data. By [April 2019](#), applications for international protection were up by 15% compared to the same period last year (January to April). **Nationals of Syria, Afghanistan and Venezuela lodged the most applications for international protection in the EU+**. Nationals of Iraq, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey, Georgia, Iran and Pakistan also lodged considerable numbers of applications, but fewer than the month before - except Iraqis, who applied in similar numbers, and Turks (increase of 26%).


Syrians continued to lodge [the highest number of applications](#) for international protection (4,930) in April 2019, but lodged 8% fewer applications compared to March. Syrian applicants received some 5,500 first-instance decisions, much fewer than the previous month (-28%). Overall in the EU+, more Syrian cases were closed (decision or withdrawn or discontinued) than applications were lodged. Approximately 41,000 Syrian applications were pending at first instance by the end of April. The EU+ recognition rate for decisions issued in the past six months (November 2018 - April 2019) was 88%, stable with the previous semester.

Thematic Section: Increasing number of Afghan arrivals in Turkey

After [Syria](#) and [Venezuela](#), Afghanistan is the third largest country of origin in the world for refugees with close to [2.6 million registered refugees](#) – half of them are children. Previous MMC research [revealed](#) that most Afghans decided to leave Afghanistan based on mixed motivations: violent conflict and insecurity as well as a lack of employment opportunities. 2.3 million or 90% of refugees, ended up neighbouring countries Iran and Pakistan, but there have been also those who attempted to access third country resettlement or reach Europe via Turkey.

Recently, Turkey has witnessed an increasing number of refugees and migrants arriving from Afghanistan. In 2018, out of a total of [268,003](#) arrivals¹¹, arrivals from Afghanistan made up by far the largest group of new arrivals in Turkey ([100,841](#) or 38%). By 26 June 2019, Afghans are still the largest group of new arrivals in Turkey: out of a total of [137,035](#) arrivals in 2019, [52,934](#) or 39% originated from Afghanistan. The graph below shows the increasing number of Afghan arrivals compared to the other top nationalities of arrivals. From 2014–2017, Afghans were number two after Syrians, but since then Afghans constitute the largest proportion of arrivals.

Top four nationalities of arrivals in Turkey since 2014



¹¹ All the figures on these arrivals to Turkey are coming from the Turkish Authorities. The Turkish Authorities regards all these arrivals as "irregular arrivals", even if the people originate from refugee sending countries such as Syria. Foreigners with residence and/or work [permits](#) or different visas are calculated and categorised differently.

While Afghan migration to Turkey dates to when the [Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979](#), there are indications that the increased number of movements to Turkey have to do a [deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan](#) - ongoing conflict, the worst [drought](#) in decades, and deepening poverty. Last year, the number of civilians who were killed in Afghanistan reached the highest in a decade. Other reasons may be [worsening economic conditions and lack of protection in Iran](#). Iran borders Turkey and hosts the majority of Afghan refugees, and the situation in Iran may have [motivated Afghans](#) to move to Turkey and seek protection there. Turkey's efforts to construct a border wall between Iran and Turkey [may have](#) spurred more crossings in 2018. By November 2018, Turkey [reported](#) that it had almost completed the 144-kilometre wall.

Many Afghans do not regard Turkey as their destination and try to enter Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean Sea route.¹² In 2018, 18% ([9,000](#)) of the total [32,500](#) sea arrivals in Greece were from Afghanistan. Afghans made up the largest group, followed by Syrians (16%) and Iraqis (12%). Again in 2019, Afghans are by far the largest group of people traveling from Turkey to Greece by sea. By 31 May, out of a total of [12,258](#) people who crossed the Eastern Mediterranean Sea into Greece, 27% ([3,349](#)) came from Afghanistan. As [reported](#) by UNHCR and its partners in Serbia, an increasing numbers of Afghans – including [many unaccompanied children](#) - also [attempt to enter Europe over land](#) via Bulgaria and North Macedonia.

While Europe is a key destination, and [45,300](#) Afghans lodged applications for asylum in Europe in 2018, Afghans' prospects of being granted asylum are not high. In the EU, the average first-instance asylum recognition rate for Afghans was 43% in 2018, and there are large [variations](#) (between 6% and 98%) across EU+ countries with no apparent reason for the divergence to be found in the nature of the cases.¹³

For those who apply for asylum in Turkey, the process has become more challenging. In September 2018, the Turkish authorities fully transferred responsibility for the registration and processing of asylum applications of non-Syrians from the UNHCR to Turkey's Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). Although this had been planned for at least two years, the implementation came as a surprise in the wake of the increasing numbers of Afghan arrivals in 2018. The transferred responsibility has created [obstacles](#) and delays in registering as an asylum seeker with DGMM offices at the local level (the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM)), and obtaining Turkish identity cards (or "kimliks," in Turkish). Without official documentation, refugees may not be able to access essential health and education services.¹⁴ Another direct risk of not having official documentation in time is arrest, detention and deportation. Over 2018, Turkey's detention capacity has [almost doubled](#) to 24 active pre-removal centres and a detention capacity of 16,116 people. Another 11 centres with 5,350 places are currently under construction. In April 2018, with the new arrivals and due to a shortage in capacity, the DGMM resorted to other facilities for pre-removal detention and detained people in [3 sports venues in Erzurum](#).

12 In 2018 in a survey done by [IOM](#) among Syrian, Iranian, Iraqi and Afghan refugees and migrants in Turkey, the findings showed that 75 % of the Afghan respondents reported Turkey as their destination country at the time of departure, while 50% reported Turkey as their destination country at the time of the interview. Europe (mostly Germany) was a desirable destination (with 22% of respondents reporting Europe as their intended destination at the time of the interview and 14% at the time of the departure), followed by Canada.

13 [ECRE](#) argues for a halt to returns to Afghanistan until there are significant changes in the situation in Afghanistan and until ECRE's three prerequisites for return are in place in Europe, specifically, fair and consistent asylum decision-making, dignified return procedures, and partnerships with third countries that are transparent and respect fundamental rights.

14 There was a report of an [Afghan asylum seeker](#) who lost his life after being refused access to a hospital in Izmir due to lack of an identification document. He had previously made an application at Van PDMM, which referred him to Afyon PDMM to register his claim. [His application was cancelled due](#) to non-compliance with the 15-day time limit.

Together with the [global decline](#) in resettlement quotas since 2016, the likelihood of Afghans accessing third country resettlement has also declined. In 2018, UNHCR in Turkey submitted [16,402](#) cases for resettlement of whom 69% (11,375) were Syrian and 15% (2,387) Afghan refugees. The number of people who actually departed to a third country is even lower, with [8,883](#) departures, of which 91% (8,096) Syrians and only 2% (170) Afghans. This year, as of 31 May, [1,876](#) Afghan cases have been submitted for resettlement in Turkey, but only [319](#) departed.

In an MMC [study](#) among Afghan returnees in 2019, returnees from Turkey cited challenges with host communities, poor local integration and loneliness as reasons for returning. Others mentioned difficulty learning the Turkish language and finding work. Other reasons were border closures and the inability to access third country protection. In 2018, there were [mixed reports](#) of an increasing number of Afghans returning from Turkey.

Reportedly, the governments of Afghanistan and [Turkey have agreed](#) on the deportation of Afghans who have been living in Turkey without legal documents. The Turkish authorities report that all the returns of Afghans are voluntary while others report that they have been [detained](#) and [deported against their will](#). Refugees International [received reports](#) from actors on the ground that Afghans have been coerced or misled into signing documents they could not understand and returned against [their will](#). An estimated [31,000](#) Afghans have returned/been deported¹⁵ to Afghanistan from Turkey in 2018.

¹⁵ According to [TRTWorld](#), the Turkey's Prime Minister Binali Yildirim has said Turkey will build a refugee camp on its Iran border to deal with the influx but reassured that only those with links to terror groups will be deported.


Highlighted New Research and Reports



Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018

UNHCR | June 2019


In advance of World Refugee Day, UNHCR [released](#) its annual Global Trends report, finding that 70.8 million children, women and men were forcibly displaced at the close of 2018, including 25.9 million refugees, 5.5 million Palestinian refugees who are under the care of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 3.5 million asylum seekers and 41.3 million IDPs.



Child Labour in the Arab Region: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis

League of Arab States (LAS) and the Arab Council for Childhood Development (ACCD) | March 2019

[Commissioned](#) by the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Arab Council for Childhood Development (ACCD), the "[Child Labour in the Arab Region: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis](#)" report found, among other conclusions that child labour is on the rise among refugees and internally displaced populations in the Arab region.



Private Sector & Refugees - Pathways to Scale

Bridgespan Group + ICF World Bank | May 2019

This study draws lessons from [173 private sector initiatives](#) in Africa and the Middle East, focused on refugees and host communities. The study identified three main factors as critical to the future success of such initiatives: flexible funding, cross-sector collaboration involving government, humanitarian and development actors, and making more data and information available to potential investors.



Special Issue on Return and Reintegration

Migration Policy Practice (Vol. IX, Number 1, January 2019–March 2019)

IOM's Migration Policy Practice Journal published a special issue on Return and Reintegration as the discourse on return and reintegration has gained renewed prominence in national and international political agendas in recent years. In 2018, with the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, governments pledged to cooperate "in facilitating safe and dignified return as well as sustainable reintegration." Within this context, the special issue presents challenges, opportunities, existing practices and policy implications on return and reintegration.



Impact of Refugee Labour Inclusion on the Host State Economy

Mercy Corps and WANA Institute | April 2019

Mercy Corps partnered with West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute on a series of research products to quantify and track labour integration impacts in Jordan from a multi-sectoral perspective. The [reports](#) provide an increased understanding of the status of Syrian labour, its effects on the opportunities of other foreign labour, and the government's efforts towards providing Syrian refugees access to work permits, as well as the effect on national investments and economic activities.



The impact of refugees on employment and wages in Jordan

Belal Fallah, Caroline Krafft, Jackline Wahba | June 2019

Since 2011, the Syrian conflict led to a large refugee influx into Jordan. This [paper](#)¹⁶ discusses the impact of Syrians on the Jordanian labour market. Overall, the authors find that Jordanians living in areas with additional refugees have had no worse labour market outcomes than Jordanians with less exposure to the refugee influx. The labour supply shock appears to have been offset by additional labour demand.

16 Article [published](#) in the Jordan of Development Economics in June 2019, but with restricted access.



Working towards self-reliance: Syrian refugees' economic participation in Turkey

Durable Solutions Platform | April 2019


The [Durable Solutions Platform](#) released a new research [report](#) and [policy brief](#) on the integration of Syrian refugees into the Turkish labour market ([Report](#) and [Brief](#) can also be read in Turkish). Key findings of the research were that (1) self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods are almost unattainable for Syrian refugees in Turkey today, (2) the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) assistance is of vital importance for many Syrian refugees' ability to meet their basic needs along with informal employment and (3) gender norms present a significant obstacle for Syrian women to access the labour market.



Refugees and hosting country economy- Integration modes & cooperation policy options

Marco Zupi and Alberto Mazzali (CeSPI, Rome, Italy) in collaboration with Royal Scientific Society, Amman, Jordan) | March 2019


The study compares the economic integration of migrants and refugees in Jordan and Italy. It looks at various models for integration and inclusion policies.



International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq

UNHCR | May 2019


The UNHCR published a new guideline on the International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Republic of Iraq. It provides an overview and update on main developments in Iraq since 2017 and the way international protection needs of asylum seekers from Iraq are assessed. UNHCR also presents its position on forced returns: "(...) UNHCR urges States to refrain from forcibly returning persons who originate from areas previously controlled by ISIS or areas with a continued ISIS presence to their areas of origin.



Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Kuwait

Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population (GLLM) | April 2019


Recent migration flows to Kuwait suggest a shift in recruitment policies towards upgrading expatriates' level of qualifications and occupations, while policies aim to correct the country's "demographic imbalance" and nationalise the labour force. Kuwait also has a sizeable population of stateless residents (the Biduns), who are considered illegal residents.



Lessons Learned and Emerging Good Practices of ILO's Syria Crisis Response in Jordan and Lebanon

ILO | April 2019

In 2016, the ILO adopted the Guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market. In order to operationalize these principles, within the framework of the Regional Refugee Response and Resilience Plan (3RP), the Jordan Response Plan, and the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), the ILO Regional Office for Arab states has adopted a development-focused and employment-driven strategy to support host communities and refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. This report synthesizes the lessons learned and emerging good practices from the ILO interventions to promote decent work amongst Syrian refugees and host communities.



Lebanon: Forced Displacement

ACAPS | June 2019

Anti-refugee rhetoric is on the rise in Lebanon and pressure on Syrian refugees to return is increasing. Refugees are being pushed back to Syria, through a combination of restrictive government policies, dire humanitarian conditions, and discrimination. ACAPS published this anticipatory note on forced displacement in Lebanon and included an analysis of the drivers of the crisis, the anticipated crisis impact, potential aggravating factors, and the response capacity.

LEADERS
 For Sustainable Livelihoods

**DIGNITY AT STAKE:
CHALLENGES TO ACCESSING
DECENT WORK IN LEBANON**

DISCUSSION PAPER



critical gaps with respect to contracts, minimum wage, and social protections through the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and provides recommendations for ways forward.

Dignity at stake: challenges to accessing decent work in Lebanon

CARE International, Oxfam, Save the Children, Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), Danish Refugee Council | May 2019

The Syria crisis has exacerbated pre-existing labour market challenges in Lebanon. Within an already complex political, demographic, and economic context, major challenges exist to establishing a decent work environment for all workers in Lebanon. The country currently hosts more than 200,000 migrant workers from Asia and Africa under the kafala system). This report points to

critical gaps with respect to contracts, minimum wage, and social protections through the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and provides recommendations for ways forward.

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The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey
Gerasimos Tsourapas

Abstract
How does forced migration affect the politics of host states and, in particular, how does it impact states' foreign policy decision-making? This relevant literature on refugee politics has yet to fully explore how forced migration affects host states' behaviour. This article addresses this gap by examining three major host states of displaced communities—the Syrian refugee crisis—Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. While all three engaged in post-2011 refugee rent-seeking behaviour, they did so for different reasons. Lebanon and Turkey sought to leverage their position as host states by increasing their position as displaced communities for material gain. It focuses on the international dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis and argues that they also have the way to leverage their position as displaced communities for material gain. Turkey and Lebanon have been able to do so because they have been able to increase their influence over the international dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis and argue that they also have the way to leverage their position as displaced communities for material gain. Turkey and Lebanon have been able to do so because they have been able to increase their influence over the international dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis and argue that they also have the way to leverage their position as displaced communities for material gain.

Keywords: Middle East, forced displacement, inductive inquiry, case studies, migration, refugee, rentier states

Introduction
“We can open our borders to Greece and Bulgaria, and we can close them to the refugees because,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared to a group of European Union leaders in 2015. “If you don’t get a deal [EU leaders] will just close their borders.”¹ In other words, Erdogan was threatening to close the borders of Turkey if the EU did not offer him a deal. In 2015, Turkey became the third largest host state of the Syrian refugee community and domestic elite perception of their governance importance vis-à-vis the international dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis increased. This article explores the workings of these refugee rentier states, namely states seeking to leverage their position as host states of displaced communities for material gain. It focuses on the Syrian refugee crisis, examining the foreign policy responses of three major host states—Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.

1. See, for example, “Turkey’s Erdogan: ‘We can open our borders to Greece and Bulgaria, and we can close them to the refugees because’,” *Al-Jazeera English*, 2015, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/turkeys-erdogan-we-can-open-our-borders-to-greece-and-bulgaria-and-we-can-close-them-to-the-refugees-because-20159141141111.html.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

Gerasimos Tsourapas | May 2019

How does forced migration affect the politics of host states and how does it impact states' foreign policy decision-making? The relevant literature on refugee politics has yet to fully explore how forced migration affects host states' behaviour. This [article](#) explores the workings of these refugee rentier states, namely states seeking to leverage their position as host states of displaced communities for material gain. It focuses on the Syrian refugee crisis, examining the foreign policy responses of three major host states—Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey.

The Dignity of Humanitarian Migrants: Explaining Migrants' Destination Preferences
Alisha Holland¹
Margaret Peters¹
Thania Sanchez²

Abstract
How do migrants fleeing violence choose where to go? Prior studies argue that asylum seekers select countries based on countries' wealth and access to welfare benefits. We argue instead that humanitarian migrants prioritize dignitarian concerns, avoiding countries that grant generous welfare benefits but limit the ability to work, and instead seek places that provide opportunities for self-sufficiency. Using a new dataset, we explain humanitarian migrants' preferences over destinations in Europe with an original survey and embedded computer experiment of over 1400 Syrians and Iraqi humanitarian migrants and focus groups with Syrians living in Jordan. We show that humanitarian migrants prioritize work opportunities over other common concerns like welfare benefits, anti-immigrant sentiment, and ease of asylum, and that they take into account their own sense of dignity.

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2. Department of Political Science, Yale University
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The Dignity of Humanitarian Migrants: Explaining Migrants Destination Choice

Alisha Holland, Maggie Peters and Thania Sanchez | June 2019

where they can provide for themselves.

BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL SURVIVAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION: ASSESSING LEGISLATIVE CASES OF
AFRICAN UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS IN ISRAEL: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Rivka Weill and Tally Kritzman-Amir*

State's complex asylum and immigration policies. The Israeli immigration and asylum regime influenced American law, and was also directly influenced by it. This Article offers the most comprehensive analysis to date on the Israeli case law on the rights of undocumented migrants, at the core of which is the question of the right to a hearing. Those who wrote or gave birth to the law, the Israeli Supreme Court, violated immigration detention laws and the legislature compassed them. The Court's decision to grant temporary protection to African migrants, which largely protected the undocumented migrants' rights, it also resorted to strategic ambiguity as a means of maintaining its power. The Court's decision to grant temporary protection to African migrants is clearer and reveals attempts to "lock" the Court with conservative justices. This high stakes dispute is understood in the Israeli context and uncommon in comparative law. We argue that courts must not only protect the constitutional and international human rights of undocumented migrants, but also bring the political branches to accountability. They should force states to conduct refugee status determinations in a timely manner rather than be satisfied with temporary protection regimes. They should further recognize that rights may accumulate as a result of a prolonged presence of an undocumented migrant in a country.

Key words: immigration detention, immigration, international law, undocumented migrants, refugee status determination, temporary protection, refugees, asylum seekers, constitutional dialogue, legislative override, constitutional avoidance, judicial strategies, comparative constitutional law, Jennings v. Rodriguez, Schlesinger v. Estate

*Electronic copy available at: <https://mern.com/doc/212080>

Between Institutional Survival and Human Rights Protection: Adjudicating Landmark Cases of African Undocumented Migrants in Israel in a Comparative and International Context

Rivka Weill and Tally Kritzman-Amir | March 2019

This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of the Israeli case law on the rights of undocumented migrants. The authors argue that courts must not only protect the constitutional and international human rights of undocumented migrants, but also bring the political branches to accountability. They should force states to conduct refugee status determinations in a timely manner rather than be satisfied with temporary protection regimes. They should further recognize that rights may accumulate as a result of a prolonged presence of an undocumented migrant in a country.

MMC publications



was complemented by semi-structured interviews and focus groups, and a literature review.



Route suggest that reducing access to legal pathways will likely have no significant effect on the number of migrants that reach Italian shores.

Players of many parts: the evolving role of smugglers in West Africa's migration economy

Ekaterina Golovko | May 2019


This briefing paper focuses on the evolving role of smugglers in West Africa's migration economy, as well as migration and smuggling patterns in West Africa and between West and North Africa. The Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4Mi) carried out a total of 153 interviews with smugglers and 3,406 interviews with refugees and migrants in Mali and Niger between August 2017 and August 2018. The surveys provide unique insight into the role of smugglers and their interaction with refugees and migrants. 4Mi survey data

was complemented by semi-structured interviews and focus groups, and a literature review.

The policy tap fallacy: Lessons from the Central Mediterranean Route on how increasing restrictions fail to reduce irregular migration flows

Gabriele Restelli | June 2019

This policy paper provides a critical analysis of the use of restrictive entry and asylum regulation as a migration management tool, using Italy as a case study. It proposes that such restrictions, rather than deterring irregular migration, tend to push more people into irregularity. While the outsourcing or "externalization" of border controls may have contributed to the recent drop in sea arrivals, migration literature and evidence from the Central Mediterranean route suggest that reducing access to legal pathways will likely have no significant effect on the number of migrants that reach Italian shores. Italy and European governments must acknowledge that this is not an effective way to combat illegal smuggling or to reduce irregular migration.



The MMC is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. The MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. The MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

The MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and global and regional MMC teams are hosted by the DRC offices in Amman, Copenhagen, Dakar, Geneva, Nairobi, Tunis and Yangon.

For more information visit:
mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

