



# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: East Africa & Yemen

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the East Africa and Yemen region (EAY). The core countries of focus for this region are Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Somalia, DR Congo, South Sudan and Yemen. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

The Mixed Migration Centre is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. For more information on the MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit [mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

### **MMC's understanding of mixed migration**

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly, and wholly, or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

#### **Front cover photo credit:**

Michael Kirby Smith (2013)

Ethiopian migrants outside the Migrant Response Centre in Haradh, Yemen, May 2013.

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
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## Quarter 3 - 2021

### Key Updates

- **Spreading conflict in Ethiopia disrupts migration routes east and south:** Disruption in Afar has affected the flow of Ethiopian migrants into Djibouti heading towards Yemen and the Gulf. Further, the Oromo Liberation Army's (OLA) plan to mount an offensive that could cut off a major highway linking Ethiopia and Kenya via Moyale, threatens movements from Ethiopia, through Kenya and further south, towards South Africa.
- **Over 40,000 Ethiopians repatriated from Saudi Arabia:** More than 40,000 Ethiopians have been repatriated from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia this quarter as deportations continue. Tigrayan returnees comprised 34% of returns in July and 20% in August.
- **Over 400 migrants intercepted along the Southern route:** Authorities in Kenya, Tanzania arrest and detain East Africans including Ethiopians, Burundians, Rwandese and Ugandans for various crimes including lack of documentation. Malawi deported 123 migrants out of a larger group of 134 Ethiopians stranded at its borders between November 2020 and March 2021.
- **First group of Afghan refugees arrive in Uganda:** 51 Afghan refugees, arrived in Uganda on request from the US government and UNHCR. Uganda agreed to temporarily host over 2,000 Afghans until they are repatriated.
- **Somali trafficker arrested in Libya:** Hassan Qeidi, was arrested by Libyan authorities in Bani Walid for crimes including leading a human trafficking network in and outside Libya, killing dozens of migrants, sexual misconduct against female migrants and mistreating migrants for ransom from their families.

## Regional Overview\*



# Mixed Migration Regional Updates

## Mixed migration within East Africa

### Senior UN officials expelled amidst conflict and famine in Ethiopia

Ethiopia [expelled seven senior UN officials from the country citing interference in the State's internal affairs](#). The seven, who's status is now persona non grata, comprise staff from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The [UN Secretary General expressed his shock at the announcement](#), which was similarly condemned by both the United Kingdom and the [United States](#).

Days before the pronouncement, the UN warned that Ethiopia's nearly three-month long blockade had '[imposed famine on hundreds of thousands](#)' in the Tigray region. [The blockade only allows for about 10% of aid](#) into the region where 90% of the population need supplies including food, water and medication. Truck drivers transporting aid into Tigray have reported [harassment and arrests](#) as well as [violence and intimidation](#), and the [UN reported](#) that out of the 466 aid trucks sent to Tigray between mid-July and mid-September, only 36 returned. The United States has issued [an executive order stipulating sanctions](#), that would apply to parties deemed to be hindering peace efforts or prolonging the conflict in the region, including the blockade.

### Spreading conflict in Ethiopia disrupts migration routes East and South

Since July 2021, the conflict has spread to Ethiopia's Afar and Amhara regions, leading to the displacement of more than [254,000 people](#) (54,000 in Afar and 200,000 in Amhara). An estimated 140 people have also reportedly been killed ([20 in Afar](#) and [120 in Amhara](#)). The Afar region is of strategic importance for trade and migration routes, as the main road and railway linking the capital Addis Ababa and the sea port of neighbouring Djibouti run through it. The disruption in Afar has [affected the flow of Ethiopian migrants into Djibouti](#), who use the country as a transit point to Yemen and the Gulf.

[As regional governments have pledged allegiance with the federal government](#), the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) [announced a military alliance](#). More than [40,000 people have reportedly been displaced](#) in Oromia region in the mounting violence between the allied forces and the government. In August, the OLA revealed a plan to mount an offensive that could cut [off a major highway linking Ethiopia and Kenya](#), via Moyale. Moyale serves as an important transit point for mixed migration movements from Ethiopia, through Kenya and further south, towards South Africa. Unconfirmed partner reports also suggest that Moyale is an emerging transit point for Eritrean refugees moving from Addis Ababa towards Uganda, where a secure environment and more favourable refugee policies exist.

## Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia relocated to new camp

[Eritrean refugees in the remaining camps](#) in Tigray, Mai Aini and Adi Harush, have finally received humanitarian assistance. There was previously no access into the camps where about [24,000 refugees were trapped](#) since the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) took control on July 14. As of August 10, [126 refugees have been relocated to Dabat](#) by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the help of the Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) to [set up the new camp in the Amhara region](#). Further, Eritreans that fled the camps to Addis have also started receiving documentation including [5,542 individuals](#) initially from the Shimbella camp.

[Hundreds of Eritrean refugees held protests in Addis](#) in July, over the insecurity at the camps where two refugees were killed as a result of clashes between armed groups. The majority of protestors were from the Shimbella and Hitstats camps that closed after being attacked during the Tigray conflict. Protestors reported "[looting, horrific killings and sexual assaults](#)" and a [Human Rights Watch](#) report detailed the involvement of both Tigrayan militias and Eritrean forces in "grave abuses" including detention in two camps in the Tigray region. The closure of the two camps prompted many to seek refuge at the Mai Aini and Adi Harush camps while others were [forced to flee back to Eritrea](#). Further, over [55,000 Eritrean](#) refugees were caught up in clashes in the Afar region that has led to displacement of thousands of people.

## First group of Afghan refugees arrive in Uganda

On August 25, [51 Afghan refugees arrived in Uganda](#) following the advancement of state control by the Taliban. On request from the US government and UNHCR, [Uganda agreed to temporarily host over 2,000 Afghans](#) until they are resettled. As the state is applauded for its "[generosity and hospitality](#)", some [Ugandans have expressed concerns](#) over the move including, that it would warrant unwanted attention from international terrorist groups and impact relations between Afghanistan and Uganda.

Uganda is host to an estimated [1.5 million refugees](#) mostly from South Sudan followed by nationals from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Somalia and others. It is also home to the [largest number of refugees in Africa and comes in third worldwide](#).

## Global Compact for Migration implementation review in Africa

Over 18 government officials and stakeholders took part in the [Africa Regional Review of the implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration](#) (GCM). The event took place in Morocco on the 31 August and 1 September 2021 organized by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the United Nations Network on Migration. Key on the agenda was to discuss Africa's implementation of the GCM as well as highlight challenges and recommendations.

The forum acknowledged the adverse impact that COVID-19 had on people and communities including migrants, greatly undermining the implementation of the GCM. Other areas of concern discussed include human rights violations, detention, trafficking, corruption, forced return and reintegration. One of the key [recommendations](#) included the undertaking of "more research into climate-induced migration, bilateral labour agreements and child protection, efforts to provide all migrants legal identity and partnerships for safe return."

Despite the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments highlighted some [progressive measures](#), including the establishment of taskforces to tackle trafficking, national policies on migration and diaspora and set up of resources to support victims of trafficking.

## The Eastern Route from East Africa to Yemen

### Refugee and migrant arrivals into Yemen

East African arrivals into Yemen climbed slightly this quarter to [6,091](#) people, compared to 4,876 migrants<sup>1</sup> recorded in the last quarter. There was month by month increase in arrivals; from [1,566](#) in July, [1,756](#) in August and [2,769](#) in September due to favourable weather conditions. It is still too early to tell whether this trend signals the beginning of a return to pre-pandemic patterns of movement, particularly with the disruption of migration routes from Ethiopia (mentioned above). Of the 6,091 refugees and migrants, 72% departed from Djibouti, reportedly due to the continued security enforcement in Somalia linked to the Somali federal elections and political tensions between Puntland and Somaliland.

### More than 30,000 remain stranded in the Horn and Yemen

Similar to trends reported in the last quarter, over [32,116 refugees and migrants](#) were stranded in the Horn of Africa and in Yemen as of August 31. 32,000 migrants were stranded in Yemen, unable to continue with their journeys as a result of the ongoing conflict and COVID-19 restrictions. A further [1,547](#) migrants on their way to the Arab Peninsula were stranded in Djibouti. There has been an increase of refugees and migrants stranded in and around Bossaso to [570](#) attributed to weather challenges and [enhanced security operations in Somalia](#).

### Spontaneous returns from Yemen slow in pace

Returns of Ethiopian migrants from Yemen back to the Horn continue, although at a slower pace, with [1,266 movements](#) between July (950) and August (316).<sup>2</sup> This was a 36% decrease in comparison to returns between May and June, possibly as a result of the [conflict between the government and Houthi rebels in Marib city](#) hindering movement through the country. Thousands have been displaced and in dire need of basic support including food, water and shelter. In Somalia, [197](#) (162 Somalis and 35 Yemenis) arrived in July and [71](#) (64 Somalis and 7 Yemenis) in August.

### More than 40,000 Ethiopians deported from Saudi Arabia

More than 40,000 Ethiopian migrants were deported from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between July and September 2021. July recorded [31,911](#) returns, while [2,500](#) and [5,605](#) deportees returned in August and September, respectively. Tigrayan returnees comprised a significant percentage of arrivals, [34% in July](#) and [20% in August](#). The [Ethiopian government has provided shelter for the Tigrayan returnees in Addis](#) as

<sup>1</sup> Including June [2021 arrivals \(3,545\)](#) not initially referenced in Q2 QMMU

<sup>2</sup> Figures for September were not available at the time of publishing.

access to Tigray and other areas affected by conflict including Northern Amhara and western Afar remain “limited and risky.” Further, those with relatives in the capital are encouraged to reunite with their families. According to IOM, response capacities in Ethiopia are [stretched](#). Unconfirmed partner reports also suggest that some returned migrants are re-migrating back to the Gulf. Mass roundups of migrants in Saudi Arabia continue, as reports indicate that [more than 16,000](#) so-called “violators of residency and labour laws” were arrested in the span of one week during September.

## The Northern route towards North Africa and Europe

### East African arrivals to Europe along Mediterranean routes

As of October, [84,528](#) refugees and migrants arrived in the Mediterranean countries of first arrival with 79,506 arriving by sea (Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Malta). By the end of August, 4,308 East Africans (Eritrea 1,570, Sudan 1,480, Somalia 717, Ethiopia 289, Democratic Republic of Congo 245, and South Sudan 7) had arrived in Europe by sea.

[3,957 East Africans](#) (Eritrea 1,693, Sudan 1,540, Somalia 418, Ethiopian 306) arrived in Italy between January and September 2021, now accounting for 9% of all arrivals. The number of Eritreans arriving in Italy showed a month by month increase from [788 in July](#) to [1,593 in August](#).

In Greece, [590 East Africans](#) (Somalia 345, Democratic Republic of Congo 245) arrived by sea between January and August 2021, accounting for 27% of all arrivals. And in Malta, [166 East Africans](#) (Eritrea 83, Sudan 83), accounting for 41% of all arrivals between January and July 2021.

### East African refugees and migrants in Libya and Tunisia

As of August 31, a total of 1,583 East Africans were registered as refugees and asylum seekers in Tunisia. [767 registered in July](#) included 325 Sudanese, 208 Eritreans, 120 Somalis and 114 DRC nationals, while those registered in [August \(816\)](#) comprised 344 Sudanese, 237 Eritreans, 120 Somalis and 115 DRC nationals.

As of October [1, 7,321 East African refugees and asylum seekers were registered in Libya](#) (4,611 Eritreans, 1,523 Somalis, 937 Ethiopians and 250 South Sudanese). This is a 9% decrease in comparison to end of the June that registered [8,065](#).

### Sea interceptions soar

Reports indicate that [23,583 migrants were intercepted](#) in the Mediterranean Sea between January and September 2021 while attempting to cross into Europe. [13,000](#) of the interceptions took place in the six months between January and June, indicating that 10,583 people occurred in half the time between July and September, signifying an increase of pace.

The increase in interceptions is attributed to [favourable weather conditions](#) that have encouraged many to

continue with their journey to Europe, as well as enabling the coastguard to undertake patrol operations. Further, the easing of COVID 19 restrictions including the [lifting of curfew in August](#) may have played a role in increased movements. Crossings from Tunisia to Europe have soared with over [10,000](#) migrants arriving in Italy between January 1 and August 25 possibly as a result of the increased interceptions at sea from Libya. More departures and diversion of flows can be expected from Tunisia as long as the interceptions continue to increase.

Despite continued interceptions, refugees and migrants are still departing for Europe. Italian media reported on a rescue mission of [191 people from 7 different boats and another where 19 migrants of African origin](#) were rescued after being stuck in a wooden dinghy. Additionally, two boats intercepted at sea with [33 migrants onboard](#) were rescued by a sea vessel, Sea-Watch. Nationals from South Sudan were among those on board. 400 migrants were also rescued off the Libyan coast in August, the majority of whom were from Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Similarly, [16 women and 2 children reported to be from Eritrea and Sudan](#) were intercepted in a group of 109 migrants on September 14.

## Deaths on the rise at the Mediterranean

As of September 23, [1,397](#) migrants are reported to have died or gone missing in the Mediterranean. This is a 61% increase from the [866](#) recorded between January and July 2021. [17 migrants drowned off the coast of Tunisia](#) while heading to Europe from Libya while more than 380 rescued by the coastguard. Migrants from Sudan and Eritrea were among those believed to be onboard.

## Somali trafficker arrested in Libya

A [Somali human trafficker, Hassan Qeidi, was arrested](#) in September by Libyan authorities in Bani Walid. The Libyan Public Prosecution accused Qeidi of deliberately killing dozens of migrants, trafficking their organs, and sexually assaulting a number of immigrant women. The Libyan Attorney General stated that the women who were victims would be assisted and allowed to give their testimonies.

## Eritreans face deportation from Egypt

Two Eritreans, Alem Tesfay and Kibrom Adhanon who left Eritrea to avoid military conscription [face deportation by Egyptian authorities. Tesfay was arrested in March 2012 while attempting to go to Europe](#) through Sudan, Egypt and finally to Libya before he was arrested and detained in Qanater men's prison. His counterpart Adhanon, was kidnapped by human traffickers in July 2013 while in Sudan. He was later handed to police after being left for dead and ended up in Qanater in September 2014. The two had been detained for more than eight years without charge.

According to their lawyers, who were barred from any legal information concerning their clients, the two men were tortured while in detention and denied access to UNHCR. Reports indicate that the two faced [disciplinary action for a week by prison administration](#) after refusing to sign deportation papers brought by Eritrean officials in August 2021.

Deportation for the 2 Eritrean nationals would mean the two face [charges](#) for 'fleeing the country without

documentation and for evading compulsory military service with a risk of facing life-threatening torture in prison, [indefinite detention](#), if they are convicted.’ [Amnesty International](#) described the attempt as a “grave” breach of international law. [Increased pressure from the UN, UNHCR and various embassies](#) in Cairo on the Egyptian government has however put a hold on the deportation. As of September 15, the two continue to be held in prison.

## The Southern route towards South Africa

### Over 400 migrants intercepted along the Southern route

A two-day crackdown operation in Tanzania’s Kagera region led to the [arrest of 161 East African refugees and migrants](#) on June 9. Consisting 152 Burundians, 7 Rwandese and 2 Ugandans, the group were arrested for illegally being in the state without proper documentation.

In the same month, Zambian police [detained 8 people](#) reported to be Ethiopians, travelling through a checkpoint. The group was caught hidden inside a Tanzania-registered truck and were suspected to be victims of human trafficking.

In a similar incident in Kenya, [104 Ethiopians](#) suspected to be victims of human trafficking were arrested in a 3-bedroom house in Ruiru in July 12. Aged between 15 and 40 years old, the men reported they had paid to be transported through the Moyale border. In August, [14 Ethiopians](#) including 10 children aged 12 and 13 with no documentation were arrested in Kirinyaga after the vehicle they were travelling in got into an accident. Another group of [60 Ethiopians](#) were arrested in two separate incidents along the Nairobi-Mombasa highway.

In Malawi, a group of [123 Ethiopians were deported](#) in September. The 123 comprised of a larger group of 134 Ethiopians who were arrested and detained after being found stranded at the borders of Malawi between November 2020 and March 2021.

# Thematic Focus:

## Looming camp closure in Kenya: the same, but different

### Renewed efforts

On March 24 2021, the Kenyan government abruptly announced a [decision to close Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps](#), giving the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) two weeks to comply. The camps are host to 439,150 registered refugees and asylum seekers; [226,689](#) in Dadaab (predominantly Somali) and [212,461](#) in Kakuma (predominantly South Sudanese). A [temporary stay order](#), issued by the High Court on April 8 put a pause on the government's plans, but despite the court's ruling, the government maintains its intention to close the camps by the end of June 2022.

In April, [the president held discussions with UNHCR](#) to further discuss the matter as well as a "road map on the next steps towards a humane management of refugees in both camps." The key elements of the roadmap include: a) a verification exercise of all populations in Dadaab and Kakuma and the undertaking of an intention survey to identify the population of expected returnees; b) continued deregistration of Kenyans registered as refugees; c) a proposal for alternative solutions for East African citizens; and d) solutions for refugees with protection concerns in third countries, including boosting community-based reintegration support in return areas.

The directive to close the camps is not a new phenomenon. Similar decrees were issued in [2016](#) and [2019](#), on the basis of national security concerns. Over the years, the government has [repeatedly sought to frame Somali refugees as a security threat](#), in what some commentators have referred to as the [securitisation of asylum in Kenya](#). And while Kenya has had to grapple with [recurrent terrorist attacks](#) over recent years, the [2016](#) declaration (and by extension the 2019 announcement) was [deemed unconstitutional](#) by the High Court.

### Where will the refugees go?

[In defence of its position](#), the Kenyan government stated that "the closure of camps must be seen as an aspiration", calling on the need to work towards a "long term solution to displacement" that isn't encampment. However, the options on the table for refugees are neither viable nor sustainable. The majority of [returns](#) to Somalia under the voluntary repatriation framework for example, are to areas affected by conflict and drought and returnees are reported to be heading into the urban areas in large numbers, placing a heavy burden on the already strained infrastructure and services. Others have found themselves in [camps for the internally displaced within Somalia](#) with little or no access to resources. With the looming deadline of June 2022, many refugees in Dadaab [do not consider return an option](#) amid the widespread insecurity in the country. And for many young refugees, especially third and fourth generations, who have been born and grown up in the camps, [the idea of return is difficult](#). Moreover, resettlement figures are down – just 312 refugees were [resettled in 2020](#) – and local integration (for most) is an unavailable option.

There is also concern that the decision and subsequent process have [lacked consultation](#). [Amnesty International](#) also cautioned that the closure of the camps “without an orderly approach that respects refugee rights invites a humanitarian disaster within the global pandemic.”

With limited possibilities, [the threat of camp closure may encourage refugees to join mixed migration flows to other countries](#) where they enjoy a better actualisation of their rights. Somali refugees from Kenya have previously [migrated to Uganda](#), where they have the [opportunity to move freely, access to education and health services, employment](#) among others. [The presence of smuggler networks operating out of the camps](#) also presents an opportunity for refugees to travel to Nairobi and onwards on the southern route towards South Africa, the northern route heading to Europe or the eastern route heading to Yemen and Gulf states. However, it is worth noting that this is only an option for those with the necessary resources to fund such journeys, leaving the most vulnerable behind.

## Legal grey areas and the dangers of alternative status

Amidst this and in September 2021, President Kenyatta [rejected the long-debated Refugees Bill of 2019](#),<sup>3</sup> raising a series of objections which may point to a regression of the protections offered to refugees in the country. The President raised an objection to clause 2 of the bill that defines a “transit area” as an area used for the purposes of temporarily accommodating asylum seekers and refugees pending their transfer to a designated area, as it does not include prisons, police stations, remand homes and immigration centres. If amended, this inclusion would be in direct contravention of Kenya’s obligation under the [United Nations Convention and Protocol on Refugee Status](#), as it would subject refugees to the same status as persons accused of committing a crime. And as [some critics have noted](#), the failure of authorities to draw a “distinction between criminals, illegal immigrants and asylum seekers” is a major challenge, exposing the latter to the “same standards of confinement.”

The President also raised issue with clause 28 of the bill, which outlines the rights and duties of refugees and asylum seekers. He contends that it does not consider the government’s policy that allows refugees from the East African Community<sup>4</sup> (EAC) to benefit from an alternative status, allowing them to obtain work permits. While this would potentially lead to a considerable reduction of the refugee population, it is not without issue. The most obvious is the exclusion of non-EAC refugees, who make up [the majority of the caseload in the country](#). The measure would arguably create multiple tiers of protection that would be tantamount to discrimination. Refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, would have to place their hopes on the ratification of the [IGAD Protocol on Free Movement of Persons](#) to benefit from similar advantages, while those from Democratic Republic of Congo would have to look elsewhere. It’s also not clear whether this approach would be the preferred option for EAC nationals, therefore precluding would-be refugees from these countries from seeking international protection if they would also qualify for a work permit.

<sup>3</sup> The bill was first gazetted in [August 2 2019](#) and has undergone numerous rounds of reading.

<sup>4</sup> EAC countries are Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.


## More of the same, or worthy of attention?

The announcement on camp closure came at a time when relations between Kenya and Somalia were [strained](#). Although now officially [restored](#), one [account](#) suggests that the Kenyan government intended to use the closure of the camps as a leverage point in the [maritime dispute between Nairobi and Mogadishu](#). Kenya has [denied](#) these claims and a decision by the International Court of Justice was [imminent](#) at the time of writing this report.

[Other perspectives](#) tie the announcement to the upcoming presidential elections in 2022, suggesting that “painting refugees as dangerous and then declaring that [the government] will protect the nation from them is a ploy to get votes...”. Additionally, a [Kenyan political commentator](#) likened Dadaab to a “bank where [the government] routinely makes withdrawals, using the threat of shutting it down to extort bribes from the international community”.

It may be easy therefore to dismiss the latest undertaking as just another in a long line of attempts to leverage the refugee situation to the benefit of the state. But the Kenyatta government has been criticised for its repeated disregard of court orders, prompting the Former Chief Justice to describe the government actions as “intentional, persistent, defiant and brazen” behaviour that signals a “[dalliance with impunity](#)”. This presents a clear picture of a government determined to change the status quo, and this time [with UNHCR on its side](#). This warrants our attention.


# Highlighted New Research and Reports



## [Climate and Migration in East and The Horn Of Africa: Spatial Analysis Of Migrants' Flows Data](#)

**IOM & Harvard Humanitarian Initiative | August 2021**


IOM Regional Data Hub in Nairobi partnered with the Humanitarian Geoanalytics Program at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative to leverage spatial analytics to investigate migration flows in the East and Horn of Africa and Yemen. By incorporating environmental variables into this spatial analysis, previously undiscovered relationships are revealed that could contribute to a richer understanding regarding migration in the region.



## [Families of Missing Migrants: Their Search for Answers and the Impacts of Loss: Lessons Across Four Countries](#)

**IOM | September 2021**

This report synthesizes the main findings of qualitative research conducted between April 2019 and March 2021 by IOM's Missing Migrants Project about the challenges and experiences of families of missing migrants in Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, Spain and Zimbabwe.



The MMC is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. The MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. The MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

The MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Global and regional MMC teams are based in Geneva, Turin, Dakar, Nairobi, Tunis, Bogota and Dhaka.

**For more information visit:**

[mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

