



**MMC Latin America
and the Caribbean**

QUARTER 3 2021



Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. The core countries of focus for this region are the countries currently affected by the Venezuelan crisis, including Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, in addition to the Caribbean islands. Concerning northern movements to the United States, this QMMU covers Mexico and Central American countries. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

The Mixed Migration Centre is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy development on mixed migration. For more information on the MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly, and wholly, or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean

Quarter 3 - 2021


Key Updates

- **The number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants who intend to move onward from a first migration country due to the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic decreased**, with some exceptions, contrary to the trend among refugees and migrants from other nationalities (mainly Haitians) who have undertaken onward movements to other countries, primarily towards the U.S.
- **On August 14, Haiti was shaken by a [7.2 earthquake](#) causing 2,207 deaths, affecting more than 137,000 families and destroying over 53,000 homes**, adding to already existing migration drivers. Weeks later, two boats with Haitian nationals onboard were captured while trying to reach Florida and Puerto Rico, respectively. In September, more than 4,000 Haitians were detained on the northern border of the Dominican Republic while trying to enter the country.
- **Attempts to reach the U.S. by sea** by Haitian, Dominican and Cuban nationals have increased due to the continued implementation of summary expulsions under Title 42 of people on the move trying to enter the U.S. through its southern land border.
- **[Panama and Colombia restrict the passage](#) of people on the move through the Darien Gap**. In August, the two countries agreed to allow 650 refugees and migrants to cross the Darien Gap daily. Starting in September, entry into Panama was reduced to 500 people per day, but Panamanian authorities are registering more than the allotted quota.
- **The U.S. is expelling people on the move deep into the south of Mexico – considered by the U.S. as a safe third country – [to prevent the re-entry \(recidivism\)](#) of those who had already been expelled across the U.S.-Mexico border under Title 42**. Mexico is, in turn, expelling people on the move from other nationalities into Guatemala through two border crossing points: El Ceibo and El Carmen.
- **Increased homelessness among refugees and migrants due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic**. Since 2020, many people on the move have been evicted from their homes and had difficulty accessing housing. By mid-September, media outlets reported 4,015 Venezuelans being homeless in [a town near the Brazilian border](#), Pacaraima - a 243% increase compared to figures in May. By end of September, sources confirmed near 3,500 people on the move, mostly from Venezuela and Colombia, [stranded and homeless in Iquique](#), Chile.
- **[Four caravans](#), mostly made up of refugees and migrants from Central America, Haiti and South America, departed Tapachula, Chiapas, in less than one week** heading toward the north of Mexico but were broken up by immigration authorities in Huixtla, Chiapas.

Regional Overview*



The Caribbean



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration flows within and out of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Venezuelan mixed migration flows

As of September 5th, the [Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants](#) (R4V) reported that the number of Venezuelans that had left their country had surpassed 5.6 million. Colombia continues to lead the list of host countries, with more than 1.7 million Venezuelans who settled in its territory, followed by Peru, Chile and Ecuador.

According to the [National Survey on Living Conditions](#) (ENCOVI) 2021 conducted in Venezuela between February and April 2021 by the Andrés Bello Catholic University, covering 17,402 households, the main reason why Venezuelans migrate is because of lack of employment opportunities (86%) and increasingly family reunification (6%). These results differ from those of the [recent regional survey](#) conducted by Equilibrium CenDe in Colombia, Perú and Ecuador, where 1,410 respondents mentioned high living costs (69%), employment opportunities (62%) and food shortage (58%) as the three main reasons for migrating.

According to [ENCOVI data](#), 50% of the population in Venezuela is economically inactive, of which 15% are mothers who have to care for their children and cannot have a job while 36% are discouraged and are no longer actively seeking employment, given the shortage of formal jobs with good conditions. Data also shows that only 40% of Venezuelans who are employed have a formal contract.

Although migration from Venezuela is not expected to cease, the intention among Venezuelans of moving onward from a first country of migration is decreasing, according to a recent study conducted by the [Migration Policy Institute](#) (MPI): the percentage of Venezuelans in Brazil, Chile and Ecuador who intend to migrate to another destination is diminishing, while Peru is an exception with 27% of respondents who intend to move onward to another country (Argentina or Chile).

Policy changes impacting Venezuelans

In July, Peru published [temporary guidelines for granting humanitarian permits](#) to Venezuelans who have applied for asylum in the country and are waiting for a decision on their application. This permit has a duration of 183 days, but it can be extended if conditions of vulnerability persist. The extension can be granted for periods of up to one year each time it is requested. Persons with a national or international administrative inquiry underway or a prior criminal record are not eligible for a humanitarian permit. A mandatory registration called “migratory pre-registration” was opened at the beginning of 2021, requesting [asylum seekers](#) to submit their data. Only 135,000 asylum seekers out of more than 530,000 did so and are expected to receive a humanitarian permit.

In late August, the Peruvian government’s [requirements for regularization were made more flexible](#), considering the difficulties Venezuelans face in obtaining documents from their country of origin. This measure is also expected to benefit citizens of other countries who do not have a valid ID with them. Four measures were established: expired passports and identity documents will be accepted from those countries that do not have consular representation in Peru or have almost no presence; in case of not

having an ID, the document issued by Peruvian immigration authorities may be presented as proof of identity; in case of not having either of the documents mentioned previously, the authority in charge must cross-check the applicant's information by other means; and, with respect to children, a birth certificate from any country will suffice.

A measure which allows Venezuelans to obtain asylum in Brazil without having to prove a risk of persecution based on race, political opinion, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group was set to expire in August, but the government [extended it until December 2022](#).

On September 1st, Bolivia approved a [decree to regularize irregular migrants](#) who had entered the country up to one day prior to the announcement. This measure is expected to benefit 3,500 people and grant people on the move two years of temporary stay. However, those seeking to benefit from this measure must pay fines between US \$2.800 and US \$4.300.

In early September, the Ecuadorian government announced that it is currently working on a plan to [regularize 450,000 Venezuelans](#) in its territory - the total number of irregular Venezuelan refugees and migrants residing in the country, according to official figures. This plan also seeks to integrate Venezuelans through work and education.

As of the end of September – 142 days after the Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPV, for its Spanish acronym) came into effect in Colombia – a total of 1.308.590 Venezuelans [out of 1.7 million](#) residing in the country had completed their registration for the permit. Registration is only the first phase of the process and does not necessarily imply being granted the ETPV in the end.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported that, in order for all Venezuelans in Colombia to be able to access this measure, additional information and support services are needed. An analysis made by IRC of their on-line information platform InfoPa'lante indicated that, since the implementation of the ETPV, more than 200,000 users have interacted with the platform's social media (Facebook Messenger, online chat and Whatsapp) looking for information on the permit. According to [IRC's director for the Venezuelan response](#), “[t]housands of Venezuelans face a digital gap, lacking not only internet access, laptops or smartphones, but also the necessary skills to use the required web platforms. Those who have access to digital services still encounter misinformation (like fake news portals) and unethical practices, such as being ‘charged’ for support with the registration process, which is totally free.”

Movements towards South America

Brazil

By mid-September, media outlets reported 4,015 Venezuelans living on the streets in a town near the Brazilian border, Pacaraima - a 243% increase compared to figures in May. According to UNHCR, this increase in the number of homeless people is due to: [“the demand repressed after months of closed borders, and the fact that “Operation Welcome” and its partners were short-staffed during the coronavirus pandemic.”](#) By the end of September, there were [2,065 homeless Venezuelans](#), 38% of whom are children and adolescents, in a city of 19,000 inhabitants, as they await their documentation to continue onward.

Mixed-migration flows in South America

Chile

On August 4th, Chile deported [77 migrants to Peru and Bolivia](#), among them irregular migrants. Chilean courts then stopped the deportations of foreigners upon lawsuits filed by civil society organizations, but [Chile decided to resume them in late September](#), due to the increase in the arrival of people on the move into the country. In August, 331 foreigners arrived at the border town of Colchane, of which 260 were of Venezuelan origin and the rest were Bolivian, Peruvian and Colombian. On September 26th, a group of 200 people on the move entered Chile from Bolivia.

At the end of September, police authorities in Iquique [violently evicted](#) a group of Venezuelan and Colombian refugees and migrants who were squatting in a square downtown. A day later, a group of [5,000 Chilean citizens took the street to protest against irregular migration](#) in the country and set fire to tents used for sleeping, documents, and other personal belongings of a group of people on the move. Sources confirm near 3,500 people on the move are currently stranded and homeless in Iquique.

Mixed migration flows in Central America

Panama

In August, the governments of [Panama and Colombia](#) agreed to allow 650 people on the move to cross daily through the Darien Gap. During that month alone, Panamanian authorities reported the entry of 18,000 refugees and migrants through the [Darien Gap](#). In September the number of allowed crossings was reduced by Panamanian authorities to 500 people per day, although they are registering more entries than the allotted quota. According to the [Mayor of Necoclí](#), the daily quota limit must be increased because approximately 1,000 people on the move are arriving daily to the coastal town. If the daily quota remains the same, by the end of September the municipality predicts a total of 25,000 refugees and migrants stranded in the urban center of Necoclí – surpassing the local population of [12,000 local inhabitants](#) living in the city's urban area.

At the end of September, [Panama's Foreign Relations Minister](#) estimated that around 65,000 people on the move were on their way to the U.S. and between [20,000](#) and 30,000 more were waiting at the Colombian border trying to cross into Panama.

Costa Rica

Since June, there has been an increase in the arrival of Nicaraguan asylum seekers in the country, due to Nicaragua's recent adoption of repressive measures, according to a [governmental official](#). Between July and August, Costa Rican authorities registered [11,000 new asylum claims by Nicaraguans](#).

On September 21st, [Costa Rica's migration police dismantled](#) a group of 21 people involved in migrant smuggling at both its borders. The network engaged in smuggling people from Haiti, Cuba, Yemen, Pakistan and Egypt through Central America and into the U.S.

Guatemala

In September, Guatemalan immigration authorities reported an [unusual increase in the number of](#)

[Ecuadorians arriving](#) by air. Most intend to reach the U.S. through Mexico, as they can enter Guatemala without a visa. As a consequence, as of September 20th, Guatemala began [requiring a visa to Ecuadorians](#) for entry.

Mixed migration flows in Mexico

A minister from the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico plans to submit a draft decision that would grant asylum seekers with a humanitarian permit the right to obtain a [Unique Population Registry Code](#) (CURP for its Spanish acronym), a document that allows access to health, employment and education rights. Currently, the CURP is only issued to temporary and permanent residents, and not to those holding a humanitarian permit.

Between July and September, the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR for its Spanish acronym) registered [38,865 asylum applications](#). So far this year, Hondurans, followed by Haitians and Cubans lead the list of nationalities among asylum seekers in the country. In mid-July, the COMAR office in Tapachula started requiring those who wanted to apply for asylum to first register online to receive an in-person appointment, rather than showing up at its premises for registration. Findings of the [Protection Monitoring](#) conducted by the Danish Refugee Council and the Jesuit Refugee Service Mexico, carried out between July and August in Tapachula, reveal frustration among respondents “as a result of these changes, emphasizing that the lack of access to electronic devices, the lack of knowledge of how to use email or use the online platform, and the lack of internet access complicated access to the procedure.” The same report indicates that by the end of August there were no longer available appointment slots through the platform.

Within a week’s timeframe – between the last days of August and the initial days of September – four migrant caravans formed in Tapachula, Chiapas, and headed toward the North of Mexico to protest delays in the asylum process. On August 28th, a first group of [500 migrants](#) left Tapachula, Chiapas for Mexico City where they hoped their asylum applications would be expedited. The group included Haitians, Cubans, Colombians, and Central Americans. Incidents of violence against people on the move along the caravan route were reported by [media sources](#). On August 31st, a [second group of 600 refugees and migrants](#) from Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, Honduras and other countries left from Tapachula and was dissolved by the authorities in a municipality in the northern part of the state of Chiapas, Huixtla, where there is no assistance for migrants. On September 6th, the fourth migrant caravan, comprised of 800 people on the move – primarily Haitians, Cubans, Venezuelans, and Central Americans, was also broken up in Huixtla, Chiapas, by Mexican authorities while heading north.

As of September, there were [40,000 migrants](#) stranded in Tapachula. Some were [waiting for a result of their asylum application, while others were expelled from the U.S.](#) to the southern border of Mexico. According to one activist, by the end of September an immigration rights group received [2,000 requests daily](#) from people on the move to file petitions on their behalf to transit freely through Mexico until they reached Mexico City, without being detained or confronted by immigration authorities. The Mexican government announced in late September that it will resume [voluntary repatriation flights](#) for Haitians from Tapachula, Chiapas and Villahermosa, Tabasco.

The situation at the U.S. border

There has been an increase in arrivals of [Nicaraguans to the U.S.](#) due to political persecution and upcoming elections in November: in the last three months, the government detained [35 opposition leaders and suspended the functions of a rival party.](#)

In mid-July, [300 migrants](#) turned themselves over to border authorities, including Cubans, Haitians and Venezuelans.

Changes in U.S. policy

In early September, the U.S. government announced that the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for migrants from Central American countries will be [extended](#) until December 31, 2022, benefiting 500,000 Salvadorans, 57,000 Hondurans, and 2,550 Nicaraguans.

At the end of August, the [Supreme Court](#) refused to temporarily lift a district court's ruling that compelled President Biden to reactivate the Migrants Protection Protocols (MPP), commonly known as the "Stay in Mexico" program, causing concern among people on the move and human rights activists. According to the U.S. government, the program has not been reinstated as [negotiations between Mexico and the U.S. are ongoing.](#)

Apprehensions

Between July and August, [Customs and Border Patrol](#) (CBP) registered 422,421 encounters with people on the move at the U.S. southern border, of whom 27% were Mexican, followed by Hondurans (21%).

Expulsions and deportations

Although the U.S. government planned to terminate Title 42 – a measure taken by the CDC allowing the expedite and summary removal of foreigners trying to enter the U.S. during the COVID-19 pandemic – in July, it [reversed its decision](#) due to a surge in arrivals, as well as an increase in COVID-19 cases as the delta variant spreads. As of July 30th, the U.S. started expelling Central American people on the move intercepted while irregularly crossing into the U.S. to two cities in southern Mexico (Tapachula and Villahermosa), rather than just across the border as previously, in an [effort to prevent repeated attempts to enter U.S. territory.](#)

Mexico is then in turn expelling Central American nationals from [Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua](#) into Guatemala at two border crossings ([El Ceibo](#) and El Carmen) where there is no institutional capacity to receive or orient them. The Guatemalan government stated it had not been informed of these expulsions in advance nor were the consulates of Honduras, El Salvador or Nicaragua, according to [Human Rights Watch](#). From August 22nd to August 29th, [2,061 people](#) on the move – including children and adolescents – have been expelled through the El Ceibo border crossing. In just 5 days, the U.S. government also [deported 44 Guatemalan migrant](#) families back to their country.

Children

In early August, [834 unaccompanied children](#) (UAC) were apprehended in one day at the southern border of the United States. Between July and August, CBP registered 37,805 UAC at the U.S. southern border. On September 14th, the U.S. started to receive [new applications for the Central American Minors](#) Refugee and Parole Program (CAM), which seeks to reunite children from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras with their parents residing in the U.S. At the same time, the country reopened CAM cases that had been suspended or closed during the previous administration. It also [expanded the program](#) to include parents and guardians with temporary or humanitarian status in the U.S., in addition to those with a residency, as a result of President Biden's commitment to family reunification. The U.S. government also announced it would grant three years of legal residency to parents or guardians of children who were separated from their families at the U.S. southern border between January 20th, 2017, and January 20th, 2021 under [the previous administration's "Zero Tolerance" policy](#) toward irregular migration.

Extra-regional mixed migration flows

In view of the political and socio-economic turmoil in Haiti and Cuba, on July 13th, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security asked citizens of these countries not to try and reach the U.S. by sea, or by any mean, as they would be [turned back, adding that](#) they would be sent to a safe third country if they expressed fear of returning home. In early June, Mexico's [Ministry of the Interior](#) (SEGOB) had anticipated an increase in the arrival of asylum seekers from Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua due to political unrest in these countries.

The number of people on the move attempting to reach the U.S. by sea has increased due to Title 42, according to a [migrant activist](#). The U.S. deported [91 Dominican nationals](#) back to their country, on September 3rd, after being intercepted at sea near Puerto Rico. In one week, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted [211 migrants](#) of different nationalities.

In early July, food shortages and high commodity prices led many [Cubans to take the streets and protest](#). The government responded by deploying the armed forces to the streets. As a consequence, and despite the U.S. government's warnings, [Cuban nationals continue](#) to leave their country by boat in an attempt to reach Florida. In one week, three boats were intercepted with 33 Cubans on board. According to the U.S. Coast Guard, there has been an increase in Cuban arrivals to the U.S. beginning in October 2020 and running through September 2021. In the previous fiscal year, only 49 Cubans were apprehended arriving in South Florida. This year, there have been reports of more than 700 encounters at sea.

In mid-August, 35 people with irregular status in Colombia - but with refugee status previously recognized in Brazil - were detained in the country's Amazonas department. The group included citizens of [Bangladesh, Haiti, Senegal, and Nepal on their way to the city's capital Bogota](#).

Thematic Focus:

Haitian mixed migration flows

Although it has gained increased media attention recently, migration out of Haiti is not a new phenomenon. While some Haitians head to Haiti's richer neighbor, the Dominican Republic, others try to reach destinations further afield, in countries in South America or even the U.S. Drivers of migration have always been multiple, including violence, corruption, political unrest, poverty, coupled with earthquakes, tropical storms, and hurricanes. The assassination of the country's president Jovenel Moïse in July exacerbated political instability and general insecurity. In addition to new migration out of Haiti, Haitian nationals have also recently engaged in onward movements from a first country of migration due to the economic repercussions of COVID-19.

Drivers

Haiti has for long been and remains the poorest country in the western hemisphere, and among the poorest countries in the world, according to the [World Bank](#). Its economy contracted by 1.7% in 2019 and by 3.8% in 2020, reversing years of improvement in poverty reduction: in 2020, the poverty rate increased to 60% up 1.5 percentage points from 58.5% in 2012. Prices have gone up considerably since May 2021, according to a [recent household survey](#) conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP): the price of fuel increased by more than 120%, local transportation costs rose by 50%, and the price of staple food commodities went up between 12% to 34%.

In terms of security, according to some sources, there are approximately [165 gangs](#) in Port-au-Prince - Haiti's capital city - of which [95 control about 1 third of the city](#), making it almost [impossible for humanitarian actors to provide assistance](#) in some areas. A recent report by OCHA and local humanitarian partners described the situation in Haiti as unpredictable, "indicat[ing] the presence of armed individuals along the National Road #2 (RN2), and constant gunfire, forcing vehicles to speed through the roads." In 2020, the [UN reported](#) a 200% increase in kidnappings compared to the previous year and a 12% increase in rapes. The country was thrown into further instability with the President's assassination on July 7th.

The Global Climate Risk Index ranked Haiti third in the world for impacts of climate related events, both in the period [1995-2014](#) and [2000-2019](#). In 2010, an [earthquake devastated](#) the country causing more than 217,000 deaths, leaving more than 1.5 million people homeless and leading to [losses](#) equivalent to 120% of GDP. Many Haitians left the country following the earthquake, mainly heading towards Brazil and Chile.

In 2016, Hurricane Matthew, category 6, affected approximately 1 million people, destroyed 200,000 homes, and left 1.4 million inhabitants in need of humanitarian aid. In addition, crops were destroyed, leaving an impoverished country without food sources. On August 7th this year, a [7.2. earthquake](#) struck the island and a couple of days later a tropical storm passed through, killing approximately [2,200 people](#), [leaving 30,000 homeless and 980,000 experiencing food insecurity](#).

Intended destinations

According to [governmental authorities](#), 105,000 Haitians arrived in Brazil between 2011 and 2018. Other sources confirm that many migrated towards Brazil in preparation for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics and worked in construction. In the same years, Haitians also migrated to Chile, which currently hosts the world's third [largest Haitian diasporas](#) with 69,000 people.

Since 2015, however, Brazil and Chile started experiencing an economic slowdown, a harder stance on immigration, and a rise in stigma and discrimination against refugees and migrants, leading many to move onwards to another destination. This trend was compounded by the economic consequences of COVID-19.

Others left Haiti more recently, following the assassination of President Moïse and the recent earthquake. Many headed to the [Dominican Republic](#). Haitians have been migrating to the neighboring country for years, seeking employment opportunities: sources suggest there are between [650,000 and 1 million Haitians](#) in the country. As a response to Haitian migration, the Dominican government conducts periodic arrests and mass deportations. Between [August 2015 and May 2016](#), for instance, more than 40,000 Haitians were deported.

Another preferred destination for Haitian refugees and migrants has for long been the U.S., [picking up pace](#) starting from 2016. [As of 2020](#), the U.S. hosted the largest Haitian diaspora in the world, with 705,000 Haitian nationals, followed by the Dominican Republic (496,000).

Although the U.S. continues to be the intended final destination for many Haitian refugees and migrants, others seem to be [leaning towards Mexico as a host country](#). Mexican authorities expressed concern over a sharp increase in the arrival of Haitian refugees and migrants in Tapachula in July: while on average 400 people on the move used to arrive daily in the state of Chiapas, [2,000 Haitians](#) arrived in just one day on July 12th. This trend remained constant throughout the month. As of mid-August, the National Migration Institute of Mexico (INM) reported that there were approximately [9,000 Haitian nationals](#) in the country awaiting a decision on their asylum application.

Onward migration

Most Haitians who are now arriving at the U.S. southern border are not coming directly from Haiti, but mainly from Chile and Brazil where they had initially settled. According to [media sources](#), they decided to move onward to the U.S. for the reasons mentioned above, despite having to [cross several countries](#) and even though in some cases they were already residents in their first country of migration.

Haitians are also arriving in large numbers at the U.S. southern border as they are being told by smugglers that they will be allowed to stay in the country under Temporary Protected Status (TPS), according to the U.S. [Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas](#). The U.S. authorities announced in May 2021 that they would extend the TPS for Haitian nationals. The measure came into effect on August 3rd and will last through February 3rd, 2023; it grants temporary status to Haitians who regularly entered the U.S. and were residing in the country before July 29th.

For Haitians heading toward the U.S. by land from South America, Colombia is an obligated step. Many Haitians, along with refugees and migrants from other nationalities, find themselves temporarily blocked on the western Caribbean coast before being able to cross the border into Panama. In early August, the [Governor of Nariño](#) warned Colombia's immigration agency of the arrival of approximately 4,000 Haitian refugees and migrants from Ecuador. According to [Colombian immigration authorities](#), more than 90% of people on the move who entered the country irregularly in August did so through the department of Nariño - many of them being Haitians. Since August, [public officials](#) coordinated the transit of 6,600 Haitians from the cities of Popayán and Cali to the Antioquia department, further north, for them to continue their journey. At the end of September, Haitian refugees and migrants stranded at the Colombia-Panama border while waiting to enter the Darien Gap were [undecided whether to continue](#) their journey to the U.S., after [1,424 Haitians were deported](#) from the U.S. the previous week.

Border closures and deportations


The day after the assassination of Haiti's President in July, the Dominican government decided to close the border with its neighbor, fearing that the political crisis might trigger an exodus. Recent deportations of Haitians from the U.S. are also likely to lead to an increase in migration movements toward the neighboring country, according to a [source](#). In early September, over a 10-day period, more than [4,000 Haitian nationals](#) were detained in the northern part of the Dominican Republic.

In mid-September, more than [10,500 people on the move](#), mostly Haitians, were camping under a bridge in Del Rio, Texas in an attempt to enter the U.S. and apply for asylum. There were reports that the total number of people who came to stay at the camp rose to [30,000](#) before it was cleared on September 24th. While more than 20,000 people on the move, mostly Haitians, who were staying at the camp were allowed entry into the U.S. to apply for asylum, others were either deported back to their country (2,000) or decided to voluntarily return to Mexico (8,000). Those who returned voluntarily to Mexico are being sent to the country's southern border, either by bus or plane. IOM reported that it had [formally asked Brazil](#) to receive some of the refugees and migrants from the camp.

Regarding deportations, in mid-September Haitian immigration authorities asked the U.S. for a "[humanitarian moratorium](#)" given the country's current socioeconomic and political situation. The U.S. government did not respond to the request, but the [U.S. special envoy to Haiti resigned](#) in protest following the mass deportations. In a 10-days timeframe, between September 19th and 28th, Haiti [received at least 3,700 nationals](#) deported from the U.S. According to anonymous U.S. officials, [single adults are the priority for expulsion flights](#). UNICEF however reported that "two out of every three Haitian migrants [...] were women and children" - some were even newborns, and over 40 children had [passports from Chile, Brazil and Venezuela](#).

Migration out of Haiti will continue, as the circumstances that drive Haitians to leave their country are not expected to ameliorate soon. Although the prospects of entering the U.S. are fading, given the recent deportations and the continuous use of Title 42 to expel people on the move from the U.S. southern border, some Haitians will still try to reach the U.S. no matter what, while others will [lean towards other host countries](#), including Mexico.

Highlighted New Research and Reports



[Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees: the cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru](#)

Migration Policy Institute | July 2021

This mixed-methods study examines the socioeconomic integration of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region, specifically in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru through five key dimensions: sociodemographic profile, levels of economic inclusion, education, access to health care, and social cohesion. It also examines the progression of socioeconomic integration over three specific periods: 2017 to June 2018, July 2018 to 2019, and 2020 to 2021.



[Formas de esclavitud moderna y su impacto en personas migrantes forzadas y refugiadas venezolanas](#)

Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Católica de Andrés Bello | August 2021


This report finds that women, children, and adolescents are the vulnerable groups that are most vulnerable to exploitation in a context of migration and especially if in irregular conditions. Types of modern slavery include human trafficking (for purposes of labor or sexual exploitation), labor exploitation, forced prostitution, forced recruitment and child begging. The report highlights that in Norte de Santander, Colombia children and adolescents are victims to practices of sexual exploitation and situations similar to slavery.



[Refúgio em Números](#)

Ministry of Justice and Public Security of Brazil – International Migration Observatory | September 2021

This report, published jointly by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security of Brazil and the Observatory of International Migration, shares information about foreigners who regularized their immigration status or applied for asylum in the country in 2020. At the end of 2020, Brazil registered a total of 57,099 recognized refugees in the country. In 2020, 63,790 asylum applications were decided upon, the highest number of applications in a decade, with only 26,577 of them resulting in the recognition of refugee status, mostly for male applicants (61.9%). In the same year, 28,899 people from 133 countries filed new asylum applications, mostly from Venezuela (60.2%), followed by Haiti (22.9%) and Cuba (4.7%). The report indicates that this was a strong decrease from the 82,552 asylum applications filed in 2019, most likely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.



The MMC is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. The MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. The MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

The MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Global and regional MMC teams are based in Geneva, Turin, Dakar, Nairobi, Tunis, Bogota and Dhaka.

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