

**MMC East and
Southern Africa**

QUARTER 3 2022



Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: East and Southern Africa

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the East and Southern Africa region plus Egypt and Yemen (ESA). The core areas of focus include the Eastern route, from East and the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula; the Southern route from East Africa and the Great Lakes towards South Africa; the Central Mediterranean Route (also called the Northern Route) from East and the Horn of Africa towards North Africa; as well as intra-regional mixed migration dynamics. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in DRC regional offices in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, and a small global team in Geneva. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes refugees and migrants traveling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often traveling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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Michael Kirby Smith (2013)

Ethiopian migrants outside the Migrant Response Centre in Haradh,
Yemen, May 2013.

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: East and Southern Africa

Quarter 3 - 2022

Key Updates

- **Drought in the Horn of Africa leads to increased displacement.** As of September, 1.1 million people have been forced to flee their homes in search of food and water with further displacement anticipated.
- **The UK relocation scheme to Rwanda is being challenged by the British High Court.** Representatives and lawyers of the UN do not consider Rwanda a safe third country and explain that the scheme would breach the 1951 Refugee Convention.
- **Increasing displacement in Sudan.** The country's economic and political crisis has further deteriorated, and adverse climate events have caused 96,457 to be internally displaced as of September.
- **Ethiopia launched a repatriation scheme targeting approximately 12,000 of its citizens** in 12 countries along the Eastern and Southern routes.
- **East Africans arrive along Mediterranean routes.** 1,591 Eritreans, 757 Sudanese and 335 Ethiopians have arrived in Italy; while 424 Somali, 99 Congolese (DRC) and 98 Yemeni have arrived in Greece since the beginning of the year.
- **The EU pledges EUR 300 million to support the Egyptian coastguard** on its border management to discourage irregular migration from Egypt across the Mediterranean.
- **Tunisians increasingly move to Southern Africa.** An increasing number of Tunisians prefer migrating to Southern Africa for work, rather than Europe or the Gulf States, because of easier arrival procedures and a high demand for their labour.
- **South Africa to end special permits for migrants from Zimbabwe and Lesotho** to live and work in the country.
- **Increasing migration from Eastern and Southern Africa to the island of French Mayotte.**

Regional Overview*



Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Mixed Migration within East Africa and the Great Lakes

Continued drought generates mass displacement

A [fifth consecutive failed rainy season](#) across Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia has caused the most severe drought in 40 years. As a consequence, as of September 2022, at least 22 million are at risk of famine and starvation, and [1.1 million people](#) have been displaced in search of food and water. [According to IOM](#), more than 80% of the displaced are women, children and the elderly, with most settling in urban areas where support services are already overstretched, and sanitation often poor. While the full mixed migration consequences of the drought are not yet known, with an estimated [12-22 million people](#) in the region reliant on pastoral livelihoods, it is anticipated the drought will exacerbate existing economic factors that drive migration; cause others to be involuntarily immobile, particularly pastoralists who have lost their livelihoods and are forced to settle in informal settlements; and exacerbate communal tensions linked to resource scarcity, prompting displacement linked to conflict. While Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia remain the countries most affected by drought, the World Meteorological Organization projected in August that rainfall deficits are likely to extend to most of Uganda and Tanzania, and parts of Eritrea. Moreover, in early September, it was reported that the weather phenomenon La Niña had formed for the 3rd consecutive year in the Pacific, which is causing and shall continue to cause [drier conditions in East Africa](#) among other changing weather patterns.

Movements linked to the Tigray conflict and humanitarian needs in Ethiopia

As of 31 August, there are [59,501 refugees](#) living in camps in Sudan who were displaced by the Tigray conflict, with 49,833 in Eastern Sudan (Kassala and Gedaref) and 8,668 in Blue Nile State. 60% of refugees are male, 40% are female, and refugees are mostly Tigrayan (90%). Within Ethiopia, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has supported [1,373,536](#) IDPs, as of July, out of a total population of [4.57 million IDPs across the country](#) as of 31 August. Of these, the highest number of assisted IDPs was in Tigray (635,782), followed by Amhara (406,853) and Afar (217,650). Media reports from this quarter indicate that people crossing the border from Tigray to Amhara are met with [discrimination, force, and mistreatment](#). A [September report](#) by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) identified [human rights violations in almost all Ethiopian regions](#). In September, the EHRC also reported that [freedom of movement and humanitarian aid have been denied](#) in some cases.

A 5-month truce in Northern [Ethiopia](#) was broken in August, with renewed fighting between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and a coalition of government forces and allies. On [20 September](#), forces in Tigray claimed that Eritrea launched an alleged new offensive. The civil war has been persisting for almost two years, with sustained new [eruptions of fighting](#) in September providing an outlook towards new displacement. Moreover in August, the United Nations announced that the UN International Commission of Human Rights (UNCHR) Experts on Ethiopia is investigating on the [breaches of international refugee law](#) committed in Ethiopia from November 2020 onwards by all parties involved in the Tigray conflict.

Hunger and displacement in Sudan

[Flash floods and torrential rains starting in June](#) and continuing until September have severely affected 15 states across the country, leading to [96,457 IDPs](#) and 226,200 people affected. Gedaref (45,270) and Central Darfur (39,448), South Darfur (30,677), White Nile (26,592) and Kassala (25,890) are the top five states in terms of the number of people most affected. Particularly in Darfur and Blue Nile State, hundreds of thousands have reportedly left their homes after farms got destroyed and livelihood opportunities were diminished. Following reports of continuous challenges of food distribution, more than 17,000 IDPs living in the Foro Baranga camp in North Darfur State crossed the border, moving into Chad, to escape a severe shortage of food and medicine, which has been ongoing since October 2021, WFP [reported](#). There are 12,564 IDPs in the camp who are at high risk of malnutrition and diseases.

Additionally, at the end of September, which represents the end of the lean season or the period between harvests, [aid agencies are predicting](#) that acute hunger in Sudan could rise from its current estimate at 12 million people to 18 million. Agricultural areas damaged by the aforementioned flooding as well as delayed rainfall in other parts of the country leading to delayed planting may further exacerbate food insecurity in the coming months. Displacement to urban areas has traditionally been one outcome of food insecurity in rural areas. With the economic crisis and rising prices, food insecurity is also impacting urban areas.

Kenyan political developments vis-à-vis migration policies

After the presidential elections on 9 August, 2022, William Ruto assumed office as the [new Kenyan President](#). In Ruto's [political manifesto](#), one reference was made to migration, in terms of attracting international talent through immigration to stimulate the country's creative economy. That being said, migration issues were largely absent during the electoral campaigns of each presidential candidate, although an important deadline fell within the same timeline. The Kenyan government had announced last year it would close the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps on 30 June, 2022, seeking to coordinate with UNHCR on durable solutions for their inhabitants. In response, UNHCR had shared [a proposition with sustainable and rights-based actions with the government of Kenya](#), with the aim of finding solutions for Dadaab and Kakuma, "[Africa's two largest refugee camps](#)". UNHCR envisaged in this proposal to enhance safe voluntary returns, to propose resettlement to third countries, and to accelerate the issuing of national ID cards of Kenyans previously registered in the refugee database. Thus far, President Ruto's office has not made any statements on the subject.

Relocation schemes to Rwanda

After the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against the United Kingdom's (UK) plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda, as explained in the [previous quarter](#), the plan is now being [challenged by the British High Court](#). Originally scheduled to take place on [19 July](#), the [High Court's hearing](#) on the lawfulness of the British government's relocation policy to Rwanda was postponed until September. A [second hearing](#) with claims launched by Asylum Aid will be conducted in October and it is anticipated that the decisions of both hearings will be announced at the same time.

Despite this, the [UK Home Office is already planning a second flight](#) to send asylum seekers to Rwanda. If at any point the policy were to be considered unlawful, asylum seekers sent to Rwanda [could be returned to the UK](#). Moreover, in September, the UK gave an extra [20 million pounds](#) to the Rwandan government in light of the partnership, on top of the 120 million pounds already offered. While the recently appointed Prime Minister, Liz Truss, has pledged to [support the deportation schemes](#), UK ministers in favour of the deal with Rwanda were warned by their own advisers that there are [serious protection concerns](#) in Rwanda, particularly for political opponents of the Rwandan government. Moreover, representatives of the UN claimed that Rwanda is “[not a safe third country](#)”, while UNHCR lawyers explained that proceeding with the scheme would also breach the Refugee Convention, violating the [principle of non-refoulement](#).

The UK is not the first country to consider Rwanda as an offshore detention site. In 2014, [Israel had also started a “voluntary departure” system to Rwanda and Uganda](#). More recently, in September, [media outlets reported](#) that Denmark and Rwanda signed a declaration on a possible relocation scheme of asylum seekers, according to which around 1,000 people may be sent to Rwanda per year from the country. The asylum seekers may opt for an [asylum application in the East African country](#), with the option of settling there.

Pledged support for Tanzania’s refugee response

As of 31 August, Tanzania hosted 246,780 refugees and asylum-seekers registered by [UNHCR](#), most of whom reside in the Nyarugusu and Nduta camps. Specifically, 83.6% of them live in camps, while the remainder lives in settlements, villages, and urban areas. Most refugees and asylum-seekers come from Burundi (64.1%) and DRC (35.7%). In the same month, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, stated the importance of “[creating favourable conditions for the return of Burundian refugees, while ensuring all refugees in Tanzania are protected and assisted](#)”. During his visit to Tanzania, he praised the country for its long history of hosting refugees. Moreover, the government of Japan has donated 500,000 USD to [assist refugees from Burundi and the DRC in Tanzanian refugee camps](#).

Displacement from DRC into Uganda spurs new emergency appeal

The 2022 outbreak of violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, has led to an unpredictable situation at DRC’s eastern borders and thousands fleeing into Uganda. As of 12 September, approximately [58,000 Congolese \(DRC\) have sought refuge in Uganda](#), with the majority (43,000) staying in transit centres, and 10,000 to 15,000 settled along the Ugandan border. In July and August alone, [UNHCR](#) noted 7,566 and 1,798 new arrivals, respectively, from DRC. In collaboration with UNHCR, the government of Uganda has [launched a new emergency appeal to tackle the current needs](#) for new arrivals in the country, stating that Uganda is rapidly approaching the limits of its hosting capacity. The plan therefore explicitly states more international support, funds and coordination is needed to respond to Uganda’s pledge, and to migration and displacement in the Great Lakes region in general.

The Eastern route from East Africa to Yemen

Returns to Ethiopia through the Eastern route

In July, Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it would begin a [repatriation operation](#) to return its citizens who are living in "dire conditions" abroad. Approximately 12,000 Ethiopians are scheduled to be returned from 12 countries, including Yemen, Oman and Djibouti. These efforts come on top of returns from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Yemen. Returns from KSA have been taking place ever since [a signed agreement](#) between both countries came into effect in March. As of July, [50,337 Ethiopians had been repatriated from KSA](#). Among these returnees, 3,628 were below the age of 18. By August, [65,446 Ethiopians had been repatriated from KSA](#), representing an increase of 30% in one month's time. 79% are aged 18-30.

Looking at Ethiopian returns from Yemen, [280 Ethiopians returned to their home country](#), as part of IOM's Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) programme on 10-11 July after "facing traumatic experiences" in the country. According to IOM Ethiopia's Head of Migration Management, the next challenges for humanitarian actors in Ethiopia will be sustainable reintegration for this returnee population, and to gain a better understanding of migration decision-making and intentions upon return, for which there is limited funding. In September, the US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) provided IOM with an additional 14.5 million USD to "[assist thousands of migrants in vulnerable situations and their host communities along the Eastern Route](#)". Such funding will contribute to the assistance of vulnerable migrants in Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and to the voluntary returns of vulnerable migrants in Yemen to their country of origin.

Mixed Migration in Djibouti

In [July](#) and [August](#), IOM's Flow Monitoring Points (FMP) observed 39,377 movements in Djibouti, of which 28,650 were arrivals into the country from Ethiopia. This represents a steady decrease in both July and August movements compared to the 22,362 movements captured in June. Average daily movements this quarter were less than their pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels, which represents a shift from the previous quarter, but [considerably higher than daily movements during the same quarter in 2021](#). A 62% increase was noted in movements from Ethiopia to Djibouti from January - July 2022 compared to the same period in 2021, reaching a total of 80,141. In Djibouti, most movements occur around the coastal town of Obock, which is a key transit point along the Eastern Route, and the main passage to go to or return from the Arabian Peninsula.

Mixed Migration in Yemen

In total, 9,713 migrants arrived in Yemen this quarter: [3,171](#) in July and [6,542](#) in August. At the time of writing, data for September are not yet available. Most migrants are men of Ethiopian nationality who intend to reach KSA. Compared to July and August 2021, when [1,566 and 1,756](#) migrants, respectively, arrived in Yemen, there has been an increase in arrivals by 292% this quarter. While the number of arrivals from July 2022 is similar to reporting from June 2022 ([3,174](#)), arrivals in August represent a 106% increase compared to the previous month. As mentioned in [the previous quarter in the case of June](#), the low number of arrivals

in July can also be attributed to “[seasonal weather conditions as well as an increase in border patrols from the Djibouti side](#)”. On the contrary, higher numbers recorded in August are deemed to be partially due to “[decreased security measures by the Djibouti Coast Guard and the good condition of weather and the sea](#)”.

The number of Yemeni returnees from KSA has also increased: a total number of 9,998 Yemenis returned this quarter ([4,476](#) in July and [5,522](#) in August). Most returnees are male, while the majority of vulnerable profiles are considered to be unaccompanied children and elderly people.

Routes towards the Mediterranean

East African arrivals along the Mediterranean routes

Between July and September, [59,292 refugees and migrants](#) arrived in Europe via land and sea Mediterranean routes, representing a 32% increase in arrivals compared to July – September 2021 and an 88% increase compared to the [previous quarter \(Q2 2022\)](#). [1,591 Eritreans, 757 Sudanese, 335 Ethiopians and 171 Somalis](#) have arrived in Italy by sea since the beginning of the year. The percentage of Eritreans arriving in Europe has continued at 3% of all arrivals, with Eritreans being the 8th-most common origin country of arrivals as of 31 August. Arrivals from Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia are not amounting the top ten origin countries. In Greece, [424 Somalis, 99 Congolese \(DRC\), 98 Yemenis, 65 Eritreans, 40 Sudanese and 35 Ethiopians](#) have arrived by sea since the beginning of the year. On 30 June, [27 people](#) were evacuated from detention centres in Libya and brought to Italy. These migrants came from [Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia](#).

EU pledges support to Egyptian coastguard on migration

In July, the European Union (EU) Commissioner on Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Oliver Várhelyi, [confirmed](#) that the European Commission vowed to support Egypt with almost EUR 300 million for long and short-term support on border management, to reduce irregular migration from Egypt and across the Mediterranean. This follows reports from June, which stated that the EU was ready to support Egypt with at least EUR 80 million aimed at [migration prevention across the Mediterranean](#). Specifically, the money is aimed to aid the Egyptian Coast Guard for [Egypt’s search and rescue, and border surveillance](#).

The Southern route towards South Africa and mixed migration within Southern Africa

Camp closures and camp returns in Malawi

In July, Malawi [announced](#) the immediate closure of Bangula, Nkhole and Minembe camps hosting more than 1,000 Mozambican families who had been displaced owing to natural disasters. On 22 July, Mozambican authorities reported [repatriating 1,600 nationals](#) who had been in Malawi since January. They were returned to the Morrumbala district in the Zambezia region, where, according to the officials, there is dedicated land to resettle returned families.

Following the approval of its High Court on 12 August, the Malawian government [ordered the return](#) of all rural-based asylum-seekers and refugees to Dzaleka Camp in the Dowa district. The Homeland Security Minister, Jean Muonaowauza Sendeza, claimed that [asylum seekers would be relocated by 20 November 2022, and refugees by 1 February 2023](#). However, this may cause “[school overcrowding, and a scramble for water and even health facilities](#)” in the refugee camp. Moreover, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Malawi and the Malawian Police Service “[have uncovered instances of human trafficking in Malawis’ Dzaleka Refugee Camp](#)”. Traffickers appear to force men into hard labour, women and girls into sexual exploitation, and children into farm and domestic work.

Mixed Migration in Zambia

In July, 51 migrants were fined and deported from the country after being arrested in June and convicted of “[unlawful stay](#)”. 48 migrants were Tanzanian and 3 were Burundian. Moreover, the Department of Immigration’s Public Relations Officer, Namati Nshinka, said that on 29 June, some 60 suspected irregular migrants were arrested, including 9 Somalis and 2 Eritreans who were later released owing to their refugee status in the country and valid mobility passes. 48 Congolese and 4 Tanzanians are currently being detained in a correctional facility “pending further processes”.

In August, the government pledged to create a [solid partnership with Malawi and Mozambique](#) to improve reproductive health services for migrants in Zambia, as accessing health is currently a challenge for cross-border migrants. As of 31 August, Zambia hosts [67,003 refugees and 4,981 asylum-seekers](#). Most refugees and asylum-seekers come from DRC, but also Burundi, Somalia, and Rwanda.

Returns to Ethiopia on the Southern route

As mentioned earlier on, in July, Ethiopia announced a [repatriation operation](#) to return citizens in dire situations abroad. Around 12,000 Ethiopians are targeted to be returned, including from countries along the Southern route such as Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In [Zambia](#) and [Malawi](#), it was reported that the return efforts helped reduce the number of Ethiopians in detention centres after they had been stopped at border checkpoints en route to South Africa. In [Zambia](#), the local Ethiopian community had been advocating for the Ethiopian government to facilitate the voluntary return of their co-nationals in detention. [107 Ethiopians](#) were returned from Zambia from 8 - 12 September. Raising concerns around the practices and logistics of return, one was reported to have [collapsed and died](#) at the [Kenneth Kaunda International airport](#) before departure.

Voluntary returns to DRC from Angola

In July, UNHCR reinitiated the [voluntary repatriation of Congolese \(DRC\) refugees from Angola](#), after departures had been stopped for two years since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Voluntary repatriations are organized by UNHCR and carried out in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the governments of Angola and DRC and other local partners. Upon their arrival in DRC, refugees are supported with [cash to cover basic needs, and with re-integration assistance](#). The first

convoy in July included [88 Congolese \(DRC\)](#) refugees leaving the Lôvua settlement in northern Angola. Refugees are scheduled to return to various destinations in western DRC, including to the capital Kinshasa. Most of them had fled to Angola during episodes of political violence in the Kasai region in 2017. Currently, Lôvua continues to host around 7,000 Congolese refugees who are eligible for voluntary return. As of 31 August, Angola hosts [25,598 refugees and 30,282 asylum-seekers](#). Most refugees and asylum-seekers originate from DRC (41.5%), Guinea (16.6%), Côte d'Ivoire (11.4%) and Mauritania (10.2%).

Displacement linked to conflict and climate in Mozambique

Since 30 August, an estimated [38,000 people](#), most of whom are women and children, have been displaced following attacks in Erati and Memba districts in Nampula province. According to OCHA, while attacks at the end of this quarter are now happening largely on a daily basis, mid-July to late August saw a dip in violence and displacement. From 31 August – 20 September, [15,400 people](#) in Cabo Delgado were on the move, with 60% travelling “due to attacks or fear of attacks” and 37% travelling “to return to their regions of origin or to join their families”. Approximately 47,000 are displaced in Erati district, Nampula province, and being hosted by family and friends, according to a September inter-cluster assessment. Based on low food reserves and income, the [Famine Early Warning Systems Network \(FEWSN\)](#) predicts that acute food insecurity will remain at Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Crisis-level (Phase 3) until January 2023 in Cabo Delgado, based on ongoing conflict; southern Mozambique, based on drought conditions; and Nampula based on conflict, flooding and tropical storms. As of [31 August](#), there are 946,508 IDPs in northern Mozambique due to conflict as well as an additional 83,000 newly displaced persons owing to recent attacks in June; 129,327 IDPs in central Mozambique displaced by extreme weather events; and 29,315 registered refugees and asylum seekers across the country. Refugees and asylum seekers mostly come from DRC (37.4%), Burundi (29%), Somalia (14.4%) and Rwanda (13.5%).

Tunisians move to Southern Africa for work

Citing growing economic and political instability in Tunisia, Tunisians [reportedly](#) are eyeing moving towards Southern Africa, rather than Europe or the Gulf states. Tunisia's fledgling job market is increasingly unable to absorb its university graduates, leaving many higher-educated graduates looking for alternatives abroad. Citing the risks linked to making the journey across the Mediterranean or alternative long paperwork procedures to obtain legal pathways to Europe, highly educated Tunisians are increasingly turning towards opportunities on the African continent. Moreover, this preference towards moving south is matched with an [“increasing demand for workers in Southern Africa”](#), encouraging Tunisians to explore such opportunities.

Shifting migration policies in South Africa

South Africa announced plans to end special permits for most migrants to [“manage an influx of economic migrants”](#). The country's Home Affairs minister, Aaron Motsoaledi, stated that the government is “not targeting” any specific nationality, though measures will include the halting of special dispensations to Zimbabweans to live and work in South Africa at the end of the year, and to migrants from Lesotho, who will see their dispensations expire in 2023. Approximately 178,000 Zimbabweans have until 31 December to apply for an alternative migration status or be forced to leave the country. [Media reports](#) highlight migration

policies and rhetoric becoming a divisive issue within the country's 2024 general election campaigns, with some candidates proposing to reduce the number of migrants in the country and others exploring a re-think to South Africa's international commitments.

Zimbabwean police arrests Malawians

In August, [Zimbabwean police detained 86 Malawians](#) found in a town between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, who were suspected to be en route to South Africa. 76 of the migrants were men and 10 were women; all were without travel documents. Another 3 Malawians were arrested leaving Zimbabwe, attempting to enter South Africa. As of September 2022, there are [11,150 registered refugees and 12,576 asylum-seekers](#) present in Zimbabwe, with most originating from DRC, Mozambique, Burundi.

Indian Ocean route to Mayotte

Mayotte, a French island in the Indian Ocean located between Madagascar, The Comoros and Mozambique, is becoming an increasingly attractive destination for refugees and migrants from East and Southern Africa, despite the perilous sea journey to its shores, [Le Monde](#) reports. There is a [lack of statistical data](#) and, hence, the magnitude of arrivals in Mayotte is hard to establish. It is reported that many originate [from The Comoros](#), and use traditional kwassa-kwassa boats to reach the island. The Comoran Island of Anjou is mentioned as a key transit point before the last leg of the sea journey towards Mayotte takes place. The dangers of the journey and the tighter immigration policies throughout time have "[caused significant number of deaths at sea](#)", as reported by [MMC](#) last year. Upon arrival in Mayotte, refugees and migrants await [difficult reception conditions](#). One Burundian refugee interviewed in Mayotte explained, "I fled Burundi in 2015 because of the war. I stayed in refugee camps in Uganda for three years, and then, when I arrived in Tanzania, it was suggested I come here. I was told that I would be taken care of, but I have never been so mistreated in my life." Moreover, refugees and migrants are at risk of experiencing xenophobia. On 25 July, a protest organized by more than 200 refugees and migrants took place in the capital Mamoudzou to [denounce reported xenophobic attacks](#) over the past months.

Thematic Focus: Burundian returnees and implications for mixed migration


Context and figures

Burundi's recent history is marked by violent conflict and contested political transitions, spurring displacement, particularly into neighbouring countries in the Great Lakes region. Both conflict and outward movements have hampered the country's development and stability processes. Burundi experienced a civil war that lasted for more than a decade (1993-2005), and a [political crisis in 2015](#) placed the country once again on the brink of civil conflict. Since the May 2020 elections, the political climate has become increasingly stable, prompting an acceleration in return movements of Burundian refugees living abroad. Following his election, President Ndayishimiye specifically addressed Burundian exiles abroad to return to contribute to the peaceful transition of the country.

Since 2017, UNHCR has facilitated the voluntary repatriation of more than 200,000 Burundians. After the 2020 elections, returnee figures grew, with [65,000 returns](#) in 2021 from Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, DRC and other countries. The number of returns in 2022 is so far showing a decreasing trend compared to 2021, reaching [16,621](#) as of 31 August, which may be linked to a growing scarcity of livelihood opportunities and the re-migration of initial returnees; challenges encountered by potential returnees to engage in go-and-see visits owing to a lack of institutional support and ability to engage in border crossings; or it may suggest that the majority of those who wanted to return have returned. UNHCR has formulated the following stance on returns to the country:

“Whereas conditions in Burundi are not yet conducive to allow for the promotion of voluntary repatriation, UNHCR is supporting Burundian refugees in the exercise of their right to return, as long as their decision is voluntary, free and informed, and that their return takes place in safety and dignity.”

Figure 1. Burundian returnees between 2017 and 2022 (up to 31 August) by country of asylum (source: UNHCR)



It is estimated that close to [258,000 Burundian refugees](#) remain in the Great Lakes region who could be eligible for repatriation. The majority is hosted in Tanzania (126,497), followed by Rwanda (48,352), the DRC (40,798) and Uganda (40,167).¹ Burundi itself hosts around [82,551 refugees and 3,990 asylum-seekers](#), of which 98.7% originate from neighbouring DRC.

Reintegration efforts and structural challenges

Burundi remains one of the least developed countries, classified as 187th out of 191 countries in the latest [UNDP Human Development Index](#). Although the political climate has improved, the [social system remains porous and fragile](#). Burundi's economy heavily relies on agriculture, and is impacted by [adverse climate change impacts](#), including drought, floods, erosion and landslides. Against the backdrop of socio-economic and developmental challenges, returnees with high vulnerability profiles often return to the poorest provinces in the country: Makamba, Kirundo and Ruyigi. These are also the provinces identified as those with the highest number of inhabitants experiencing persistent food insecurity and hosting the highest number of IDPs. The Joint Refugee, Returnee and Reintegration Plan (JRRRP), led by UNHCR, UNDP and

¹ As noted by UNHCR, these overall figures do not include a number of around 42,200 Burundian refugees in Tanzania who have lived in the country for decades and no longer receive assistance, as well as Burundian refugees hosted in Southern Africa, including in Malawi (10,800) and South Africa (9,900).

the Government of Burundi, is taking an inclusive approach, targeting 87,378 vulnerable host community members alongside returnees in the six main provinces of return. Yet, the JRRRP risks being severely underfunded in 2022, with only 16% of a projected USD 80.5 million covered by May 2022. To put this into context, in 2021, just 21% of the total estimated budget for the JRRRP was collected. Further, as of [August 2022](#), UNHCR received just 27% of its total estimated budget for Tanzania. A comprehensive response aimed at sustainable reintegration efforts risks, therefore, being hindered by multi-annual chronic underfunding, [UNHCR](#) reports. During a [three-day visit to Tanzania in August](#), UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi said, “The Burundi situation remains significantly underfunded. I appeal to donors, including development partners, to provide funding and investment in Tanzania and boost the provision of basic services.”

Map 1. Burundi’s three main provinces of refugee returns




Implications for mixed migration

[UNHCR](#) established a protection monitoring architecture in 2017 to better understand returnees' needs and challenges upon return in Burundi, with standardized monitoring taking place since 2019 up until the time of writing in all 18 provinces of the country. The data reveal that since early 2020, an increase can be noted in the number of returnees who are not found in their areas of return during monitoring activities. Between the annual number for 2019 and November 2020, an estimated increase was noted from 9% to 33% of refugee returnees who were not in their place of return, and with a likelihood of having engaged in onward movements or re-migration. Moreover, 31% of monitored returnees reported being unsatisfied with their overall situation upon returning, and 88% reported a lack of livelihood opportunities.

When family members, relatives and neighbours were asked about non-located returnees' whereabouts, findings demonstrated that close to half of them (46%) were believed to have left Burundi, participating in onward movements to neighbouring countries, and/or potentially returning to their country of asylum before return, including Tanzania, Uganda and the DRC. An intention to move back to country of asylum could indicate they form a part the Burundian group of "[repeat refugees](#)", which includes those displaced to neighbouring countries for the first time during the Burundian Civil War in 1993-2005, then returning to Burundi, before leaving again due to not feeling properly reintegrated or due to civil unrest from 2015 onwards.

The high number of returnees deciding to not stay in their area of return raises questions around their needs and challenges upon return, but also their drivers of return and re-migration decision-making and aspirations. On drivers, [Amnesty International](#) expressed concern in 2019 over the repatriation of Burundian returnees in Tanzania not being "wholly voluntary", based on a leaked bilateral agreement signed between Tanzania and Burundi on returns from September - December 2019, which followed a Tripartite Agreement on returns signed by the two countries and UNHCR in 2017. Moreover, over the last years, [reports](#) have come out on the maltreatment and profiling of Burundians in Tanzania, and [Human Rights Watch](#) reported having evidence on disappearances and torture of Burundian refugees. The recent [closure of Mtendeli refugee camp](#) in December 2021, relocating 21,000 individuals to Nduta refugee camp, raised questions around providing continued conducive environments for refugees and asylum-seekers in Tanzania. Further research on the migration drivers and intentions of Burundian refugees in the Great Lakes region and Burundian returnees could increase an understanding of how Burundians engage in mixed migration dynamics, and if their mobility patterns are forced, voluntary or ambiguous by nature.


Highlighted New Research and Reports



[At Risk: Environmental Mobility in African Coastal Cities.](#)

Robert Bosch Stiftung | August 2022


With cities having an important role as transit or destination countries for migrants, this report offers an in-depth analysis of environmental mobility patterns and living conditions in coastal cities in Africa. This report's objective is to create a policy action plan to address the needs of environmental migrants and the host communities from an area-based approach. The research focuses notably on the case of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), among other cities including Accra (Ghana), Freetown (Sierra Leone), and Monrovia (Liberia), all cities which are facing incoming movements spurred by, among other migration drivers, environmental factors.



[A Region on the Move 2021: East and Horn of Africa.](#)

IOM | August 2022

The ninth report of "A Region on the Move" series, this document explores mixed migration in the East and Horn of Africa region. It does so by providing a regional overview of data on international migrants, including data on migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, and irregular migrants. The document also dives into international remittances and the impact of COVID-19 on migration trends, and on the socio-economic reality of the region. Lastly, this report provides an outlook on movements related to the current drought in the region.



[Climate Induced Displacement to Secondary Cities in Eastern and the Horn of Africa: What Do We Know?](#)

Cities Alliance, University of Oxford & SDC | August 2022

This report explores the data on urban displacement, the determinants of climate-induced displacement, and examples of the actions of municipalities to support climate-induced displaced people and curb climate impact on cities. The report also provides recommendations that emerge from academic and practical considerations in the cities of this area. Some key recommendations include engaging with local entities for a coherent decision-making process on

climate-induced forced migration, using data and evidence-based knowledge on climate projections, and undertaking household-level interventions to improve urban resource access.




[The Impact of Covid-19 on Ethiopian Migrants and their Households in Five Communities of High Emigration.](#)

IOM & EU | July 2022

This report is the third publication of a project started in 2019, to understand the experiences and decisions of Ethiopians emigrating to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The document contains household and individual-level data, conducted in five Ethiopian high-emigration areas in the first half of 2021. It also focuses on how money, ideas and knowledge are exchanged among Ethiopian communities. Importantly, this study explains the role the

COVID-19 pandemic played for households living in such high-emigration communities in Ethiopia.




[Urban Refugees and IDPs in secondary Cities: case studies of crisis migration, urbanisation and governance.](#)

Cities Alliance, University of Oxford & SDC | July 2022

As the result of a two-year project, this report aims at providing data on how secondary cities manage displacement and new arrivals in their constituencies. The overall objective is to have evidence-based information to improve municipal actions in the future. Specifically, this document offers examples from secondary cities, which are often overlooked in the literature. Among these: Arua (Uganda), Adama (Ethiopia), and Kakuma and Lodwar (Kenya). Based on

these cities' experiences, recommendations on how to manage growing urbanization of forcibly displaced people are outlined.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in DRC regional offices in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, and a small global team in Geneva.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Global and regional MMC teams are based in Brussels, Geneva, Dakar, Nairobi, Tunis, Bogota and Dhaka.

For more information visit:
mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

