



# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa



This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the West Africa (WA) region. The core countries of focus for this region are Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council (DRC) regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit [mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

### **MMC's understanding of mixed migration**

“Mixed migration” refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes refugees and migrants traveling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often traveling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

#### **Front cover photo credit:**

Jean-Baptiste Joire (2017)

Women watching boats in Joal-Fadiout, Senegal, February 2017.

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# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa

## Quarter 1 - 2023


## Key Updates

- **Jump in Burkinabè refugee numbers:** As of 22 February, UNHCR estimated that there were some [70,000 Burkinabè refugees](#) in Mali and Niger, and at the end of March, [45,640 Burkinabè refugees](#) in the coastal countries of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. The Head of the UNHCR West and Central Africa Bureau highlighted her concern over the significant increase in Burkinabè fleeing to the [coastal countries](#) during the quarter.
- **Expulsions from Algeria:** As of 15 March, the NGO [Alarme Phone Sahara \(APS\)](#) estimated that the number of people expelled from Algeria this year had reached at least 9,686. APS, [MSF](#) and [IOM](#) all expressed concern during the quarter about the thousands of migrants stranded in northern Niger following expulsion and their lack of access to humanitarian assistance.
- **Decrease in Canary Islands arrivals:** According to the [Spanish Ministry of Interior](#), the first quarter of the year saw a decrease of 63% in arrivals by sea to the Canary Islands with 2,178 people recorded compared to 5,940 people in the same period last year.
- **Deportations from Spain to Senegal:** As reported in [ElDiario](#), Spain carried out at least two deportation flights to Senegal during the quarter. These flights departed from Madrid and stopped in the Canary Islands en route to Senegal. At least 31 Senegalese were returned during these operations.
- **Government organised repatriations from Tunisia:** Following a surge in [racist incidents](#) targeting refugees and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Tunisia, various West African states organised repatriation flights for their citizens, returning at least 1,300 West Africans during the quarter.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This number is based on MMC calculations drawing on the following sources: Jeune Afrique [3 March](#), Africa News [16 March](#), InfoMigrant [20 March](#), Africa News [24 March](#).

## Regional Overview\*



\*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration flows within and out of West Africa.

# Mixed Migration Regional Updates

## West Africa region

### Refugee numbers from Burkina Faso on the rise

As the security situation continues to worsen and access to humanitarian assistance becomes more challenging in Burkina Faso, cross-border displacement has increased during the quarter. As of the end of March, [UNHCR](#) estimated that there were some 45,640 refugees from **Burkina Faso** in the West African coastal countries of **Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana** and **Togo**. This included 1,118 Burkinabè in Benin, 18,136 in Côte d'Ivoire, 6,011 in Ghana and 20,000 in Togo, as well as 375 refugees of other nationalities who had entered Côte d'Ivoire from Burkina Faso. The recorded monthly influx of Burkinabè into the coastal countries has been on the rise since November of 2022, with UNHCR having counted 16,648 refugee arrivals from Burkina Faso in February and March 2023 alone. In a 22 February [statement](#), the Director of UNHCR's Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa stated her concerns over the significant increase in Burkinabè fleeing to the coastal countries during the quarter. In her remarks, the Director also noted that approximately 70,000 Burkinabè refugees are present in Burkina Faso's northern neighbours of **Mali** and **Niger**.

Numbers of [internally displaced persons](#) in Burkina Faso have increased from 1,882,593 at the end of 2022 to 1,938,792 as of 31 January.

On February 9, 2023, the Republic of Benin issued a ministerial arrêté granting prima facie refugee status to 863 Burkinabè. While this decision comes in recognition of widespread insecurity in Burkina Faso, it does not systematically concern all Burkinabè, but specifically a group of asylum seekers living in Tanguiéta in the Atacora Department.<sup>2</sup>

## Policy, diplomacy and legal updates

### Spanish migration diplomacy: high-level meetings take place between Spain and Morocco

At the beginning of February, a [high-level meeting](#) took place between the Spanish Interior Minister and his Moroccan counterpart. The meeting was intended to further strengthen collaboration on migration issues. The Spanish Minister attributed such cooperation with Morocco and other migration origin and transit countries – particularly in relation to fighting 'people-smuggling mafias' – to the 26% reduction in irregular arrivals to Spain in 2022 (see [North Africa Q1 2023 Quarterly Mixed Migration Update](#) for more details). The president of the Canary Islands – a major recipient of [irregular arrivals](#) from Morocco – also paid a [diplomatic visit](#) to Morocco in mid-March. In his communication around the visit, the Canary Islands president cited [cooperation](#) with Morocco as having helped reduce irregular arrivals to Spain in the previous months.

<sup>2</sup> Arrêté année 2023/n 12 MISF/DC/SGM/SP-CNR/SA008SGG23 portant reconnaissance collective (prima facie) au statut de réfugiés de huit cent soixante-trois (863) Burkinabè, demandeurs d'asile vivant à Tanguiéta dans le Département de l'Atacora, adopted on February 9th 2023 by the Ministry of Interior and Public Security, to be published in the *Journal Officiel* of Benin.

## Spanish migration diplomacy: a new circular migration program imminent

In January the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation met with the Senegalese Foreign Minister in Madrid where they discussed opportunities for circular migration between the two countries. As quoted in [EuropaPress](#), the Spanish Foreign Minister welcomed “all the political signals” Senegal is sending to Spain and European counterparts regarding the fight against human smuggling networks. Spain is due to implement an agreement on circular migration with Senegal beginning in April. According to a government source cited by [Reuters](#), this program will employ 100 Senegalese to work in the Spanish agricultural sector for the harvest season before returning to Senegal. While a pilot program in 2019 was not deemed a success given that only 18 of its 47 participants returned to Senegal, the new program is said to be modelled on a scheme with Morocco which privileges women with children, an approach thought to encourage return. In 2022, another [pilot program](#) sent 17 young Senegalese to Spanish agricultural enterprises and all returned after the agreed upon three-month period.

## Cooperation agreement between Switzerland and Guinea-Bissau to facilitate returns

On February 27, the Swiss State Secretary for Migration signed a migration-related cooperation agreement with Guinea-Bissau which seems designed to ease returns to that country. According to a 28 February Swiss government [communiqué](#), the number of Bissau-Guinean asylum applications in Switzerland is not high, but the agreement will facilitate the issuance of travel documents needed to return people in an irregular situation to Guinea Bissau. In exchange, Switzerland committed to support projects in Guinea-Bissau, such as the digitization of its civil register.

## Frontex status agreement negotiations with Senegal and Mauritania not concluded

In response to a [question](#)<sup>3</sup> posed by a Member of the European Parliament, on 20 March 2023, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs provided a written [update](#) on the negotiations with Mauritania and Senegal on status agreements with Frontex.

*“The Commission received authorisation from the Council to negotiate a status agreement with the Republic of Senegal in July 2022. Discussions have taken place, while formal negotiations with Senegal on the status agreement have not started so far.*

*The Commission received an authorisation from the Council to negotiate a status agreement with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in July 2022. Negotiations are currently ongoing.”*

3 Parliamentary question - E-000156/2023



# Mixed migration from West Africa towards North Africa and Europe

## Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Route

According to the [Spanish Ministry of the Interior](#) (Moi) the irregular arrival of migrants in Spain by sea and land has decreased by 51% in the first quarter of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. This trend is particularly noticeable in the Canary Islands, with a decrease of 63% in arrivals by sea in the same period. Indeed, 51 boats containing 2,178 people were recorded by the Spanish Moi from January through March, compared to 123 boats and 5,940 people in the first quarter last year. According to [InfoMigrants](#), this significant decrease is due to the improvement of diplomatic relations that occurred in April 2022 resulting in a strengthening of migration controls on the part of Morocco.

The majority of [migrant boats](#) arriving in the Canary Islands depart from the coast of Morocco's disputed region of Western Sahara<sup>4</sup> (Dakhla or Laayoune). However, some leave from further south, as evidenced by the [pirogue](#) that left Gambia in early January and was rescued in Cape Verde after drifting at sea for 25 days. The boat contained 90 migrants from the region (Gambia, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone), six of whom were hospitalized and two of whom lost their lives.

While [young Moroccans](#) outnumber other specific nationalities on the Atlantic route, [West Africans](#) as a broad group have been the most represented on the route in recent years. The route is also used more and more by [women and minors](#), with an increase of 20% to 30% of arrivals over the past two years.

### Concerns over Canary Islands reception conditions

In January [El Pais](#) reported that more than 400 migrants – including minors – were being held on the island of Lanzarote in overcrowded, undignified and unsanitary conditions. The arrival of nine boats in three days maxed out the capacity of the holding facility where authorities keep migrants for their first 72 hours on the island. This situation is reportedly due to a disagreement between the Spanish Ministry of Interior – which has set up a brand-new camp in the port of Arrecife – and the municipal council of Arrecife – which is opposed to the camp's opening. The equipped and furnished camp has stood empty since October.

Located on the island of Tenerife, the Las Raíces reception camp has been [condemned](#) by migrants over several years for its [unfit conditions](#), which – according to reporting from [El Diario](#) – the Ministry of Migration pledged to improve in September of 2022. Recent reporting has also raised concerns about potential cases of [sexual exploitation](#) affecting migrants at Las Raíces. According to the testimonies of migrants and volunteers, residents of Tenerife have allegedly offered money, clothes, alcohol or drugs to migrants in exchange for sex. The [National Police](#) have begun an investigation into complaints filed by residents of the camp.

In [March](#) the Spanish Ombudsman registered his [annual report](#) in Spain's Congress of Deputies. In the report's section on migration, the Ombudsman pointed to a "significant improvement in the conditions of detention of migrants who are intercepted attempting to gain irregular access to the islands." However, he

4 Western Sahara has been on the United Nations [list](#) of Non-Self-Governing Territories since 1963.

made clear that certain facilities still do not reach the necessary standards. The report also raised multiple remaining concerns in the reception of minors and women specifically. At the end of March, the Government of the Canary Islands announced it is dedicating [2.6 million euros](#) to the care of unaccompanied foreign minors and their integration in residential spaces and educational and employment training resources.

## Deportations from Spain to Senegal

In November 2020, [high-level meetings](#) between the Spanish and Senegalese governments took place in Dakar, with migration high on the agenda. During these meetings, the Senegalese government acknowledged that Senegalese nationals who are in Spain irregularly can be returned to Senegal. In December of that year, the [Spanish Foreign Minister](#) underscored that returns to Senegal would take place in the near future. Despite these assurances, deportations do not appear to have occurred for more than two years since then, until mid-February of this year. According to reporting from the newspaper [El Diario](#), deportation flights between Spain and Senegal occurred on 15 February and 1 March, carrying at least 31 Senegalese. These flights left from Madrid and stopped by the Canary Islands on their way to Senegal. Spain had already resumed regular [deportation flights](#) of people from Morocco and Western Sahara in March last year.

## Southbound mixed migration

### Returns and evacuations within and to the West Africa region<sup>5</sup>

#### Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM)

According to [UNHCR](#), as of 31 January, a total of 5,099 refugees have left Niger for third countries under resettlement or through complementary pathways, such as study visas. This number includes 3,526 persons evacuated from Libya to Niger under UNHCR's Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM).

On 20 March, the [AU-EU-UN](#) tripartite working group met in Brussels to discuss the situation of refugees and migrants in Libya. Among other points, the group emphasized the importance of using the ETMs in Niger and Rwanda more frequently and called on the international community to provide practical assistance, such as expanding safe and regular migration channels, improving resettlement options, and supporting voluntary returns and reintegration.

#### Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVR)

Continuing the trend noted in [2022](#), IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) program supported the return of a significant number of Malians and Nigerians in the first quarter of 2023.

In February, at least 293 Malians returned from Niger ([149 migrants](#) on 1 February and [144 migrants](#) on 8 February). In March, [95 migrants](#) were assisted to return from Sebha, Libya to Bamako.

In this first quarter, at least two return flights were also made to Nigeria. A flight in February brought back [150 migrants](#) from Niger and another flight, in March, returned [281 Nigerians](#) from Libya. [112 Nigerian migrants](#) also were assisted to return from Sebha, Libya to Niger in February.

<sup>5</sup> This overview highlights the main trends regarding returns and evacuations within and to the West Africa region during the quarter. However, it does not necessarily capture all return activity within the region.



## Wave of racist and anti-migrant sentiment spurs repatriations from Tunisia

Following a statement on irregular migrants made by the Tunisian President, there has been a rise in [anti-Black racism](#) targeting sub-Saharan African [refugees and migrants](#), as well as [Black Tunisians](#). [Human Rights Watch](#) and [Amnesty International](#) have documented incidents of physical violence, verbal harassment, and arbitrary detention and arrest of sub-Saharan Africans, regardless of their legal status. Many were also [forcibly evicted](#) from their homes and [dismissed](#) from their jobs. (For an in-depth analysis of the issue, please see [Thematic Focus of the Q1 2023 Quarterly Mixed Migration Update for North Africa](#).)

The situation in Tunisia prompted many refugees and migrants to seek assistance from their respective embassies. The Côte d'Ivoire and Mali [embassies](#) in Tunisia provided emergency housing arrangements to cater to some affected individuals. The events in Tunisia were also met with criticism from multiple African states, such as [Côte d'Ivoire](#), [Mali](#), [Guinea](#), [Senegal](#), and [Burkina Faso](#), which took prompt action to organise repatriation flights for their nationals. As a result, at least 1,300<sup>6</sup> individuals were repatriated by 24 March. Other refugees and migrants continue to [gather](#) in front of the [IOM](#) and [UNHCR](#) premises in the capital city of Tunis, demanding a resolution to their situation, including repatriation, resettlement, and heightened protection.

## Expulsions from Algeria

During the first quarter, multiple waves of expulsions from Algeria to Niger continued, following the expulsion of more than [25,300 people](#) in 2022. As of 15 March, the NGO [Alarme Phone Sahara \(APS\)](#) estimated that the number of people expelled from Algeria to that point in the year had reached at least 9,686. Although the [majority](#) of deportees were from sub-Saharan African countries, there were also deportees from other [nationalities](#), such as Yemen, Palestine, Syria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and even Costa Rica.

Both APS and [Médecins Sans Frontières](#) (MSF) highlighted the grave situation for migrants and refugees who are stranded in the northern Niger desert without access to protection and necessities. MSF has declared the situation an “emergency” and has called on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to provide urgent protection and assistance for those in dire and precarious circumstances. According to the [MSF head of Mission](#) in Niger, “this is an unparalleled situation that requires an urgent humanitarian response.”

In an [interview](#) conducted in February, the Coordinator of APS in Agadez condemned the fact that many of the expelled migrants and refugees (the majority of whom come from sub-Saharan African countries) have reported experiencing racist acts. This includes being physically and verbally harassed and being racially profiled, which can lead to arrest and deportation.

IOM expressed concern, in a [statement](#) on 5 April, over the rising number of stranded migrants living in poor conditions in Assamaka. The number of migrants seeking IOM assistance increased by 35% in 2022 compared to 2021, with over 17,000 migrants assisted. The numbers continue to grow in 2023, with an estimated 7,700 stranded migrants in Niger, including 5,000 in Assamaka. IOM [reported](#) that its capacity to provide assistance is limited to 1,500 individuals, while a group of 3,500 refugees and migrants was awaiting assistance outside of the IOM transit center.

<sup>6</sup> This number is based on MMC calculations drawing on the following sources: Jeune Afrique [3 March](#), Africa News [16 March](#), InfoMigrant [20 March](#), Africa News [24 March](#).

# Thematic Focus:

## The ins and outs of documentation in Dakar, Senegal

In partnership with the Heinrich Böll Foundation, in the second half of 2022 the MMC carried out a qualitative study<sup>7</sup> with refugees and migrants in Dakar. The study sought to understand their motivations in coming to Dakar, how they live in the city, and the risks and challenges they face there. The study particularly focused on refugees and migrants' access to services (education, health), housing and employment, as well as the vulnerabilities they experience.

The research found that migrants and refugees do not seem to suffer from institutional discrimination; in other words, they are not excluded from accessing public services or targeted by authorities such as the police. However, migrants and refugees face a range of difficulties in accessing services and meeting basic needs, including lack of financial resources, lack of information, and lack of bargaining power. And, absolutely fundamental to accessing services and being able to productively go about their lives in Dakar was the possession of the necessary administrative documents, which in itself can prove challenging for refugees and migrants.

The following is based on and excerpted from the study, "[Dakar, portrait d'une ville de migration.](#)"

### Importance of documents for refugees and migrants

Administrative documents were omnipresent in the discussions with the migrants and refugees who participated in the study. They are essential to access almost all types of formal services and structures in Dakar. One key informant from civil society summed up the perspective of multiple study participants:

***“In principle, there is no problem [accessing services and meeting basic needs]. But everything is conditioned on the fact that you have administrative papers. Those who do not have them will encounter problems in accessing certain institutions.”***

One area where this is particularly evident is education. Multiple key informants spoke of how schooling is conditioned on being able to present a birth certificate. Participants in all focus groups also identified lack of documentation as a central barrier in accessing and benefitting from education. For example, one migrant participant from Ivory Coast was able to complete her bachelor's degree in Dakar but cannot get her diploma to prove this because she lacks the required documents. She is currently struggling to find internships and other work experiences as a result.

<sup>7</sup> The MMC conducted semi-structured interviews and four focus group discussions (FGDs) with a total of 46 refugees and migrants. It also interviewed 13 key informants with expertise on migration. These key informants were from a variety of backgrounds: civil society, NGOs, international organizations, academia and journalism.

Lack of documentation also affects other areas of life. While this is less consequential for people working in the informal sector – as is the case for many migrants and refugees – lacking papers can prove an obstacle to accessing work or registering a business in the formal sector. It is also a problem when it comes to opening a bank account. While FGD participants spoke of some banks being more flexible than others regarding the documents they accept, official identification is nonetheless necessary, with several participants describing challenges in this regard.

## The difficulty in obtaining documentation

It is fairly common to arrive in Senegal without key documents of personal identification (ie birth certificate, passport, identity card etc.), which can be crucial in their own right, but are also necessary in order to obtain documents of establishment in Senegal (i.e. consular card, residence permit etc.). This may be because the country of origin has different or weaker requirements for civil status documents, or because it is more complicated to obtain them (especially in conflict zones). In Burkina Faso, for example, 23% of children under the age of 5 are not registered and in some areas of the country, only 30% of the population has a birth certificate.<sup>8</sup>

According to the interviews and focus groups, some refugees and migrants who do not have the necessary documents face obstacles in trying to obtain them. For instance, some may be unaware that they need to bring specific administrative documents with them to Senegal. Others may not know how to go about accessing such documents upon arrival in Dakar. This is highlighted by the words of a Togolese migrant who said that she had encountered difficulties in obtaining documents:

**“I have already looked for this type of papers, but it was not easy. It was a friend of my brother who took me to someone. [...] If you are looking for papers and you don't know someone, it's not easy.”**

## Particular challenges for refugees and asylum seekers

Refugees and asylum seekers can find themselves in a very complicated administrative situation. Indeed, individuals fleeing a country may not have the opportunity to obtain the necessary documents or may not bring them along in their rush to leave. Moreover, once they arrive in Dakar, the potentially fraught relationship with their country of origin can make obtaining the missing documents extremely challenging, as expressed by a Rwandan refugee:

**“When you go to the police to look for a residence permit, they will tell you that you have to provide the birth certificate. But when you run away, you can't go back to your country [...] and the embassy is your country of origin. You can't go to your embassy.”**

8 Planète Enfants & Développement - [Pour des services sociaux et d'état civil performants](#)

While almost all refugees said they found the process of obtaining documents complex and daunting, women seemed particularly affected. The process of obtaining a refugee card was described as an "obstacle course." This was particularly evident in the words of one woman from the Democratic Republic of Congo:

*“It’s difficult here in Senegal to get the papers so that you are recognized. I have been in Senegal for 20 years and I have no papers, I am not recognized. People asked me why I crossed all these countries [from the DRC] to come to Senegal. And then if you say “I was raped”, they say “prove to us that you were raped” for example. You are a woman, you have been raped, are there really signs that you have been raped? There aren’t, you can’t prove it.”*

Even if the procedure is successful and the refugee card is obtained, refugees can still encounter problems. Authorities such as police and service providers such as bank employees are not always aware of refugee status or familiar with a refugee card as a valid form of ID. According to several participants, the refugee card remains little known, if not completely unknown to the authorities, and is not highly valued. Thus, the card is both challenging to obtain and does not always convey its intended benefits.


## The right documents are more important than ‘regularity’

Notably, while the importance of documentation was emphasized in connection with access to services by migrant participants, having the specific documents which confer regular migration status in Senegal was not. It appears that as long as migrants have some documents they can get by in Dakar even if they still have an ‘irregular’ status. For instance, several non-ECOWAS migrants who are required to obtain a residence permit to regularize their status said they had not bothered to do so. In explaining why, they said the process was long and tedious, and that the consular card they had obtained from their embassies was sufficient for their daily life in Dakar.

The apparent lack of concern over regularizing one’s status may be explained by the fact that controls by the authorities are rare, but also because the required documents to access services and meet basic needs are rarely related to proving regular status. According to an academic key informant, the notion of irregularity in general is not as relevant in Senegal – nor West Africa overall – as it can be elsewhere:

*“If it was in countries where the rate of formality was very high like in Western countries, I imagine it would be a particular constraint. But here anyway informal activity basically dominates the economic level and I think that offers a number of opportunities to certainly bypass regulations and then be able to access goods and services.”*

# Highlighted New Research and Reports



## [Nigerien Migrant Workers in Libya : General Overview and Opportunities for the Future](#)

### **IOM | February 2023**

In 2021, Libya and Niger signed a memorandum of understanding on bilateral labor migration. Written to guide the operationalization of this MOU, this background paper examines the experience of the large population of Nigerien migrant workers in Libya. The paper highlights the irregular status of the vast majority of Nigeriens when entering and working in the country, and the impact this has on their security. Other critical issues such as access to documentation, the ability to send remittances, and migration intentions are addressed. This report provides insight into the state of the large Nigerien community (constituting 25 percent of the country's migrant population), a community which is crucial to the Libyan economy.



## [Smuggling of Migrants in the Sahel – Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment - Sahel](#)

### **UNODC | March 2023**


This report is one of the five TOCTA (Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment) launched by UNODC for the Sahel region in March 2023. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data from the MMC, it analyses the dynamics of the market for smuggling of migrants in the region. It also gives a comprehensive overview of smugglers' profiles, responsibilities, and modi operandi. This report aims to support nuanced understanding of this sensitive issue. Multiples graphs and maps (notably on smuggling routes) are provided. The document concludes with several policy implications.



## [Podcast – Chapter 1: The Senegal Dream](#)

### **NPR | January 2023**

This 20-minute podcast is the first in a series about global migration and its link to climate change and political extremism. This first episode takes listeners to St. Louis, a city in northern Senegal that has been hit particularly hard by rising water levels. Listeners meet several individuals directly affected by climate change who have undertaken or aim to undertake the migration experience towards Europe. The podcast immerses the listener in the daily life of the inhabitants of St. Louis, showing the many ways migration is a part of their existence. This includes news of frequent departures and reported deaths, examples of returned migrants whose journeys 'failed,' and visible transfers of wealth from migrants abroad. The podcast also gives a glimpse of the relationship that youth have with migration.



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MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit:  
[mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

