Mixed Migration Centre

PAPER

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Displaced from Ukraine to Berlin

A case study on journeys, living conditions, livelihoods and future intentions

This briefing paper is part of a series of three "sister" MMC publications covering displacement of people fleeing Ukraine in Europe, focusing on the cities of Berlin, Bern, Warsaw. You can find all three publications here.

Acknowledgement: This document uses MMC data to explore the profiles of people from Ukraine currently residing in Berlin, their aspirations, journey, situation in the host city, assistance and needs, livelihoods and their future migration intentions. The content of this report is entirely the responsibility of MMC. The data used in this paper stems from a research project conducted in partnership with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants, funded by the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). MMC extends its gratitude to the enumerators who conducted the data collection and to all respondents involved in this study.

Introduction

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022 triggered a massive displacement crisis, which resulted in millions of people being internally displaced in Ukraine and seeking refuge in neighbouring countries in Europe and beyond, with more than 874,000 people leaving Ukraine in the first week of the conflict.[1] As of May 9, 2023, 8.2 million refugees from Ukraine have been registered across Europe, including 1.06 million recorded in Germany alone, making the country the second largest host country for people fleeing Ukraine in Western Europe after Poland (1.6 million refugees from Ukraine).[2] Berlin, quickly became a major hub for Ukrainian refugees in Germany, with an estimated 85,000 registered by the end of 2022,[3] as well as being a significant hub for migration to other Western European countries.[4]

The activation of the 2001 European Union (EU) Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) in March 2022[5] simplified registration process across EU countries for Ukrainians fleeing the conflict (as well as for specific groups of third-country nationals), granting them access to a status, full services and rights – including access to employment, education, social welfare and freedom of movement within EU – while preventing asylum services in Europe from being overwhelmed. However, as the conflict continues, and with it risks of a protracted displacement crisis, concerns about the needs and vulnerabilities of people from Ukraine in Berlin are increasing, and data is scarce. This briefing paper explores new data collected by MMC on the profiles of people from Ukraine currently in Berlin, their journey from Ukraine, drivers and aspirations, potential discrimination in the city, assistance and needs, livelihoods and income, and long-term migration intentions.

Methodology

This analysis is based on 400 surveys conducted between February and March 2023, in Berlin, during face-to-face interviews with people who left Ukraine after February 2022, and on nine semi-structured interviews with key informants, conducted face-to-face in Berlin and remotely, between December 2022 and May 2023. MMC used a non-randomized, purposive sampling approach for quantitative data collection, with a minimum quota of non-Ukrainian nationals who fled Ukraine, and monitoring for gender and age. The sample aims to achieve diversity and was primarily carried out through social networks, access to targeted and diverse places of residence such as hostels, shelters and private accommodations, making the final sample non-representative in a housing perspective. Key informants were identified on the basis of their expertise and included representatives from NGOs, community leaders, researchers, as well as representatives of local and federal authorities.

1 Wagner, M. (2022) [The war in Ukraine and the renaissance of temporary protection - why this might be the only way to go](), ICMPD
2 UNHCR, (2023) [Ukraine Refugee Situation]() (Retrieved on 24th May 2023)
3 Kinkartz, S. (2022) [Berlin to create 10,000 extra beds for Ukrainian refugees](), DW.
4 Bennhold, K. (2022) [A Welcome Steeped in History: Ukrainian Refugees Arrive in Germany](), The New York Times.
5 Article 5 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001.

Key findings

Drivers and aspirations

- Although most refugees from Ukraine arrived in the weeks following the beginning of the invasion, **fears of harsh winter with no functioning electricity led to an increase of arrivals in October-November 2022**.

- **Less than 5% of respondents paid for smuggling services**, showing that the existence of a legal pathway from the beginning of a crisis results in little to no demand for smuggling.

- **Looking at the specific consequences of the war that forced people to flee Ukraine, 92% left out of fear of physical harm**, **31%** because they lost their livelihood, **28%** because they lost their home, and **25%** deemed it impossible to live in Ukraine through the winter.

Discrimination, relationships with the local population and assistance

- **91% of respondents reported they never felt discriminated against in Berlin,** Ukrainians and third-country nationals who fled Ukraine alike.

- **Finding accommodation is the most pressing need (38%) reported by respondents**, in a city where pressure on housing makes it hard to find affordable, long-term accommodation.

- Other pressing needs include **employment for 30%** of respondents, **cash for 21%,** and **education for 19%**.

- When in need of support, **respondents most often turn to friends (43%), relatives (36%) and compatriots (33%)** they know in Berlin, rather than to authorities and NGOs.

Livelihood and income

- **At the time of the interview most respondents were not working and relied on social benefits** (67% of Ukrainians and 45% of third-country nationals (TCN)) or do not have any income (18% of Ukrainians and 30% of TCN), while only a small minority have regular paid jobs (5% of Ukrainians and 6% of TCN).

- The **lack of skills in German** is the most significant barrier to finding a job, mentioned by 82% of respondents. **The costs and difficulties regarding the recognition of qualifications rank second** (34% and 30%).

Returns and future intentions

- **22% of respondents had gone back to Ukraine** at least once since they arrived in Berlin.

- **35% of them do not have clear plans** regarding their long-term intentions, while **34% plan to go back to Ukraine**, and **27% decided to stay in Germany permanently**.
- Of those planning to return to Ukraine, **86%** mentioned they would go back **because it is their home**, **65% to join family**, **40% to join friends**.

- The **end of the war (82%),** and **the end of the occupation by Russian forces (79%)** are the main preconditions for respondents to return.

Profiles and legal status of respondents

80% of respondents were Ukrainian nationals. **Among Ukrainians, 23% of respondents were men, and 77% were women.** The population of Ukrainian respondents is composed of adults aged 18 to 81 years old, with half under 36 years old, and half over 36 years old. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian respondents had never lived outside of Ukraine before fleeing to Germany (93%), and almost all spoke both Russian and Ukrainian. 37% of Ukrainians spoke English and 19% spoke German, which represents a significant increase compared to data from surveys conducted in 2022, where around 4% of Ukrainians declared speaking German,[6] indicating relatively rapid integration into German society.

20% of respondents were third-country nationals (TCN) from neighbouring countries, Asia and Africa, who were living in Ukraine before the beginning of the war. Contrary to Ukrainian respondents – most Ukrainian men face restrictions on leaving Ukrainian territory – men made up a larger proportion of TCN (57%), compared to women (43%). 71% of third-country nationals from Ukraine were aged 18 to 36 years old, and 29% aged 37 to 81 years old. This group was composed of diverse nationalities, mostly from neighbouring countries (21% Moldovan, 13% Belarusian, 6% Russian), from Asia (16% Azerbaijani, 13% Armenian, 4% Iranian, 4% Indian), and, to a lesser extent, from Africa and the Middle East (5% Moroccan, 4% Syrian, 4% Turkish). When in Ukraine, 28% of those TCN were students, 9% had a work permit and 6% were refugees or asylum seekers. While almost all TCN spoke Russian, only 41% spoke Ukrainian, making Russian the vernacular language in use among the TCN population in Ukraine. 36% spoke English and 8% German.

Among the entire population of respondents, a majority came accompanied: **65% came with either their partner, other relatives or friends, while 20% came alone to Berlin.** 34% had at least one of their own children with them, and only a handful (5 Ukrainian women) came with other children under their care. Most respondents (86%) came from urban areas, in similar proportions both for Ukrainians and TCN. Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa are the three major cities of origin of respondents (37% of respondents). 22% of respondents came from smaller cities, outside of provincial capitals.

82% of respondents were residing in Berlin under the temporary protection directive (article 24), 12% were refugees and 4% were temporary residents (with permits or visa, including tourist visas). Although the majority of Ukrainians and TCN were covered by the temporary protection status (83% of Ukrainians and 76% of TCN), almost all refugees were Ukrainians and all respondents with temporary residence were TCN. The significant proportion of TCN under temporary protection accounts for the effectiveness of the provisions in German law to protect TCN as well.[7]

6 Brücher et al. (2022) *Ukrainian refugees in Germany: Escape, arrival and everyday life*, 2022:4, BAMF Brief Analysis, Research Centre for Migration, Integration and Asylum at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

7 European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), (2022) *Germany Booklet*.

MMC's understanding of 'smuggler' and 'smuggling'

MMC uses a broad interpretation of the terms 'smuggler' and 'smuggling', one which encompasses various activities — paid for or otherwise compensated by refugees and migrants — that facilitate irregular migration. These include irregularly crossing international borders and internal checkpoints, as well as providing documents, transportation, and accommodation. This approach reflects refugees' and migrants' perceptions of smuggling and the facilitation of irregular movement. Our interpretation is deliberately broader than the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants' definition. However, this does not imply that MMC considers all activities it includes in its broad understanding of smuggling to be criminal offences. MMC prefers to use the term 'human smuggling' instead of 'migrant smuggling' as smuggling involves both refugees and migrants.

This publication is produced in partnership with the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants. The Observatory uses the word 'smuggler' when it can reasonably be assumed that the crime of migrant smuggling is constituted, as per Article 3 of the UN Smuggling of Migrants Protocol, while the word 'facilitator' is used whenever the elements of (a) irregular entry and/or (b) financial or material benefit, could reasonably be assumed not to be in evidence. www.unodc.org/res/som/index.html

Journey

Figure 1. When did you arrive in Berlin?



Most respondents arrived in the two months following the invasion, with a second uptick of arrivals between October and November 2022 (See Figure 1). A peak of arrivals at the beginning of March 2022, followed by a steady decrease in volume, is consistent with existing data at the country level.[8] The approaching winter and the attacks on the Ukrainian electricity network led to the uptick in arrivals at the end of 2022.

8 Panchenko T., (2022) Prospects for Integration of Ukrainian Refugees into the German Labor Market: Results of the ifo Online Survey, ifo Center for International Institutional Com- parisons and Migration Research, CESifo Forum, Volume 23.

Figure 2. How much money did you spend in total on your journey to this city?



Half of respondents reported not having to pay anything for their journey to Berlin, which can be explained by the numerous humanitarian evacuation convoys and mechanisms organized since the beginning of the invasion. For those who paid, Ukrainian nationals reportedly paid less than TCN: the median amount spent by Ukrainians was around 200 euros, while it was around 300 euros for TCN. (See Figure 2). Reports of racism suggest TCNs could not access transportation so easily, and potentially therefore had to pay more to leave.

Figure 3. Did you pay anyone to provide transportation or documents to cross the border illegally during your journey? (not an official)



Smuggling from Ukraine to Europe is almost non-existent, thanks to existing legal pathways to enter and permanently reside in the EU (visa free entry + TPD). Less than 5% of respondents resorted to paying anyone (in cash or by other means) to have access to transportation or get documents to cross the border illegally during this journey (See Figure 3). In other words, almost no one reported using a smuggler during their journey, and the difference between Ukrainians and TCN on that point is negligeable. Key informants mentioned cases of men using intermediaries to evade conscription in Ukraine and leave the country illegally, mostly paying for fake documents granting them derogations, or relying on historical cross-border networks in Carpathian border areas (Lviv, Chernivski and Zakarpatia Oblast) to evade Ukrainian border controls. Although the actual number of cases is impossible to assess, those cases were considered rare by most experts.[9] But the almost complete absence of smuggling from Ukraine to and within Europe at the height of the displacement crisis, compared with the use of smugglers by people fleeing other crisis situations such as Afghanistan or Syria, strongly suggests the effectiveness of legal pathways – visa free entry - and short/medium guarantee for access to basic services and rights – TPD – in preventing human smuggling.

9 Interview with a Ukrainian diaspora CSO in Bern, Switzerland, April 2023.

Drivers and aspirations

Figure 4. What effects of the war drove your decision to leave Ukraine?



As expected, 98% of the respondents mentioned the war as the main reason to leave, with similar results between Ukrainians and TCN. **Looking at the specific consequences of the war that forced people to flee Ukraine, fear of physical harm and death, need for income and loss of household property were the main drivers to leave Ukraine.** While fear of physical harm and of death is the overwhelming reason for leaving Ukraine (92% of respondents), 31% mentioned the loss of their livelihood and the need for income, 28% the loss or destruction of their household property, and 25% the impossibility of living in Ukraine through the winter. Both Ukrainians and TCN reported those reasons in the same proportions, suggesting both were impacted by the war in similar ways. Fear of conscription was another significant reason for men, with 18% of them reporting it. The fear of conscription, although more of a concern for men than for women (18% of men compared to 3% of women), still ranks quite low on the factors driving men out of Ukraine. This could be explained by the quite high proportion of male respondents holding derogatory rights not to be conscripted. It is also to be noted that this may be underreported by male respondents, possibly reluctant to mention this as a reason during the interview. Women were more concerned about living through the winter (28%) than men (16%) (See Figure 4).

Figure 5. Why did you decide to come here?



The need to be safe, pre-existing social networks and livelihoods prospects were the main reasons for choosing Berlin as a destination. Both safety and livelihood opportunities are comparatively more important reasons for women as both topics were reported respectively by 41% and 33% of women, and 26% and 23% of men (see Figure 5).

In addition, pre-existing social networks also played a significant role in the choice of destination: 36% of respondents reported they came because it was recommended by someone they know or because friends (17%) or family members (13%) were already living in Berlin. Pre-existing family links in Berlin play a more important role for TCN, with 21% reporting the intent to rejoin family members, contrary to 10% of Ukrainians. This result is corroborated by other studies.[10]

More than a quarter of respondents (28%) claimed that the help provided by the government was a factor in their decision to come to Berlin, which may be related to the implementation of the TPD in Germany and expected accompanying assistance and benefits.

10 Panchenko T., 2023, Op. Cit.

Discrimination, relationships with the hosting population and accommodation

Figure 6. Since you arrived here, have you or anyone in your family felt any discrimination?



Almost no respondents felt discrimination in Berlin, and almost all reported good relationships with local communities, despite anecdotal cases of discrimination against TCN by key informants. The is the same across nationalities and gender. In line with this assessment, 89% of respondents reported a "good" or "very good" relationship with the local population and 10% "fair", pointing to a positive relationship with communities in Berlin (see Figure 6). Although TCN also massively reported positive relationships with local communities, they reported "good" instead of "very good" slightly more often than Ukrainians.

Figure 7. What kind of accommodation do you currently live in?



39% of respondents from Ukraine lived either in hotel/hostels, 30% in a house/apartment for their family, 16% in rooms in apartments shared with other Ukrainian families, and 9% were hosted by local households with shared facilities.[11] The situation is different for TCN respondents: 80% of them were in hotel/hostels (vs. 29% of Ukrainians) and only 14% had access to private accommodation for their family only (vs. 33% of Ukrainians) (see Figure 7). Furthermore, very few TCN lived in rooms in apartments shared with other families, or were hosted by local households, compared to Ukrainians. Gender also plays a role in access to different types of accommodation: 64% of men vs. 29% of women lived in hotels and hostels. Women were more often living in alternative forms of accommodation, like private houses, shared apartments or hosted by local households. Key informant interviews highlighted that in a city such as Berlin, which faces a chronic housing crisis, finding accommodation represent a major concern for authorities and NGOs involved in the response to the Ukraine crisis.[12]

The above highlights that refugees from Ukraine seems to be suffering from pre-existing challenges in the Berlin housing market and, more than one year after arriving to Berlin, many still struggle to find affordable, longer-term housing options,[13] **while state-sponsored shelters and accommodation are scarce.**[14] Furthermore, and despite the general goodwill of individuals to host refugees from Ukraine, NGOs reported bias, preconceived ideas, and sometimes plain discrimination against TCN or minorities such as Roma people in accessing services and assistance,[15] which could explain the very low proportion of TCN hosted by local households (3%). As Ukraine may become a protracted crisis offering limited prospect of return, finding durable accommodation solutions in hosting countries is likely to become a growing concern: although most hosting families have reported hosting as a positive experience,[16] many had not anticipated hosting families for more than a few months.[17]

11 Accommodation data in this paper varies significantly from other sources, including from the BAMF. This can be explained either as data for this paper was collected later and the housing situation has evolved, or due to the non-representative, purposive sampling approach used for data collection.
12 Interview with a representative of the social services in Berlin and of several NGOs, April 2023.
13 Interview with a Ukrainian researcher and employment public services in Berlin, April 2023.
14 Interview with a representative of the social services in Berlin, April 2023.
15 Interview with a Roma protection civil society organisation (CSO) in Berlin, April 2023.
16 Haller et al., (2022) Private accommodation of forced migrants from Ukraine, DeZIM working paper #5.
17 Interview with an NGO specialized on THB in Berlin, April 2023.

Assistance and needs

Figure 8. Arriving here, have you or anyone in your family received any kind of assistance from NGOs, civil society or community?



Upon arriving in Berlin, respondents reported having access to a wide range of assistance, with healthcare, language lessons, food, access to transportation, and support for regularization and administrative process ranking highest, all reported by more than half of respondents (see Figure 8). Both Ukrainians and TCN reported these in the same proportions, except employment/livelihoods, reported by 40% of Ukrainians and 61% of TCN. This is a positive indicator of integration for TCN, as very few TCN respondents spoke German (4% vs. 19% for Ukrainians), and few had long-term status in Germany, therefore they may find it particularly hard to access the job market.

Figure 9. What are your most pressing needs at the moment?



The most pressing needs of people fleeing Ukraine were accommodation (38%) employment (30%), cash (21%), and education (19%) (see Figure 9). The pre-eminence of accommodation as a pressing need echoes previous findings about general limited availability of suitable housing options in Berlin. Healthcare and family reunification remain more pressing needs for women (respectively, 19% and 17%), compared to men (8% and 10%) (see Figure 9).

The need for psychological support seems to be particularly underappreciated. Fewer than 9% of respondents (exclusively Ukrainians) reported having received psychological or emotional support (see Figure 8) and only 6% of respondents reported a need for such support (see Figure 9), making it the least cited need for people from Ukraine. However, social workers working closely with Ukrainians see it as one of the most important needs of refugees from Ukraine, although they note a strong prejudice against psychological support among Ukrainians, who they also report do not tend to identify psychological support as a need.[18]

Figure 10. When you need support, who do you turn to?



18 Interview with an NGO specialized on THB in Berlin, April 2023.

When in need of support, respondents most often turn to friends (43%), relatives (36%) and compatriots (33%) they know in Berlin (see Figure 10). Neighbours, who might be compatriots themselves, also play a significant role (32%), as well as local NGOs (19%). Ukrainians tend to turn much more to their relatives in Ukraine or other countries (a third of Ukrainians) than TCN (3% of them). Conversely, TCN rely relatively more than Ukrainians on the religious communities they belong to in Berlin (13% compared to 4%). Despite a strong mobilization in the humanitarian response in Berlin by authorities at all levels and, to some extent, by international NGOs and UN agencies, those actors are almost never reported as sources of support by respondents. Key informants noted that people from Ukraine usually contact local NGOs about specific services they need or heard about.[19]

Figure 11. What are your preferred channels to look for information about services you need?



As respondents favour turning to their closer social circles in Berlin when they need support, they also **prefer to look for information about services through in-person contact** (see Figure 11). **Social media, direct messaging with trusted networks and groups on messaging apps are the other main channels for them to seek information**. More traditional media, such as websites, phone, or TV, radio or newspaper are the least preferred channels. The dominance of messaging apps and social networks highlights the high level of familiarity with digital tools of people from Ukraine,[20] but bring additional risks of disinformation, rumours, erroneous information, scams or exploitation.[21] Authorities and several NGOs involved in the response have started engaging with people from Ukraine on those platforms, mostly with the ambition to provide reliable information on those channels.[22]

19 Interview with representatives of a Ukrainian NGO in Berlin, May 2023
20 Interviews with several NGOs in Berlin, April and May 2023.
21 Interview with Ukrainian journalists, remote, April 2023.
22 Interviews with a Ukrainian NGO and Berlin and with representatives of German law enforcement, April 2023.

Livelihood and income

Figure 12. Are you earning money now?



Most respondents were not working and were instead relying on social benefits (67% of Ukrainians and 45% of TCN) or did not have any income (18% of Ukrainians and 30% of TCN), while a small minority held regular paid jobs (6%) (see Figure 12). These findings are in line with the recent OECD reports about labour market integration of Ukrainian refugees in Europe, according to which between 7% and 25% of Ukrainians in Germany are working regularly.[23] The relatively small number of people with regular jobs can, moreover, partly be explained by the strong incentives provided by German authorities to first learn German (through German language classes) before looking for jobs. Although work exploitation is a major concern for NGOs and public authorities, 10% of TCN and 4% of Ukrainians reported engaging in casual/occasional work without a contract or working irregularly. According to employment authorities in Berlin, the right to work granted by the TCD has had a significant impact in reducing risks of Ukrainians falling into severe forms of exploitation, as was sometimes the case for Ukrainian workers in an irregular situation in Germany before the war.[24]

23 OECD, 6 January 2023, What we know about the skills and early labour market outcomes of refugees from Ukraine, Policy Responses: Ukraine, Tackling the policy challenges.
24 Interview with representatives of a public employment agency, Berlin 2023.

Figure 13. What kind of sector are you making money in?



Of those who reported working (63 respondents),[25] **the sectors they work in are markedly different for men and women. Women mostly work in the domestic/cleaning sector (35%), small service business (16%) or, to a lesser extent, teaching or civil service (11%), while 31% of men work in the construction sector, 19% in transportation, and 15% in domestic work or cleaning** (see Figure 13). Those tendencies are corroborated by key informants, who highlighted the domestic and cleaning sector and entrepreneurship as the most prevalent activities for women and construction as the main sector for men.[26]

Although two-thirds are reportedly satisfied with their job, 17% are not and would prefer to find occupations more in line with their qualifications. This frustration is acute among a population which has, reportedly, a relatively high level of education, and echoes the reported difficulties of diploma recognition for Ukrainians in Germany.[27]

25 While this sample (63 respondents) is relatively small, results have been corroborated by qualitative data.
26 Interview with representatives of a public employment agency, Berlin 2023.
27 Interview with representatives of a public employment agency, Berlin 2023.

Figure 14. Since coming here, what would you consider to be the three main challenges to accessing a decent job or running a business?



Respondents mentioned several important barriers to accessing a decent job, of which lack of skills in German is by far the most significant, mentioned by 82% of respondents (see Figure 14). Authorities in Berlin have responded to this, and incentivize people protected under the TPD to learn German before looking for a job by conditioning social benefits on class attendance. Experts are confident the proportion of people looking for and finding jobs will increase in the next months as language skills increase,[28] as language indeed plays a crucial role

28 Interview with representatives of a public employment agency, Berlin 2023.

in finding work in general, and securing jobs demanding qualifications in specific sectors.[29]

The cost of recognition of qualifications (34%), a mismatch between skills and job requirements (33%), the overall lack of jobs (31%), and difficulties with the recognition of qualifications (30%) are the other main challenges reported by respondents in accessing a decent job or running a business.

Those findings are in line with recent research from the OECD, which also noted that, comparatively speaking, Ukrainians' employment rate in Germany is lower than in other European countries, but increasing fast.[30] Also, taking a broader perspective, it must be noted that the integration of Ukrainians on the job market only started a year ago. In general terms, when compared to other groups of refugees, the labour market inclusion of Ukrainian refugees has been progressing much faster, in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe.[31]

Returns and future intentions

Figure 15. Since you left, have you been back to Ukraine?



Around a fifth of respondents (22%) had gone back to Ukraine at least once since they had arrived in Berlin (see Figure 15). Women went back more often than men: 22% of women went back at least once, compared to 9% of men. Of the 72 respondents who went back, more or less half of the men went back once, the others a few times. 8% of the women reported having returned regularly (once a quarter), the others are equally split among those who went back once and those who went back a few times.[32] Men tend to stay longer in Ukraine, when they go back: 60% of them stayed for a period between one week and one month, compared to 20% of women. 26% of women noted they would go for a few days only, while no men reported going for such short periods of time. According to key informant interviews, this tendency makes sense as men fitting conscription criteria are in general more cautious about going back to Ukraine, and when they do so they tend to stay for a longer period of time.[33]

29 https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ukrainians-european-labor-markets
30 OECD, (2023) *OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine*
31 OECD, Op. Cit.
32 This analysis is done on a relatively small population of 72 respondents, and results should be considered with caution.
33 Interview with a Ukrainian CSO in Bern, Switzerland, 2023.

Figure 16. In the future, do you plan to stay here, return to Ukraine or go to another country? (By gender and overall)



Intentions of respondents regarding long-term migration are almost evenly split between 35% not having clear plans, 34% planning to return to Ukraine permanently at some point and 27% having decided to stay in Germany permanently (see Figure 16). Those results are very well aligned with those of previous studies about intentions of Ukrainians.[34] Only 4% of respondents had decided to move on to another country. Most people from Ukraine who arrived in the first months did not anticipate the war would last longer than a few months, though, and intentions regarding permanent return to Ukraine may change quickly, according to the dynamics of the conflict. Gender plays an important role in those aspirations, and the share of women willing to return permanently to Ukraine (39%) is almost twice as high as the share of men (22%).

Figure 17. In the future, do you plan to stay here, return to Ukraine or go to another country? (By nationality)



Ukrainians and TCN also have different perspectives on their long-term aspirations and plans. **Only 18% of TCN are planning to go back permanently to Ukraine and more wish to stay permanently in Germany than Ukrainians** (38% of TCN, compared to 25% of Ukrainians). Although TCN are more inclined to plan to move to another country than Ukrainians,[35] only 10% of them consider this as an option. Uncertainty is still high: a third of Ukrainians and of TCN don't know what they intend to do. The difference in status between Ukrainians and some of the TCN is a significant factor to be taken into consideration, as TCN without temporary protection may face additional difficulties regularizing their stay in Germany in the long-term.

34 Brücher et al., 2022, Op. Cit; Panchenko T., 2023, Op. Cit.
35 "Moving elsewhere" includes, for TCNs, the option to move back to their country of origin.

Figure 18. In the future, do you plan to stay here, return to Ukraine or go to another country? (By age)



Although indecisiveness is prevalent evenly across all age groups, people 37 to 81 years old are more keen on returning to Ukraine permanently (46% of them) than young adults (24%) (see Figure 18). Similarly, a higher share of adults between 18 and 36 years old plan to stay in Germany permanently (33% compared to 20% of adults above 37). This echoes reports from key informants about both the difficulty older people have integrating in Germany,[36] as well as the common choice made by parents with young children to stay as their children have started adjusting to their life in Germany and the German education system.

Figure 19. For what reasons would you like to go back to Ukraine?



Among the 136 respondents who reported they would like to return permanently to Ukraine, a large majority reported personal and family considerations as their primary reasons to go back. Attachment to their place of origin ranks first, as 86% of them reported they would go back because it is their home, followed by rejoining family (65%) or friends (40%) still living in Ukraine, and reuniting with a community or a culture they are familiar with (31%) (see Figure 19). Finding better economic opportunities was only mentioned by 13% of respondents, hinting to concerns about the economic difficulties in a war-torn country. This reason was, however, chosen by 29% of TCN, highlighting the comparatively greater difficulties finding economic opportunities in Germany for individuals with less assured legal status.

36 Interview with a representative of a government agency working on THB, April 2023.

Figure 20. What do you need to happen to go back to Ukraine?



Almost all people planning to return to Ukraine would not go back without crucial conditions met. Unsurprisingly, most preconditions reported were linked to the end of the war (82%) and of the occupation by Russian forces (79%), while 39% of respondents had specific concerns about the fighting stopping in their region of origin. Less than a quarter (23%) considered the reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine as an important precondition, which sets a much longer timeframe for the potential return of this group.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council regional offices in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis, and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move, and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit:
www.mixedmigration.org and follow us at **@Mixed_Migration**

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