

MMC Asia and the Pacific

QUARTER 2 2023



Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Asia and the Pacific

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers Asia and the Pacific. The core countries of focus for this region are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Australia, New Zealand and Türkiye. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council (DRC) regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes refugees and migrants traveling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often traveling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Asia and the Pacific

Quarter 2 - 2023

Key Updates

- **Resettlement of Afghans in Europe and UK progressing at a slow pace:** As of May 2023, only 54 Afghans were resettled in [the UK](#) and 271 Afghans across the [EU](#). [Germany](#) announced its intention to pause the acceptance of resettlement applications from Afghans.
- **Protection of migrant workers in Malaysia remains an issue:** [500 migrant workers](#) from Nepal and Bangladesh holding temporary work visas are stranded in Malaysia without promised jobs. [Two immigration officials arrested for](#) working in conjunction with recruitment agencies and accepting bribes and approving temporary work visas for these workers.
- **Irregular movements from Pakistan to Europe continue:** [350 Pakistani](#) migrants and refugees reported dead or missing following the [capsizing of an overloaded vessel](#) in the Mediterranean Sea near Greece. [37 suspects arrested](#) by the government of Pakistan for their alleged involvement in smuggling activities related to the tragic incident.
- **Sri Lanka forges new partnerships to combat irregular migration:** To prevent irregular migration and the exploitation of its migrant workers, the government of Sri Lanka entered into partnerships, including for maritime cooperation with [Myanmar](#), [Bangladesh](#), and [Switzerland](#).
- **Rohingya living in Bangladesh and Myanmar exposed to aggravated risks:** [Further cuts to food support](#) from the World Food Program, escalating gang violence in camps, [acts of arson](#) as well as the impact of [Cyclone Mocha](#) worsened the protection risks Rohingya refugees are exposed to.

Regional Overview*



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration within and out of Asia and the Pacific.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Unscrupulous recruitment practices and collusion with corrupt state officials uncovered in Malaysia

In April 2023, [500 migrant workers from Nepal and Bangladesh entered Malaysia on temporary work visas](#) after having paid up to USD 4,500 to recruitment agencies in their countries of origin to secure their travel and employment. However, upon arrival to Malaysia the workers were [informed that there were no jobs available](#) for them, and had their passports confiscated by their recruitment agencies. The migrant workers involved are currently facing situations of extreme destitution, and rights groups are concerned about the risk of [debt bondage and potential forced labour](#). Since April, two Nepali workers have reportedly died by suicide as a result of the situation. The government of Malaysia launched an investigation and subsequently [arrested two immigration officials for accepting bribes from the recruitment agencies](#) and approving temporary work visas for the workers.

During this quarter, [five Malaysian officials, and four individuals involved in recruitment were also arrested on charges of migrant smuggling, shedding light on](#) the role of state corruption in the irregular movement of people across the Malaysia-Indonesia border. The group reportedly charged Indonesian migrant workers up to USD 755 to facilitate entry into Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), via Sabah (eastern Malaysia) through the use of stolen identities.

Charges laid against individuals involved in the trafficking and death of refugees at the Malaysia-Thailand border

In June 2023, [Malaysia charged four Thai citizens](#) for their involvement in the trafficking and death of refugees in transit camps at the Malaysia-Thailand border after over 30 graves were discovered near Wang Kelian in 2015. Traffickers held refugees in these camps, forcing their families to pay ransom for their release. The charges are a result of the work of the Royal Commission for Inquiry set up by Malaysia in 2019 to investigate crimes and abuse committed by the accused against Rohingya women, children and men paying to be smuggled into Thailand and Malaysia. According to the inquiry, no Malaysian border guards, public servants or citizens were involved. [In 2017, Thailand convicted 62 individuals](#) in connection to the case, including an army general and a politician from southern Thailand.

Malaysia considers re-engaging with UNHCR

In another development this quarter, [Malaysia considered re-engaging in conversations with UNHCR](#) around handling issues associated with refugees and asylum seekers in the country. Earlier in 2022, Malaysia had accused [UNHCR of issuing ID cards without seeking the government's approval](#) and considered closing down the agency's local office. The current government plans to put in place [new mechanisms for the management of refugees and asylum seekers](#), which includes more responsibility-sharing with UNHCR. The government of Malaysia is also pushing to have a say in determining refugee status – which was previously done by UNHCR alone.

Grim developments for Rohingya in Bangladesh as some consider return to Myanmar

The quarter marked a series of grim developments for Rohingya refugees living in camps in Bangladesh. In March 2023 a [fire broke out in a camp in Cox's Bazar](#) destroying around 2,000 homes. After investigation it was found that the fire was [an act of arson](#) committed by criminal gangs fighting to establish their dominance in the camps. After this, on 14 May 2023, [Cyclone Mocha hit the coastal areas of Bangladesh and Myanmar](#), further damaging Rohingya settlements in the surrounding areas of Cox's Bazaar.

In June, the UNWFP announced [a further cut](#) to food ration support for Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazaar from 12USD to 8USD per person per month. This announcement comes after a [first round of cuts to food support was announced in March 2023](#). Tired of the worsening conditions in the camps, Rohingya refugees engaged in protests in June 2023, [asking to be repatriated to Myanmar](#) in order to escape the dire conditions in Bangladesh.

Plans to repatriate Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar continued this quarter. In May 2023, [officials from Myanmar visited Rohingya refugee camps](#) in Bangladesh and [20 Rohingya refugees and seven officials visited model villages constructed in Myanmar](#) built to house returning Rohingya refugees. Bangladesh and Myanmar are moving forward with the repatriation program mediated by China, despite [widespread concern for the safety of Rohingya upon return](#), including the likelihood of Rohingya returnees being subjected to curtailed movements, among others. Many [Rohingya refugees remain sceptical about the scheme, reluctant to return](#) to Myanmar unless granted citizenship and assured of safety and security.

Tragedy in the Mediterranean once again highlights the severe risks for those engaged in irregular movements

On 14 June 2023, an [overloaded vessel carrying around 750 migrants and refugees capsized in the Mediterranean Sea](#) near Greece having departed from Libya en route to Italy. 104 migrants and refugees were rescued, and only 82 bodies were recovered. Among those [reported dead or missing were 350 Pakistani migrants and refugees](#), along with others from Egypt, Syria and Palestine. A large number of migrants and refugees from Pakistan who died were from the same village, [with one relative interviewed by a reporter](#) stating that they had lost an entire generation of young men. Pakistan has been facing tense economic conditions – [soaring inflation and depleting foreign reserves](#), worsened by devastating effects of floods in 2022 and political instability caused by the recent arrest of former prime minister Imran Khan on charges of corruption. Overall, this has led to more people risking their lives to reach Europe in search of safety and a better future. Following the tragic incident, Pakistan detained and [arrested seven suspects and 30 individuals accused of being involved in facilitating the smuggling of migrants](#) onboard the vessel. [Nine individuals from Egypt have also been detained and arrested](#) for their involvement.

In response to the rise in fatalities of those trying to reach Europe, a group of Pakistani migrants and refugees are [creating and sharing YouTube videos speaking about the dangers experienced en route](#). The videos, aimed at raising awareness among prospective migrants, share information about how to secure a visa without the help of an agent, and also share realities upon arrival to Europe, including difficulties in finding jobs.

Rise in returns to Afghanistan as conditions worsen in neighbouring countries, resettlement options stall

Faced with limited options in Pakistan, and Iran, many Afghans are left with fewer alternatives than returning to Afghanistan. Towards the end of last quarter, Pakistan announced that [movements of Afghan refugees will be restricted](#) to within the jurisdiction of the local police station where they are registered. They will also now have to seek permission before travelling to another province, and return to Afghanistan once their residence permits expire. Throughout this quarter in Pakistan, approximately 300-400 Afghans were arrested for not possessing valid travel or residence documents, despite the [Taliban urging the government of Pakistan to cease arrests](#) and detention of its citizens. In April, the government of Pakistan also released [208 Afghan detainees from prison and facilitated their return to Afghanistan](#). This quarter also marked an increase in returns from Iran to Afghanistan. As reported in local news sources [35,900](#) Afghans returned in April, with over [65,000](#) returning in May and [2,100](#) in June (as of 5th of June).

This quarter the [Taliban also called on the international community to stop facilitating the resettlement of skilled professionals](#) from Afghanistan as they fear a 'brain-drain' from the country. Despite the ongoing need for durable solutions for the many displaced Afghans in the region, resettlement rates have slowed to an almost standstill. Within the region, the [Philippines is considering hosting 50,000 Afghans](#) while they wait to be resettled to the US. Although [Canada resettled 30,000 Afghan refugees](#) of the 40,000 it aims to resettle by the end of 2023, 24 Afghans who previously worked for the government of Canada in Kabul are [suing Canada for an unreasonable delay in the resettlement](#) process. As a part of resettlement efforts, Canada entered into an [agreement with the UAE to guarantee Afghan refugees safe passage](#) while committing to resettle up to 1,000 Afghan evacuees [currently in UAE](#).

In Europe and the United Kingdom, resettlement options for Afghans also remain bleak. [Germany has temporarily stopped accepting applications](#) for the resettlement of Afghans due to "isolated indications of possible attempts at abuse" during the process. This quarter [Germany also considered partially lifting the ban on deportations and forced returns to Afghanistan](#). Should they move ahead, Afghan nationals who have been convicted of a crime or who are considered a threat to national security stand a risk of being deported to Afghanistan, a practice paused since 2021.

Resettlement for Afghans in the UK also remains slow with only [54 Afghans receiving resettlement this year as of May](#). Reports have emerged of applicants to the resettlement scheme being asked for [documents authorised by the Taliban's administration](#) in order for the process to move forward – a requirement that is not only hard to fulfil, but one that can also compromise the safety of Afghans seeking asylum abroad. In late March 2023, around 9000 Afghan evacuees were also informed that their [temporary hotel accommodation would be discontinued](#) from 2 May 2023. It remains unclear if alternative housing options will be offered.

Two Sri Lankan Asylum Seekers on the British Territory of Diego Garcia granted third-country asylum

At the end of the last quarter, five Sri Lankan asylum seekers on Diego Garcia, a British-held Indian Ocean island, [attempted suicide after being told by UK officials that they would be returned to Sri Lanka](#). The five are among 68 asylum seekers who remained on Diego Garcia from among the 89 asylum seekers who arrived by boat from Sri Lanka in October 2021 fleeing torture, sexual abuse and persecution by national

security forces for their links to the Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTT). Upon arrival, British forces placed them in a fenced encampment on the island where they have since awaited processing. The UK transferred the five asylum seekers who lived through a suicide attempt to Kigali, Rwanda, where they are being provided medical and psychological assistance. [Two of five have since been granted third-country asylum](#) by the UK. However, it remains unclear which third country they will be sent to. The move of the asylum seekers to Rwanda has fuelled fears that the UK is moving forward with plans to use Rwanda as a “third country” option for offshore migration processing.

The Sri Lankan government forges partnerships to combat irregular migration and the exploitation of its workers abroad

Arrivals of Sri Lankan families to India via [Talaimannar](#), [Mullaitivu](#) and [Jaffna](#) in northern Sri Lanka continued this month. Migrants and refugees reported paying up to [USD 323](#) to smugglers to organise their journey from Sri Lanka to India.

This quarter the Sri Lankan government continued to forge partnerships with [Myanmar](#), [Bangladesh](#) and [Switzerland](#) to prevent irregular migration and protect its citizens from exploitation abroad. In response to a November 2022 incident of the trafficking of [90 Sri Lankan women for sexual exploitation to Oman](#), Sri Lanka is set to start a [three-month pilot project to address irregular migration](#). The pilot will include increased regulation of recruitment agents and intermediaries, and awareness raising for prospective migrants.

UNHCR announced possibility of ending its operation in Sri Lanka

This quarter refugees and asylum seekers in Sri Lanka faced a major setback with [the possibility of UNHCR ending its operations by December 2023](#). At present, refugees do not have work rights in Sri Lanka, and recognition from UNHCR allows them access to an allowance, and education for refugee children – support refugees and asylum seekers in Sri Lanka stand to lose if UNHCR withdraws.

Australia budget announcements: A\$350 million annually to retain Nauru as an offshore processing site but no funding allocated for expanding refugee intake

The [departure of the last refugee held in Australia's offshore processing centre on Nauru](#) on 24 June 2023 was widely reported this quarter. Australia's offshore processing policy has provided an unfortunate roadmap for other countries keen to avoid responsibility for asylum seekers arriving irregularly to their borders. Australia's offshore set-up was again condemned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, [in his recent visit in April 2023](#). Records of human rights abuses, including [indefinite detention and inhumane treatment](#) in places of detention may [place Australia on the United Nation's non-compliance list](#) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). A report released by the Australian Human Rights Commission in June 2023 revealed the [devastating impacts on the physical and mental health](#) of immigration detainees held in hotels used as ad hoc immigration detention centres in Australia. Despite

ongoing research outlining the devastating effects of the system, offshore processing remains a part of Australian immigration policy. The government will continue [spending A\\$350 million annually](#) in maintaining the empty facility on Nauru as a deterrent to potential future boat arrivals.

Meanwhile, the recently announced federal budget in May 2023 fell short of the Labor Government's previous commitment to expand the country's annual humanitarian intake. Although Australia had announced that its refugee program's intake would be increased from 18,000 to 32,000, [no additional funding was allocated](#) for this.

New Zealand makes slow progress on resettlement agreement with Australia, while introducing amendments to detention bill

As of May 2023, New Zealand received [46 refugees from Australia](#) as part of an [arrangement between the two countries](#) announced in March 2022. The arrangement will see up to 450 refugees from Australia resettled in New Zealand over the next three years. However, as of 30 June 2023, only [a third of the annual quota](#) has been filled. Concerns have been raised over the delay as refugees who applied for the scheme are left in limbo while they wait. The bilateral arrangement between Australia and New Zealand is part of the latter's [Refugee Quota Programme](#) whereby 1,500 refugees are resettled annually. This year is [the first time the quota has been successfully fulfilled](#) with direct resettlement of refugees from Lebanon, Jordan, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Iran, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.

This quarter, the government also moved to amend a bill which would [extend the period of detention without a warrant of asylum seekers arriving en masse](#) by sea from four days to 28. The widely criticised amendment would apply to asylum seekers arriving in groups of 30 or more on the basis that an extension of the detention period would provide more time for asylum seekers to access adequate legal representation. Given the [low likelihood of mass arrivals](#) by sea to New Zealand, with only eight attempts recorded since 2019, the need for amending the bill and putting in place harsher laws has been questioned.

Türkiye continues securitising its borders, with support from the UK

Türkiye continued to implement measures against irregular migration with [46,633 deportations](#) recorded in the six months between January and 22 June 2023. Türkiye's border securitisation has been backed by funding from the UK government which has [channelled up to £3 million](#) as part of its regional policy to prevent irregular migrants from reaching its territories.

This quarter also saw the continued politicisation of refugee issues and migration in the run-up to the general election in May 2023. Anti-refugee and migrant sentiments as well as [violent hate crimes targeting these populations](#) grew amidst a backdrop of economic slowdown in the country. [All political parties except the Green-Left Alliance](#) pledged to repatriate Syrian refugees should they win the election. [Returning to Syria is not an option](#) for many due to persistent conflict in Syria, and worsening conditions due to the earthquakes in February 2023. As part of conversations on returns, Türkiye started the [construction of 240,000 housing units in Northern Syria](#) in May 2023, through their Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) in partnership with the Qatar Fund for Development which aims to repatriate up to one million Syrians in the next three years.

Thematic Focus:

Climate change amplifies displacement in Myanmar: A perfect storm of conflict, extreme weather and vulnerability

This quarter Myanmar saw intensifying clashes between the Tatmadaw and resistance groups across the country. Myanmar's ongoing conflicts have resulted in large-scale internal displacement, as well as increasing numbers of people crossing the border into [Thailand](#) and [India](#). In May, Rakhine state in the northwest of the country was also hit by a devastating cyclone, with flash floods and heavy rainfall also affecting other states. The cyclone impacted areas already home to [large numbers of IDPs](#) living in precarious and vulnerable situations, resulting in over 145 fatalities and around [700,000 houses damaged](#) throughout the country. Cyclone Mocha is one of a growing number of natural disasters to hit the country in recent years.

Using a combination of secondary sources, and MMC's 4Mi data, this piece considers the multiple crises affecting Myanmar, including violent conflict and natural disasters, and their impacts on both internal and cross-border movements. It also explores how increasing extreme weather events in the face of climate change may intersect with ongoing violence and conflict to affect outward movements of migrants and refugees from Myanmar in the future.

Cyclone Mocha – a frightening reminder of rapid intensification of extreme weather events facing Myanmar

On 14 May 2023, [Cyclone Mocha wreaked havoc in Myanmar's Rakhine state, causing extensive damage, loss of lives and further displacement](#). UNHCR has estimated that [7.9 million people in Myanmar were directly affected by the cyclone](#), among whom 3.4 million are in need of humanitarian assistance. De facto authorities in Myanmar confirmed that the [death toll reached 145](#), including [100 Rohingya](#). Several IDP camps in Sittwe, the capital city of Rakhine state, were destroyed, leaving many already vulnerable people without shelter. While Rakhine state was the most affected, [Chin, Sagaing, Magway and Kachin states](#) also experienced heavy rainfall and flash floods. The response was hampered, as the [Tatmadaw blocked the supply of aid and assistance](#), and the National Unity Government insisted on [bureaucratising international aid organisations' access to those affected](#).

Historically, though Myanmar has been exposed to natural disasters, between 2000-2019, the Global Climate Risk Index ranked Myanmar as the [second most affected](#) country by extreme weather events worldwide. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "[most of East and Southeast Asia are projected to experience more intense rainfall events as soon as by the middle of the 21st century](#)."

Conflict continues to escalate in Myanmar fueling large-scale displacement

Cyclone Mocha made landfall in a country in the midst of political and civil unrest. In 2022, it was reported that Myanmar had the [highest number of events of violence targeting civilians by state forces globally](#). This year, clashes between the Tatmadaw and resistance groups, as well as Tatmadaw-led airstrikes, have been intensifying in [Kayah state](#), [Kayin state](#) and [Shan state](#) bordering Thailand, and in the [Sagaing region](#) and [Chin state](#) bordering India.

Since the military's seizure of power on 1 February 2021, [1,499,000 people](#) have been internally displaced, comprising the majority of the total IDP population of 1,827,000 throughout the country. [IDPs live in often rudimentary and precarious conditions](#), rendering them more vulnerable to the impacts of disasters such as the recent cyclone.

In terms of cross-border movements, numbers on people who leave Myanmar and do not seek asylum are hard to obtain. However, since February 2021 around [88,300 people have sought refuge in neighbouring countries, joining the estimated 1,180,000 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar already in surrounding countries](#). Migrants and refugees are fleeing Myanmar not only for reasons tied to accelerating internal conflict and increasing threats to personal rights and freedoms, but the reasons are also connected to [a loss in employment opportunities](#) since the military seized power. The [persistent systemic persecution and discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly Rohingya](#), has also played a significant role in movements within and from Myanmar.

Conflict and violence are primary drivers of movements to Thailand and Malaysia

Between December and May 2023, MMC conducted 1,354 [4Mi](#) surveys directly with people who had left Myanmar (including 990 surveys with Rohingya) in Thailand and Malaysia.¹ 73% of the respondents were interviewed in Malaysia and 27% were interviewed in Thailand. The main reason respondents decided to leave Myanmar was the growing violence and conflict in the country – cited by 90% of respondents. Among these, 90% indicated that political unrest and riots in the country pushed them to flee. This was observed more often among Rohingya respondents (98%) as compared to others who left Myanmar (68%). 85% of those who left for reasons of violence and conflict reported that this was related to armed conflict, and 74% reported it was related to worsening feelings of general insecurity.

After violence and conflict, the second most common reason for leaving Myanmar was a lack of rights and freedoms – reported by 78% of respondents. The proportion of Rohingya respondents (88%) who reported this was higher as compared to others who left Myanmar (50%) – in line with the long-standing [human rights violations to which Rohingya in Myanmar are exposed](#). The third most commonly cited reason was tied to economic factors, encompassing [loss of employment](#), [rising inflation](#) and a [volatile economy](#), reported by 36.3% of respondents. 35.8% of respondents reported [acts of corruption](#) associated with their access to services within Myanmar as the fourth most cited reason for leaving.

1 The sample only includes respondents who left Myanmar February 2021 onwards - around the time the military seized power occurred.

Climate change, internal displacement and cross-border migration

Violence and conflict undoubtedly remain the primary driver of movement out of Myanmar. In contrast, most [climate-related displacement currently remains internal](#), and in many scenarios is expected to remain largely internal. However, it is important to consider whether increasingly extreme weather events resulting from climate change will impact cross-border movements in the future. No 4Mi respondents reported environmental or climate factors as a primary driver of movement, but when asked if such factors had an impact on their decision to leave Myanmar, 13% said yes. This reflects the widely-established view that except for survival displacement in the aftermath of a sudden-onset disaster, [climate change and environmental factors are often an indirect driver of movement](#), particularly cross-border movement. As Myanmar, already fraught with conflict and violence, grapples with the impacts of climate change, there are a number of ways this indirect interaction with cross-border movement could play out.

Firstly, livelihoods are impacted by the depletion of natural resources, as well as damage to personal assets and national infrastructure from natural disasters. In the face of these, an increasing number of people may leave in search of livelihoods elsewhere.

Secondly, gradual environmental changes such as [rising instances of droughts, flash floods and unpredictable monsoons](#), induced by climate change could intensify competition between ethnic groups and states, as resources become scarcer in Myanmar. Violent conflict – new conflicts or escalations in existing conflicts – will likely lead to displacement.

Lastly, the combination of natural disasters, prolonged internal conflicts and inadequate governance will not only affect the economy in general, but may impede the timely provision of emergency aid and assistance, as was seen in the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha. This in turn increases the probability of people moving further, if they are able to, in search of support.


If violence and conflict escalate and spread, coupled with the damage caused by natural disasters, internal migration may be less viable, with fewer places offering livelihood options. People may be trapped or may travel across borders. While it is hard to predict likely cross-border movements, and the figures that are commonly cited are not necessarily reliable (the IPCC reports that “[there is low agreement on projected numbers](#)”), it is important to consider the multiple and indirect ways in which a combination of climate change impacts and violent conflict may change prevailing mobility patterns – including immobility and cross-border mobility.

Concluding thoughts: the intersection of climate, conflict and migration

The cyclone that has recently hit Myanmar exemplifies the devastating impact of natural disasters on a nation already grappling with prolonged and persistent crises. While the cyclone itself is a catastrophic event, its aftermath and consequences are happening at the same time as – and in interaction with – the impacts of violence and conflict between the de facto authorities and resistance groups. Consequently, a multifaceted predicament of immense vulnerability emerges, affecting a significant portion of the population in Myanmar.

The complexities of the climate change impact in Myanmar, including extreme weather events, requires further attention and analysis, particularly their interaction with the existing context of violence and conflict in the country. Understanding this connection is crucial for helping us to better understand the movement of migrants and refugees within and from Myanmar, now, but also into the future. It will also enable the framing of appropriate programmatic responses to both climate and conflict-related crises.

Highlighted New Research and Reports



[A Glimpse at Camp Life in Cox's Bazar: Examining Aid Response and Distilling Solutions](#)

U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) | April 2023


This report examines camp conditions, infrastructure improvements, and aid accomplishments witnessed by USCRI. It also provides a brief overview of the Rohingya crisis and the current refugee situation in Bangladesh. It considers the ongoing challenges of providing adequate healthcare, mitigating human trafficking risks, and ensuring access to education. Insight into the host community's perspective is also dispersed throughout the report. Finally, USCRI analyzes funding and U.S. resettlement issues. USCRI also offers recommendations at the end of each chapter to address the existing needs of Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh that the international community, the Bangladeshi government, local NGOs, and the U.S. Government can implement.



[Asia-Pacific regional synthesis: climate change, displacement and the right to education](#)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability (UNU-IAS) | April 2023

In Asia and the Pacific alone, 21.3 million people were displaced, making it the region the most impacted by national disasters and climate change in the world. Therefore, country case studies were carried out in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Tuvalu, and Viet Nam to examine not only specific vulnerabilities to climate change and related mobility, but also the impacts of climate change on the right to education in Asia and the Pacific. These case studies show that climate change directly threatens education – through the destruction of schools and property – but also indirectly puts education in peril by forcing people to cross borders, ensuring neither legal residency nor the right to education. This regional synthesis report aims to guide policymakers by providing operational policy recommendations on how to ensure education is protected in Asia and the Pacific in the face of climate change and displacement from a human rights-based approach.




Regional Situation Analysis: Situation of Children Affected by Migration in ASEAN Member States

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) | May 2023

Until recently, children were invisible in migration literature. Migration was viewed as an adult experience, with child migrants typically being seen only as an extension of their parents. As a result, little is known about the unique realities of migration for children, or about the impact of migration policies on them, a knowledge gap this report seeks to address. This publication places the child at the center, allowing us to better understand how children are affected by migration to inform migration policies and practices that are in the best

interests of the child. Importantly, it supports the implementation of the landmark ASEAN Declaration on the Rights of Children in the Context of Migration and the subsequent Regional Plan of Action 2021-2030 that was developed to support its implementation.




Labor Migration in Asia: Changing Profiles and Processes

Asian Development Bank, International Labour Organization (ILO), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) | June 2023

Labor Migration in Asia: Changing Profiles and Processes analyzes labor migration trends in Asia, taking into account the landscape of labor markets after the lifting of strict entry and cross-border controls imposed during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The report highlights recent developments in labor migration and associated policy measures in major

origin and destination economies, drawing upon case studies from selected economies. The report also provides up-to-date comparative statistics on labor migration flows in, to, and from Asia. It describes the new profile of labor demand in Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the implications for labor migration in Asia. It also examines the role of digitalization in improving recruitment and emigration processes for migrant workers in India and Sri Lanka.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit:
mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

