

**MMC Eastern and Southern  
Africa | Egypt and Yemen**

**QUARTER 2 2023**



# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Eastern and Southern Africa | Egypt and Yemen

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Eastern and Southern Africa region plus Egypt and Yemen (ESA). The core areas of focus include the Eastern route, from East and the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula; the Southern route from East Africa and the Great Lakes towards South Africa; the Central Mediterranean Route (also called the Northern Route) from East and the Horn of Africa towards North Africa; as well as intra-regional mixed migration dynamics. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council (DRC) regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit [mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

### MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes refugees and migrants traveling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often traveling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

#### Front cover photo credit:

Michael Kirby Smith (2013)

Ethiopian migrants outside the Migrant Response Centre in Haradh, Yemen, May 2013.

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
# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Eastern and Southern Africa | Egypt and Yemen

## Quarter 2 - 2023

## Key Updates

- **Crisis in Sudan triggers large-scale internal displacement, cross-border movements and involuntary immobility:** Cross-border movements have been [recorded](#) in Egypt (255,565), Chad (180,683), South Sudan (135,402) and Ethiopia (55,618).
- **Increase in refugee and migrant arrivals in Yemen:** In Q2, [35,677](#) refugees and migrants arrived in Yemen, compared to [11,614](#) during the same period last year. This increase corresponds to earlier IOM reporting expecting arrival numbers to match pre-pandemic figures. Further along the Eastern Route, [MMC reported](#) on the widespread and deliberate killing of hundreds of Ethiopian migrants through artillery and mortar attacks by security officials operating under Saudi state authority on the Yemeni-Saudi border.
- **Arrests of undocumented migrants in Djibouti:** In May, Djibouti announced a [crackdown](#) on all undocumented migrants stranded or transiting through the country. At least [3,000 were arrested](#) during roundups and detained prior to their deportation.
- **Uganda passes Anti-Homosexuality Bill:** Uganda [approved](#) its Anti-Homosexuality Bill in May, while similar anti-LGBTQI+ legislation is currently being reviewed in [Kenya](#). Movements out of the country and additional protection needs and legal pathways for LGBTQI+ persons should be anticipated.
- **Uncertainties around UK-Rwanda deal:** The UK affirmed it would [move ahead](#) with the UK-Rwanda deal, despite the potential for strikes from Home Office staff and the high costs of deportation. At the end of Q2, the UK Court of Appeal ruled the deal was [‘unlawful’](#).
- **Increase in Egyptian and Eritrean arrivals in Italy:** In Q2, Egyptians represented the second-most common nationality to [arrive in Italy](#) (3,866). In terms of absolute numbers, Egyptian arrivals were 23% higher than during the [same period](#) last year. The number of Eritreans arriving (1,270), representing the 10th most common nationality from January – May, increased by 121% compared to the [same period](#) last year.
- **Expulsions from Mayotte:** From May–June, France launched [Operation Wuambushu](#) on Mayotte, leading to the [demolition](#) of irregular settlements on the island mostly inhabited by Comorian migrants, with the goal to expel all undocumented individuals to Comoros.

## Regional Overview\*



\*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration within and out of Eastern and Southern Africa as well as Egypt and Yemen.

# Mixed Migration Regional Updates

## Mixed Migration within East Africa and the Great Lakes

### Conflict in Sudan spurs internal displacement, cross-border movements and immobility

On April 15th, largescale conflict erupted in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), after years of escalating tensions between the two groups since the overthrow of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. For most of April, May and June, up until the end of this reporting period, [heavy fighting has persisted](#) in the capital Khartoum and its surroundings, North Kordofan, West Darfur and other state capitals including Nyala, Zalingei and Al Fasher. With the current political stalemate, and fighting igniting longstanding [ethnic tensions in Darfur](#), it is increasingly likely that the conflict will continue beyond 2023, as [some political analysts](#) have predicted. Some [reports](#) claim the tensions could lead to another military campaign of ethnic cleansing, with the [United States stating the current events](#) should be strongly condemned and serve as a reminder of the genocide committed in Darfur in 2004.

As of June 27th, [2,152,936 people](#) have become internally displaced, and 644,861 have crossed borders into neighbouring countries since the start of the conflict. The largest numbers of Sudanese, nationals of neighbouring countries and third-country refugees and migrants who were in Sudan when conflict broke out, arrived in Egypt (255,565), Chad (180,683), South Sudan (135,402) and Ethiopia (55,618), followed by CAR (15,335) and Libya (2,258). Neighbouring countries have so far kept their borders open, but [Ethiopia](#) requests a visa for all incoming Sudanese, while [Egypt](#) has revised its policy and asks for the same as of June 10th. There are also [reports of Darfuris](#) crossing into Chad being asked to pay at the border, although it is not clear whom they are paying – border officials, local militias or smugglers. It remains to be seen how many Sudanese, returning nationals and third country refugees and migrants remain in neighbouring countries or decide to engage in onward movement within the region or along the Central Mediterranean Route towards Europe.

It must be emphasized that the majority of conflict-affected Sudanese and refugees and migrants from other countries remain involuntarily immobile in the country. Many refugees, after fleeing their home countries, are once again severely affected by war, and are believed to be [left behind](#) to fend for themselves, while they may not have support networks spread across Sudan. This makes it difficult to access information required for them to plan their departure, and this, combined with pre-existing vulnerabilities, is trapping them in their current locations. Prior to the outbreak in fighting, as of March 2023, Sudan hosted [1.1 million refugees](#), mainly from South Sudan (over 800,000), Eritrea (137,000), Syria (90,000) and Ethiopia (70,000), with most settled in Khartoum (over 300,000), as well as an estimated [migrant population of 775,570](#). With the objective to inform and share updates on the wider mixed migration consequences of the conflict in Sudan, MMC has so far published articles [Round 1](#) and [Round 2](#).

## Complex decision-making of South Sudanese fleeing Sudan

South Sudanese in Sudan have been forced to decide whether to remain in the country and seek out areas of relative safety, return to South Sudan or move onward to third countries. Their decision-making is complicated by the fact that some South Sudanese were born in Sudan, and have never lived in South Sudan, but [de facto gained South Sudanese citizenship](#) with the country's independence, raising the question if they could be considered as "returnees". By the end of June, after two months of conflict, it was estimated that around 16% (125,925) of the pre-conflict South Sudanese refugee population had returned. With high arrival numbers, the emergency situation unfolding in South Sudan is increasingly becoming untenable for authorities and humanitarian actors. While many South Sudanese had planned for long-term integration in Sudan, those now arriving in South Sudan cite having effectively "[nothing to return to](#)". This raises concerns over already stretched humanitarian assistance in the country. Many are believed to be [stranded in remote border areas](#), while others are moving onwards to major cities including Juba and Bor, and engaging in further movements south (see this QMMU's **Thematic Focus**).

## The precarious situation of Eritreans in Sudan

Concerns are growing over the [highly precarious situation of Eritreans](#) in Sudan. While other nationals are returning or being repatriated by their respective governments, Eritreans are to a large extent being left behind, since return would likely incur high protection risks and detention upon arrival. An increasing number of Eritrean refugees have reportedly [gone missing in Kassala](#), close to the Eritrean border, and were allegedly captured and/or kidnapped either by the Eritrean authorities or by human traffickers. Moreover, the Government of Eritrea has been accused of forcibly repatriating more than 3,500 Eritrean refugees in Sudan since the start of the conflict. Given their lack of options to move out of Sudan, Eritreans might be compelled to engage in risky onward journeys, particularly towards the Central Mediterranean Route.

## Drought and flooding in Somalia spur growth of Dadaab, amidst Kenyan talks on solutions for refugee camps

Following a record drought crisis in the Horn of Africa from 2020 – early 2023, in May, large parts of Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti suffered from torrential rains and flash flooding. According to the [World Food Programme](#), acute food insecurity in the region is therefore far from over, and continued humanitarian assistance is needed in drought and flood-affected locations of origin and in camps and urban and peri-urban areas where displaced populations have sought relief.

In Q1, approximately [1.5 million Somalis](#) were internally displaced by the dual impact of drought and conflict. By June 2023, this number has reached [1.7 million](#) owing to the impact of recent flooding on displacement. Looking at those crossing borders, Kenya's Dadaab refugee camps [recorded](#) over 110,000 new arrivals by March over a 2-year time period. While no new updates on arrivals were provided in Q2, [UNHCR cited](#) that in June, Dadaab was home to an estimated 320,000 refugees, up from [218,873](#) by the end of 2020. This rapid expansion has led to overcrowding and a stretched funding landscape as well as a "looming health catastrophe" spurred by a cholera outbreak affecting thousands, according to [MSF](#) in May. To alleviate the strain on existing resources, [Kenya announced](#) in early June it would temporarily reopen a fourth camp in Dadaab, Ifo II.

The announcement of the opening of Ifo II coincides with the recently announced “Shiriki Plan”, or “the refugee transition plan”. With this new plan, Kenya aims to [convert the refugee camps](#) into integrated settlements that will eventually become permanent urban centres, where refugees will live alongside local communities and have access to government services. [By the end of June](#), the Shiriki Plan had received funding worth close to USD 200 million. It has received praise from UN agencies, donors and NGOs, which describe it as a progressive solution to improve the situation of refugees in the country, and eventually help support durable solutions. This follows [earlier recommendations](#) from UNHCR for refugees to be integrated into society and contribute to local economies. This plan represents a partial shift in Kenyan policy surrounding its refugee camps, which focused on closure and return or resettlement to third countries. In 2021, the Kenyan government had set an [ultimatum](#) for UNHCR to devise a plan for returning refugees from Kakuma and Dadaab camps to their origin countries, which was set to take effect in 2023, but was ultimately not further developed and put in place.

## Shrinking protection space for LGBTQI+ communities in the region and impact on human rights and mixed migration

The space for LGBTQI+ individuals in the wider East Africa region, including refugees and migrants, to identify as part of the LGBTQI+ community, and to seek support and assistance is shrinking amidst intolerant new legislation, marginalisation and discrimination. On May 29th, Uganda [enforced](#) its Anti-Homosexuality Bill, after approval by President Yoweri Museveni. The legislation is a watered-down version of what was earlier proposed by the Ugandan parliament, but it remains one of the harshest anti-LGBTQI+ laws in the world. While engaging in homosexual acts was already illegal, it can now result in a life sentence upon conviction. Moreover, it imposes the death penalty for so-called “aggravated cases”, including LGBTQI+ individuals who are also diagnosed as HIV-positive. Prior to the bill’s approval, politicians and charitable organizations urged the UK government to advocate for establishing secure pathways for LGBTQI+ refugees from Uganda [to seek asylum and rebuild](#) their lives in the UK. While [Uganda heavily relies on humanitarian and development funding](#), several actors including the United States have pressured Uganda after the bill was signed into law, warning they might withdraw aid and sanction state officials. In June, [alarming news reports](#) mentioned that HIV clinics in Uganda are emptying, and those who are HIV-positive might go untested and untreated.

In Kenya, a new [Amnesty International report](#) highlights the perilous environment for LGBTQI+ refugees in the Kakuma refugee camps. Kakuma, close to the borders with South Sudan and Uganda, [hosts a variety of nationalities](#), including South Sudanese, Somalis, Ethiopians and refugees from the Great Lakes region. The report mentions hate crimes, including homophobic and transphobic violence, against LGBTQI+ refugees are rampant, and happen within an already established environment of marginalization and discrimination. Perpetrators reportedly enjoy impunity and authorities show little response.

While Kenya remains the only country in the East Africa region to [accept refugees and asylum-seekers persecuted based on their sexual orientation](#), a newly proposed anti-LGBTQI+ law could put an end to that. The proposed legislation, known as the [Family Protection Bill](#), has been submitted to the Kenyan Parliament for review in April. If passed, it would criminalize the “promotion, recruitment and funding of homosexuality”, including same-sex marriages and “homosexual behaviours”. The law would have severe implications for already highly vulnerable LGBTQI+ refugees in the East Africa region, with no country

remaining open to receive those seeking protection on grounds of sexual orientation. In addition, the onward movements of LGBTQI+ refugees and migrants, out of Uganda, Kenya and the wider East Africa region, should be anticipated, generating a need for resettlement and alternative legal migration pathways to countries farther afield.

## Developments on UK deal with Rwanda

Despite growing concerns from human rights organisations, the United Kingdom (UK) Home Secretary Suella Berman [affirmed in April](#) Rwanda would be a safe destination for asylum seekers and irregular migrants, and the UK would go ahead with sending them to the country. In early [May](#), the UK government called for reform of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), to push through the partnership deal. In June 2022, the ECHR issued an injunction that prevented the first flight to Rwanda from taking off. Progress on the deal has since then slowed down amidst legal challenges and concerns from human rights organizations. At the end of May, however, a [statement](#) issued by UK Home Office staff revealed that members would consider striking if the government was to carry out the migration policy, which they considered to be unlawful. Further, in June, the UK announced it had conducted a detailed economic impact assessment revealing that its plan to send asylum seekers and migrants to Rwanda would [cost approximately 169,000 GBP per person](#). This cost includes an average payment of 105,000 GBP to Rwanda for hosting each individual, 22,000 GBP for the flight and escorting, 7,000 GBP for detention and 18,000 GBP for processing and legal expenses. The projected plan, which ultimately aims at “detering people from entering the UK”, is estimated to also have a cost-saving element of 106,000 GBP per person who would not arrive and reside in the UK, although [the analysis](#) cites “uncertainty around the deterrence impact”, and the projected decrease in arrivals, given the novelty of the partnership. Finally, on [June 29th](#), the UK’s Court of Appeal ruled the UK-Rwanda deal was ‘unlawful’, including reversing the statement Rwanda could be seen as a ‘safe third country’. This development entails further delay in finalizing the partnership, as the UK government would now first have to appeal the Court’s decision to the Supreme Court.

## Congolese engaging in onward movements sent back to Uganda

In June, [Kenyan authorities](#) completed a series of returns of more than 1,600 Congolese refugees back to Uganda. Hundreds of Congolese had reportedly moved onwards to Kenya after experiencing reduced food rations in Ugandan refugee camps and hoping to find better access to assistance in Kenya. Kenyan authorities announced they had found groups of Congolese stranded in towns in the northwest, with some having become street vendors. Already at the end of 2022, [UNHCR noted](#) that Uganda’s refugee response was dealing with a dire funding gap, having implications on efforts to support more than 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers in the country. This year, moreover, Uganda may see additional humanitarian funding cuts by the [World Bank and USAID](#), among others, after the passing of its ‘Anti-Homosexuality Bill’ in May.

## Tanzania announces mobilization of return of Burundians

Tanzania has [ruled out granting citizenship to Burundians](#) residing in refugee camps in the western part of the country. On June 21st, Sudi Mwakibasi, Director of the Refugee Services Department within the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs, added that instead the authorities are “mobilizing Burundians to return



voluntarily”. The statement was made in light of World Refugee Day, emphasizing many Burundians have stayed in Tanzania for long periods of time. Now, they are urged to return as “the country is now peaceful”, the director added. In an effort to support ongoing voluntary returns to Burundi, the [European Union](#) allocated €9 million in April to support Burundians who are planning to voluntarily return, as well as those who have already returned. Earlier this year, UNHCR’s High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, applauded efforts of the return process to Burundi in a [press release](#), while at the same time acknowledging the magnitude of needs and vulnerabilities of those returning. In the context of the experiences and needs of Burundians upon return, MMC is planning to publish two 4Mi snapshots based on primary data collected with Burundian returnees in Q3.

## Congolese women and children raped and abused during deportation from Angola

According to the UN, Angola has recently [deported thousands of Congolese](#), following a pattern of expulsions that have occurred over the past 12 years. The UN report reveals that during this recent mass expulsion, Congolese women and children have endured rape and other forms of abuse. The report does not specify perpetrators of the incidents, while [Al Jazeera](#) quoted a doctor working in the region, who pointed towards “Angolan forces and civilians in the DRC”. [According to UN officials](#), over the last 6 months, approximately 12,000 Congolese were forced to cross the border into the Congolese town of Kamako. Following the arrival of the deportees, Kamako has now transformed into an “open air migrant camp”, IOM’s Head of Mission to the DRC has stated.

## The Eastern Route from East Africa to Yemen

### Mixed migration in Djibouti

In April – May 2023, [IOM DTM](#) recorded 19,775 entries into Djibouti, representing an approximately 16% decrease compared to the same period last year ([23,448](#)). The decrease could be explained by [reported rumours in Djibouti](#) on an increased crackdown on migrants in the Lahj Governorate in Yemen, as well as by a partial shift in departures towards the Arabian Peninsula from Obock to Bari, Somalia (also see below in **Mixed Migration in Yemen**). Despite the decrease in arrivals, a considerable migrant population may remain stranded in Djibouti, IOM noted in May. Stranded migrants who have depleted their resources may lack access to basic services, exposing them to various risks. Their immediate needs include better access to drinking water, food, hygiene kits and essential non-food items. As of [May 30th](#), at least 960 stranded migrants were identified in nine informal sites across the regions of Dikhil (35%), Obock (32%), Tadjourah (18%) and Ali Sabieh (15%). In April – May, 807 migrants spontaneously returned from Yemen to Djibouti, compared to 1,055 in the same period last year.

In May, Djibouti’s Minister of Interior, Said Nouh Hassan, expressed concerns about his country being overwhelmed by the growing numbers of stranded and transiting migrants. The statement was paired with an announced [crackdown](#) “to curb irregular migration, and with the aim of protecting the wellbeing of Djiboutian nationals”. In early May, at least [3,000 undocumented migrants](#) were apprehended by the police in a series of roundups. The detained migrants were transferred to deportation centres and then

transported back to their respective countries of origin, according to the Minister. To give undocumented migrants who had already found a job in the informal sector in Djibouti a chance to remain, an additional “30-day policy” was put in place in which working migrants would be able to register to formalize their stay.

## Mixed migration in Yemen

In Q2, IOM DTM recorded the arrival of [35,677](#) refugees and migrants in Yemen, compared to [11,614](#) in the same period last year, representing a 207% increase. This follows earlier reporting from IOM indicating arrival numbers in Yemen would match pre-pandemic figures in the first quarters of 2023 through steady increases. In May, [DTM](#) noted a significant shift in departures from Obock, Djibouti (-25%) to Bari, Somalia (+57%), noting this shift could be linked to weather conditions, sea tides and decreased coast guard patrolling in Bari. Moreover, an increase in returns to the Horn of Africa from Yemen was recorded, ascribed to the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and the risk of remaining stuck there due to continuing challenges to move onwards to Saudi Arabia, and reported abuse, including rape of young girls, extending to extrajudicial killings at the Yemeni-Saudi border.

Within that context, MMC has recently published an [article](#) which focuses on the systematic killing of large numbers of Ethiopian migrants on this border, happening on a daily basis, and carried out by “security officials operating under the Saudi Arabian state authority”. In 2022, it is estimated at least 794 migrants were killed, and a further 1,703 were injured following incidents at the Yemeni-Saudi border.

## Ethiopia confirms new bilateral labour agreements with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, despite human rights concerns

In June, the Ethiopian government [signed a new agreement](#) with Kuwait to supply migrant domestic workers, while similar agreements between Kuwait and Kenya and Uganda are still in process. Kuwait has turned to sourcing labour from Ethiopia, and potentially the wider East Africa region, after a diplomatic row with the Philippines over the [reported killing of a Filipino domestic worker](#) had brought recruitment to a halt. Approximately 600 employment agencies which are supervised by the Ethiopian Federation of Domestic Workers will be involved in the process. It is hoped that the new agreement shall lay the groundwork for a permanent labour migration agreement between Ethiopia and Kuwait. Workers will reportedly receive a monthly wage of 300 Kuwaiti Dinars (around \$300).

The deal follows [announcements](#) from earlier this spring on a new agreement between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia entailing the recruitment of half a million Ethiopian female domestic workers aged 18-40. [Human rights organisations](#) voiced their immediate concern given Saudi Arabia’s poor human rights track record with regard to migrant workers, with [many Ethiopians ending up in detention before eventually being deported back to Ethiopia](#). In a shift away from the process being dominated by “local Ethiopian recruitment agencies and human traffickers”, [Al Jazeera cites](#) that, this time around, the Ethiopian government is overseeing the entire process of recruitment. Recruited women “may earn up to \$260 monthly”. Further, government officials are reportedly promoting the announcement as a safe alternative to the perilous journey along the Eastern Route, through Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen.

## Routes towards the Mediterranean

### Conflict in Sudan leads to large-scale arrivals in Egypt and smaller numbers in Libya

In Egypt, as of June 19th, [250,000 Sudanese and 5,565 third-country refugees and migrants](#) have arrived from Sudan since the outbreak of conflict on April 15th. To plan for the hosting of populations fleeing Sudan, UNHCR launched the [Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan \(SRRRP\)](#) on May 17th, covering the May – October 2023 period “to support refugees, returnees and host communities” in Sudan’s neighbouring countries. In Egypt, the plan aims to assist 350,000 Sudanese refugees. As of the end of June, the number of Sudanese arrivals already represents 71% of this planned figure. According to [IOM](#), 2,258 Sudanese and third-country nationals had arrived in Libya by the end of Q2. It is to be noted Libya is not included in the SRRRP, and those arriving in Libya’s remote southeast are likely to consider moving onwards towards the Central Mediterranean Route.

### East African arrivals along the Mediterranean routes

As a continuing trend from Q1, East Africans were not among the main nationalities to move along the Central Mediterranean Route and arrive in Italy this quarter. Between April and June, [45,878 refugees and migrants](#) arrived in Europe through land and sea routes. [This represents a 26% increase](#) compared to the [previous quarter](#), and a 45% increase when looking at the same period last year. Egyptians remained among the most common nationalities to arrive in Italy, moving from 4th to 2nd most common arriving nationality compared to the last quarter. Absolute numbers of Egyptian arrivals in Italy (3,866) in April – May are 23% higher than in [Q2 last year](#). Between January – May 2023, arrivals [in Italy](#) include Egyptians (6,232; 2nd), Eritreans (1,270; 10th), Sudanese (599; 14th), Ethiopians (186; 19th) and Somalis (119; 20th). It is not yet clear whether any of these recent arrivals were refugees or migrants formerly residing in Sudan. However, when compared to [the same period](#) last year, Eritrean arrivals increased by 121%. This could indicate Eritreans, [recently affected by the conflict in Tigray](#), and now by the war in Sudan, could be increasingly seeking to move out of East Africa towards the Central Mediterranean Route.

[In Greece](#), the most represented nationalities among arrivals since January up until the end of May include Somalis (469; 3rd), Eritreans (445; 4th), Congolese (DRC; 439; 5th), Yemenis (275; 8th), Sudanese (228; 9th), Ethiopians (32; 12th) and Egyptians (10; 16th). These figures do not yet include survivors from the [shipwreck occurring on June 14th off the Greek coast](#). The boat had disembarked from Tobruk, Libya, days before, en route to Italy, and carried over an estimated 700 people. Of this figure, 500 remain missing, while 80 are confirmed to have died, and around 100 were saved by a rescue mission. The shipwreck is one of the deadliest ever to take place in the Mediterranean and in general [in any context of refugees and migrants seeking protection and asylum](#). Among the main nationalities on board were Egyptians, as well as Syrians, Palestinians, Afghanis and Pakistanis. Days after the tragic incident took place, [nine Egyptian survivors](#) were arrested in Greece on charges of being the suspected smugglers of the ship, with a trial pending at the time of writing this QMMU.

## The Southern route towards South Africa and mixed migration within Southern Africa

### Mixed migration in Tanzania

In April 2023, Tanzanian authorities apprehended [63 undocumented Ethiopians](#) residing in the Njombe region, while an estimated 40 others were reported to have evaded capture. According to the police, the approximately 100 Ethiopians had entered Tanzania from Kenya, en route to South Africa. However, their journey was disrupted when the lorry transporting them was involved in an accident over the Easter weekend. Hamis Issah, the Njombe Regional Police Commander, stated that the Scania lorry carrying the Ethiopian migrants came to a halt following the accident.

In addition, in an attempt to regulate movements, the Minister for Home Affairs in Tanzania, Hamad Masauni, announced at the end of May that Tanzania will [introduce a visa-on-arrival policy](#) for Ethiopians. This follows an assessment by the authorities which found that a significant proportion of undocumented migrants in the country are Ethiopian.

### Malawi reinforces encampment policy

At the end of Q1, on March 27th, Malawi issued a policy directive to enforce its encampment policy for refugees and asylum-seekers in the country, popularly dubbed the [“back to camp” refugee policy](#). The directive mandated that all refugees and asylum-seekers residing in urban and rural areas must voluntarily return to the camp by April 15th or be subject to compulsory relocation. Since then, media reports have focused on the forced apprehension of refugees and asylum-seekers in the country, particularly in Lilongwe. By the end of May, [902 refugees and asylum-seekers](#), including [men, women and children](#), had been stopped and/or had their businesses closed down. They were temporarily detained, before being relocated to Dzaleka refugee camp, approximately 40 kilometres away from Lilongwe, without any belongings or possessions. Within the camp, some refugees have returned to their previous residences, while others are being hosted by families and relatives. [Reports](#) denounce overcrowding in the camp, specifying inadequate water and sanitation facilities, posing risks to safety and health. The camp, originally intended to accommodate up to 12,000 refugees, now hosts more than [56,000 refugees](#), primarily from the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda. Among those relocated to the camp, thousands had resided in rural and urban areas of Malawi for decades. Many are considered to have successfully integrated into the local community, achieving self-reliance and contributing to the local economy, before they were sent back to the camp. Forced relocations to camps that do not enjoy the same access to services or livelihood opportunities, may prompt some refugees and asylum-seekers to consider moving onward.

### Permit extension for Zimbabweans in South Africa

This quarter, South Africa announced a temporary solution for the future of approximately 200,000 Zimbabwean residents who had initially entered the country undocumented. While the overall ‘special dispensation’ status for Zimbabweans in South Africa [ended at the end of 2021](#), a considerable number

were given Zimbabwean Exemption Permits (ZEP), which were to expire by the end of June. While many would have faced [deportation](#) upon expiry, South African authorities extended the deadline from June 8th to the end of the year. The [announcement](#) stated Zimbabweans would have until December to apply for alternative visas and waivers to continue working and residing in the country.

## Political tensions between Comoros and France following anti-immigration campaigns in Mayotte

Following a months-long diplomatic standoff between Comoros and Mayotte, and by extension France, [Comoros announced](#) it would accept “voluntarily” returning nationals from Mayotte. However, this implied it would not take back any of the nationals who were deported from Mayotte without their consent, as it planned to put in place “mechanisms to assess the voluntariness of return”. Tensions between the countries rose at the end of 2022, when violent clashes between migrants and the local population, many of whom are of Comorian descent, took place in Mayotte’s capital Mamoudzou. France responded with the drafting of a securitization policy, launching Operation Wuambushu, meaning “recovery” in Maore Comorian, which envisaged the demolition of irregular settlements and the expulsion of undocumented Comorians.

Over the course of March and April, France sent approximately 1,800 security officers to Mayotte to support Operation Wuambushu, which [started at the end of April](#). By May 23rd, [The Guardian](#) noted a total of 162 makeshift houses had been destroyed in what was the largest shantytown on Mayotte, while arresting its inhabitants, most of whom were undocumented Comorians. While figures on the number of expelled migrants remain unavailable, sources claim France’s objective is to [expel between 10,000 and 20,000 individuals](#) without proper documentation. Approximately [half of Mayotte's population](#), estimated at around 350,000, consists of foreign residents. While most migrants are from neighbouring Comoros, insights reveal other East African nationalities have also increasingly engaged in risky sea journeys on the so-called Indian Ocean Route, including Congolese and Burundians. Moreover, on April 17th, [news reports](#) mentioned the arrest in Madagascar of two nationals operating as smugglers. They were held responsible for the sinking of a boat en route to Mayotte which carried approximately 60 Malagasy, of whom 34 were reported to have drowned.

# Thematic Focus:

## Impact of the Sudan conflict on movements south

This thematic focus zooms in on the mixed migration consequences of the Sudan conflict on movements southwards, to and through South Sudan and into Uganda. While media and news reporting have so far concentrated on cross-border movements, rather than onward movement patterns linked to the conflict, humanitarian programming insights and interviews conducted by MMC reveal some conflict-affected populations moving south. The sections below synthesize the findings from key informant interviews conducted in May 2023 with two Sudanese and two South Sudanese respondents who had recently arrived in Rhino Camp Refugee Settlement, Uganda, from Sudan. The interview data are complemented by insights obtained from an MMC enumerator in Juba, South Sudan, and humanitarian programming partners.

### Fleeing Sudan: drivers, experiences and intentions

Both South Sudanese respondents had been residing in Khartoum State when conflict erupted, one for 2 years and the other for 10 years. Both had moved to the capital after fleeing conflict and violence in South Sudan. The two Sudanese respondents were from Nuba, South Kordofan, and Khartoum. Both noted the presence of Darfuris also arriving in Uganda. The variety of regions of departure in Sudan suggests that moving south might not be confined to geographical proximity, but instead to other factors like pre-existing links with the country or may be a result of less planned stepwise movements. All four respondents mentioned the outbreak of conflict as their reason for departure, describing relatively quick and sudden migration decision-making. A 21-year-old Sudanese man from Nuba (South Kordofan) noted the main reason for his sudden departure right after the outbreak of conflict was looming forced conscription, into the army or military groups, if he would stay any longer in Sudan.

Respondents had resorted to selling their valuables to finance their journey to Uganda, highlighting the existing financial strain faced after the outbreak of conflict and the [rapid increase in prices for commodities in Sudan](#), including fuel and transport. The estimated travel costs of the journey to Northern Uganda, which often included segments by foot, car or bus, amounted to around 200 USD per person, although costs varied among participants. A 26-year-old South Sudanese woman fleeing Khartoum with her 7 (step) children described the different journey segments until arriving in Uganda:

**“We went from Khartoum to Aran, in South Sudan, which cost us 50 USD per ticket per person. From Aran to Poloch it was another 25 USD per person. Both these trips were with buses. From Poloch, we went to Juba. The Government of South Sudan facilitated this trip with a bus. Then, we went from Juba to Adjumani, in Uganda, in a cargo truck. We paid 17 USD upfront per person, and then another 8 USD when we arrived in Uganda.”**

One key informant noted his family had made the entire journey using a private car, not having to rely on others. None of the respondents cited interacting with a smuggler to facilitate (parts of) their journey, while they rather relied on existing networks of relatives and other contacts along the taken routes. It is important to mention that some elderly family members were left behind in Sudan because they were too old to move, or there were not enough financial resources to move with all family members.

Upon exiting Sudan through its border with South Sudan, many – especially those with some measure of resources to continue moving and who come from an urban background – move to South Sudan’s cities, particularly Juba and Bor. While numbers are not yet available on the arrivals to these cities, according to an MMC enumerator reporting from Juba, Sudanese and South Sudanese fleeing the conflict are trying to access information in South Sudan on protection assistance and services, as well as the presence of assistance in Uganda and other third countries. Indeed, respondents noted that, after consulting with friends or based on pre-existing social networks in Uganda, they decided to transit South Sudan and continue to Uganda. At the same time, they added that others may have had limited access to such information, and had remained in Juba for the time being. Access to information therefore comes out as a determining factor for future movement intentions. A 25-year-old Sudanese man from Nuba (South Kordofan) noted he spent a week in Juba to ask for information on where to go, while a 21-year-old man from Khartoum explained:

*“I didn’t know anything about where to go as a refugee from Sudan. I have a Sudanese friend who lives in Uganda and he told me they would help me here. He explained me how to get here, so I came.”*

## Humanitarian response in Uganda and mixed migration consequences

Despite information on assistance in Uganda shaping their onward movement decision-making, after their arrival in the north of the country, respondents expressed unmet expectations in the Rhino Camp Refugee Settlement as a result of assistance reductions, as well as no livelihood opportunities. In January 2023, WFP’s Deputy Country Director in Uganda, Marcus Prior, [explained in a press release](#) that WFP had to reorient its available funds towards prioritising assistance to the most vulnerable in Uganda, citing the “needs outstrip resources”. Insights from field visits to Rhino Camp as well as Imvepi Camp reveal that many refugees opt to go to urban centres to find work opportunities as a livelihood strategy, and a potential coping mechanism, while they may occasionally return to the camps to receive food assistance. Arrivals from Sudan could be particularly affected by further reductions in humanitarian aid in Uganda, especially given that Sudanese do not yet receive prima facie refugee status, as opposed to South Sudanese.<sup>1</sup> This could indicate a significantly longer refugee status determination process, with Sudanese having limited access to available humanitarian assistance and services until the process is completed. While they may encounter safety and security in Uganda, a lack of protection for Sudanese might contribute to even greater humanitarian needs in Uganda and/or precarious onward movement.

1 As of 2023, South Sudanese and most Congolese receive prima facie refugee status upon their arrival in Uganda ([UNHCR](#)).

# Highlighted New Research and Reports



## [The State of Migration in East and Horn of Africa: 2022 Report](#)

### **EAC, IOM and IGAD | April 2023**

The report highlights the potential for regional integration and human mobility to bring about transformative socioeconomic development. Furthermore, it emphasises the benefits of trade and labour mobility as key drivers of regional integration. Integrated border management, particularly through One-Stop Border Posts (OSBPs) and digitalisation, play a crucial role in facilitating the cross-border movement of people, goods and services. Ensuring access to healthcare and promoting sustainable reintegration are essential for safe cross-border movements of populations affected by conflict and climate change. Gender considerations and equity remain vital aspects to be addressed for regional integration and for promoting safe, orderly, and regular human mobility.




## [The Southern Dream: Exploring Migration Dynamics from the Horn of Africa to South Africa along the Southern Route](#)

### **IOM | April 2023**

This report offers a comprehensive analysis of migration dynamics along the Southern Route from the Horn of Africa to South Africa. It includes sections on the profiles of migrants, their motivations for migration, the means they employ to migrate and their experiences in their countries of origin, transit and destination. The research consolidates data collected at multiple stages over nearly three years, drawing insights from a range of stakeholders, experts and practitioners. Moreover, it includes in-depth testimonies of migrants at various points along their extensive journeys. A key recommendation focuses on a consolidation of efforts on data collection and analysis along the Southern Route, to better understand the different stages of the journey, and in particular the experiences of migrants in 'transit hotspots' along the route.






## Kenya: “Justice Like Any Other Person”. Hate Crimes And Discrimination Against LGBTI Refugees

### **NGLHRC and Amnesty International | May 2023**

The National Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (NGLHRC) and Amnesty International have released a joint report highlighting the pervasive hate crimes, violence and human rights abuses faced by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) asylum seekers and refugees in the Kakuma camps. The report exposes the discriminatory treatment and violence endured by this group. Moreover, it emphasises that these hate crimes are a product of

a normalisation of discrimination and stigmatisation of LGBTI refugees and asylum seekers. Despite the gravity of the situation, the report reveals that perpetrators of violence and intimidation enjoy almost total impunity, as authorities fail to take adequate action.




## Is Climate Change a Driver of Mobility? A mapping of Perceptions in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

### **ICMPD, EUROMED MIGRATION and EU | June 2023**

The objective of this report is to examine the diverse perceptions and narratives surrounding climate mobility in three countries: Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Through interviews with key stakeholders, the study aims to offer policymakers insights into the evolving public discourse on the connection between climate and mobility in these countries. The research delves into people's perceptions of climate impacts and their influence on migration decision-making processes.

By doing so, it seeks to reveal the intricate and distinct realities that are often overlooked by reporting on climate-induced mobility.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in DRC regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit:  
[mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

