

MMC Asia and the Pacific

QUARTER 1 2024



Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Asia and the Pacific

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers Asia and the Pacific. The core countries of focus for this region are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Australia. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes migrants travelling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often travelling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Asia and the Pacific

Quarter 1 - 2024

Key Updates

- **Deportation of Afghans from Pakistan to recommence:** The Pakistani government announced plans to expand and expedite [the deportation of Afghan refugees](#) as of April 15 as part of Phase 2 of their controversial 'Repatriation Plan'.
- **Rohingya boat arrivals to Indonesia continue:** In January, two boats carrying close to 300 people disembarked in the provinces of [North Sumatra](#) and [Aceh](#). Tragically, a third boat [carrying 151 people](#) capsized near Aceh. [75 people were rescued and 11 bodies were recovered](#), with the remaining passengers [feared dead or missing](#).
- **India pursues hard-line response to Myanmar refugee arrivals:** The Indian government has [suspended the Free Movement Regime](#) with Myanmar and plans to [construct a wall](#) along the India-Myanmar border. Additionally, despite escalating conflicts in Myanmar, India has begun [deporting Myanmar refugees from Manipur state as of March](#).
- **Australia's offshore processing policy resumed in full swing:** In February, [43 people, believed to be from Bangladesh, Pakistan and India](#), arrived by boat in Western Australia. All of them were subsequently taken to Nauru, where they joined [15 people who were already there as of January 4](#).
- **Increased displacement from Myanmar to Bangladesh:** Around [300 Myanmar border guards and civilians](#) sought refuge in Bangladesh, only to be deported later. [Renewed conflict between Myanmar military and Arakan Army](#) in Rakhine state has prompted [calls for Bangladesh to accept more Rohingya refugees](#).

Regional Overview*



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration within and out of Asia and the Pacific.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Deportations of Afghan refugees from Pakistan ramp up

This quarter, the plight of Afghan refugees in Pakistan worsened as the newly elected government announced its plans to expand and expedite the expulsion of Afghan refugees. In October 2023, Phase 1 of the Pakistani government's Repatriation Plan was announced, giving a 30-day deadline for all undocumented Afghan refugees to leave the country or be subject to deportation, prompting [over half a million Afghans to leave Pakistan](#), according to estimates by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The recent announcement to [recommence deportations through Phase 2 of the Repatriation Plan](#) as of April 15, has exacerbated concerns. Phase 2 will see the government focus on the expulsion of all Afghans holding Pakistan-issued Afghan Citizen Cards, [estimated to affect around 800,000 people](#). Phase 2 is expected to be followed by a third phase which will target UNHCR-issued Proof or Registration card holders, [estimated to be around 1.3 million people](#).

The government's repatriation plans have been widely criticised for not only violating refugee and international human rights law but [also placing millions of Afghan refugees at risk](#), particularly women and girls, as well as human rights defenders, artists and former Afghan government and security officials. Also among the most vulnerable are members of the LGBTQI+ community, including [transgender Afghan refugees](#) who have fled the Taliban regime and sought refuge in Pakistan, underscoring the intersecting and multiple levels of discrimination faced by refugees. Additionally, [aid cuts in Afghanistan have compounded the difficulties](#) faced by refugees who have returned, particularly during the harsh winter months.

Amidst the challenges, there are glimmers of hope this quarter as [188 Afghan nationals have been resettled in Germany from Pakistan](#), adding to the initial group of the same size relocated last December. In the United States, encouraging signs of progress emerge as [visa limits for Afghan nationals have been lifted](#) through a collaborative effort between the Biden administration and Congress, potentially providing greater opportunities for Afghan refugees seeking resettlement. However, despite these positive advancements, global efforts still lag in adequately addressing the protection needs of Afghans. [Over 11,000 Afghans](#) awaiting relocation to Germany find themselves still stranded in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan; while [another 80,000 individuals await](#) progress on their visa applications to the US.

Concerns for Sri Lankan asylum seekers on Diego Garcia as new report released

[Last quarter](#) plans to forcibly return 61 asylum seekers, predominantly Tamil Sri Lankans stranded on the British Indian Ocean Territory Island of Diego Garcia, were withdrawn and deemed unlawful. This quarter, UNHCR released a report detailing the struggles faced by asylum seekers held on the island, who currently endure [conditions deemed amounting to arbitrary detention](#). The report highlights disturbing accounts of alleged [sexual violence against women and children by fellow asylum seekers, alongside deteriorating mental health, and incidents of attempted suicide](#). These realities have prompted calls for urgent relocation of these individuals to a third country where they can find safety and security.

Malaysia's continued shift towards xenophobic policies and migrant crackdown

In recent months, Malaysia has implemented various measures impacting migrant workers, reflecting a continued shift towards xenophobic and anti-migrant policies. Notably, two states, [Negeri Sembilan](#) and [Johor](#) have enforced bans on migrant workers residing in residential areas, citing public nuisance complaints. Instead, these workers are being relocated to Centralised Labour Quarters (CLQ), effectively enclosed living quarters separated from local communities.

Furthermore, crackdowns on undocumented migrants persist this quarter, with immigration raids conducted across the country, targeting both undocumented migrants as well as their [employers](#). [200 immigration raids were conducted in Kuala Lumpur](#) in the first week of January alone. Reports of arrest continue to emerge, including of [13 children](#), one of which is a nine-month-old baby in Selangor and a [2-year-old toddler](#) in Johor. Concurrently, the immigration department has introduced a [Migrant Repatriation Program](#) which will run from March to December 2024, allowing undocumented migrants to voluntarily return to their home country after paying a fine, thus avoiding prosecution under Malaysian immigration law. It is estimated that between 300,000 to 400,000 migrants may sign up for this program, underscoring the significant scale of irregularity among migrants in Malaysia.

In February, [131 migrants, including 115 Rohingya and 16 of other Myanmar ethnicities](#), fled a Malaysian immigration detention centre following a riot, with [101 subsequently arrested and two tragically losing their lives](#) while attempting to escape. Malaysian law continues to penalise undocumented migrants including refugees and asylum seekers and there are [estimated 12,000 migrants currently detained](#) across the country. Detainees are held in often squalid and cramped conditions, at risk of indefinite detention, and since August 2019 have been denied access to UNHCR, as revealed in a [Human Rights Watch report](#) released this quarter.

Cox's Bazar camp fire and renewed conflict in Rakhine highlight the urgent needs of Rohingya refugees

In January, a devastating fire swept through Cox's Bazar refugee camp, [leaving nearly 7,000 Rohingya homeless](#). Fortunately, there were no casualties reported, however, the fire destroyed approximately 800 shelters, five education centres, and two mosques, further exacerbating the already dire living conditions faced by Rohingya in the camps. The incident has raised [questions about the adequacy of support mechanisms and aid distribution](#) in the camps and has highlighted the urgent need for a sustained response.

Also this quarter, [renewed conflict between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine state](#) has broken out, sparking [mounting calls for Bangladesh to accept more Rohingya refugees](#) from Myanmar. However, Bangladesh has stood fast in its current stance of being unable to accept [more Rohingya refugees](#), due to a lack of capacity.

A recently released UNHCR report has also documented the rise of maritime movement from Bangladesh in 2023, likely [driven by the desperate situation for Rohingya in the camps and the lack of durable solutions](#),

including the ability to return to Rakhine state. Out of the 4,500 individuals undertaking on sea journeys, [569 were reported missing or dead](#), marking the highest toll since 2014.

Risks prevail as Rohingya maritime arrivals to Indonesia increase

As [reported last quarter](#), Indonesia has been grappling with a significant increase in Rohingya arrivals since late 2023, which has been met with escalating hostility from local communities. This quarter has seen a continuation of new arrivals, with over [140 individuals disembarking in North Sumatra](#) and approximately [137 arriving in Aceh](#) in January. Tragically, a vessel departing from Bangladesh, [carrying approximately 142 people](#), capsized near the coast of Aceh province in March. Despite the rescue of [75 individuals, 11 bodies were recovered](#), and the remaining passengers are believed [to have perished or gone missing](#), underscoring the dangers faced by those undertaking perilous maritime journeys in search of safety.

Increased refugee arrivals from Myanmar met with hard-line approach in India

Increasing refugee arrivals from Myanmar to India have been met with mounting hostility. In February, India's Home Minister, Amit Shah, announced intentions to [suspend the Free Movement Regime between India and Myanmar](#), implemented in 2018, [allowing citizens of both countries to travel within a 16km radius](#) of the border without a visa. This coincides with India's plans [to fortify the border with Myanmar](#), akin to the barriers erected along the India-Bangladesh border. However, such plans have encountered opposition from various quarters, including [Mizoram's Chief Minister, Lalduhoma](#). As of March 8, the government began deporting Myanmar nationals from Manipur state, despite the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, drawing [criticism over the violation of the principle of non-refoulement](#) under international law. A total of [84 Myanmar nationals](#) are planned to be deported to Myanmar.

Also this quarter, the legal status and rights of Rohingya refugees in India have been subject to intense debate and judicial scrutiny. In March, the [Indian government argued before the Supreme Court](#) that Rohingya are "illegal" under the provisions of the Foreigners Act and do not possess a fundamental right to reside in India. This stance was argued by the Indian government in response to a [plea seeking the release of detained Rohingya refugees in the country](#). Amidst the litigation, reports have emerged about the plight of [Rohingya women and girls trafficked into India](#) and coerced into marriage. The risks of arrests and detention often deter these victims of trafficking from seeking assistance, leaving them vulnerable to further exploitation by their purported 'husbands'. In a separate legal development, a group of Rohingya refugees have filed [public interest litigation \(PIL\) against Facebook](#) in the Delhi High Court, alleging that the platform failed to curb hate speech and misinformation in India targeting the Rohingya community.

In March, the India government also [announced further details regarding the implementation](#) of India's controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), sparking questions about the political motives behind its enforcement, due to [the timing coinciding with the upcoming elections](#). While the law provides opportunities for some refugees to register as Indian citizens, the exclusion of Muslims from its provisions has faced criticism for allegedly [discriminating against India's Muslim minority](#). Afghan Muslims, among others, have voiced [opposition to the CAA](#), expressing concerns about its discriminatory nature and its impact on religious minorities.

Australia resumes hard-line approach concerning asylum seekers and refugees

Australia has faced renewed scrutiny over its treatment of asylum seekers, particularly those arriving by boat. Concerns were raised this quarter as reports surfaced of [eight asylum seekers, including a child, who arrived to Australia by boat 'voluntarily' returning to their country of origin](#) in November last year, just two months after being transferred to Nauru. In February, an additional [43 people, believed to be from Bangladesh, Pakistan and India](#), arrived by boat in Western Australia. All of them were subsequently taken to Nauru, adding to the [15 people who were already there as of January 4](#). Criticism has been directed towards the government due to its lack of transparency regarding these events, including the withholding of crucial details concerning the countries of origin of the asylum seekers and their repatriation. Besides, the new developments have also reinvigorated ongoing debates about the treatment and rights of people seeking asylum in Australia and come as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has claimed there will be ['no changes' to Australia's hard-line border policy](#) - Operation Sovereign Borders.

[Last quarter](#) 151 detainees were released under a landmark ruling on unlawful indefinite immigration detention in Australia. This quarter a [court case](#) involving an Iranian asylum seeker in detention is hoped to set a new precedent, potentially leading to the [release of more asylum seekers and refugees held in immigration detention, including those who refuse to cooperate with authorities](#). Following the challenges on the legality of detention, the government introduced the Migration Amendment (removal and other measures) bill 2024 in late March. The bill, which is pending approval from the Senate, [criminalises individuals who fail to cooperate with their removal](#), including those who may face harm upon return. Moreover, under this bill, individuals from specific countries who refuse to accept returns, could potential be prohibited [from traveling to Australia](#).

Australia cancels Palestinian visas mid-flight to Australia

Additionally, following the conflict in October, the Australian government [issued over 2,000 visitor visas to Palestinian](#). However, concerns arose when reports emerged of [visa cancellations for individuals](#) fleeing Gaza, leaving many stranded en route to Australia. This included a [Palestinian who found himself stuck in transit in Istanbul](#) after his visa was abruptly cancelled mid-flight. Although the government later [reinstated the visas](#), questions persisted regarding the [lack of transparency surrounding the cancellation decision and the perceived double standard](#) in visa handling compared to the case of Ukrainian refugees.

Cambodian activists arrested and Uighur refugee detained, raising human rights concerns in Thailand

Recent developments in Thailand have raised significant human rights concerns, particularly with the arrest of [three Cambodian political activists holding UNHCR refugee status, along with their families](#), in Thailand. This occurred just days before an official visit of the Cambodian Prime Minister on February 7, prompting fears of transnational repression in the region. Rights activists are concerned about the potential for deportation of the refugees and hold fears for their safety, calling on the government to facilitate safe passage to a third country. Additionally, this quarter marked a decade-long implementation of Thailand's

[indefinite detention policy for Uyghurs](#), which began with the [arrest of 220 individuals](#) in March 2014. Some of these individuals have been forcibly deported to China, while [50 of them](#) face prolonged detention without access to UNHCR and legal representation.

Thai crackdown on border crossings amid Myanmar instability contradicts humanitarian aid efforts

Thai authorities have intensified efforts to curb irregular border crossings from Myanmar this quarter, amidst escalating violence and instability and the announcement of conscription laws, [prompting many to seek refuge](#) in neighbouring countries. In two separate weeks in [February](#) and [March](#), about 200 Myanmar nationals were arrested for irregular border crossings. However, these crackdowns contradict the Thai government's efforts to establish [a humanitarian corridor](#) between Thailand and Myanmar. Despite the launch of a pilot humanitarian aid delivery project in Kayin state on March 25 along this newly developed corridor, aimed at reaching 20,000 people, [scepticism remains regarding the efficacy of aid distribution in reaching the population in need](#), particularly as it is channelled through the junta-controlled Myanmar Red Cross.

Thematic Focus:

How Myanmar's new taxation and conscription policies may impact migration dynamics

As Myanmar grapples with ongoing political turmoil, recent directives have exacerbated the challenges faced by its citizens. The enforcement of conscription laws and the imposition of new taxation and remittance regulations have intensified pressures on the people of Myanmar, and will potentially drive more towards irregular migration. This article delves into the far-reaching consequences of these policies against the backdrop of the nation's protracted conflict, shedding light on their impacts on mixed migration.

Escalating conflict in Myanmar fuels financial woes for de facto authorities

The Tatmadaw's new legislative measures unfold against a backdrop of intensifying conflict that has engulfed the nation since the military seizure of power in February 2021. The de facto authorities are facing serious setbacks as the resistance group and National Unity Government (NUG) in exile claim to have [gained control over 60% of the Myanmar's territory](#). However, this also comes at a significant human cost. As of March 2024, approximately [2.5 million individuals have been internally displaced, with an additional 109,100](#) fleeing to neighbouring countries.

While fighting has been sustained since 2021, in recent months the conflict in Myanmar has escalated dramatically, in particular following the launch of [Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance](#), in Shan state in October 2023. Most recently, resistant forces have claimed success for a [30-strong drone attack in Naypyidaw](#), the country's capital and the stronghold of the military regime. Over in Rakhine state, this quarter, clashes between the Tatmadaw and Arakan Army marked the [end of a year-long ceasefire in the state](#), a region already plagued by long-standing ethnic tensions between Rohingya and other Myanmar nationals. Clashes between resistance groups and the Tatmadaw have now spread to [two-thirds of Myanmar as of December 2023](#), and have led many to believe the military's control of the country may soon come to an end.

Against this volatile backdrop, the de facto authorities face mounting strain as [revenue streams dwindle](#) due to sanctions from the West, [economic slowdown due to the conflict](#), and a [revenue denial campaign](#) led by the National Unity Government (NUG) in exile. This has prompted the cash-strapped de facto authorities to [introduce a slew of new policies](#), including tax hikes on local businesses and households, and an increase in utility tariffs and vehicle registration fees, in a bid to bolster their cash reserves. Two such policies, in particular, target Myanmar's overseas migrant workers and risk intensifying their economic vulnerabilities and potentially driving more into situations of irregularity.

Financial reforms target migrant workers and risk pushing some into irregularity

The first such policy requires that a portion of remittances from Myanmar nationals working abroad must come back into the country through formal channels. This means that migrant workers must [remit at least 25%](#) of their monthly salary through official channels recognised by the de facto authorities. This new rule only applies to migrant workers who migrated through [regular pathways under a Memorandum of Understanding](#) (MoU) between Myanmar and other countries including Japan, Malaysia, Qatar, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Failure to comply with this new rule will lead to a [three-year travel ban](#) for returned migrant workers upon the expiration of their existing work permits. However, this measure has encountered widespread criticism due to the [unfavourable fixed exchange rates](#) set by the Central Bank of Myanmar, significantly undercutting the remittances values vis-à-vis informal channels such as hundi networks, and inevitably resulting in the erosion of migrant workers' take-home incomes.

In addition, following the remittance mandate, an amendment to the Union Tax Law 2023, effective from October 2023, was enacted requiring migrant workers to pay tax on their foreign income. This amendment overturned a previous [tax exemption](#) accorded in 2012. Under the new law, Myanmar migrant workers are subject to either [a flat rate of 2% or a tiered income tax ranging between 10% to 25%](#) of their earnings. This imposition of the amended law results in double taxation for migrant workers, who are obligated to already pay income taxes in their respective host countries. Along with significantly reducing their already limited incomes, many Myanmar migrant workers have also expressed reluctance to contribute to tax revenue that funds the de facto authorities. Migrant workers risk becoming undocumented if they fail to provide [proof of tax payment upon their passport renewal](#), having potential and significant flow-on effects relating to the potential increased risk of exploitation in the labour market as well as of arrest and detention for being undocumented.

The additional burden of income tax on migrant workers, coupled with the forced remittances through formal channels is likely to push already struggling communities to the brink. Migrant workers and their families reliant on remittances for their survival will find themselves caught in an increasingly precarious situation, as their income diminishes. However, the ramifications of these measures extend far beyond mere economic strain, potentially driving some towards irregularity if they fail to comply with the new imposed rules, or in other cases to more risk-laden migration channels to evade the tax burden and forced remittances through official channels.

Conscription law drives regular and irregular outward movement

Furthermore, this quarter on Feb 10, the de facto authorities announced the [enforcement of Myanmar's 2010 People's Military Service Law as of April 2024](#). The law mandates military service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27, with evasion punishable by up to five years' imprisonment. This directive has spurred widespread panic and outward migration, particularly among youth seeking to evade conscription. [Thailand has emerged as a prominent destination](#), evidenced by [a surge in visa applications at the Thai embassy](#), resulting in appointments being fully booked for weeks ahead, despite a doubled daily quota of 800 applicants. Concurrently, Myanmar's passport office is facing an overwhelming surge in applications,

with [advance appointments fully booked until mid-2024](#). Exploitative brokers have taken advantage of this situation by inflating prices for expedited passport applications.

The limited availability of accessible regular pathways, exacerbated by the [suspension of formal labour migration pathways](#) established through bilateral MoUs mentioned above, has resulted in many resorting to [irregular migration](#), despite its associated risks, to escape enforced military service. Furthermore, the laws also have an impact on migrants from Myanmar who are already abroad. For irregular Myanmar migrants and refugees in countries such as [Malaysia](#) where undocumented persons, including refugees and asylum seekers, are deemed “illegal” and subject to detention and deportation, the additional risk of military conscription upon deportation would exacerbate their vulnerabilities. Even for migrants with regular status, the looming risk of being drafted for military services might deter them from seeking services such as document renewal at the Myanmar Embassy or returning to Myanmar upon the expiry of their travel documents, potentially leading to further situations of irregularity.

Addressing the crisis

Escalating conflict, economic strain, and forced conscription have created a complex web of vulnerabilities and risks, and will potentially drive many towards irregular migration or result in undocumented status. As conflicts in Myanmar continue to escalate, an increase in refugee arrivals to neighbouring countries is anticipated, with an estimated [40,000 new arrivals in Thailand projected for 2024](#). However, this figure remains conservative given the fluidity of the situation and uncertainties surrounding the activation of the conscription law in April 2024, which may further aggravate migration dynamics. Humanitarian actors must bolster their responses to a possible surge in new arrivals to neighbouring countries, necessitating increased funding from donors. Host countries can contribute by alleviating the financial burden on Myanmar migrant workers through measures such as reducing or eliminating income taxes, thereby easing the burden of double taxation. Moreover, there is an urgent need to expand regular migration pathways for individuals intending to leave Myanmar.

Highlighted New Research and Reports



[2023 Post-Earthquake Population Dynamics Analysis - Türkiye](#)

UNHCR | February 2024

The devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake, and 7.7 magnitude aftershock, in southeast Türkiye on 22 February 2023 resulted in multiple waves of population displacement, and secondary displacement, both within and outside of the impacted areas. Significant numbers of Turkish nationals and refugee survivors moved on to other provinces, in many cases facilitated by the Government of Türkiye (GoTR). This report presents the findings from the surveys and monitoring activities throughout 2023 by UNHCR to better understand the profiles of refugees involved in these population flows.



[Afghanistan cross-border mobility report two years of mixed migration in review](#)

IOM | February 2024


Considering the history of migration between Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan in over the last four decades, this report presents a descriptive analysis on movements going into and out of Afghanistan with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan over a two-year period. With the aim of better informing humanitarian operations, the analysis below provides an overview of the mixed cross-border situation which has unfolded during this reporting period, covering the transition since mid-August 2021 to the lead-up of events in Pakistan post-August 2023



[“We Can't See the Sun”: Malaysia's Arbitrary Detention of Migrants and Refugees](#)

Human Rights Watch | March 2024


Malaysian law makes all irregular entry and stay in the country a criminal offense, with no distinction among refugees, asylum seekers, trafficking victims, and undocumented migrants. Anyone without valid documentation is considered an “illegal” immigrant and subject to arrest, detention, and deportation. With no legal limit on the length of immigration detention, migrants are at risk of being detained indefinitely. The report documents Malaysian authorities' punitive and abusive treatment of migrants and refugees in 20 immigration detention centres across the country.



The Rohingya boat crisis: Recent developments and key contributing factors in South and Southeast Asia

Women’s Peace Network | March 2024

This briefing paper addresses the deteriorating situation of Rohingya across South and Southeast Asia, and draws attention to the deadly sea crossings and those who have been forced into it. It analyses the background and key contributing factors to the boat crisis, including its root causes, and life-threatening abuses faced by Rohingya boat people, such as those who were recently permitted to land in Aceh, Indonesia. The paper also provides recommendations to regional and international actors to effectively and comprehensively address the crisis, as well as to ensure Rohingya’s safe, voluntary, sustainable, and dignified repatriation in the near future.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based mixed migration responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

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