



MMC West Africa

QUARTER 1 2024

Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa



This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the West Africa (WA) region. The core countries of focus for this region are Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration


"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes migrants travelling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often travelling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

Front cover photo credit:

Jean-Baptiste Joire (2017)

Women watching boats in Joal-Fadiout, Senegal, February 2017.

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa

Quarter 1 - 2024

Key Updates

- **Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger withdraw from ECOWAS, adding uncertainty to regional mobility and migrant protection:** On 28 January, ECOWAS founding members Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their [withdrawal](#) from the organisation. While it is too early to fully understand the withdrawal's impact on regional mixed migration trends, some obstacles to regular movements have emerged. In February, [expulsions](#) from Côte d'Ivoire of citizens of the three countries have been reported. Furthermore, Burkina Faso passed a [law](#) introducing new visa and residence permit requirements upon entry into the country, including for ECOWAS citizens.
- **Worsening security situation in the Central Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) increases displacements towards coastal countries:** As the humanitarian situation is worsening, some [17 million](#) people require assistance and protection in the three countries. In the past 12 months, [IOM](#) reported an increase in refugee movements from the Central Sahel and towards Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, and Benin. 87,000 people are [reported](#) seeking refuge in the northern regions of these four countries, predominantly women and children.
- **Northbound mixed migration from Niger further increased after the abrogation of the EU-supported anti-smuggling law 2015-36 by the military leadership:** According to IOM, the number of registered individuals leaving Niger increased from 50,195 in [January 2023](#) to 125,249 in [January 2024](#). Even with the abrogation of law 2015-36, the route through the desert towards Libya remains [dangerous](#).
- **New migration agreement concluded between Mauritania and EU:** During the first quarter, a shift in countries of departure on the Atlantic Route from Senegal to Mauritania was observed. On 7 March, the EU and Mauritania announced a new [joint declaration](#) establishing a migration partnership to create job opportunities, promote the protection of asylum seekers and refugees, support legal migration, prevent irregular migration and support strong border management. This declaration was adopted after the EU had [announced](#) a EUR 210 million package for migration management, humanitarian aid and opportunities for youth on 8 February 2024.
- **Atlantic Route to the Canary Islands busiest migration route to enter the European Union in the [first two months](#) of 2024:** The Spanish Ministry of Interior reported 13,115 arrivals to the Canary Islands in the period of 1 January – 31 March, an increase of 502% compared to the same period last year.

Regional Overview*



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration within and out of West Africa.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

West Africa region

As of 16 March, the number of refugees in the region has further [increased](#) to more than 1.7 million compared to around 1.6 million in [December 2023](#). According to [UNHCR](#),¹ there were more than 5 million people of concern in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania), as of 29 February. This includes refugees, asylum-seekers, refugee returnees, internally displaced people (IDP) and IDP returnees.

Worsening security situation in the Central Sahel increases refugee numbers in coastal countries

The security situation in the Central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) continues to [worsen](#) increasing movements towards coastal countries in the first quarter of 2024. IOM [reported](#) increased movements from the Central Sahel towards the coastal countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, and Benin, continuing a trend observed over the past 12 months. Due to a [spillover](#) of the crisis, 87,000 people are [reported](#) seeking refuge in the northern regions of these four countries, predominantly women and children.

According to [IOM](#), some 17 million people in the Central Sahel require humanitarian assistance and protection, which represents about one-fifth of the population. Reacting to the worsening situation, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP published a [joint response plan](#) in March, developing a strategy to streamline their work on forcibly displaced populations in the Central Sahel. On 21 and 22 March, UNHCR and the Togolese government organised a [regional dialogue](#) on national security and refugee protection in the region, taking place in Lomé.

In addition, this quarter UNHCR [reported](#) a higher influx of Malian refugees into the south-eastern regions of Mauritania, especially the Hodh Chargui region. At least 14,410 refugees arrived in the region in [January 2024](#) alone. UNHCR [estimates](#) that the region hosted some 181,000 Malians as of 29 February 2024, of which 99,000 are registered in Mbera Camp, thus exceeding the camp's [official](#) capacity by almost 30,000. A further 81,000 are hosted in out-of-camp situations. The large [majority](#) (98%) of refugees in Mauritania are Malians, who benefit from prima facie refugee [status](#) upon arrival in the Hodh Chargui region.

Tensions between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire increase uncertainties among migrants

After the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in January 2024, tensions between the neighbouring countries Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire have [increased](#) following a border crossing incident by Burkinabè security forces on 27 March. [Prior](#) to the

¹ UNHCR Sahel Crisis Coordination platform was accessed on 21 March 2024 and reflects figures displayed at that time (current as of 29 February 2024).

incident, tensions had begun to build up due to political disagreements over the military coups in Burkina Faso and Niger. In February 2024, a [report](#) of expulsions from Côte d'Ivoire of nationals of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger became public.

According to a MMC key informant, extortion, and prices to travel within Côte d'Ivoire have increased over the last quarter. On a main migration route linking Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, the key informant reported himself having to pay higher prices for passage at fourteen checkpoints within Côte d'Ivoire. Having a migrant population constituting [22%](#) of its total population, Côte d'Ivoire has long been considered a [country of destination](#), especially for labour migrants from the [region](#). The recent developments might exacerbate the vulnerabilities faced by migrants from Mali, Burkina, and Niger, increasing uncertainty regarding their residence statuses.

Niger: Increasing northbound mixed migration after abrogation of law 2015-36

Following the abrogation of the anti-smuggling [law 2015-36](#) in November 2023 in Niger, [IOM](#) has reported an increase in northbound mixed migration. According to IOM, the number of registered individuals leaving Niger increased from 50,195 in [January 2023](#) to 125,249 in [January 2024](#). IOM reported an [increase](#) of 98% in cross-border mixed migration from the North of Niger to Libya between December 2023 and January 2024, primarily individuals in search of economic opportunities.

The abrogation of the law 2015-36 has brought back [relative safety](#) for migrants and people who gain their livelihood from the migration industry as they can once again operate openly. While mobility was driven underground with the enforcement of law 2015-36, since November 2023 smugglers can go back to using [official roads](#) and register with a weekly official [convoy](#) towards Dirkou with the Nigerien military to protect them from armed groups operating in the North of Niger. Nevertheless, the route through the desert remains [dangerous](#) as migrants face several risks, such as abandonment without adequate water and food, accidents, or attacks by armed groups. Further along the route, once in Libya, [dangers](#) for migrants remain, such as sexual and physical violence, forced labour or kidnapping for ransom payments.

While northbound flows have increased from Niger, [data](#) shows that migrants aim for Libya for economic opportunities. The impact of the increase of flows through Niger on arrivals to Europe remains to be determined over the coming months and monitored jointly with the increased [interceptions](#) at sea in Tunisia.²

² For more details see the North Africa QMMU.

Policy, diplomacy and legal updates

ECOWAS withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger raises questions for migrants across the region

On 28 January, ECOWAS members Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their [withdrawal](#) from the organisation, raising uncertainties for migrants in the region. This decision follows the countries' [withdrawal](#) from the G5 military force in the Sahel region in 2023. Following several [military coups](#) between 2020 and 2023, the three countries have been under [sanctions](#) from ECOWAS. In September 2023, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso [announced](#) the founding of the defence pact Alliance of Sahel States (AES). On 25 February, ECOWAS announced the [lifting](#) of the sanctions against Mali, Niger, and Guinea, the latter remaining an ECOWAS member, which has been interpreted as a [signal](#) to renew dialogue. The sanctions against Burkina Faso remain in place.

The departure of the three countries from ECOWAS has sparked diverse reactions. In a 24 February [communiqué](#), ECOWAS stated its concerns over the withdrawal's political, economic, humanitarian, and social impact and urged dialogue to resolve the situation. Both the [European Union](#) (EU) and the [African Union](#) (AU) Commission expressed regret over the countries' "unilateral and immediate withdrawal." Among the AES citizens, sentiments vary. While some [see](#) the withdrawal as an emancipation from perceived ECOWAS shortcomings, others [worry](#) about the potential uncertainties ahead, especially regarding their residency and livelihoods in ECOWAS countries.

As mobility was previously governed by the ECOWAS free movement protocol³, these developments have raised [questions](#) about the effects for migrants across the region, such as regarding formal and informal mobility, border closures, the legal status of migrants, protection concerns and changes in economic migration dynamics. At the same time, alternative frameworks on mobility such as the [free movement zone of the West African Economic and Monetary Union](#) (WAEMU)⁴ and the importance of informal networks remain in place and [continue](#) to play an important role. Therefore, the actual legal effects of the ECOWAS withdrawal on migrants and on mobility dynamics in the region remain to be monitored in the months to come.

Burkina Faso passes law to control migration

On 22 February the transitional parliament of Burkina Faso adopted a [law](#) on entry and exit into the country, as reported by local news sources. While the entry and exit of nationals of ECOWAS countries had previously been governed by the ECOWAS free movement [protocol](#), the [new law](#) introduces visa and residence permit requirements upon entry into Burkina Faso. The law now requires all foreigners entering

3 Since 1979, a series of protocols formalized the right to free movement, allowing for residency and establishment rights, granting progressive rights to enter, reside, and establish businesses across the region. These protocols include the 1979 Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment as well as Supplementary Protocol.

4 The WAEMU founding treaty (WAEMU, 1973) sets out the creation of a common market, based inter alia on the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the right of establishment of self-employed or salaried persons. Article 76 of the Amended Treaty (WAEMU, 2003) contains further provisions on freedom of movement, residence and establishment. See [Free movement policies and border controls: regional migration governance systems in West and North Africa and Europe, and their interactions](#)

the country to present themselves at a police station to receive a visa, including nationals of ECOWAS countries. Leaving the country must be recorded with a travel document.

The new law can be situated in the context of growing [tensions](#) between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire over the spill-over of violence from the Central Sahel crisis (see p. 5) and an uncertain institutional landscape after the withdrawal from ECOWAS. The Minister for Security stated that the law [aims](#) at better controlling the entry and exit of nationals and foreigners to strengthen the country's legal and institutional framework, as well as improving the fight against terrorist groups operating across the Central Sahel. Furthermore, he added that the new law represents an opportunity to "clarify the concepts of nationals, foreigners, or stateless persons" residing in the country, as [reported](#) by a local news source.

Launch of EU-Mauritania deal on migration

A new [migration partnership](#) between the European Union and Mauritania was concluded on 7 March 2024 amid [rises](#) in migrant departures from the Mauritanian coast. After a [visit](#) of EU officials to Nouakchott in October 2023, the President of the European Commission and the Spanish Prime Minister [announced](#) a package of EUR 210 million to be used for migration management, humanitarian aid and opportunities for youth on 8 February 2024. At a following visit of the EU Commissioner of Home Affairs, the Spanish Interior Minister and Belgian's Secretary of State for Asylum and Migration, a [joint declaration](#) establishing a migration partnership was signed on 7 March. Its goal is to create job opportunities, promote the protection of asylum seekers and refugees, support legal migration, prevent irregular migration, and support strong border management.

According to the [European Commission](#), the goal is to "promote legal migration and combat smuggling and human trafficking", by offering financial and operational support. The Spanish Interior Minister called Mauritania a "[priority strategic partner](#)" in migration matters, as Spain has been active in the country for 15 years assisting with border surveillance and training police and border guard staff. The deal has been [criticized](#) by civil society actors, such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) for its likely increase in "violations of the rights of people who are on the move in Mauritania."

The deal is one in a series of recent EU deals on migration in West and North Africa, following the Memorandum of Understanding with [Tunisia](#) signed in July 2023 and the most recent agreement with [Egypt](#) on 18 March.

Spain introduces new visa requirements for Senegalese citizens

Facing [rising numbers](#) of Senegalese nationals applying for asylum at the Madrid airport while waiting for a layover flight, the Spanish government introduced new visa requirements for Senegalese travellers on 19 February. In order to transit through Spain, Senegalese nationals now need to have a [transit visa](#). This requirement had already been [in place](#) for nationals from other West African countries, such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and the Gambia.

The visa changes follow recent [reports](#) of rising numbers of West Africans attempting to reach the United States via Latin America. Travelling by plane, migrants transit through Spain to enter [Nicaragua](#) and then continue northward overland. Prior to Spain's visa changes, El Salvador [introduced](#) an entry tax of USD 1,000 for African nationals, following an increase of African nationals entering the country on their way to the United States. The Spanish newspaper El Pais [reports](#) that this change had been introduced upon pressure from the United States to control northbound migration.

Mixed migration from West Africa towards North Africa and Europe

Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Route

As of 31 March, the Spanish Ministry of Interior [reported](#) 16,156 irregular arrivals in the first quarter of 2024, compared to 4,287 arrivals in the same period last year.⁵ The large majority (13,115) of these arrivals were recorded in the Canary Islands, an increase of 502% compared to the same period last year.⁶

According to [data](#) collected through IOM's Missing Migrants Project (MMP), at least 111 migrants have gone missing on the Atlantic Route in the first quarter of 2024, compared to 91 deaths during the same period in [2023](#). A [total](#) number of at least 4,158 migrants have gone missing on the Atlantic and Western Mediterranean Routes since the inception of the project in 2014.⁷ IOM acknowledges that these numbers represent an underestimation, as many deaths remain undocumented. In fact, the NGO [Caminando Fronteras](#) reported 6,618 migrant deaths on routes to Spain in 2023 alone.

Western Mediterranean Route

According to [UNHCR](#), from 1 January to 24 March, 3,186 refugees and migrants arrived in Spain by land or sea along the Western Mediterranean Route, a decrease of 41% compared to [last](#) quarter. However, number of arrivals are still 62% higher than during the [first quarter](#) of last year.

Atlantic route

Last year marked the highest-ever [recorded](#) number of arrivals to the Canary Islands. Continuing this trend, the Atlantic Route was observed to be the busiest migration route to enter the European Union in the first two months of 2024, according to [Frontex](#). The Spanish Ministry of Interior reported 13,115 arrivals to the Canary Islands in the period of 1 January – 31 March, an increase of 502% compared to the same period last year.

In addition, a shift in country of departures on the Atlantic Route from Senegal to Mauritania continued during the first quarter of 2024. According to Infomigrants, of the more than 7,000 migrants that arrived in the Canary Islands in January 2024, more than 80% departed from Mauritania. This shift already started in August 2023, as reported by the NGO Caminando Fronteras and by the end of 2023, more people

⁵ All data provided by the Spanish Ministry of Interior covers the period from 1 January to 31 March 2024. Therefore, any comparisons to 2023 from the same source refer to the same timeframe (1 January – 31 March, 2023).

⁶ The majority of these arrivals were recorded on the Canary Islands, as the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla are hard to access. For more information see the North Africa QMMU.

⁷ Data as of 25 March 2024.


departed from Mauritania than from other countries on the Atlantic Route. Previously, the highest numbers of departures were observed from [Senegal](#) in 2023 and [Morocco](#) in 2022.

This shift might be attributed to several factors including the recent worsening of the security situation in [Mali](#), as well as the already [strained situation](#) regarding the provision of services for refugees in Mauritania. As shown in Figure 1, Malians represented 58% of arrivals (4,232 arrivals) on the Canary Islands in January 2024, according to the latest data from Frontex.

Senegalese nationals represent the second highest number of arrivals (17%), followed by Mauritanian nationals (14%). The number of Mauritanians arriving on the Canary Islands in January 2024 increased by 233% compared to December 2023 and was the highest ever recorded since [Frontex](#) began publishing border crossing statistics in 2009. The number of Senegalese arrivals decreased since the spike in October 2023 (9,075 arrivals), perhaps due to harsh weather conditions and emergency measures [issued](#) by the Senegalese President in November 2023 to combat departures.⁸ However, in January, prior to the Presidential elections, the number of Senegalese arrivals to the Canary Islands slightly increased again in January 2024 (1,233 arrivals). Migration played a [key role](#) in the election campaigns, following the [increase](#) in deaths on the Atlantic Route in the second half of 2023.

8 For a detailed discussion of migration from Senegal, see [QMMU 4, 2023](#).

Figure 1: Atlantic Route, arrivals to the Canary Islands by country of nationality between January 2023 and January 2024



Source: Frontex Migratory Map

Central Mediterranean Route (arrivals to Italy)

The first quarter of 2024 shows a continuation of the [shift](#) in nationalities on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) observed from [November 2023](#) onwards. Contrary to [previous quarters](#), in January 2024, the top five nationalities of arrivals to Italy did not count any West African country. The number of Guinean arrivals significantly decreased, from almost 10,000 in the [third quarter](#) of 2023 to under 900 in the [fourth quarter](#) of 2023, to 59 in [January 2024](#).

The decrease in arrivals of West Africans in Italy could be due to increased [interceptions](#) by the Tunisian coastguards and the growing [importance](#) of an alternative migration route to the United States, via Central America used by West Africans, including Guineans. Furthermore, an overall significant decrease along the Central Mediterranean Route during the first quarter could be observed. As of 31 March, [UNHCR](#) reported that 11,055 migrants arrived in Italy by sea, marking a 60% decrease compared to the same period last year.

Southbound mixed migration

Returns and evacuations within and to the West Africa region⁹

Emergency Transit Mechanism

In [January 2024](#), 124 refugees were resettled from Niger through UNHCR's emergency transit mechanism (ETM)¹⁰, bringing the total number of people resettled to 5,817 since its inception in 2017.¹¹ This number includes 3,867 people who were first evacuated from Libya to Niger through the ETM and then resettled to third country, in addition to the resettlement of 1,950 registered refugees from Niger to third countries.

Assisted Voluntary Returns

In the first quarter of 2024, repatriation flights organized through IOM's Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVR) Programme continued.¹² On [30 January](#), 327 Nigerien nationals with irregular status in Libya were repatriated to Niger. On [14 February](#), IOM repatriated 147 Nigerian nationals from Libya to Nigeria.¹³

In [January](#), IOM facilitated the return of 392 migrants from Tunisia to their countries of origin through the AVR Programme, including 163 to Burkina Faso, 165 to the Gambia, 7 to Guinea, 33 to Mali, 23 to Senegal, and one to Liberia.

⁹ This overview highlights the main trends regarding returns and evacuations within and to the West Africa region during the quarter. However, it does not necessarily capture all return activity within the region.

¹⁰ Through the [emergency transit mechanism](#), refugees and asylum seekers are voluntarily evacuated from Libya to Niger, and afterwards resettled to third countries.

¹¹ According to the latest numbers from January 2024.

¹² Since 2019, IOM in Niger has facilitated the voluntary return of over 66,619 migrants to their countries of origin, making Niger the main host country for voluntary return worldwide, according to the organization.

¹³ This overview does not necessarily capture all return activity within the region.


Continued expulsions from Algeria to Niger

According to Alarme Phone Sahara (APS), between 1 January and 31 March 2024, Algeria carried out the expulsions of 8,401 individuals¹⁴ to the Niger border. This increase in expulsions, as documented by [APS](#), continues the trend observed in the [last years](#) with at least 26,031 expulsions from Algeria to Niger in [2023](#). The majority of those expelled are from sub-Saharan and West African countries. While some were [residing](#) in Algeria, others had been previously expelled from neighbouring countries like Tunisia, Libya, or Morocco. On 3 April, Niger summoned the Algerian ambassador to [express](#) its disagreement with the intensified violent expulsions. The Secretary General of the Nigerien Foreign Ministry called on the Algerian diplomat to ensure the respect of migrants' dignity, as well as their "physical and moral integrity."

Despite Algeria's ongoing expulsions, population movements from Niger persist. According to the most recent [IOM data](#) available, in January 2024, outgoing cross-border movement from Niger to Algeria increased by 34%, compared to December 2023.

14 MMC calculations based on the following: 1,939 [expelled migrants](#) between 1 and 17 January, and 4,311 [expelled migrants](#) between 1 and 28 February 2024, and 901 [expelled migrants](#) in March 2024.

Highlighted New Research and Reports



[Ep. 7: EU-Africa “Cooperation” and its discontents](#)

African Arguments Podcast | February 2024

In this podcast episode, Amanda Bisong of the European Centre for Development Policy Management looks at policies governing mobility between Africa and Europe. Examining the most recent history of EU-Africa “cooperation” in the field of migration, she explains the dynamics and drivers behind policy decisions. In this context, this episode delves into the intended and unintended consequences these policies have for African countries. Starting with the establishment of the Schengen area, Bisong explains key instruments of EU-African migration cooperation, such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes and the partnership between the African Union and the EU. While these partnerships are not solely focused on migration, we can observe a continuing trend of conditioning financial aid on migration management, leading to a reduced focus on protecting migrants, Bisong explains.



[The case of Civipol: commodified mobility policing in West Africa and its colonial continuities](#)

Statewatch | February 2024

In this article, the authors take a closer look at the activities of Civipol, a French public-private actor owned both by the French state and major security companies, that has specialized in building African states' internal security capacity. Current European attempts to outsource migration control to West Africa mirror historical entanglements between colonial logics, corporate interests and policing. This article looks at the place of public-private relations in French colonialism in order to historically situate the activities of Civipol. Putting the involvement in a wider political perspective, the authors argue that the blurring between public and private interests in contemporary European mobility policing in Africa constitutes a colonial continuity.



[Podcast: De Dakar au bout du monde, femmes en migration \(available in French and Wolof\)](#)

Studio Ėpoukay | March 2023


From Dakar across the world - When talking about migration in Senegal, we most often imagine young men going to the Canary Islands on a pirogue. Left out of this discourse are the many migrant women who play an important role in migration dynamics. This 7-episode podcast gives a voice to Senegalese women who migrated to other West African countries and beyond. Why did they do it? How did they get there? What difficulties did they encounter on the way? What joys and successes did they experience? These are the questions this podcast seeks to answer talking to a dozen women migrants, a trade unionist and a sociologist. The podcast is available in French and Wolof.



[Between the necessity and the ban on migration: an assessment of Senegal's \(Im\)mobility policies in 2023 \(Blogpost\)](#)

Migration.info | March 2024

This article describes the obstacles to mobility and the violations of the rights of migrants in Senegal in 2023, and for the years to come. The domestic political context prior to the elections was marked by repressions of fundamental democratic rights, such as the right to free movement within the member countries of the Economic Community of West African States — but also the right to information and the right to demonstrate. The author argues that these infringements of fundamental rights represent a danger to the whole of Senegalese society and jeopardize the country's future development, particularly looking at migration dynamics. The article does not take into account the results of the election held on 24 March 2024.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based mixed migration responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit:

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