

**MMC Eastern and Southern
Africa | Egypt and Yemen**

QUARTER 2 2024



Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Eastern and Southern Africa | Egypt and Yemen

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Eastern and Southern Africa region plus Egypt and Yemen (ESA). The core areas of focus include the Eastern route, from East and the Horn of Africa towards the Arabian Peninsula; the Southern route from East Africa and the Great Lakes towards South Africa; the Central Mediterranean Route (also called the Northern Route) from East and the Horn of Africa towards North Africa; as well as intra-regional mixed migration dynamics. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council (DRC) regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

“Mixed migration” refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes migrants travelling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often travelling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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Michael Kirby Smith (2013)

Ethiopian migrants outside the Migrant Response Centre in Haradh, Yemen, May 2013.

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Eastern and Southern Africa | Egypt and Yemen

Quarter 2 - 2024

Key Updates

- **The war in Sudan continues to fuel internal displacement and cross-border movements:** Compared to the [previous quarter](#), [cross-border movements](#) have increased by 42% in Libya (10,836), 14% in South Sudan (718,560), 13% in Ethiopia (134,447), 8% in Chad (786,036) and 8% in the Central African Republic (31,649).
- **Extended military campaigns lead to continued decrease in arrivals in Yemen:** In April-May, [3,164 migrants](#) entered Yemen, marking an 87% decrease when compared to the same period in 2023.
- **New MMC evidence confirms that despite widescale reporting in 2023, migrant killings at the Saudi-Yemeni border are continuing.** In addition, in Q2, three boats capsized off the coasts of [Djibouti](#) and [Yemen](#), with at least 103 migrants confirmed to have drowned.
- **Sudanese deported from Egypt:** [Amnesty International](#) reported on the arrest, detention and deportation of Sudanese without an authorized status in Egypt back to war-torn Sudan.
- **Rwanda deal becomes law in the UK, but subsequently gets scrapped by new Labour government:** Following the passing of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, the UK Home Office [launched a campaign](#) in Q2 to identify and detain migrants who were eligible for deportation to Rwanda. However, in early Q3, following the UK general election, the new Labour party Prime Minister Keir Starmer [announced](#) abandoning the Rwanda deportation act, while seeking to implement alternative ways to curb irregular migration.
- **Migrants intercepted along the Southern Route:** In Q2, several groups of Ethiopians were apprehended while en route to South Africa in [Kenya](#), [Tanzania](#), [Malawi](#), [Zambia](#) and [Zimbabwe](#). Furthermore, Mozambican authorities reported arresting [more than 5,000 migrants](#) since the beginning of the year, of which most were Malawian, Zambian and Zimbabwean, while South Africa intercepted [3,841](#) over the Easter period.

Regional Overview*



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration within and out of Eastern and Southern Africa as well as Egypt and Yemen.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Mixed Migration within East Africa and the Great Lakes

War in Sudan continues to drive internal and cross-border displacement

The war in Sudan marked its one year anniversary on 15 April 2024 and has become the [largest displacement crisis globally](#). As of [25 June](#), 7,720,119 people in Sudan have been internally displaced, representing a 17% increase compared to [Q1](#) (6,622,565). This adds up to a total figure of 10,540,215 internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the country, including an estimated 2.8 million who were internally displaced prior to the war. Moreover, 2,196,355 have fled Sudan to neighbouring countries since 15 April 2023, marking an 8% increase compared to the end of the previous quarter (2,031,858).

In contrast to last quarter, the number of IDPs increased at a higher rate than those crossing borders. Internal displacement may have been accelerated by the recent advances (and attempted advances) of the Rapid Support Forces in areas which were previously hosting IDPs, such as [Sennar State](#), or were strongholds of the Sudanese Armed Forces, including [El Fula in West Kordofan](#). Furthermore, the battle over El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, has been ongoing for most of Q2, with [many feared](#) to be trapped inside the city and caught in crossfire.

For those who have crossed borders, a majority have fled to Chad (786,036), South Sudan (718,560), Egypt (514,827)¹ and Ethiopia (134,447). Some 31,649 arrivals have been recorded in the Central African Republic (CAR) and 10,836 in Libya. At the end of Q2, the [United Nations \(UN\)](#) called for urgent international support for the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad, which “had reached a critical point”.

Sudanese refugees stranded in Amhara after fleeing camps

At the end of April, [reports emerged](#) of a group of Sudanese refugees abandoning the Awlala and Kumer camps, located in the conflict-affected Ethiopian region of Amhara. Those who left the camps cited dire humanitarian conditions and protection risks, having witnessed abuse, rape and abductions. Sudanese media [noted](#) that extreme violence perpetrated by the Fano militia had spurred camp exits, giving an example of a male youth who was shot after he refused to hand over his phone in a local market in Kumer, and a [woman who was killed](#) in Awlala in June. The militia holds large parts of Amhara, leading to a power vacuum where the government has limited control over the security environment in and around the camps.

Since the group left the camps, their situation has become [particularly dire](#) over the course of Q2. While initially they had intended to go to Gondar to meet with UNHCR, it was [reported](#) they were blocked from accessing the town by Ethiopian authorities. Once faced with the obstructed access, the group settled in a roadside forest in early May. Since then, accounts have emerged that the refugees are on hunger

1 No new data was available for Egypt, with this figure being the same as reported in Q1.

strike, demanding improved aid and increased safety and security in Amhara. Estimates on the number of people in the makeshift forest camp vary greatly, with UNHCR [citing](#) 1,000 individuals, and other sources varying between [4,250](#) and [8,000](#). In a number of official statements, UNHCR [deplored](#) the circumstances in the forest and were working with Ethiopian authorities to improve the fluid security situation in Amhara. UNHCR advocated for the group to return to the camps, and for additional financial support from donors, citing the Ethiopia humanitarian response as one of the most underfunded.

Ugandan Constitutional Court upholds 'Anti-Homosexuality Bill'

Despite widespread international condemnation of the 2023 'Anti-Homosexuality Bill', the Ugandan Constitutional Court [upheld](#) most of its provisions in a hearing in April 2024. The court removed certain sections which limited healthcare access to people of diverse SOGIESC, criminalized the renting of housing to them and obligated people to report on 'acts of homosexuality', citing these elements went against human rights. Local media have [reported](#) that ever since the bill was enacted, a wave of severe abuse has put people of diverse SOGIESC at extreme risk in Uganda, with many having departed from the country and more still aspiring to leave.

The Eastern Route from East Africa to Yemen

Decrease in arrivals in Yemen

In Yemen, IOM DTM recorded 3,164 new arrivals in [April](#) and [May](#), representing an 87% decrease compared to the same period last year (24,877). Arrivals in Yemen continue to demonstrate a decreasing trend since mid-2023 when a military campaign was launched to curb migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen. The campaign is concentrated in and around Lahj Governorate, which has resulted in almost no arrivals to this region since August 2023. All migrants in April-May arrived in Shabwah Governorate, similar to last quarter. Most migrants had left from Bari or Bossaso, Somalia, for which Shabwah serves as the usual point of entry in Yemen. In May, a smaller number of 175 migrants arrived from Obock, Djibouti. While reports on the situation of migrants in Yemen are scarce, a [social media post](#) from June cited that Yemeni authorities had arrested and were in the process of deporting 306 Ethiopians. The news follows an article from *The Guardian* in May which [focused](#) on the increasing number of migrants trapped in Yemen while facing abuse and starvation.

Increase in arrivals in Djibouti

At the same time, in April and May, IOM DTM [recorded](#) 37,256 entries into Djibouti from Ethiopia and Yemen, a 47% increase compared to the same period last year (19,775). With a decline in departures to Yemen, more migrants are believed to remain stranded in Djibouti upon arriving in the country. In April, IOM [noted](#) arrivals from Ethiopia were increasing due to conflict and political violence. This trend is reflected in the profiles of new arrivals in Djibouti. While earlier, Ethiopians from Oromia constituted the largest group to arrive in Djibouti, more arrivals from Amhara (34%) and Tigray (34%) have been recorded this year, followed by Oromia as the third region of origin (27%). Returns from Yemen to Djibouti also increased to

1,871 compared to 807 during the same period last year, with IOM noting the ongoing military campaign in Yemen and the increasingly challenging humanitarian situation there driving returns.

Migrants intercepted in Somalia

During two separate events in April, the Somaliland regional authorities announced intercepting and detaining groups of [193](#) and [170](#) Ethiopian and Somali migrants who were on their way to Yemen. The groups were detained on vessels off the coast of the Sanaag region, which could indicate an increase in coastal journeys from the Somaliland region towards the ports of Bossaso and Bari, as a strategy to avoid risky overland journeys in Somalia due to conflict and harsh conditions and avoid police and other authorities when moving between regions.

In June, the Mayor of Garowe, the capital of the Puntland federal region, [ordered](#) all “Ethiopians without permits” to leave the city, with deportation following if they would not comply. The mayor cited that the number of migrants in the city placed a burden on the local administration.

Three fatal shipwrecks mark perilous journeys along the Eastern Route

Two fatal shipwrecks off the coast of Djibouti occurred this quarter. On [9 April](#), at least 38 migrants drowned after their boat capsized about 200 metres from shore. On [23 April](#), another shipwreck occurred, in which 16 migrants drowned and another 28 went missing. According to [IOM](#), the boats were transporting primarily Ethiopians on their return journeys from Yemen, after they had failed to reach Saudi Arabia.

It is noteworthy that the distances from either Obock or coastal cities in Somalia to Shabwah represent a significantly longer journey when compared to Obock to Lahj through the narrow Bab Al-Mandab Strait. With this shorter route now blocked due to the ongoing military campaigns in Yemen, the longer journeys at sea [lead to greater precarity](#) in terms of shipwrecks and injury due to harsh conditions from the sea crossing. [On 11 June](#), a boat capsized off the Shabwah coast, with 49 migrants reported to have drowned, 140 missing and 71 survivors. The boat had departed from Bossaso and was carrying around 115 Somalis and 145 Ethiopians, of which 90 were women.

Mass arrests of migrants in Saudi Arabia

In April, Saudi Arabia [announced](#) they had arrested almost 15,000 migrants in one week for “breaching residency, work and border security regulations”. A majority of those arrested were Ethiopian nationals, followed by Yemenis. In addition, in May, a Saudi citizen [was arrested](#) for allegedly facilitating the transport of 10 Ethiopians into the country and was facing imprisonment of up to 15 years. These developments stand in stark contrast to an [announcement](#) from Saudi authorities in early April, wherein the government presented plans to regularise the status of thousands of migrants residing irregularly in the country.

In June, MMC [published](#) new evidence on the killings of migrants by Saudi authorities at the Saudi-Yemen border. Despite reports last year by [HRW](#) and [MMC](#) revealing the level of lethal violence, generating global publicity, the new findings demonstrate that the deaths and injuries continue.

Ethiopia continues repatriations from Saudi Arabia and Oman

Following an [announcement last quarter](#) by the Ethiopian authorities that 70,000 nationals 'in difficult conditions' would be repatriated from Saudi Arabia in 2024, by May, [27,000 Ethiopians](#) had been repatriated. Ethiopian authorities have been operating three daily flights, four days a week, from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia in carrying out these returns. The Ethiopian government estimated that around 750,000 nationals are believed to be living in Saudi Arabia, of whom up to 450,000 may not have the required documentation to be in the country. Furthermore, in May, Ethiopian authorities [announced](#) the repatriation of 1,590 Ethiopians from Oman, with a total of six flights carried out in May. The group was reported to have been incarcerated in detention centres in Oman prior to their return.

Uganda announces labour migration deal with Oman

In April, Uganda [announced](#) making progress towards signing a memorandum of understanding with Oman to streamline the sending of Ugandan migrant workers to the country. Local media [criticized](#) the move, as the announcement did not stipulate measures to safeguard Ugandan workers in Oman. Earlier on, in 2017, the Ugandan government had blacklisted Oman as a destination for domestic workers, citing stories of torture and mistreatment, and the absence of an agreement with the Omani authorities to effectively protect its citizens working in the country.

Routes towards the Mediterranean

East African and Egyptian arrivals along the Mediterranean routes

Between April and June, [31,695 refugees and migrants](#) arrived in Europe through land and sea routes. [This represents a 23% decrease](#) compared to the previous quarter, and a [31% decrease](#) when looking at the same period last year. Egyptians represented the 5th most common nationality to arrive in [Italy](#) in January-May 2024. However, the absolute numbers of Egyptian arrivals (465) in April-May are 88% lower than in the same period in 2023. Other nationalities to arrive since the beginning of the year include Sudanese (612; 10th), followed by Eritreans (457; 12th), Ethiopians (287; 15th), Somalis (239; 16th) and South Sudanese (51; 27th). The low ranking of East African nationalities is accompanied by an overall decrease in arrivals, while it may also indicate more and more migrants are facing arrest and deportation in North Africa, as reported in light of the EU deals with [Tunisia](#) and [Egypt](#).

This quarter, UNHCR retroactively published data on arrivals in [Greece](#) from January to March 2024. The most represented nationalities include Egyptians (1,250; 3rd), Eritreans (434; 4th), Yemenis (263; 6th), Sudanese (199; 8th), Somalis (142; 10th), Congolese (DRC, 41; 14th) and Ethiopians (37; 15th). Compared to [Q1 in 2023](#), Egyptian arrivals have increased from 5 to 1,250, and Eritrean arrivals, from 137 to 434.

These figures align with media reports on the [increase in arrivals](#) from Egypt to Greece through the Eastern Mediterranean Route, and in particular to the islands of Gavdos and Crete. Amidst this trend, Egypt and Greece [announced](#) a bilateral agreement in May to bring Egyptian labour migrants to Greece for seasonal work on farms amid labour shortages, and in an effort to reduce irregular entries from Egypt.

Sudanese arrests and deportations from Egypt

In Q2, [reports have emerged](#) of Egyptian border guards, security forces and police arresting Sudanese who arrived in the country following the outbreak of war in Sudan, but who entered irregularly and have yet to receive refugee status determination. An [Amnesty International report](#) reveals that authorities held men, women and children in dire conditions in detention centres, including on [military bases](#), while awaiting their deportation to Sudan. The Sudanese [were said to have been accused](#) of being 'complicit with smugglers', or having committed 'harms to Egypt'. At the same time, since the tightening of entry regulations for Sudanese fleeing the war in May and June 2023, [local media have reported](#) that many have had to resort to using smugglers as their only way to flee Sudan and enter Egypt. This is especially the case for those fleeing without the documentation needed to process visas and/or those without the means to provide for their livelihoods in Northern Sudan for the estimated 4-6 months needed to process visas. [The New Humanitarian has noted](#) that such pushbacks contravene the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which Egypt is a signatory. Arrested Sudanese have reportedly not been given the chance to challenge their deportation decision, apply for asylum or await the outcome of pending asylum cases.

European Union restricts visas for Ethiopians amidst readmission row

At the end of April, the European Union (EU) [announced](#) it would start restricting the visa provision for Ethiopians into the EU. Specifically, it would no longer be possible to apply for waivers of required documentation and multi-entry visas. The issuance of EU visas would also take longer, going up to [45 days](#) from 15 days. The decision followed an assessment carried out by the European Commission (EC), which concluded the Ethiopian authorities did not sufficiently collaborate with the EU to take back Ethiopian nationals found to be staying irregularly. The report notes that there is a perceived lack of response from Ethiopian authorities on readmission requests, the issuance of emergency travel documents, and voluntary returns and deportations from the EU to Ethiopia.

The Southern Route towards South Africa and mixed migration within Southern Africa

Migrants intercepted and detained along the Southern Route

In April, authorities in Mzimba District, Malawi arrested and jailed [19 Ethiopians](#) who entered the country irregularly. The group received sentencing at the Mzuzu Principal Resident Magistrate Court and will be required to pay the costs of their deportation upon completion of their prison terms. As individuals may

lack funds to return home, this could lead to prolonged detention in [Malawi](#). In April, a local media outlet reported that over [200 migrants](#), a majority of whom were Ethiopian, were incarcerated in Malawi prisons.

Also in April, Mozambican authorities in Tete province urged its constituents “to report any suspicious movement of individuals” to the migration authorities. This comes after authorities returned close to [500 migrants](#) without an authorized status from January to the end of April 2024. Those deported were en route to South Africa and included Ethiopian, Bangladeshi, Congolese (DRC), Somali, Zambian, Zimbabwean and Malawian nationals. Further south, in Sofala province, a total of [64 Malawians](#) were detained by authorities for irregular entry.

In the [same month](#), two people were arrested in Pretoria, South Africa, under suspicions of human trafficking after the bus they were travelling in was found to be ferrying 21 Ethiopians without an authorized status. The [Border Management Authority](#) of South Africa furthermore reported intercepting 3,841 migrants over the recent Easter period. Towards the end of April, [50 Ethiopians](#) were detained in Zambia. The migrants were being transported in a supermarket truck container and were detained along with the Zambian driver and another Zambian national.

In May, [24 Ethiopians](#) who were transiting through Kenya to South Africa were abandoned in thickets by smugglers in Isiolo County. The migrants sought assistance at a police station and were detained by authorities and awaiting arraignment. Authorities suspect that the smugglers were avoiding checkpoints along the Isiolo-Narobi Highway. In Zambia, a Tanzanian truck driver and [seven Ethiopians](#) were arrested for smuggling the group into the country. Also in May, Mozambican authorities [announced](#) they had so far arrested more than 5,000 individuals in Tete province since January. The majority of the [detainees](#) were Zimbabwean, Malawian and Zambians who had been affected by extreme drought which spurred their mobility.

In June, Tanzanian authorities [seized](#) a car in Kilimanjaro belonging to a member of parliament (MP) which was found to be transporting seven Ethiopians. The MP could not be reached at the time of seizure of their vehicle. The news follows the introduction of a visa-on-arrival policy for Ethiopians to enter the country, with authorities citing the increase in irregular entries into Tanzania by individuals from the Horn of Africa. In Zimbabwe, nine Ethiopians were stopped in Chirundu for irregular entry into the country. After appearing before court, their ordered deportation was pending according to a [local source](#).

Ethiopians stopped in Namibia

In April, Namibian authorities [announced](#) arresting nine Ethiopians for irregular entry. The group had crossed into Namibia from Angola, and reported to be on their way to South Africa. The interception of Ethiopians in Namibia may indicate an alternative migration route towards South Africa is forming through Angola and Namibia, which could have been the result of an increase in arrests along the Southern Route in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique.

Ethiopians trafficked in Malawi

In April, Malawian authorities apprehended [an Ethiopian couple](#) for allegedly running a human trafficking ring in Dzaleka Refugee Camp. The man was said to be an experienced trafficker and had been operating out of Malawi for a long time. The couple was deported out of Malawi directly after their arrest. The raid resulted in the arrest of 31 Ethiopians, suspected victims of human trafficking, who had been held in a high-walled cell surrounded by barbed wire, while another 114 who were suspected to have fallen victim to the same trafficking ring had been previously found and arrested in the same camp. This raises concerns about victims of trafficking not being properly identified and treated as migrants with an unauthorized status. The migrants (possible victims) will be returned to Ethiopia. Local media [reported](#) the Ethiopians were being held for ransom, and their family members in Ethiopia were being extorted for 1,000 USD for their release.

In June, [Malawian authorities acquitted](#) Tadikira Mafubza, ex-President Peter Mutharika's stepson, of charges linked to human trafficking and aggravated manslaughter. He had been arrested together with seven other individuals after a police investigation determined that they were linked to the deaths of [29 Ethiopians who were found in a mass grave](#) at the end of 2022. Reports did not clarify if an investigation into the deaths will continue.

United States and Zambia sign anti-trafficking partnership

In May, the United States (US) and Zambia [signed](#) a new multi-year partnership to combat trafficking in persons. The agreement, part of the new American Prevent Trafficking in Persons (P2P) initiative, is the first globally with the US Trafficking in Persons (TIP) office contributing 4 million USD to Save the Children, which will work together with the Zambian authorities. The aim is to implement an action plan focused on promoting coordination across stakeholders, providing readily accessible protection services and ensuring legal actors work with trafficking-specific legal frameworks to identify, investigate, prosecute and convict following a 'victim-centred and trauma informed approach'.

Xenophobia in South Africa fueled by election rhetoric

On 29 May, South Africa held general elections, which culminated in the ruling African National Congress (ANC) losing its majority for the first time since the first post-Apartheid election in 1994. Prior to the elections, in early May, HRW published a [report](#) on the toxic rhetoric that South Africa politicians used towards (im)migrants prior to the elections. Nomathamsanqa Masiko-Mpika, a HRW researcher in South Africa, argued politicians were "using immigrants as pawns, without regard for their safety in an attempt to score votes ahead of the general elections", adding their statements were making foreigners a "target of abuse". The xenophobic discourse linked to election campaigning follows [a long series](#) of xenophobic incidents and attacks in South Africa, which have occasionally been fueled by politicians themselves.

The Western Indian Ocean Route towards Mayotte

Record number of boats intercepted in 2023 and demolition of migrant informal settlement area in Mayotte

During a visit to Mayotte in early May, the French Minister for the Overseas, Marie Guévenoux, [announced](#) that 2023 was a record year in terms of the number of migrant boats intercepted by the coastguard in Mayotte. Some 661 boats were apprehended, though the number of migrants is unknown. The minister's visit took place during a "clean up" of an informal settlement inhabited by migrants next to the Cavani stadium, in Mayotte's capital Mamoudzou. The authorities defended the action as necessary to improve security and hygiene, while inhabitants were only allowed to keep their most valuable personal items. Although the informal settlement was demolished, [no alternative housing](#) was provided for the now homeless migrants, making the emergence of a new informal settlement likely.

Departures from the Comoros

In [April](#), around 50 migrants arrived in Grande Comore from Tanzania. A smuggler reportedly brought the group to a rented, large unfinished house, before disappearing and becoming unreachable. The group consisted of Burundians, Congolese (DRC), Tanzanians and Djiboutians, with individuals aged between 14 and 40 years old, as well as some infants. The migrants eventually transited to the island of Anjouan, en route to Mayotte.

In June, the Mahoran border police [intercepted a boat](#) north of Mayotte which had departed from the Comoros. According to the source, there were around 30 people on board, of undisclosed nationalities, including the smuggler. After the group was held in a detention centre in Pamandzi, Mayotte, the migrants were returned to Anjouan island, while the smuggler was kept in custody to face legal charges.

Departures from Madagascar

In April, Malagasy police forces in Ambanja [announced](#) intercepting and arresting 16 Somalis, four Ethiopians, four Malagasys and one Kenyan who were planning to depart from the port of Antsahampano, Ambanja, towards Mayotte. The individuals were driven by a Malagasy national, who was among the arrested, and apprehended at the port before they could embark. Another source [noted](#) the recent interception by Mahoran authorities of a boat transporting Somali, Malagasy, Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi nationals aiming to reach the French island. The report cited an increase in the organization of crossings from Madagascar to Mayotte, amidst a trend of more diverse nationalities joining Malagasys on this route.

East Africans farther afield

UK passed Rwanda deal, after which new Labour government scraps the scheme

In [Q1](#), the UK parliament voted in favour of the Rwanda deal, going against a UK Supreme Court decision from November 2023 that ruled against sending migrants to the East African country. This quarter, in April, the bill [received approval](#) from the UK House of Lords, which had long opposed the deal without additional safeguards in place. The bill [subsequently received](#) royal assent from King Charles and formally became law. In the first week of May, the UK Home Office [launched](#) a campaign to identify and detain migrants who would be eligible for deportation to Rwanda.

On social media, the Home Office [clarified](#) that it would only arrest and deport “those who saw their asylum case be refused, and for whom it is not safe to return to their home country”, whereas the law has been elsewhere [described](#) as a way to send asylum seekers and have their claims processed in Rwanda. Furthermore, a series of videos were [controversially published](#) by the Home Office to illustrate the raids carried out. After the Home Office released a figure of around 52,000 individuals who would be eligible to be deported, the Rwandese authorities [noted](#) that they could not (yet) guarantee how many could be taken in under the scheme. In April and May, it also became clear that other countries had been approached by the UK for similar migration deals, with [Namibia](#) and [Botswana](#) clarifying they had rejected the proposals. Finally, in early Q3, after the UK general election, the new Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer [announced](#) scrapping the bill, citing “the Rwanda deportation scheme is dead and buried”.

Malawian workers leave Israeli farm after facing exploitation and underpayment

In [Q1](#), Malawian authorities approved sending workers to Israel to work on farms which had become understaffed since the outbreak of war in Gaza in October 2023, with many foreign workers fleeing the unrest and Gazans having had their permits to work in Israel [revoked](#). Although the approval was given despite [concerns raised](#) by the Malawian opposition earlier on, and in defiance of [available documentation](#) on the widespread abuse of migrant workers on Israeli farms, it [transpired](#) that during Q2, several individuals from the first group sent to Israel had left the farms and were seeking other employment opportunities. They [explained](#) underpayment and exploitation were the main reasons for departing from the farms and breaching their visa agreements. In May, Israeli authorities [announced](#) they would deport a group of 12 Malawians who were working in a bakery in Tel Aviv in bids for fairer payment.

Thematic Focus:

Displacement linked to severe flooding in East Africa

Background

In Q4 of 2023, [MMC](#) reported on climate-induced movements in the Horn of Africa linked to extreme weather, particularly flash floods. The rains arrived after a prolonged period of drought from [2021-2023](#) and were also linked to the impact of the weather phenomenon El Niño. In 2024, and particularly in Q2, these rains have persisted, now impacting a wider number of countries around the region, including Burundi, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, and also reaching Chad, while they are set to further impact Sudan and South Sudan. Despite a delayed onset, the usual long rainy season running from [March-May](#) intensified in April and May, resulting in wetter-than-normal conditions for most of Kenya, south-central Somalia, southeast and northeast Ethiopia, southeast South Sudan and southern Burundi. According to [OCHA](#), as of 30 May, 1.6 million people were affected by the heavy rains and flash floods with 528 people having lost their lives and 480,000 people displaced across the region. Kenya remains the country with the most displaced individuals linked to flooding (293,200), followed by Ethiopia (95,000) and Somalia (38,700).

Context and figures

With large areas of the country highly affected by the floods, [Kenya](#) recorded the highest death toll in the region with 315 people having been killed. In early May, the government ordered the evacuations of residents near 178 dams and water reservoirs across 33 counties in anticipation of Cyclone Hidaya. While the overall effects of Hidaya were [weaker than expected](#), flooding exacerbated by the [cyclone](#) left 228 people dead and damaged critical infrastructure. Nearly 20,000 people in the [Dadaab refugee camps](#), many of whom were displaced by recent droughts in Somalia, became displaced again due to the rising water levels. Around 4,000 of this displaced population took shelter in [six schools](#) within the camp, that were also heavily damaged by the floods. Nationwide, the [school calendar](#) was also interrupted, with the Ministry of Education postponing the reopening of schools after school holidays to 13 May, owing to the damaged school infrastructure and some schools being occupied by people who had been displaced because of mudslides, landslides and the floods. The ripple effects of this damage are still being felt as nearly [500,000](#) students are reported to have not yet gone back to school as of July, with many of them likely having become displaced with no access to education.


Similar damage to school infrastructure was reported in [Somalia](#) from March to May. At the end of June, [Mogadishu](#) was still dealing with flash floods that transformed streets into waterways creating difficulties in moving within the area. Areas of western Ethiopia, southern Sudan and southern Somalia are forecasted to receive [above-normal rainfall](#) at the end of Q2 and early Q3. The resulting flooding in these areas is likely to further drive displacement.

Future outlook

Alongside the impact of extreme weather patterns, DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan are experiencing the challenges brought forth by localised conflict and civil war. This will likely further erode people's livelihoods and increase their vulnerabilities, while making it harder to remain in locations of origin. Moreover, as the case of Dadaab illustrates, the damages to many [refugee homes](#) and critical infrastructure in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi will force the displacement of many people. In Chad, where [over 786,000](#) Sudanese refugees are hosted as of 16 June 2024, those concentrated in border towns have lost precarious shelters and infrastructure following floods.

In Q4, [South Sudan](#) is reported to be expecting the worst floods in 60 years. The floods are expected from October to December 2024 as Lake Victoria water levels have risen by 13.6 cubic meters, a record high for the Nile basin in 128 years. This may further complicate the already strained humanitarian response to those fleeing Sudan. In Q2, in [Panyijiar County](#), Unity State, an estimated 5,000 people already fled their homes along the River Nile due to rising water levels. Furthermore, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan ([UNMISS](#)) expressed great concern about the impacts of the anticipated floods combined with the upcoming elections, due to be held in December on the overall stability in the country. This could further affect refugees arriving from Sudan, and may inform further onward movements for both South Sudanese and Sudanese nationals, particularly towards Uganda. As similar floods are being expected in neighbouring Sudan, [UNHCR](#) has revised its original 1.4 billion USD humanitarian aid appeal to \$1.5 billion USD. There are concerns that the floods will hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid in the country, further increasing the needs of those remaining.

Highlighted New Research and Reports



[Between Hope and Hardship. Migration and work experiences of Ethiopian domestic workers in Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon](#)

The Freedom Fund | May 2024

This report focuses on the migration decision-making, migration patterns and employment experiences of Ethiopian women in three countries: Lebanon, Jordan and Kuwait. Through in-depth interviews, the findings demonstrate widespread experienced abuse and exploitation, with many reporting Ethiopian embassies were not able to help adequately to provide critical support to those facing abuse and protection risks.



[Sudan: Impact of long-term displacement in the North](#)

ACAPS | May 2024


This snapshot zooms into forced displacement spurred by the war in Sudan towards states of relative stability in the north: Northern state and River Nile state. In particular, Northern State remains a key transit point for further movements towards cross-border migration into Egypt. The research notes that Sudanese face several barriers in Northern state while trying to access Egypt, including very high visa prices charged by intermediaries, which have gone up to an estimate of 1,000-3,000 USD per person.



[“Handcuffed Like Dangerous Criminals”. Arbitrary Detention and Forced Returns of Sudanese Refugees in Egypt](#)

Amnesty International | June 2024

Over the last quarters, Amnesty International has carried out in-depth qualitative research to consolidate evidence on mass arbitrary arrests and forced deportations of Sudanese refugees in Egypt. The report reveals those who are arrested are kept in inhumane conditions in military bases or warehouses prior to their forced return, and are stripped of any opportunity to apply for asylum while in Egypt, contravening international refugee conventions.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based mixed migration responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

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mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

