



**MMC Latin America
and the Caribbean**

QUARTER 2 2024



**Quarterly Mixed
Migration Update:
Latin America and
the Caribbean**

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. The core countries of focus for this region are the countries currently affected by the Venezuelan crisis and the Caribbean islands. This QMMU covers Mexico and Central American countries concerning northern movements to the United States. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council (DRC) regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes migrants travelling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often travelling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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Juan Carlos Tomasi/MSF/February 2018

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean

Quarter 2 - 2024

Key Updates

- **Venezuelans continue to move:** While the primary movements out of Venezuela have [slowed](#), the demographic is changing, and new arrivals now tend to be those in greater economic need. At the same time, the secondary movement of Venezuelans in neighbouring countries is increasing.
- **Departures from Ecuador are increasing:** The Ministry of the Interior [estimates](#) that 80,000 have left in the first half of 2024, with 68,000 leaving in February and March. In addition, Ecuadorians were the second most common nationality [passing through](#) the Darien since the start of 2024, with 3,175 passages recorded in April and May.
- **Costa Rica has adopted a new, more progressive refugee law:** The [new law](#) removes the one-month filing deadline for refugee applications after irregular entry and increases access to appeals, enhancing procedural protections.
- **The third ministerial meeting following up on the Los Angeles Declaration agreed on a raft of new migration management policies:** From expanding the mandate of the Safe Mobility Offices (SMOs) in Guatemala to addressing the situation of Hondurans and Venezuelans to supporting the reinforcement of Costa Rica's asylum adjudication system.
- **Overhaul of US border management:** The Biden administration's [Presidential Proclamation](#) on safeguarding the border introduces significant new limitations to accessing asylum, banning applications for asylum when the number of migrants exceeds a certain number, reducing access to complimentary types of protection and providing for accelerated deportations.
- **Panama's new president vows to shut down the Darien:** newly elected Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino vows to "[shut down](#)" the Darien and signs an agreement with the US for support in doing so.

Regional Overview*



The Caribbean



*The information in the map refers to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration in and out of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Mixed migration dynamics in South America

Departures from Venezuela are slowing down, but movements within the continent continue

Displacement out of Venezuela continues but appears to be slowing. The latest R4V estimates published in May 2024 show a population of Venezuelan refugees and migrants of 7,774,494, an increase of only 51,915 over their previous estimate in November 2023. However, this figure may not completely represent the outflow because the R4V estimates are based on national estimates, not all of which are accurate or have been updated.

However, a recent [WOLA report](#) cited US and IOM noted that while previous arrivals were lower-middle class, recent arrivals to Colombia, already hosting [2,857,527 Venezuelan refugees and migrants](#), tend to be in greater economic need. Recent arrivals are likely to have a harder time integrating into the country, both because of their more meagre resources and because recent arrivals are not eligible for Colombia's PPT regularisation program, complicating legal status.

It is so far unclear how the upcoming presidential elections in Venezuela on 28 July will impact these dynamics. A recent poll [indicated](#) that 47% of surveyed people in Venezuela will not leave the country if the opposition wins. Another poll indicated that two in three of those who are thinking of leaving would [change their minds](#) if the opposition wins, whereas 80% would leave sooner if Maduro wins. Among those who have already left the country, some have indicated that they are hoping for an opposition win so that they can return.

In addition, the secondary movements of Venezuelans in the region are increasing. Between January and March, the number of Venezuelans exiting Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina [exceeded the number of arrivals](#). Departures from Ecuador increased by [33%](#). This [has been attributed](#) to worsening economic conditions in the host countries, less favourable [migration policies](#) (for example, Chile revised their immigration law in 2021 and again in February 2024, making it harder for Venezuelans to regularise), and increasing [xenophobia](#) (for example, in the Chilean city of [Liquique](#) saw anti-migrant protests that destroyed migrant camps and destroyed their belongings).

Ecuador imposes visa requirements on Chinese nationals

In early June, Ecuador [announced](#) that, effective July 1st, it would suspend an agreement with the Chinese authorities to allow visa-free travel for Chinese nationals. This decision was based on reports indicating that about [50%](#) of Chinese nationals who entered Ecuador visa-free either left the country irregularly, most likely traveling to Colombia to continue their migration route to the US, or overstayed their permitted time frame. As one of only two countries offering visa-free travel for Chinese nationals on the continent, Ecuador had become a [starting point for northward journeys](#), as Chinese became the [fourth most common nationality](#) passing through the Darien.

Migration from Ecuador and Peru is increasing

Ecuadorians are increasingly leaving the country, with the Ministry of the Interior [estimating](#) that 80,000 have left in the first half of 2024, with 68,000 leaving in just February and March, compared to 120,000 in all of 2023. In addition, Ecuadorians were the second most common nationality [passing through](#) the Darien since the start of 2024, with 3,175 passages recorded in April and May. They are also the fifth most commonly encountered nationality in Honduras, with [4,805 encounters](#) recorded in Q2, and the [sixth most commonly encountered](#) nationality at the US Southern border in FY 2024, with [26,418 encounters](#) recorded in April and May alone. This is being [driven](#) both by a dismal economic situation and increasing violence, and there is concern that the same factors could push more of its nearly half a million Venezuelan refugees and migrants to leave as well. The Ecuadorian government [has asked](#) the US government to grant temporary protected status to its nationals already in the United States.

Migration from Peru is also [increasing](#), with 400,000 leaving in 2022 and the same number in the first half of 2023 alone. The number of Peruvians recorded passing through Colombia increased by 77% in the second quarter of 2024 compared to the [same period in 2023](#). The number passing through the Darien between January and May [2024 has increased by 86%](#) in the same period [last year](#). This migration is [driven](#) by an economic downturn, increasing violence, and poor governance.

Many of these migrants cross through Colombia. According to institutional data, [214,781](#) people transited irregularly the country in the first half of 2024, including [17,025 Ecuadorians and 1,965 Peruvians](#). On the other hand, passages through the Darien in May were slightly [higher](#) than in April 2024, although lower than the first three months of the year. More than [170,000](#) people had passed through the region by the start of June.

Update on temporary regularisation processes in the region

Colombia proposes a Temporary Protection Permit for the legal representatives of children

In April 2024, the Colombian government [announced](#) a new regularisation initiative for Venezuelans. The new mechanism is [intended](#) to provide legal documentation to the custodians or legal representatives of children who have had a temporary residence (PPT) since 2022. The new status would grant two years' residency, allow bearers to leave the country and return, and accord basic rights to health and education. At the moment, Venezuelans who entered Colombia irregularly after February 2021 or regularly after June 2023 are [not eligible](#) to access the PPT.

However, [concerns about the program](#) have been noted. For example, the new system [will not be free](#), which can create barriers to access. Further, [concerns](#) have been raised about the program's inaccessibility to those who entered after 2022.

Peru moves forward in regularisation through a new Temporary Permit to Stay

Peru [issued](#) a new law offering Special Residency to Venezuelan migrants whose status has lapsed or who didn't enter regularly to regularise if they have been in the country for at least six months and do not have a criminal record. To be noted that the process will [require a valid Venezuelan passport](#), which is difficult for many to obtain, as well as a declaration of economic solvency, which may be difficult for the most vulnerable to obtain.

Ecuador ends their regularisation program

In April, Ecuador ended a regularisation program that began in October 2022 with Executive Decree 436 granting an immigration amnesty and two-year residency visas. At the end of the process in April 2024, 140,277 visa applications were lodged, 95,809 visas were granted and 72,337 ID cards were issued, according to [UNHCR](#). However, Venezuelans in Ecuador have [pointed out](#) that the residency of these visas is already starting to expire, and called on the government of Ecuador to create a new scheme to extend the stay of those whose residency is now ending and also individuals who were unable to access the scheme.

Uruguay offers a new regularisation scheme

Uruguay [announced](#) a new regularisation scheme to benefit 20,000 people, primarily Cubans and, to a lesser extent, Dominicans who entered Uruguay irregularly, applied for asylum without receiving a positive answer, and could not request legal residence as foreign citizens. This new system will [allow](#) these individuals to withdraw their asylum applications and access residency based on work, family, or training. In the first five months of 2024, more than 5,000 such visas have [reportedly](#) been approved.

Mixed migration dynamics in Central America

Costa Rica reforms its refugee law

In June 2024, Costa Rica [reformed](#) its refugee law to better align with international standards. The reform eliminated the previous one-month filing deadline, allowing greater flexibility for asylum seekers. In addition, asylum seekers are now granted work permits as soon as they file their applications for refugee status. The new process introduces an expedited procedure for cases believed to be manifestly unfounded, requiring applicants to pass through two interviews, rather than just one. The new framework also eliminates consideration of whether other countries that the asylum seeker might have passed through could be considered secure. Finally, the revised framework allows for appeal, offering additional procedural protection.

Guatemala hosts Los Angeles Declaration follow-up meeting

In May 2024, the third ministerial meeting following up on the Los Angeles Declaration was [held](#) in Guatemala. The Los Angeles Declaration seeks to create coordinated action on migration on three pillars, 1) addressing root causes and supporting the integration of migrants to foster long-term stabilisation, 2) expanding lawful pathways and 3) strengthening humane enforcement. At the meeting, the US [announced](#) a program of \$578 million in humanitarian, development and economic assistance to help partner countries in the initiative to meet humanitarian needs, expand lawful pathways, and support integration. Some of the [programs](#) that will be supported are introducing biometric data management in Costa Rica, awareness raising around the CBP One system, expansion of the Safe Mobility Offices Initiative in Guatemala to include Hondurans, Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, support to Costa Rica to streamline its refugee adjudication system, increasing lending for Guatemalans, and regularisation programs in Ecuador and Colombia.

Mixed migration dynamics in the Caribbean

UNHCR issues new guidance on international protection considerations for Haitians

In March, UNHCR issued new [guidance](#) on international protection considerations for Haitians. UNHCR argued that current conditions in Haiti represent a significant breakdown in public order and therefore suggest that they would be eligible for refugee protection under the broader Cartagena Declaration refugee definition or UNHCR's expanded mandate. It also encouraged the development of complementary or temporary protection arrangements. The international agency also called for a moratorium on forced returns to the country.

Haitians continue to leave Port au Prince

Haitians are continuing to leave Port au Prince. IOM tracking of internal displacement found that the displaced population increased by [215,523](#), about 60%, between March and May 2024. Although similar numbers were not available for international migration, another IOM survey [found](#) in April that of those who are leaving the capital, 97% intend to stay in Haiti, 2% to go to the Dominican Republic, and 1% to go to the United States, which would indicate that there are still significant departures ongoing.

Deportations to Haiti from the Dominican Republic continue

[According to](#) the Dominican government, 251,011 Haitians were deported from the Dominican Republic in 2023. The deportations, including of children, have continued in 2024, with the Zanmi Foundation [reporting](#) an increase in child deportees turning to its shelters this year.

In May 2024, Luis Abinader was re-elected as president of the Dominican Republic, enjoying one of the highest approval ratings in the Americas at [70%](#), partly due to his [hard line](#) on Haitian immigration. He has initiated the construction of [a wall](#) to prevent Haitian migrants from entering the country and has [promised](#)

to complete it in his second term. His electoral victory indicates that current Dominican policies will remain in place and deportations will continue.

Mixed movements towards North America

Biden overhauls border processing

On June 4, 2024, the Biden administration issued a [Presidential Proclamation](#), accompanied by an interim final rule overhauling how arrivals at the border would be treated. The order bars the right to seek asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border, when an average of 2,500 people enter per day over seven days until the daily number of arrivals falls to 1,500 per day. It is unclear when the restriction may be lifted, as entries [averaged](#) 3,800 per day in May.

This means that, with limited exceptions, individuals cannot apply for asylum. These exceptions include those with previously scheduled CBP One appointments, unaccompanied children, trafficking victims, and people facing life-threatening emergencies. Access to other forms of protection is also severely curtailed, with border officers no longer required to ask migrants if they fear return. Asylum advocates [have stated](#) that the “Rule flouts domestic asylum law and the United States’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention.” Another advocate, more directly, [called](#) the initiative “a direct assault on the fundamental human right to seek asylum.” Those who are not determined to have a reason to stay are subjected to an accelerated deportation procedure and will be expelled in days or even hours. The rule is similar to a measure imposed under the [Trump administration](#) that was later found to be unlawful, and it has already been [challenged](#) by a coalition of organisations, so it is unclear how long this will remain in effect. The increased deportations are [reportedly](#) overloading shelter space in Mexico.

The Biden administration was under significant pressure to show that it could control the influx at the southern border as the issue is a focus in the run-up to the US elections in November 2024. However, a range of measures, including the imposition of the CBP One system and [pressuring Mexico to carry out additional immigration](#) enforcement, had already significantly lowered border crossings. Encounters on the southern border in May 2024 [reached](#) their lowest levels since June 2023. According to CBP, arrivals from December 2023 to March 2024 [reduced](#) by 54.8%.

Migration is a major focus of US elections

Migration is a key issue in the upcoming US elections and featured prominently in the first debate on 27 June. Trump [accused](#) Biden of leaving the country open to “people who are from prisons, people that are from mental institutions.” Trump also made [exaggerated claims](#) that as many as 18 million migrants have irregularly entered the United States and has accused them of driving up crime and bringing terrorism. Biden defended his record, noting that border crossings are down [40%](#).

Although Trump has undoubtedly taken a harsher stance on migration than his opponent, the Biden administration has also adopted restrictive measures, as is illustrated by the recent changes in border management described above. And there is strong evidence that the issue is garnering greater public

concern. A recent [Pew poll](#) found that immigration was rated by more Americans as their #1 concern than any other non-economic issue (22%). This percentage has increased from 16% in December 2023. The Democratic and Republican base view migration in very different terms, with 36% of Trump supporters [agreeing](#) with the statement, “America’s openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a nation, as compared to 87% of Biden supporters.

In this context, immigration is commonly used for political ends. In March, Florida governor Ron De Santis [deployed](#) additional police and coast guard, warning of a possible influx of Haitians fleeing unrest in the country by sea. At the time, even conservative commentators [acknowledged](#) that there were not many boat arrivals occurring, leading liberals to accuse the governor of grandstanding.

Mexicans fleeing to the US following violent elections

Mexico’s June 2 elections were the most [violent in its history](#). The organisation Integralia [documented](#) 560 victims of violence and 29 candidates assassinated during the election period. Others reported that [37](#) had been killed. This has forced some Mexicans [to flee to the US](#).

Impact of the elections on migration management

Although immigration does not [seem](#) to have been a major issue in the outcome of the June 2 elections, Claudia Sheinbaum’s win seems to have been based largely on her continuity with her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (or AMLO). In this context, she will likely continue the latter’s policy of cooperation with the US and militarising the southern border.

Mexico supporting returns to Venezuela

In March, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) [signed](#) an agreement with Venezuela to offer a stipend to repatriated nationals. In explaining the initiative, AMLO said, “We want the people of these countries not to see themselves as obliged to migrate.”

Mexico continues to adopt new measures to restrict mixed migration

Mexican engagement with the US on border control has been credited with reducing the number of encounters at the US Southern Border, but the government is continuing to adapt these policies. In May, Mexico began requiring visas from Peruvians, a move lauded by US officials, following the imposition of similar measures against Brazilians, Ecuadorians, and Venezuelans.

Mexico reported having registered [481,025](#) migrants with an irregular status between January and April 2024. Of these [230](#) were reported as in the process of seeking refugee status. The Mexican authorities also reported having performed [10,427](#) returns, primarily to Guatemala (54%) and Honduras (35%).

In addition to these restrictive measures, Mexico is working to [reinforce](#) its asylum system, which is getting more and more applications each year and is expected to become one of the five largest systems globally. In this context, the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) is working to increase its capacity to digitise and improve filing and enhance its capacity for verification with \$6 million dollars of support from the Canadian government.

Violations of migrants rights continue in Mexico

Serious violations of migrant rights continue to be recorded in Mexico. A caravan of migrants in March in Mexico [denounced](#) increasing violations, including assaults and extortion committed against migrants. In April 2024, the US advocacy organisation WOLA [highlighted](#) the rising tide of kidnappings and abuse by criminal organisations in Mexico.

Mixed migration by sea

Political concern and interdiction continue even as movements of Haitians continue at low levels

There have been a number of reports of boat arrivals to the US from Haiti in the last month. In early June, more than 300 Haitians and Bahamians [were intercepted](#) by the US Coast Guard and returned. Later in June, another 118 Haitian migrants [were found](#) trying to land and returned in Key West.

This represented the continuation of US policy to return Haitians intercepted to the island nation, despite widespread consensus that the situation in the island nation is [deteriorating](#) sharply. The US Coast Guard [claims](#) that returns are necessary to discourage additional migrants from undertaking the dangerous journey.

Migration to Central America from Colombia's San Andres islands continues

As of June 28, the Colombian Navy reported having intercepted [132](#) migrants attempting to migrate to Central America from the San Andres Islands, most of them from Venezuela, but also from Colombia, Ecuador, Cuba, Haiti and countries from other continents. At least 100 of these individuals were intercepted in [April](#), [May](#), and [June 2024](#). On 6 May, the US [imposed](#) visa restrictions on the executives of several Colombian maritime transportation companies for facilitating irregular movement.

Thematic Focus: new Panama-US partnership to shut down the Darien

Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino made “[shutting down the Darien](#)” a key pillar of his campaign. He [called](#) the significant passage through the region a “humanitarian and environmental crisis.” “We’re going to close the Darien Gap, and we’re going to repatriate all these people,” he [said](#). He also [argued](#) that “Panama and our Darien are not a transit route. It is our border.” It appears that this rhetoric [played a role](#) in his May 5 win.

It also appears that the issue is a priority for the new administration, which signed an [agreement](#) with the US to implement the plan on the very day that the new president was inaugurated. On July 3, the Panamanian border control [announced](#) it would close down three migration pathways frequently used by those passing through the Darien, installing barbed wire fences. They argued that this action would help to channel migrants towards Bajo Chiquito, which would allow the government to concentrate security forces there.

Under the agreement, the US will “[support... safe and effective repatriation operations that include protection screening](#).” The US agreement appears to focus on deporting individuals who arrive on the Panama side of the border rather than controlling the entrance to the Darien or creating protective measures for people on the move. More specifically, the administration will [reportedly](#) train Panamanian authorities to determine who can be deported under Panamanian law and pay for charter or commercial flights for the removal of those deemed removable.

The US presented the initiative, [termed](#) the “Removal Flight Program,” in the framework of the Los Angeles Declaration through which it seeks to expand legal pathways, support people to stay where they are and humanely manage borders. US Secretary of State Blinken [said](#) that the US would assist Panama to “address the unprecedented level of illegal migration through the Darien and dissuade would-be migrants from attempting this extremely dangerous journey”

Mulino also [met with](#) his Colombian counterpart, Gustavo Petro, to discuss migration issues. The Colombian authorities have announced the militarisation of the area around the Darien by land and sea, with an [increase](#) of the 180 National Armed Forces members guarding the border zone.

The initiative represents a significant shift in Panamanian policy as the government [had previously facilitated](#) the travel of the migrants northward to Costa Rica. It remains to be seen how feasible and effective the proposed measures will be. As Emidgio Pertuz, delegate in the National Consultation Forum, [put it](#), “Migration is not going to stop because they put in some barbed wire fences.” Given that [170,014](#) people were recorded as passing through the Darien between January and May 2024, screening and deporting these individuals would present considerable logistical problems. Screening would be complex, given the diverse nationalities of migrants coming through the Gap. They speak a wide variety of languages and come

from very different national contexts that would need to be considered in making determinations about protection. While the type of protection screening envisioned has not been specified, it is worth noting that asylum systems throughout the region face significant backlogs. The US asylum system currently has a backlog of over [two million](#) claims, with asylum seekers waiting [four to six years](#) for a decision. Panama's neighbour, Costa Rica, has a backlog of [240,000 cases](#).

Once a determination will be made, a new set of complexities will emerge. First there is a risk of "returning migrants to dangerous situations," [as pointed out](#) by Adam Isacson of the Washington Office on Latin America. If that concern is set aside, the cost would be significant. As Isacson [said](#), "A daily plane, which would be extremely expensive, would only repatriate around 10% of the flow (about 1,000 to 1,200 per day). The United States only manages to do about 130 flights monthly in the entire world."

Concerns have also been raised that if the effort is, in fact, successful in preventing migration through the Gap this may result in a [concentration](#) of the population in the Urabá zone, on the Colombian side of the border, creating challenges in meeting needs in that area that have been experienced before. In 2021 and 2022, thousands of migrants have already been [held up](#) in border municipalities in Colombia, waiting to cross the Gulf of Urabá to begin the overland route to the Darien. The Colombian Ombudsperson's Office [has raised concerns](#) about the lack of response capacity of the concerned municipalities, especially given the many vulnerable groups heading northward, including children, pregnant and breastfeeding women.

There is also a risk that such measures could strengthen the business model of the criminal networks that [control](#) migrant smuggling in the Colombian territory, by expanding the demand for smuggling services and escalating the fees migrants have to pay. These actions are likely to push people to take routes hidden from control where perpetrators of abuses are more prevalent, hindering their access to justice and protection mechanisms. This could further increase the vulnerability of already at-risk individuals traveling through the region. If migrants are fearful of deportation, this may make it harder for them to access assistance in Panama when they emerge from the jungle. It could also push more migrants to perilous sea routes, as the ones from Juradó and San Andrés Islands.

Highlighted New Research and Reports



[Riesgos y Protección en las Zonas más Peligrosas de las Rutas de Tránsito Migratorio por Centroamérica y México](#)

**International Organisation for Migration | April 2024
[available only in Spanish]**

It is well known that migrant journeys on the continent are dangerous. This report maps out eight of the most dangerous areas along those routes, beginning with the Darien but also including Puntarenas in Costa Rica, the Department of Guatemala, Chiapas State in Mexico, and others, highlighting the most encountered risks in each area. It also analyses the regions, identifying the most commonly encountered risks, the most dangerous means of travel, and the individual, family, community, and structural factors that most increase risks.



[Migrants in Colombia: Between Government Absence and Criminal Control](#)

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) | June 2024

This report offers an overview of the challenges faced by migrants traveling through and from Colombia. The absence of government presence and protection in many areas, the report argues, creates a vacuum being filled by criminal actors and exposes migrants to a variety of risks. In addition, the report points out how increasing obstacles to regularisation and integration of Venezuelans are increasing out migration. In this context, it calls for a new approach to Colombian policy on migration.



Costa Rica: Access to Protection

Centre for Engagement and Advocacy in the Americas | June 2024


The Costa Rican asylum system has been beset by difficulties, including delays in processing asylum claims. This report details some of the obstacles to accessing and getting a decision from the Costa Rican General Directorate of Migration and Foreign Nationals.



Precluding Protection: Findings from Interviews with Haitian Asylum Seekers in Central and Southern Mexico

Centre for Gender and Refugee Studies, Haiti Justice Partnership, the Haitian Bridge Alliance | April 2024

As the humanitarian situation deteriorates in Haiti, more and more Haitians are being forced to leave home. However, they face significant barriers to accessing protection in both the US and Mexico. They are not able to leave the state of Chiapas while the Mexican government considers their claims in a process that is confusing and not linguistically accessible. Many are unable to access shelter and are forced to live in dangerous circumstances. If they try to move to the US, they face misinformation about the asylum system and technical failures and language barriers in using the CBP One app to make an appointment at the border.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based mixed migration responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit:
mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

