



MMC North Africa

QUARTER 4 2024

A photograph of two men on a boat. The man in the foreground is wearing a white t-shirt and has his hand to his face, looking down with a somber expression. The man behind him is also wearing a white t-shirt and is looking out at the sea with his hands clasped near his face. The background shows a vast blue ocean under a clear sky.

Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: North Africa

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the North Africa (NA) region. The core countries of focus for this region are Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

For more information on MMC and the quarterly updates from other regions, visit mixedmigration.org and subscribe to the [MMC newsletter](#) to receive our latest research. Follow us on BlueSky [@mixedmigration.org](#), on X [@Mixed_Migration](#) and LinkedIn [@mixedmigration-centre](#).


MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes migrants travelling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often travelling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

Front cover photo credit:

Taha Jawashi (2017)

SUPPORTED BY:



**MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF DENMARK**
Danida


Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: North Africa

Quarter 4 - 2024

Key Updates

- **A 58% decrease in migrant arrivals in Italy between 2023 and 2024 coincided with a 16% increase in the number of migrants crossing the Atlantic to the Canary Islands during the same period.** In 2024, [Spain](#) recorded 63,970 irregular arrivals, including 46,843 to the Canary Islands (+17%), while Italy saw 65,474 [total](#) arrivals. Compared to [last quarter](#), arrivals to Spain increased by 25% while arrivals to Italy decreased by 31%.
- **In 2024, the Balearic Islands record 6,000 migrants arrivals, triple the 2,278 recorded in 2023.** Most of these migrants departed from [Algeria](#). Since August, 2,024 people have been [rescued](#) in the Balearic region, including over 700 who arrived during just four days in November. To address this, Algerian authorities established a new [security unit](#) in December to combat migrant smuggling.
- **According to the NGO Caminando Fronteras, a [record number of 10,000 migrants died or disappeared](#) while attempting to reach Spain by sea in 2024,** including 9,757 deaths on the Atlantic Route alone. Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s [Missing Migrants Project](#) (MMP) recorded 1,062 deaths or disappearances along the Atlantic route, 412 on the WMR, and 1,659 on the CMR.
- **[Rights advocates](#) and [UN experts](#) criticise [EU's](#) consideration of Tunisia as a safe disembarkation point for migrants.** Despite the [European Union](#) and its member [states](#) considering Tunisia as a safe place for disembarking migrants intercepted at sea, a [joint declaration](#) by human rights and humanitarian organisations, published on 4 October, stated that Tunisia cannot be considered a "safe place" for such disembarkation.
- **Return operations from Tunisia increases in 2024, with [EU support](#).** As of 16 October 2024, IOM has assisted over 5,400 migrants with voluntary return, reflecting a 111% [increase](#) compared to the 2,557 migrants returned in 2023 and a 206% [increase](#) compared to 2022.
- **Morocco increases bilateral cooperation on migration management.** The country signed an [agreement](#) with [Spain](#) in October on the return of Moroccan unaccompanied minors from Spain, though EU legal challenges hinder the process. Morocco and France also signed a "[Reinforced Exceptional Partnership](#)", focusing on facilitating regular migration, combating irregular migration, and improving readmission procedures for Moroccan returnees from France.
- **Morocco and the EU negotiate a new [partnership agreement](#)** to address irregular migration and enhance trade relations. This new partnership agreement is [akin](#) to those signed with Egypt and Tunisia in 2023, valued at 7.4 billion euros and 1 billion euros respectively.

Regional Overview*



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration movements within and out of West Africa and North Africa.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Mixed migration from North Africa to Europe

Western Mediterranean Route & Atlantic Route (arrivals to Spain)

According to [UNHCR](#), as of 29 December, Spain registered a total of 63,427 irregular arrivals in 2024. This figure includes 21,237 people during the period from [29 September](#) to 29 December. This represents a 11% yearly increase compared to 2023 and a 25% increase compared to [last quarter](#).

Most arrivals are recorded in the Canary Islands, via the Atlantic route. In 2024, they reached 46,524 as of 29 December (16,109 from 29 [September](#) to 29 December), representing a 16% [increase](#) compared to 2023 and a 47% increase compared to [last quarter](#). As of December 2024, the main nationalities migrating through the Atlantic Route to the Canary islands [are](#) Malians (13,530), Senegalese (9,554), Moroccans (3,892), Guineans (2,953), and Mauritians (2,608). The increasing migration of West African nationals via the Atlantic route corresponds with a consistent [decline](#) in their migration through the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR).

[Arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route](#) (WMR) overall remained stable with a slight decline of 1% compared to 2023, totalling 16,903 as of 29 December (5,128 this quarter, representing a 14% decrease compared to [last quarter](#)). While [overall sea arrivals](#) to the Spanish Peninsula and Balearic Islands decreased from 15,435 in 2023 to 14,431 in 2024, arrivals to the Balearic islands alone have [tripled](#) in the same period, reaching nearly 6,000. In terms of land arrivals to Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish Ministry of Interior [data](#) reveals a continuing [increase](#), rising from 1,234 to 2,647, with most occurring in Ceuta (from 1,068 to 2,531). On the WMR, the [main](#) nationalities continue to be Algerians (7,992) and Moroccans (4,212).

Central Mediterranean Route (arrivals to Italy)

As of 29 December, Italy [recorded](#) 65,474 irregular sea arrivals in 2024, a 58% decrease compared to 2023. During this quarter – from 29 [September](#) to 29 December – 16,166 individuals reached Italy by sea. Compared to [last quarter](#), arrivals to Italy registered a 31% decrease. The largest group of arrivals consisted of Bangladeshis (21%), followed by Syrians (19%), Tunisians (12%), Egyptians (7%), and Guineans (6%). During the same period [last year](#), Guinea was the leading country of origin of migrant arrivals in Italy via the CMR. The share of Guinean migrants dropped from 12% in [2023](#) to 6% in 2024. Côte d'Ivoire, which held the third position with 10% of total arrivals [last year](#), does not appear in the top ten rankings of countries of origin any more.

The majority (67%) of those arriving by sea departed from Libya (41,484, including 11,341 this quarter), followed by 31% from Tunisia (19,238, including 3,438 this quarter), with 1,257 (2%) arriving from Algeria (including 555 this quarter). Departures from Tunisia decreased by 80% compared to last year's [figure](#) of 97,306. Departures from Libya saw a more moderate decline of 20% from its previous year's [total](#) of 52,034. This decrease in departures can be [attributed](#) to the increased interceptions in both countries. This is especially the case in Tunisia; where the sharp reduction in departures is closely tied to [intensified](#) migration

enforcement measures, largely influenced by strengthened [EU relations](#) and the Tunisian government's increasingly [restrictive](#) stance on migration. While data is unavailable for this quarter, between January and July 2024, [80%](#) of interceptions in Tunisia involved Sub-Saharan African migrants. In Libya, according to IOM at least 21,470 migrants have been [intercepted](#) and forcibly returned to Libya in 2024. Last year, 17,000 migrants were [intercepted](#) and returned to Libya.

In contrast, departures from Algeria increased by 115% from the prior year's count of [583](#). As MMC has previously [noted](#), irregular departures from Algeria have been increasing since 2023, with a growing number of Algerians also taking the northern routes directly to Spain. Several factors [contribute](#) to this rise in Algerian migration. These include economic and political stagnation in Algeria, increasing restrictions on regular migration, and the growing securitisation of other regional migration routes in the context of EU cooperation, notably in Morocco and Tunisia. The stricter migration controls in Tunisia and Morocco, while disproportionately affecting sub-Saharan African migrants, may have discouraged Algerian migrants to consider alternative routes to Europe.

Dead or missing migrants¹

2024 was a [particularly](#) deadly year for migrants, with widely varying figures reported depending on the source. The differences in the figures presented by IOM and Caminando Fronteras (see below) likely reflects differences in methodology and underscores the challenges of tracking migrant fatalities and disappearances, as many incidents go undocumented.

The Spanish NGO [Caminando Fronteras](#) reported 9,757 deaths on the Atlantic Route in 2024, emphasizing the growing risks as migrants sought alternative paths to Spain due to increased securitisation of Mediterranean migration routes. 183 deaths were recorded on the Western Mediterranean Route (WMR) and 513 on the Algerian route, bringing the total number of migrant deaths on routes to Spain in 2024 to over 10,000. This represents the highest annual death toll since Caminando Fronteras began tracking these figures in 2007.

Meanwhile, the IOM's [Missing Migrants Project](#) (MMP) recorded 1,062 deaths or disappearances along the Atlantic route. Of these, 208 died or disappeared during the fourth quarter of 2024. On the WMR, IOM registered 412 deaths and disappearances, including 48 in the fourth quarter, as of 31 December. Additionally, at least 1,659 people have died or gone missing on the CMR, including 438 during the fourth quarter.

Mixed migration in Libya

Latest figures on migrants and refugees in Libya

According to the latest available estimates from the [IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix](#) (DTM), as of October 2024, there were 787,326 migrants in Libya. This represents an increase of 3% compared to the 761,322 migrants reported [last quarter](#) (as of July 2024) and a 13% increase compared to the same period [last year](#)

¹ Numbers in this section are drawing on IOM's MMP and based on MMC calculations made accessing the website on 3 January 2025.

(697,532). The primary countries of [nationality](#) of these migrants in 2024 were Sudan (26%), Niger (24%), Egypt (21%), Chad (10%), and Nigeria (4%). Most migrants in Libya (54%) reside in the West of the country, followed by the East (34%), and South (12%).

As of 1 January 2025, there were [79,019](#) refugees and asylum seekers in Libya. This represents a 13% increase compared to the figure reported [last quarter](#) (69,676) and a 46% increase compared to [last year](#), as a result of the [continual arrivals](#) of Sudanese refugees. Sudanese nationals represented the largest group, comprising 73% of the total population of refugees and asylum seekers. Syrians accounted for 11%, while Eritreans made up 10%.

Nigerien migrants kidnapped by armed group in Western Libya

An armed militia [abducted](#) a group of Nigerien migrants in Shouaraf, a region in western Libya, raising concerns about the escalating [dangers](#) faced by migrants transiting through the country. This incident, reported by the Niger-based NGO Alternative Espaces Citoyens, highlights the ongoing human rights crisis facing migrants in Libya. The NGO estimates that dozens of migrants were abducted, although the exact number remains unclear. Some were reportedly [released](#) following intervention by their Libyan employers.

This incident follows a pattern of migrant abductions documented in Libya, often linked to [ransom](#) demands. An investigation conducted by [InfoMigrants](#) revealed that armed groups frequently target migrants transiting through the country, kidnapping them and demanding ransom payments from their families. These abductions also contribute to the widespread [human trafficking](#) networks operating within Libya.

The NGO Alternative Espaces Citoyens has called upon the Nigerien government to engage with Libyan authorities through diplomatic channels to address this [grave](#) human rights violation and ensure the safety and protection of migrants in Libya.

Migrants expelled from Libya remain stranded in Niger

Around 400 individuals, mostly Nigerian nationals, remain [stranded](#) in the desert town of Dirkou in eastern Niger, many for several months, outside the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) camp. Most of these individuals [come from](#) Nigerian regions such as Kano, Katsina, and Maiduguri, having fled violence, while others are originally from Chad and Sudan. Many of these individuals had previously been in [Libya](#) and are now seeking to return to their home countries. This situation echoes a similar incident in [July](#) when approximately 460 individuals were expelled from Libya to Niger and were temporarily stranded before being transferred.

In December, migrants stranded in Niger, [protested](#) outside the IOM International office demanding assistance with their return to their home countries. Alarme Phone Sahara ([APS](#)) has called for immediate humanitarian assistance, stressing the urgent need for blankets, mattresses, and other basic supplies, especially given the cold winter temperatures in the desert. The organisation has also highlighted the importance of [accelerating](#) transfers to larger IOM centres in Agadez, which are already operating [beyond their capacity](#) as expulsions of migrants from Algeria and Libya continue.

Mixed Migration in Tunisia

Latest figures on refugees in Tunisia

As of 31 December, 15,514 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with [UNHCR](#) in Tunisia, representing a 6% decrease compared to the 16,638 registered [last quarter](#) and a 5% decrease compared to [last year](#). Similar to what was reported [last quarter](#), UNHCR registrations remain [closed](#), which might explain the continued decrease. The primary countries of nationality include Sudan (48%), Syria (17%), Somalia (8%), Côte d'Ivoire (4%), and South Sudan (3%). Most refugees and asylum seekers are in Medenine (50%), followed by Tunis (22%), Sfax (9%), Ariana (7%), and Sousse (2%).

Rights advocates and UN experts criticise EU's consideration of Tunisia as a safe disembarkation point for migrants.

Despite the [European Union](#) and its member [states](#) considering Tunisia as a safe place for disembarking migrants intercepted at sea, a [joint declaration](#) by human rights and humanitarian organisations, published on 4 October, stated that Tunisia cannot be considered a "safe place" for such disembarkation.

The EU-Tunisia relationship has been [marked](#) by a long-standing debate surrounding Tunisia's designation as a "[safe third country](#)" for migrants. This debate has [intensified](#) in recent years, with the EU increasingly viewing Tunisia as a partner in managing migration towards Europe. The 2023 [Memorandum of Understanding on Migration](#) between the EU and Tunisia exemplifies this approach. This [cooperation](#) includes providing funding to the Tunisian Coast Guard to enhance their ability to intercept boats heading toward Europe. While the EU and member states argue that such [cooperation](#) is essential to prevent perilous sea journeys and reduce migrant deaths at sea, many human rights and humanitarian actors strongly [contest](#) the characterisation of Tunisia as a safe place for disembarkation.

Their [joint declaration](#) highlights widespread violations of migrants' rights, particularly those of sub-Saharan African migrants. It [points](#) to practices such as the use of excessive force during sea interceptions and collective expulsions, all of which violate international principles, including non-refoulement. The declaration also [warns](#) that ongoing cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Tunisia on migration management might exacerbate these violations, urging the EU to halt this cooperation.

On 14 October, UN independent experts [echoed](#) these concerns, raising alarm over human rights violations against migrants during interceptions and forced transfers to Tunisia's borders. Reports highlight dangerous practices, such as capsizing boats, removing engines, and threatening violence during interceptions at sea. Both the [joint declaration](#) and the [UN](#) experts call for immediate action to address these abuses and ensure compliance with international human rights standards.

Return of migrants from Tunisia increases

In Tunisia, the assisted return of migrants to their countries of origin has seen a [significant](#) increase. The countries to which migrants are primarily being returned from Tunisia [include](#) the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and [Mali](#). As of 16 October 2024, over 5,400 migrants have been assisted with their return, reflecting a 111% [increase](#) compared to the full-year figures of 2,557 in 2023 and 1,614 in [2022](#).² The rise in return operations underscores the [growing reliance](#) on voluntary return programs, supported by EU funding.

This increase in returns coincides with an increase in the [interception](#) of sub-Saharan African migrants by the Tunisian Coast Guard, often with EU funding [support](#). These [dangerous](#) interceptions, coupled with reports of numerous human rights [abuses](#) against Sub-Saharan African migrants in Tunisia, have created a precarious situation for many migrants leading many to choose to return to their countries of origin as a means of escaping this challenging environment.

The EU, through its [funding](#) of both [interceptions](#) and [return](#) programs, plays a significant role in this dynamic. While the European Union (EU) views the return operations, such as those under the Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration in North Africa ([MPRR-NA](#)), as essential for enhancing the protection and sustainable reintegration of migrants, [critics](#) argue that these returns are often not truly voluntary, as many migrants feel pressured to return due to their difficult circumstances. Moreover, [critics](#) express concern that returnees may face unsafe or challenging conditions upon their return, undermining the goal of safe and dignified reintegration. This is particularly concerning given the [increasing violence](#) in the Sahel region, [including](#) Burkina Faso and Mali.

EU Ombudsman criticises the absence of human rights assessment in EU-Tunisia agreement

A recent Ombudsman [inquiry](#) revealed that the European Commission bypassed conducting a formal human rights impact assessment (HRIA) prior to sending the funds to Tunisia within the framework of the July 2023 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Arguing that a HRIA was not necessary given that the MoU is non-binding, the European Commission relied instead on a risk management exercise,³ conducted prior to signing the MoU. This exercise, however, was not [shared](#) with the Ombudsman nor made public. While the Ombudsman [acknowledged](#) that the risk management exercise addressed some concerns, it failed to ensure robust monitoring and accountability and argued that a HRIA remains essential within the framework of EU-Tunisia cooperation.

She [called](#) on the Commission to publish a summary of the risk management exercise conducted for Tunisia before signing the MoU and to compile a regularly updated document on the outcomes of human rights monitoring under migration projects in Tunisia. The commission, the Ombudsman [argued](#), should also publicly clarify the criteria for suspending contracts over human rights violations and encourage implementing partners to establish complaint mechanisms for reporting such violations.

² The percentage difference will likely be higher once the November and December figures for 2024 are available.

³ Akin to a standard HRIA, it evaluated factors such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

Call for action to safeguard civil society support for migrants in Tunisia

In Tunisia, civil society actors involved in supporting migrants are facing [challenges](#) amidst [calls](#) to protect individuals and organisations providing assistance to migrants from being targeted or detained for their work. Among those arrested is a civil society leader [detained](#) on 12 November 2024, whose organisation supports migrants, disabled children, and other marginalised groups. Many who were arrested back in May [remain](#) behind bars.

According to the [signatories](#) of a statement issued by a group of NGOs opposing the criminalisation of solidarity with migrants in Tunisia, this arrest reflects an [ongoing pattern](#) of targeting activists and organisations working on migration. This repression has intensified throughout [2024](#) in parallel to large-scale systemic abuses and security campaigns against Sub-Saharan African migrants that began in early 2023, as [previously reported](#). The impact has seen overwhelming precarity among migrants in Tunisia become more acute, as many organisations are unable to respond to needs on the ground.

Mixed Migration in Morocco

Spain and Morocco strengthen cooperation on migration management

In October, the President of the Canary Islands [visited](#) Morocco to discuss the growing number of irregular migrants arriving to the Canary Islands, particularly the increasing number of Moroccan unaccompanied minors. The Canary Islands' social services are currently responsible for the care of roughly [6,000](#) of these children. While Morocco expressed [readiness](#) to repatriate Moroccan children, the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs contended that the process is [stalled](#) by legal and procedural gaps within the EU. Against this backdrop, during his [visit](#) to Morocco, the President of the Canary Islands [highlighted](#) the need for coordinated efforts to facilitate the repatriation of these minors, while [praising](#) the role currently played by Morocco in managing irregular migration.

The partnership between the two countries was further strengthened in December, when Spain provided Morocco with 20 advanced [surveillance](#) systems, valued at 4.12 million euros, as part of their growing cooperation to combat irregular migration. These systems aim at [strengthening](#) Morocco's ability to monitor its borders and detect crossings to combat irregular migration into Spain. These developments portray the increasingly growing and transactional cooperation between Spain and Morocco since 2022.

Morocco and France deepen ties with a focus on migration management

In October 2024, the Moroccan king and French president signed a "[reinforced exceptional partnership](#)" declaration, signalling a deepening of Morocco-France cooperation across multiple sectors, including migration management.

Building on this declaration, Moroccan and French officials convened in Paris in [November](#) to operationalise these commitments. The discussions focused on preventing irregular migration and improving procedures for issuing consular travel documents to facilitate the readmission of individuals with an “Obligation de Quitter le Territoire Français” (OQTF, or Obligation to Leave French Territory). Both sides stressed the [need](#) for streamlined processes and effective collaboration to address delays and challenges in implementing readmissions.

These developments come in a context where Morocco has increased its migration management efforts. According to Morocco’s Ambassador to France, during an interview with [TV5Monde](#), Morocco issued 80% of the requested OQTFs (Ordre de quitter le territoire français - Order to Leave French Territory), reflecting the country’s responsiveness to France’s readmission requests. Furthermore, from January to October 2024, Moroccan authorities [intercepted](#) and returned 50,000 irregular migrants, underscoring Morocco’s broader efforts to deter migration on its side.

Morocco and the EU to negotiate a new partnership agreement

In November 2024 the European Union announced that is set to [sign](#) wide-ranging deals with Morocco (and Jordan) to address irregular migration and enhance trade relations, as announced by the incoming Commissioner for the [newly](#) established [Directorate General dedicated to the Mediterranean](#). This proposed deal aims to enhance Morocco’s border management and proposes [broader](#) economic cooperation, encompassing investments in infrastructure and development projects in Morocco.

This new partnership agreement is [akin](#) to those signed with Egypt and Tunisia in 2023, valued at 7.4 billion euros and 1 billion euros respectively. These deals have sparked [controversy](#) due to concerns over human rights and democratic backsliding in both countries. While similar [concerns](#) are raised in a similar agreement with Morocco, the incoming Commissioner for the Mediterranean [defended](#) the deals. She cited the urgent need for action considering the political instability in the region and the significant decrease in migrant arrivals, particularly from Tunisia. She also [emphasised](#) the new directorate’s goal of securing similar agreements with all countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, among others.

Mixed Migration in Algeria

Migrants continue to make their way to the Balearic Islands from Algeria’s coast


This quarter, migrants continue to arrive in the Balearic Islands from Algeria’s coast, highlighting the increasing prominence of this migration route. In [2024](#), nearly 6,000 migrants reached the islands – almost triple the 2,278 recorded in 2023. Since August, 2024 people have been [rescued](#) in the Balearic region, including over 700 who arrived during just four days in November. While the majority are [Algerian](#) nationals fleeing economic hardship and high unemployment, arrivals have also included individuals from other [nationalities](#).

Algerian authorities established a new [security unit](#) in December to combat migrant smuggling. They report dismantling two smuggling networks and arresting 10 individuals involved in the operations. Smugglers are said to charge up to [5,000](#) euros per person for the perilous sea crossing to the nearest Spanish islands, significantly more than for the comparatively shorter Central and Western Mediterranean maritime journeys.

Local officials in the Balearic Islands have also voiced increasing [frustration](#) over what they see as inadequate support from the Spanish federal government. They have called for the [redistribution](#) of migrants to other regions of Spain. Additionally, the president of the Balearic Islands has stressed the importance of [reestablishing relations](#) with Algeria to foster collaboration on migration issues

Expulsions from Algeria to Niger reach record high in 2024

In 2024, Algeria [expelled](#) at least 31,404 people to the Niger border, a 21% increase compared to 26,031 expulsions in 2023, with over 11,606 of these [expulsions](#) occurring between August 14 and December 31. Alarme Phone Sahara highlights the inhumane and sometimes fatal conditions faced by those expelled, primarily sub-Saharan Africans, including cases of abandonment in the desert and multiple deaths. The organisation [attributes](#) the rise in expulsions to intensified cooperation among [Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya](#) as well as the European union which aims at limiting migration. They [call](#) for an immediate halt to these practices, emphasizing the urgent need to address the dangerous conditions and human rights violations at Algeria's borders.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Copenhagen, Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based mixed migration responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit: www.mixedmigration.org

follow us on Bluesky: [@mixedmigration.org](https://bsky.app/org/mixedmigration.org)

X: [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration) LinkedIn: [@mixedmigration-centre](https://www.linkedin.com/company/mixedmigration-centre)

and [subscribe to our newsletter](#).

