



MMC North Africa

QUARTER 3 2025

A photograph showing several people, mostly women wearing headscarves, standing on top of a concrete wall at night. One person is hanging from the wall. The scene is illuminated by a warm, orange light, possibly from a street lamp or fire, against a dark, cloudy sky.

Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: North Africa

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the North Africa (NA) region. The core countries of focus for this region are Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a knowledge centre engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programming on mixed migration. MMC has regional hubs in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, with a global team headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and based in several countries worldwide.

For more information on MMC and the quarterly updates from other regions, visit mixedmigration.org and subscribe to the [MMC newsletter](#) to receive our latest research. Follow us on Bluesky [@mixedmigration.org](#), on X [@Mixed_Migration](#) and LinkedIn [@mixedmigration-centre](#).

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking and people seeking better lives and opportunities. People engaged in mixed migration are motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, have a range of legal statuses and a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes refugees and migrants travelling along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly and wholly or partially assisted by migrant smugglers.

Front cover photo credit:

© Guy Martin / Panos Pictures (2011)

Between 200 to 300 Nigerian people arrived in the port of Misrata, Libya, April 2011, as they try and board an IOM chartered ferry transporting 3rd country nationals to Benghazi.

Libya remains a major—and perilous—transit point for migrants to this day.

SUPPORTED BY:



**MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF DENMARK**
Danida


Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: North Africa

Quarter 3 - 2025

Key Updates

- **As of 28 September 2025, Italy recorded 49,799 sea arrivals;** overall [arrivals](#) were up 1% from last year but down 2% from last quarter. Most arrivals [continued](#) to depart from Libya (88%), though departures there fell by 8%. Only 544 individuals [departed](#) from Algeria, yet this marks a 98% increase from the previous quarter.
- **Arrivals to Crete from Libya [rose](#) to 13,059 as of 28 September 2025, a 318% increase from last year.** In response, Greece [suspended](#) asylum processing for arrivals from North Africa and [launched](#) cooperation with the Libyan coast guard.
- **Italy and Turkey signed a new agreement to curb irregular migration from Libya.** The deal [focuses](#) on joint coast guard operations, information sharing, and training to dismantle smuggling networks, [aiming](#) to reduce departures from Libya and strengthen security in the central Mediterranean.
- **Libyan authorities have [stepped](#) up deportations and detentions of migrants in the eastern part during summer 2025.** 1,102 Egyptians were deported across several operations between 1 July and 22 September and around 700 Sudanese were [deported](#) in one operation on 18 July, while over 1,500 migrants were [detained](#) in workplace raids.
- **Tunisia is facing growing legal challenges over its treatment of migrants.** Civil society groups are documenting alleged abuses to [bring](#) cases before international and regional courts.
- **The Western Mediterranean Route (14,648) has overtaken the Canary Islands route (12,909) as the main entry point to Spain for the first time since 2020;** as of 28 September 2025, Spain [recorded](#) 27,557 arrivals, with WMR growth [driven](#) mainly by Algerians but also rising numbers of Moroccans, Somalis, Malians, and Guineans.
- **Irregular arrivals to Ceuta from Morocco have increased since late July 2025, with around 700 [attempted](#) crossings daily.** In response, Spain and Morocco have [intensified](#) joint security operations and round-the-clock surveillance, while Spain plans to [transfer](#) 4,400 minors from Ceuta and the Canary Islands to mainland regions.

Regional Overview*



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration movements within and out of West Africa and North Africa.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

Mixed migration from North Africa to Europe

Central Mediterranean Route (arrivals to Italy)

As of 28 September, Italy [recorded](#) 49,799 irregular sea arrivals in 2025, a 1% increase compared to the same period in 2024, but a 2% decrease this quarter compared to the previous three months.¹ Of those [arriving](#) in Italy by sea (49,799), the vast majority (88% or 43,901 individuals) departed from Libya, with smaller numbers from Tunisia (8% or 3,727) and Algeria (2% or 983). Departures from Libya decreased this quarter by 8% compared to the [last quarter](#) (from 18,391 to 17,008). In contrast, departures from Tunisia increased by 21% (from 1,516 to 1,839) while departures from Algeria increased by 98% (from 275 to 544).

Recent trends show diverging dynamics across North African countries, suggesting shifting routes as enforcement measures and deteriorating conditions reshape mobility. The decrease in departures from Libya may reflect the impact of intensified enforcement measures during the summer months, particularly in eastern Libya, including deportations and detentions of migrants (see dedicated section below). Interceptions at sea also [appear](#) to be increasing, with 19,264 recorded as of 29 September compared to 21,762 in all of 2024 and 17,190 in 2023.² Similarly, as conditions in Tunisia [deteriorate](#), more migrants are opting for assisted voluntary [return](#). Although departures from Tunisia increased this quarter, they remain far below the same period in 2024,³ when about 15,800 people departed, compared to just 3,727 this year. This suggests that tighter controls are reducing overall departures but not halting them. Instead, restrictions in both Libya and Tunisia appear to be redirecting and diversifying migration routes, with more departures now recorded from Algeria along the CMR to Italy. This aligns with broader shifts observed from Algeria toward Spain's Balearic Islands, suggesting that restrictive measures in other departure counties, including [Mauritania](#), may be rerouting movements through Algeria.⁴

The largest group of arrivals to Italy this quarter consisted of Bangladeshis (31%), followed by Eritreans (14%), Egyptians (13%), Pakistanis (7%), and Sudanese (5%). Compared to last quarter, Bangladeshis remain the largest group of nationalities arriving in Italy. Eritreans and Pakistanis both declined slightly as a share of total arrivals, while Egyptians increased and are now the third largest group. While Egyptians accounted for 6% of arrivals in Italy between January and September 2024, their share rose to 13% in 2025, reflecting growing restrictions and deportations in eastern Libya, disproportionately affecting Egyptians and Sudanese,^{5 6} which may be prompting more to depart before being detained. Meanwhile, West African presence remains limited, with only Guineans appearing in the top ten (3%), consistent with patterns observed throughout 2024 and 2025.

1 20,094 between 29 June and 28 September, down from 20,537 between 30 March and 29 June.

2 While most departures continue to be recorded from western Libya, increasing border control efforts are being reported in the east (see page 9).

3 15,800 [people](#) arrived in Italy after departing from Tunisia, compared to just 3,727 this year.

4 For more details, see page 14.

5 Although Sudanese migrants still represent a small share of arrivals, their proportion has grown from 2% in March to 3% in September. Given the rise in total departures during this period, it points to an increase in their absolute numbers from a previously low base.

6 See page 9.

Western Mediterranean Route & Atlantic Route (arrivals to Spain)

For the first time since 2020,⁷ the Western Mediterranean Route (WMR)⁸ has now become the main entry point to Spain in 2025, with cumulative arrivals (14,648) surpassing those recorded on the Canary Islands (12,909). According to [UNHCR](#), as of 28 September, Spain registered a total of 27,557 irregular arrivals in 2025. This represents a 35% decrease compared to the same period in 2024 but a 64% increase compared to the previous quarter (as of [end-June](#)).⁹

Arrivals on the WMR continue to increase in 2025. According to UNHCR, 14,648 arrivals were recorded as of 28 September, representing a 26% increase compared to the same period in 2024 and a 112% increase compared to the previous quarter (as of [end-June](#)).¹⁰ As of July, the main countries of origin of migrants on this route are Algeria (50%), Morocco (17%), Somalia (14%), Mali (6%), and Guinea (4%). Many of these migrants are departing from Algeria's northern coastline, which has become an increasingly prominent point of departure as controls tighten elsewhere.¹¹

While overall arrivals to Ceuta and Melilla remain relatively limited, they have increased over the [past quarter](#), especially in Ceuta. Land arrivals rose from [858](#) as of 15 June to 2,644 as of 30 [September](#) (+206%), while sea arrivals, though still minimal, increased from 3 to 6 over the same period, though this remains lower than the 23 recorded over the same period in 2024. Since 22 August, attempted crossings from Morocco toward Ceuta have increased, reportedly [reaching](#) around 700 per day.¹² However, most appear to be intercepted or expelled, as recorded arrivals remain very low despite the increase in attempts.

The Canary Islands [registered](#) 12,909 arrivals as of 28 September, representing a 58% decrease compared to the same period in 2024 and a 27% drop from the previous quarter.¹³ This sustained drop in arrivals to the Canary Islands may be [attributed](#) to the increasingly tighter migration controls in Mauritania and Senegal. The absolute number of arrivals from the main nationalities has fallen year-on-year as of July 2025 compared to the same period in 2024, including -47% for Malians, -46% for Senegalese, -54% for Moroccans, -11% for Guineans, and -77% for Mauritians. The nationality profile on the Canary Islands route has remained broadly stable. Malians continued to make up the largest group, accounting for 44% of arrivals as of [July](#), followed by Senegalese (23%), Guineans (11%), Moroccans (8%), and Mauritians (4%). Despite the overall decline in arrivals, migrants continue to move. Some travel from northern Morocco toward Ceuta. Malians also keep moving despite growing insecurity while smuggling networks are launching boats from further [south](#), including The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea, in response to tighter controls further north.¹⁴

7 2019 marked the revival of the Canary Islands route, its first [reactivation](#) since 2006, and in [2020](#) the shift occurred, with the Atlantic route overtaking the WMR.

8 This route connects North Africa (Morocco and Algeria) to mainland Spain, the Balearics, and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

9 9,535 arrivals between 29 June and 28 September compared to 5,826 between 31 March and 29 June.

10 8,064 arrivals between 29 June and 28 September, compared to 3,812 arrivals between 31 March and 29 June.

11 See page 13.

12 See page 11.

13 1,471 arrivals between 30 June and 28 September, compared to 2,014 arrivals between 31 March and 29 June.

14 See [West Africa QMMU Q3 2025](#) for more information on Mali and the developing routes.

Dead or missing migrants

According to the [Missing Migrants Project](#) (MMP), as of 30 September 2025, there were 885 recorded migrant deaths or disappearances on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) to Italy and 206 on the Western Mediterranean Route (WMR). On the Atlantic Route to the Canary Islands, there were 353 recorded migrant deaths or disappearances. Across the three main routes, the recorded number of deaths and disappearances in 2025 is [lower](#) than in 2024 (-24% on the CMR, -20% on the WMR, and -19% on the Atlantic Route). However, monitoring gaps and underreporting remain significant, meaning the true scale of fatalities may be higher than recorded. As the MMP acknowledges, these figures are likely a [substantial underestimate](#).

Mixed migration in Libya

Latest figures on migrants and refugees in Libya

According to the latest available estimates from the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix ([DTM](#)), as of April 2025, there were 867,055 migrants in Libya. This represents a 1% increase from [February](#) to April (858,604), and a 19% increase compared to the same period [last year](#) (725,304). These figures are likely a significant underestimate. Local authorities, UN agencies, and NGOs estimate that the number of Sudanese in Libya is closer to 800,000. As UNHCR registration is limited to Tripoli and most NGOs operating in affected areas have seen their activities curtailed by the authorities over the past six months, the true scale of needs and the actual size of this population remain difficult to assess.

While the migrant population in Libya has grown steadily, this has not translated into sustained increases in departures. Departures from Libya to Italy rose last quarter but have since declined. In addition to migrants who do not intend to move onward from Libya, this may reflect growing obstacles to departure, such as tighter controls, as well as an accumulation effect with war-driven arrivals, especially Sudanese, adding to the migrant stock without immediately moving onward.¹⁵ The primary countries of origin continue to be Sudan (33%), Niger (22%), Egypt (19%), Chad (10%), and Nigeria (3%). Most migrants (53%) reside in the West of the country, followed by the East (35%) and South (12%).

As of 1 [September](#) 2025, there were 101,567 refugees and asylum seekers in Libya. This represents a 10% increase compared to the figure reported last quarter (92,436), and a 52% increase compared to [last year](#) (66,879). The ongoing [war](#) in Sudan continues to be a driver of displacement toward Libya. Based on UNHCR figures, the total Sudanese population has increased by 3% between [June](#) and [August](#) 2025 (from 313,000 to 323,000). The recent rise in the number of registered refugees and asylum seekers in Libya therefore also appears to reflect increased registration of Sudanese already present in the country. Sudanese represent 80% of the total population of refugees and asylum seekers (81,590), indicating a 14% increase compared to last quarter (71,533). They are followed by Eritreans (9%, or 9,025), and Syrians (5%, or 5,440). The number of Syrians continued to decline this quarter, falling from 7,292 in [April](#) to 5,440 in August, a 25% decrease, as many Syrian refugees return home.

¹⁵ At the same time, not all migrants in Libya intend to head to Europe: some, such as Nigeriens, may be engaged in circular migration, moving to Libya for work opportunities with the aim of returning home rather than transiting.

Rising arrivals to Greece from Libya prompt restrictive measures and closer cooperation

Arrivals to the Greek island of Crete have increased over the summer, prompting restrictive measures from Greece. As of 28 September 2025, Crete has recorded [13,059](#) arrivals, marking a 318% increase compared to the 3,127 arrivals registered over the same period [last year](#). In response, the Greek government has suspended the processing of asylum applications in July from people arriving from North Africa for three months, [citing](#) the same legal basis used in 2020 to [halt](#) crossings from Turkey. As noted by [civil society](#) and the [UN](#), the measure violates international and EU law, denying the right to seek asylum and protection from refoulement. Earlier in June, Greece [deployed](#) navy vessels off the Libyan coast, in coordination with European partners and Libyan authorities. Greece also [launched](#) a programme in Crete to train Libyan coast guards as part of efforts to strengthen bilateral cooperation on migration control.

In July, Greek, Italian, and Maltese ministers, together with the EU migration commissioner, [visited](#) Libya to discuss rising departures but were [denied](#) entry by the eastern-based government for allegedly violating Libyan sovereignty. Despite this, Greece has [reiterated](#) its intention to deepen cooperation, while the EU migration commissioner has [called](#) for renewed engagement¹⁶ with eastern Libyan authorities to address rising departures on this route.

Italy and Turkey step up joint efforts to curb departures from Libya

On 11 September, Italy and Turkey signed a new cooperation [agreement](#) aimed at curbing irregular migration, particularly from Libya. The announcement followed an August summit in Istanbul, where the Turkish president [hosted](#) the Italian and Libyan prime minister for talks focused on migration, enhanced cooperation, and support for Libya's political stability. According to the Italian prime minister, the three leaders [discussed](#) strengthening cooperation in the Mediterranean, starting with the management of migration.

The Italian and Turkish foreign ministers [announced](#) the new agreement at a press conference in Rome, emphasising their shared objective of preventing departures from Libya. The agreement [sets out](#) operational measures to combat irregular migration and related organised crime, including strengthening cooperation and information exchange between their coast guards, coordinating law enforcement investigations, and providing training on dismantling smuggling networks, risk analysis, and route identification. According to Italian officials, the operational phase of the agreement is [expected](#) to begin within two weeks post signature and is seen as a key step towards curbing departures from Libya and enhancing security in the central Mediterranean.

¹⁶ Several European legal rulings have questioned the lawfulness of cooperation with Libya, especially that leading to returns to Libya (e.g. [Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy](#); [Italian Court of Cassation 2024](#); [Tribunal of Trapani 2019](#); [European Court of Auditors complaint 2020](#)). These decisions underline that such as cooperation has repeatedly been deemed incompatible with international and regional legal standards due to the lack of safety and protection guarantees in the country.

Deportation and detention of migrants in Libya

In the summer of 2025, Libyan authorities carried out a series of deportations and detentions of migrants, mainly in the country's east, targeting various nationalities, with Sudanese and Egyptian migrants standing out among those affected. This comes amidst anti-migrant [demonstrations](#) in late September in [Libya](#), rejecting the settlement of foreigners and calling for deportations.

On 18 July alone, more than 700 Sudanese were [deported](#), following a similar operation in May during which around 500 Sudanese were also [deported](#). Many Sudanese are fleeing an active war, and their deportation risks returning them to dangerous conditions. Libya is [bound](#) by the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention, which [enshrines](#) the principle of non-refoulement. This principle is also [recognised](#) as customary international law, binding on all states regardless of treaty ratification.¹⁷

Egyptian migrants were also particularly impacted, with 1,102 deported across several operations,¹⁸ as part of intensified efforts to curb irregular migration. In separate operations, Libyan authorities deported 115 [migrants](#) of African, Arab, and Asian nationalities in early September. This comes as Libya [announces](#) plans to deport large numbers of migrants of various African nationalities through land and air borders. At the same time, Libyan authorities [detained](#) over 1,500 migrants following workplace inspections targeting individuals without residency permits, passports, or health records. Migrants intercepted or detained by Libyan authorities are usually held in detention centres, where conditions have [consistently](#) been the subject of [concern](#) and have been widely [denounced](#) as violating international law.

Libyan coastguards open fire on NGO-operated migrant rescue vessels during operations at sea

On 24 August, the Ocean Viking, a rescue vessel operated by the NGO SOS Méditerranée, reportedly [came](#) under fire from the Libyan coastguards while in international waters, shortly after completing two rescue operations off the Libyan coast. According to SOS Méditerranée, the patrol boat fired hundreds of rounds at the vessel, damaging rescue equipment but causing no injuries. At the time, 87 [rescued](#) people were on board, many of them Sudanese, including several unaccompanied minors. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency ([Frontex](#)) expressed concerns over the incident and called for a thorough investigation. After European [pressures](#), Libyan authorities have recently [opened](#) an investigation, but no further details are available. One month later, on 26 September, another civilian rescue vessel, the Sea-Watch 5, also [came](#) under live fire from a Libyan patrol boat, supplied by Italy, while rescuing 66 people in distress at sea.

Following the first incident, a group of NGOs [issued](#) a joint letter to the European Commission denouncing the attack. SOS Méditerranée has also [called](#) for accountability for those responsible, an end to European cooperation with Libyan coastguards, and an end to the criminalisation of NGO search-and-rescue activities.

¹⁷ The principle of non-refoulement applies [broadly](#) beyond recognized refugees and asylum seekers.

¹⁸ MMC calculations : 70 deported on 1 [July](#), 77 on 8 [July](#), 183 on 19 [July](#), 103 on 3 [August](#), 462 on 10 [August](#), and 207 on 22 [September](#).

Concerns emerge over treatment of migrants following release of Libyan footage

Recent [footage](#) has surfaced showing armed groups in Libya allegedly engaged in people smuggling activities. The material, recorded in mid-August during a rescue mission by a humanitarian NGO, depicts masked men in uniform operating from patrol boats. A second recording, captured two days later, appears to [show](#) a group of migrants being forced into the sea from a similar vessel. Survivors rescued by the NGO [reported](#) that they had been held in a Libyan detention centre shortly before being thrown overboard and alleged that several individuals who [resisted](#) orders were killed. The videos, [published](#) in Italian media, have raised serious concerns about the role of armed actors in abuses against migrants. Since then, evidence was [submitted](#) to judicial authorities in Europe and to international bodies, further [incriminating](#) those responsible for the abuses as well as officials implicated in smuggling activities.

Mixed Migration in Tunisia

Latest figures on refugees in Tunisia

No updated figures on refugee populations in Tunisia since [March](#) 2025.

Mounting legal challenges over Tunisia's treatment of migrants

Tunisia is facing growing international pressure over its treatment of migrants from East, Central, and West Africa, with several legal initiatives [emerging](#) to seek accountability for alleged human rights violations. Civil society groups and legal actors are documenting reported abuses, including violence and pushbacks, with the aim of bringing these cases before international and regional courts such as the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).¹⁹ These efforts come despite Tunisia's [announcement](#) in March 2025 that it would no longer recognise the jurisdiction of the ACHPR.

More migrants opt for voluntary return from Tunisia

In Tunisia growing number of migrants are [seeking](#) to leave the country through the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme. Last [quarter](#), Tunisian authorities [emphasised](#) the need for stronger cooperation around voluntary returns and for [faster](#) action regarding repatriations. More than 5,000 were [assisted](#) with voluntary return between [January](#) and July 2025, which is already more than double the 2,557 recorded in [2023](#) and approaching the 7,250 [recorded](#) in all of 2024. According to MMC key informants, the nationalities of the returned migrants include Guineans, Ivorians, Gambians, Malians, and Cameroonians...etc

19 One [planned](#) case before the African court reportedly concerns an asylum seeker who claims to have been a victim of violence in Tunisia.

The [EU and several Member States](#) – including Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and Austria – support return programmes and play a central role in this dynamic. Italy and Tunisia also reaffirmed their cooperation on migration in July, [highlighting](#) joint efforts to combat smuggling. The EU [frames](#) these returns as efforts to strengthen migrant protection and support sustainable reintegration. However, [critics](#) contend that many returns are not voluntary, as migrants may feel compelled to leave due to harsh conditions.

Mixed Migration in Morocco

Latest figures on migrants in Morocco

According to Morocco's 2024 [General Population and Housing Census](#), published in August 2025, the country now hosts 148,152 foreign migrants. This marks an increase of about 44% from the estimated 103,000 international migrants recorded in 2020 ([published](#) in 2023). The largest migrant populations are [concentrated](#) in Casablanca-Settat (60,902 people, about 41% of the total) and Rabat-Salé-Kénitra (29,233 people, about 20%). In terms of [origin](#), 58% are from West Africa, 12% from North Africa, and 9% from East and Central Africa. These figures are likely conservative but remain the official national estimates.

Rising arrivals to Ceuta from Morocco

Since late July 2025, the Spanish enclave of Ceuta has seen an increase in attempted irregular arrivals from Morocco. Calmer seas and coastal fog [known](#) as taró have created favourable conditions for night-time departures, with hundreds of people attempting to swim or embark on makeshift boats. Migrants sometimes attempt [longer](#) offshore swims to evade the heavily monitored Tarajal breakwater, increasing the risks of the route. While this route was mainly used by Moroccan minors, more adults from [other](#) African [countries](#) are now taking it, and over the past year, there has also been a rise in young Moroccan [girls](#) attempting the crossing.

Since 22 August, Ceuta has [seen](#) around 700 attempted sea crossings daily, peaking at 1,500 on 26 August, while authorities [report](#) over 150 expulsions per day. Reception capacity has reached [saturation](#). By early August, around 1,400 people were [hosted](#) in Ceuta, including over 500 unaccompanied minors. Faced with the increase, Ceuta's government has appealed for stronger intervention from Madrid. Transfers are planned under a government scheme to [relocate](#) 4,400 minors from Ceuta and the Canary Islands to Spanish mainland regions.

In response, Morocco and Spain have [intensified](#) joint security operations. Moroccan authorities have also deployed an [unprecedented](#) array of ground and maritime resources, including round-the-clock surveillance near the Tarajal crossing point. Spain has also reinforced its presence, dispatching additional maritime vessels to Ceuta, underscoring the close coordination between the two countries' forces.

EU-Morocco talks on new migration partnership

The European Union is [negotiating](#) a new comprehensive migration partnership with Morocco, modelled on recent agreements with countries such as [Tunisia](#) and [Egypt](#). Discussions began after the EU announced in November 2024 that it planned to sign wide-ranging deals with Morocco and Jordan to curb irregular migration, as [noted](#) by MMC at the time.

The deal [aims](#) to formalise long-term cooperation on border security, irregular migration control, and regular migration pathways, forming part of the EU's broader strategy to [externalise](#) migration management. High-level [meetings](#) between Morocco's Foreign Minister and EU officials, including the [Commissioner](#) for Directorate General dedicated to the Mediterranean, underscored the partnership's importance, linking migration to wider trade, security, and geopolitical cooperation in the Mediterranean and Sahel. Similar EU agreements with [Tunisia](#) and [Egypt](#) have drawn [criticism](#) for facilitating rights violations and prioritising short-term border control over rights-based migration governance.

Violent clashes between migrants in Morocco lead to camp dismantling

At the end of August, violent clashes [broke out](#) between groups of migrants in the informal settlement of Aïn Harrouda, near Casablanca, where two people were killed and several others injured. The violence, reportedly linked to tensions among [Sudanese](#) migrants, prompted a large security operation. On 31 August, Moroccan authorities evacuated the site and demolished dozens of makeshift [shelters](#). Bulldozers cleared the camp, which had housed migrants for several years. An [investigation](#) has been opened under the public prosecutor's supervision, with no further details available.

Mixed Migration in Algeria


Rising arrivals to Spain's Balearic Islands from Algeria

While overall irregular arrivals to Spain declined by 35% in 2025 compared to 2024, the Balearic Islands continue to [witness](#) an increase in arrivals, especially from Algeria. By late September, more than 5,700 [people](#) had reached the archipelago, a 71% increase compared to the same [period](#) in 2024. Between 2023 and 2024, arrivals had already [increased](#) by 266% (from 2,194 to 5,848). With crossings typically [peaking](#) in autumn, authorities expect 2025 numbers to surpass last year's record. Officials also [note](#) that real figures may be higher, as many boats land undetected along the coasts of Almeria and Murcia. These crossings cost between €7,000 and €10,000 per person, especially for departures from Oran toward eastern Spain. Further east near Algiers, [cheaper](#) "low-cost" journeys to the Balearics on smaller boats have multiplied, with prices around €1,500.

While the route remains dominated by North Africans, it is becoming more varied as other nationalities are now arriving in bigger numbers, notably [Somalis](#). Algerians remain the largest group, representing 50% of all [arrivals](#) between January and August, followed by Moroccans (17%) and Somalians (14%). Smaller nationality groups include Malians (6%), Guineans (4%) and Sudanese (3%). Since late July and August, several reports have also pointed to the growing [presence](#) of Afghans, Pakistanis, and especially [East Africans](#) on this route, with [Somalis](#) standing out.

While some observers have linked the increase in the use of the Algerian route to [strained](#) Algeria-Spain political relations, since early 2025 there has been a renewed collaboration, including [discussions](#) to strengthen joint responses to migration. Algeria has also continued to report interceptions: between 30 July and 9 September 2025, its Coast Guard [intercepted](#) 1,382 people at sea,²⁰ compared to 826 in July 2024. The recent trend can be better explained by the increasingly restrictive migration policies elsewhere on main migration routes. Crackdowns in [Mauritania](#) and [North Africa](#) may be contributing to a shift in movements toward Algeria, as arrivals in the Balearic Islands accounts for 39% of all arrivals on WMR as of 28 September. Sources indicate that migrants are deliberately [avoiding](#) Mauritania, suggesting that enforcement there is reshaping migration patterns. This aligns with a broader trend highlighted in migration [research](#): restrictive measures do not halt mobility but reroute it, with new pathways emerging as others close.

²⁰ While reporting periods differ, Algeria typically issues weekly or bi-weekly updates, the gap between July 2024 (one month) and late July-early September 2025 (around six weeks) is relatively small. That said, in migration dynamics even short timeframes can see major fluctuations, making strict comparisons difficult. More broadly, consistent and comparable data on interceptions in Algeria remain limited. The figures cited here are based on MMC calculations from updates published on the [Algerian Ministry of National Defence](#) website.



MMC is a knowledge centre engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programming on mixed migration. MMC has regional hubs in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, with a global team headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and based in several countries worldwide.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based mixed migration responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit www.mixedmigration.org

Follow us on Bluesky [@mixedmigration.org](https://bsky.app/profile/mixedmigration.org)

X [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration) LinkedIn [@mixedmigration-centre](https://www.linkedin.com/company/mixedmigration-centre)
and [subscribe to our newsletter](#).

