European countries grapple with irregular migration
European countries continue to grapple with the challenges of irregular migration along land and sea routes towards the continent. Despite some reforms, such as the recent EU Migration and Asylum Pact, political and media debates on migration remain heated and polarising, and migration is a key topic in many of the election campaigns in Europe. The results include a downward spiral of ever more extreme policies aimed at keeping people out, as documented in MMC’s annual ‘Normalising the Extreme’ compilation, and questionable migration diplomacy agreements by the EU and member states with transit countries with insufficient human rights safeguards for people on the move.
Meanwhile, a lack of solutions in refugee-hosting countries and regions, a wide range of persistent reasons of why people leave their countries of origin and a strong demand for (irregular) migrant labour in many destination countries, continue to drive people towards irregular, onward and often dangerous migration journeys, causing enormous harm for people and huge profits for smugglers.
So what is the solution? “Safe and legal routes” is the dominant plea we often hear on the more progressive side of the political spectrum, and indeed the notion of opening legal migration channels has featured in a wide range of global, regional and European migration governance agreements and initiatives. However, serious implementation and upscaling has been lacking and the somewhat simplistic call for “safe and legal routes” fails to seriously address some of the complexities of creating such routes.
USA created ‘Safe Mobility Offices’
However, in 2023, the United States administration directly engaged with this challenge and made a bold move by creating the so-called Safe Mobility Offices. The SMOs objective is to “protect migrants from abuse by smugglers” by ensuring that “refugees and vulnerable migrants do not have to undertake dangerous journeys in search of safety and better opportunities”. Arguably, with more than 2 million encounters annually on the US Southern border in recent years, the challenge of irregular arrivals in the US is much more significant compared the few hundred thousand irregular arrivals along land and sea routes to the EU, proportionally even more so when taking into account the much higher population of the EU compared to the US.
The SMOs objective is to “protect migrants from abuse by smugglers” by ensuring that “refugees and vulnerable migrants do not have to undertake dangerous journeys in search of safety and better opportunities”.
MMC study on Safe Mobility Offices in Latin America
The SMOs were set up in 4 transit countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Guatemala) and currently provide access to refugee resettlement, as well as information on three other legal migration pathways into the US (humanitarian parole, family reunification, labour migration) for a number of eligible nationalities, in addition to a small number of people who could be resettled or referred to labour migration pathways to other countries, notably Canada and Spain.
The Mixed Migration Centre recently studied how the SMOs are functioning so far, how they influence the migration dynamics in the region and, importantly, whether this is a model that could be replicated in the context of mixed migration towards Europe.
Are Safe Mobility Offices (SMOs) a model for Europe?
The simple answer to that last question is: yes they could and they should. The SMOs show what is possible with some brave and careful thinking and political will. They are a novel and innovative way of addressing the challenges of dangerous irregular migration and onward movement of refugees and hold great potential for better governance of mixed migration towards Europe.
The more complicated answer is: in the way they are currently set up, they won’t work for Europe – or in the Americas for that matter. But from our study, we can draw a number of important lessons learned from how the SMOs operate in the Americas that should inform the development of a similar initiative along migration routes towards Europe. And these are timely lessons learned, as according to ICMPD, replication of the SMOs appears to be already under consideration in Europe, where EU governments and the Commission are ‘highly likely to explore proposals on the model of the SMOs:
“A European equivalent (perhaps ‘EU Migration Transit Centres’) in strategic locations along key migration routes would be a significant flanking measure to the Pact’s reforms: supporting efforts to reduce irregular migration by sea; providing safe legal channels for those in need of international protection; and in certain cases helping to match skilled migrants with employers willing to sponsor their journey to Europe”. (ICMPD)
Six lessons for Europe.
First, in terms of refugee resettlement, the SMOs represent a clear demonstration that with sufficient resources and political will, it is possible to create a system of expedited and accessible resettlement in regions that host the majority of the world’s refugees and migrants, and to move refugees to safety in relatively large numbers. The SMOs are a concrete and visible example of responsibility sharing within a global context of forced migration – similar to what the EU did with the response to Ukrainian refugees. The way the US, with partners, developed this system through the SMOs should inform a European-wide resettlement scheme.
Second, however, while the improved resettlement numbers are admirable, the offices have had limited impact on overall migration patterns. The stringent eligibility criteria means few migrants can access the offices and those most likely to be in transit, to engage in dangerous onward movement and rely on smugglers are generally not eligible. Moreover, contrary to the initial understanding among some that the SMOs would be a one-stop-shop of sorts to access one out of the four already existing legal migration pathways to the US as mentioned above, they actually primarily facilitate access to refugee resettlement, while only providing information on the other legal pathways.
To be more successful in significantly addressing broader mixed migration dynamics and reach a higher number of people on the move in transit countries, a European SMO model should also facilitate access to other migration pathways than just refugee resettlement. With the widely recognised need for increased and better legal labour migration pathways to many of Europe’s ageing countries, this should be feasible. It would provide an orderly and safe alternative to the current irregular arrival and/or overstay of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers, often working informally – without paying taxes and often in exploitative situations – in various sectors of Europe’s labour markets where there is a high demand for migrant workers.
Third, the SMOs require carefully managed political negotiations with key stakeholders. The Offices have created a positive framework for collaboration among key actors, including between the US, the states hosting the Offices and UNHCR and IOM. This requires true and equal partnership between destination and host countries in a ‘whole of route’ approach. In the context of Europe and its relations with various transit countries along the major mixed migration routes, this will pose a challenge, as the current relation is more transactional with, simply put, Europe providing large sums of money in exchange for stopping migration. A strong, regional framework – like the LA Declaration in the Americas in which the SMOs are framed – is important. The 2015 Joint Valetta Action Plan could be the European equivalent and the development of European SMOs under the umbrella of the JVAP could even provide the JVAP with the necessary boost towards a more equal EU-Africa partnership. A genuine approach of wealthier states’ willingness not only to throw money at countries hosting the majority of the world’s displaced, but also to welcome individuals into their countries is crucial.
Fourth, civil society has an important role to play in both advertising and critiquing any future initiative, as well as in supporting the identification of appropriate cases. In the SMO initiative, only a select few have engaged, while others have been left frustrated. Questions about how to manage and maximise civil society relationships are important in replicating the SMO initiative elsewhere.
Fifth, safeguarding access to asylum is fundamental. The SMOs are not designed for external processing of asylum claims. The SMOs should not be considered as a replacement for maintaining proper asylum systems at the domestic level or upholding international legal obligations to those in need of protection. They must not be used as cover for shutting down access to asylum for arrivals at Europe’s borders.
Finally, a European equivalent of the SMOs should use technology judiciously. It is a positive innovation that the technology used by the SMOs allows for self-referral for resettlement, instead of having to go through a gate gatekeeper. However, the online system can disfavour those most in need, those who are not literate, and those who do not speak the right languages or do not have access to both technology and a robust internet connection.
If we address their weaknesses and make use of the lessons learned, we can build on the successes of the SMOs and implement a similar model that offer access to various legal pathways from countries of origin and transit into Europe.
In conclusion, the potential replication of the SMO requires strong political will and partnership, real access to a variety of migration pathways beyond resettlement and they should not be used as smokescreen for further externalisation of asylum. But in a global and particularly European migration context in which there is seldom good news, the SMOs show what is possible. If we address their weaknesses and make use of the lessons learned, we can build on the successes of the SMOs and implement a similar model that offer access to various legal pathways from countries of origin and transit into Europe. European SMOs alone will not be the silver bullet solving all issues and they need to be accompanied by other measures, such as fast and fair asylum processing at Europe’s external borders, true solidarity between European countries in terms of hosting refugees and a better functioning return and reintegration system. Importantly, replicating the SMO along routes to Europe, does also not necessarily mean increasing the total number of migrants and refugees coming to Europe. But it means they will arrive in an orderly way, they know where to go to access regular pathways, what their rights and opportunities are, avoid the use of dangerous land and sea routes and reliance on smugglers and it will enable a European-wide matching of migrants skills and labour market needs.