The Netherlands’ politically manufactured migration crisis
In July 2024, following elections in November 2023, the new Dutch government was officially sworn in. It consists of a coalition of four parties: the far-right, anti-Islam Party for Freedom (PVV), the centre-right Liberals (VVD), the New Social Contract (NSC) party—recently established by former Christian Democrat Pieter Omtzigt—and the right-wing and populist Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB). Interestingly, though, the PVV leader Geert Wilders—who came first in the election with 23.7 percent of votes —abandoned his bid for the position of prime minister because, in his own words, he could “only become prime minister if ALL parties in the coalition support it. That was not the case”. After months of talks among the four party leaders, it was decided that none of them would take a position in the newly formed government, but that they would continue leading their parties as members of parliament. For this reason, they selected Dick Schoof, a former civil servant not affiliated with any party, as the country’s new prime minister.
Wilders’ party was allocated a range of ministerial positions, including—crucially—one for asylum and immigration, which has long been the PVV’s primary concern. Whilst some of the party’s most extreme anti-migration reforms—such as banning mosques and the Quran, closing Dutch borders and bolstering deportation schemes, all in line with the vision for “less asylum and immigration. Dutch people first” —might not come to fruition now that his leader finds himself in a coalition, what remains certain is that Wilders’ focus on migration and asylum won’t shift.
The hard-right’s framing of migration as a “crisis”
Mirroring a Europe-wide trend from recent years, the topic of migration is widely politicised and sensationalised in the Netherlands, with Wilders going as far as to state that the country is battling with an “asylum crisis”. The available data, nonetheless, paint a different—and a lot less alarming—picture: not only is the number of asylum seekers entering the Netherlands currently at its lowest level since 2020, with official 2024 figures likely to reach 50,000 entries (the same as in 2022 and 2023), but it is also very average compared to other EU countries. With two first-time asylum applications per 1,000 people in 2023—equal to the average in the rest of the EU—the Netherlands was overtaken by ten other European countries with higher relative numbers of asylum seekers. In this context, talking about an asylum “crisis” seems like a far cry from reality. It could be argued, however, that there is somewhat of a ‘self-inflicted’ asylum reception crisis, since reception capacity has been, contrary to all advice and even rational economic analysis, kept very low by consecutive governments.
Related Content:
Interview with MMC director Bram Frouws on the Reception Crisis in the Netherlands, 2022.
…the number of asylum seekers entering the Netherlands currently at its lowest level since 2020
Arguably, one of the reasons why Wilders’ fixation with the concept of a crisis is so popular in the Netherlands is because he heavily campaigned for migration to be seen as the key driver to other, more pressing, issues that the country is contending with—namely, the endemic housing shortage, the ever-rising cost of living and access issues to its healthcare and education systems. In particular, the connection between housing and migration was a pervasive one throughout the PVV’s electoral campaign, resonating especially with both young and even first-time voters, who view the difficulty in securing housing and the alleged “prioritisation” of housing for foreigners as a failure of the Dutch government—and one that Wilders’ party and ideals might provide the ideal solution to. However, with asylum seekers on average making up around 10 percent of net migration to the Netherlands, even if there is an association between housing shortage and migration, it is more related to other migrant categories, such as expats, foreign students and labour migrants, which most of the coalition partners are less keen to reduce in volume.
Besides the causal association between housing and migration, the PVV’s leader also presents migrants and asylum seekers as “threats” to Dutch society, culture and identity, invariably defining Islam as “not a religion but an ideology” that aims to foster and spread terror and hatred, and that is not compatible with the values of the Netherlands. Similarly, in past speeches, Wilders referenced the Islamic headscarf as a “head rag” that “pollutes” public spaces—and that, as such, should be banned or taxed.
Ironically, the Netherlands is currently facing a very real problem with pollution, in the form of farmers’ nitrogen emissions. In 2019, a court found that the nitrogen emissions from Dutch farmers—which mainly come from livestock—were in violation of EU nature-protection laws. However, since then, nothing has been done to solve this issue; with farmers vehemently opposing previous government proposals, and with the Farmer Citizen Movement currently in power as part of the coalition, hopes that this situation might be adequately addressed and solved are slim—particularly, as the current government continues to be primarily preoccupied with the migration “crisis”. In addition to years of inadequate housing policies, this nitrogen emission crisis also contributes to the lack of available houses, as it has become difficult to get permits to construct new properties. Reportedly, the Netherlands faces a shortfall of one million new homes by the start of the next decade.
Proposed policies to tackle the migration and asylum “crisis”
Why is the Dutch government so determined to talk about “crisis” when referring to migrants and asylum seekers? The main reason is that, by declaring an “asylum crisis”, the coalition hopes to be able to derogate from the country’s Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet), a law that protects the rights of asylum seekers, and temporarily bypass both the parliament and the senate, which would only review new laws and measures after, instead of before they are implemented. The emergency mechanism the government wants to invoke is normally meant for situations of acute disaster, such as a war or natural calamity, and should not be brought into the discourse due to “political unwillingness”. Whilst human rights advocates and organisations like the Dutch Council for Refugees have been expressing their concerns about and rejection of the idea of a real “crisis”, in September 2024, the Dutch government announced its intention to implement an array of rigid measures aimed at migrants and asylum seekers.
The emergency mechanism the government wants to invoke is normally meant for situations of acute disaster, such as a war or natural calamity
These include stricter border controls, a moratorium on all new asylum applications, a halt to the country’s open-ended asylum permits and harsher regulations for those who have been granted asylum for family reunification purposes. In parallel, the coalition also communicated that it is starting to work on a new law that would greatly limit the services and facilities offered to asylum seekers, as well as suspend all decisions on any new asylum applications for up to two years. At the time of writing, the coalition parties are discussing potential alternatives to the emergency law.
In addition, the Dutch government also sent a letter to the European Commission to request an opt-out from European migration and asylum legislation (similar to Denmark’s), while fully realising the very low likelihood of getting this approved, as it would require a European treaty amendment and consent from all other EU member states. Finally, just ahead of the European Heads of State Summit in Brussels on 17 October, the Dutch government announced it is exploring a plan to send rejected asylum seekers to Uganda; with the increasing focus of the EU on so-called ‘return hubs’ outside the region, this plan was relatively well-received by most member states.
Implications for mixed migration
Should all these proposed policies be implemented, the conditions for asylum seekers and their families in the Netherlands could deteriorate further. The country has already been struggling with years of budget cuts to its refugee and asylum system and facilities. The only registration centre in the north of the country is strained to meet the requests of asylum seekers, hundreds of whom were ultimately forced to sleep rough or transported to hotels and other temporary accommodations all over the country. Although this was the consequence of a deliberate policy and budgetary choice, the sight of people sleeping rough reinforces the sense that the system is overwhelmed and in crisis.
The country has already been struggling with years of budget cuts to its refugee and asylum system and facilities.
Marjolein Faber, Asylum Minister and member of Wilders’ PVV, declared her intention to stop entirely the state’s contribution to the accommodation of migrants and refugees, as of 1 January 2025, adding that she is “advocating for deportation, not subsidised housing”. In September, she also proposed to place signs in asylum centres in multiple languages saying, “Here, we are working on your return”, even though many asylum seekers who might have fled war or persecution are ultimately granted asylum. Her proposal was rejected by Parliament and even by other coalition members, but it represents yet another symbolic move meant as a way to deter asylum seekers whilst also presenting a harsh approach to the electorate.
The current government also intends to repeal the Distribution Act (Spreidingswet), the country’s very recent legislation developed by the previous government, which was originally aimed at addressing the shortage of reception centres, overcrowding and other problems in a select number of small villages hosting relatively large centres, which will likely further contribute to normalising a context in which migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are left in limbo at the edges of Dutch society. Again, the impact will be visually evident and distressing for Dutch citizens, suggesting the situation is unmanageable.
Family reunification for children 18 years of age or older will also become more complex, should the new proposals come into effect. Currently, there are already several limitations to the circumstances under which an older child can be reunited with their family—such as whether the child is seriously ill or disabled—but the new measures could turn the entire family reunification process into a near-impossible feat for many more people on the move.
Normalising the endless “crisis” cycle
Looking at the 2023 general election results, it is clear that many people in the Netherlands feel like they are being faced with a real migration and asylum “crisis”. Anti-migrant sentiment has become widespread, legitimised and normalised, whilst the heightened levels of fear and anxiety that these narratives promote are contributing to emphasising xenophobia, distrust and social divisions, rendering any integration efforts of migrants and asylum seekers virtually impractical—and unwanted.
Despite getting into power thanks to an extreme populist, anti-migrant and anti-Islam ideology, it is, nonetheless, unlikely that Wilders will be able to implement his most exclusionary policies, as they will go against Dutch and EU law, whilst potentially also facing the opposition of the other parties in this fragile coalition.
By shifting the focus from pressing issues and policy failures, such as the housing shortage, the farming situation and problems with the healthcare and education systems, to the easy scapegoat that migration has come to embody, parties like the PVV can comfortably keep on steering the discourse in their favour,
Even if any of the new proposed policies to tackle the “asylum crisis” should go ahead, they will probably not achieve what they promise—an ending or, at least, resolution to this “crisis”—because it is precisely by constantly keeping the issue high on the agenda and at crisis level that far-right, populist and nationalist parties continue to hold on to power. By shifting the focus from pressing issues and policy failures, such as the housing shortage, the farming situation and problems with the healthcare and education systems, to the easy scapegoat that migration has come to embody, parties like the PVV can comfortably keep on steering the discourse in their favour, winning votes and presenting themselves as undisputed guardians of national identities under threat.