The instrumentalisation of migration in the populist era

The following essay was originally compiled for the Mixed Migration Review 2024 and has been reproduced here for wider access through this website’s readership.

The essay’s author, Ayhan Kaya is Professor of Politics and Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics of Interculturalism at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgy University, Director of the European Institute and Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, and Member of the British Academy and Science Academy Türkiye. Additional contributions to this essay were made by Chris Horwood (Ravenstone Consult) and Bram Frouws (Mixed Migration Centre).

Anti-migration, populist political parties are a rising force around the world. In 2024, elections and election campaigning illustrated their ability to attract – and maintain – voter support as independent polls repeatedly showed mixed migration as one of the hottest issues. Is it inevitable, though, that populist parties are anti-migration? Are they posturing opportunistically to capitalise on people’s genuine concerns, and do they therefore represent a response to a groundswell of public feeling against migration? Or, instead, do they help create anti-migrant narratives which also maintain a sense of crisis around migration – a crisis which is never really solved, but works to attract more voters to the right-wing populist cause? This essay will focus on right-wing anti-migration populism, how it instrumentalises migration within a broader analysis of populism, how it can be explained, how it operates, why it is currently so popular and what its likely direction going forward is.

Three explanations of populism

A typical modern explanation of populism links it to socio-economic factors, suggesting that populist sentiments arise from the destabilising effects of neoliberal globalisation, leading to precarity and marginalisation among the working and lower-middle classes. These groups reject mainstream politics, generate narratives of ethnic competition and national division, and appeal to a polarising narrative that divides the nation into “aversive insiders” and “invading outsiders”.

Another explanation views right-wing populism as a reaction against cosmopolitan elites, emphasising a return to ‘traditional values’ and an anti-establishment stance. Accordingly, a growing number of people in the EU believe that elites have pushed forward liberal rights such as gender equality, gay rights, mobility, inter-faith dialogue, ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, environmental protection and so on, against the will of ordinary people.4 Here, populism instrumentalises the politics of nostalgia to win the hearts and minds of those constituents who are subject to a rapid societal, structural, spatial, demographic and cultural transformation in the age of globalisation. Populist slogans in the US – such as Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” or the Tea Party’s “Take America Back” – and in the UK – with UKIP’s “We Want Our Country Back” and the Brexit campaign promising to “Take Back Control” – strongly resonated among significant numbers of the electorate.

A third approach focuses on the strategic methods populist leaders use to connect with constituents, leveraging ethnicity, culture, religion and myths to mobilise those alienated by globalisation and inequality. Populist leaders often engage in performative acts to highlight both their ordinariness and extraordinary qualities, such as displaying virility. Examples include Silvio Berlusconi’s notorious and much-publicised escapades with women, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s nickname Uzun Adam (tall man) and Vladimir Putin’s tabloid photos showcasing his naked torso while hunting. These figures also ‘battle’ perceived enemies on behalf of the people, with a recurring theme of paranoia and martyrdom. Another good example is Trump’s immediate words just after being shot at in 2024: “Fight, fight, fight!” while raising a fist as security personnel carried him away. Many of his supporters have attributed the failure of the assassination attempt to an act of God, using the phrase: “Because he was touched by God.”

Occasionally, in fact, these acts of extraordinariness have religious connotations. Hugo Chávez presented himself as the reincarnation of Simon Bolivar, Silvio Berlusconi once declared himself the Jesus Christ of politics, and Marine Le Pen’s associations with Joan of Arc’s sacrifice and martyrdom reportedly increased her party’s followers’ admiration for her ‘saint-like’ female courage.

A rising phenomenon

Populism is a complex concept with varying definitions among scholars. It has been described as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (meaning it addresses only part of the wider political agenda), a political style, a political strategy, a discourse to connect with ‘the people’ or a political logic that mobilises marginalised groups. It has also been suggested that populism is not confined to any region or ideology but is an aspect of various political cultures. Populist leaders typically maintain popular support by dramatising and scandalising existing or fabricated problems, crises, breakdowns or threats.16 Populist politicians often exploit and reframe events and situations for their benefit to keep the public on high alert. This tactic makes it easier for them to engage with their supporters through these radically simplified issues and political debates. In Latin America, for instance, some populist politicians invoke imperialist conspiracies; in Africa, they leverage neo-colonialism; in the Netherlands Geert Wilders frequently exploits the perceived increasing Islamisation of the country as a threat to the nation’s social, economic and political well-being. In particular, the issue of mixed migration and its framing as a ‘crisis’ is politically very convenient, offering common ground to unite most right-wing populist parties. Arguably, the populist cause has an unholy alliance and dependency on this ‘crisis’ never being adequately managed or solved, as it provides a certain level of guaranteed support.

Populist parties have become common in many Western countries in recent years. A selection of these right-wing populist parties – always also promoting anti-migrant or migrant-restrictive positions – include the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, (also the Forum for Democracy (FVD) and JA21), the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, the Swedish Democrats in Sweden, the Front National (now National Rally) and Bloc Identitaire in France, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Finns Party in Finland, Brothers of Italy, Lega, CasaPound and the Five Star Movement in Italy, Vox in Spain, Chega! In Portugal, the Freedom Party in Austria, Alternative for Germany in Germany, Victor Orban’s Fidesz and Jobbik Party in Hungary, the English Defence League, the British National Party, the UK Independence Party and the Reform Party in the UK, the Golden Dawn (previously) and Greek Solution in Greece, Law and Justice Party in Poland, Pierre Poilievre’s Conservative Party in Canada, and the Justice and Development Party in Türkiye. Some have had periods of success followed by demise and oblivion, but most are active and, in many cases, have gained strength in recent years. In 2024, in particular, many populist right-wing, anti-migration parties did well in elections. These parties, however, represent just a limited selection of the extent of populism, both in terms of its geographic and political spread.

Contemporary right-wing populism

Populism is not new, but at the very heart of the rise of contemporary right-wing populism lies a significant disconnection between centrist and moderate politicians and their electorates. Over the last decade, right-wing populist parties have gained increasing public support, particularly in the wake of two global crises: the financial crisis (2007-2008) and the so-called (European) refugee crisis (2015-2016). The financial crisis, coupled with neoliberal governance, has led to a degree of socio-economic deprivation for some Europeans. Meanwhile, the refugee crisis has been leveraged by opportunistic political groups to evoke nostalgic feelings about identity, nation, culture, tradition and collective memory. This populist moment has not only bolstered many former far-right-wing parties, but has also given rise to new ones.

In the EU, despite national variations, populist parties are characterised by their opposition to immigration, a concern for the protection of national culture and European civilisation, and adamant criticisms of globalisation, multiculturalism, the EU, representative democracy and mainstream political parties. They exploit a discourse of essentialised cultural differences, often conflated with religious and national differences.

Right-wing populist parties and movements frequently exploit the issue of migration and asylum, depicting it as a threat to the welfare as well as to the social, cultural and even ethnic characteristics of a nation. Populist leaders often attribute major societal problems – such as unemployment, housing shortages, violence, crime, insecurity, drug trafficking and human trafficking – to lenient migration policies. This narrative is bolstered by racist, xenophobic and demeaning rhetoric, with terms like ‘influx,’ ‘invasion,’ ‘flood’ and ‘intrusion’ commonly used. Public figures such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria have spoken of the “foreign infiltration” of immigrants, particularly Muslims, in their countries. Similarly, the AfD (Alternative for Germany) leader, Alexander Gauland, depicts immigrants as threats to the Heimat (homeland), a concept cherished by sedentary ‘ordinary people’. In practice, the AfD’s primary focus is not so much on combatting the ‘new cosmopolitan class’ but addressing the issue of ‘irregular mass migration’, a concern it shares with many populist parties throughout Europe today.

In Europe, some populist political party leaders, such as Éric Zemmour, Marine Le Pen, Thierry Baudet, Alexander Gauland and Viktor Orbán promoted the ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy, framing the immigration of Muslims as a calculated strategy of Islamification. Additionally, they openly criticise Islam by aligning themselves with liberal and civilisational stances on issues like the emancipation of women and LGBTQI+, using them to further their anti-Islam rhetoric. For many right-wing populists, Islam, introduced by immigrants and refugees, is the primary adversary. They will, therefore, strategically adopt liberal principles such as free speech and gender equality if it aids in their efforts against Islam and Muslim immigrants and refugees in Northern and Western Europe.

Populism unbound

Populism manifests differently across the world, with leaders and parties holding diverse ideologies including communism, socialism, Islamism, nationalism, fascism or environmentalism, yet all employing populist rhetoric and strategies. Left-wing populism, for example, focuses on class as a unifying force, while right-wing populism emphasises culture and heritage, often coded as race. Left-wing populism supports intellectualism and a vanguard party, whereas right-wing populism is antielitist, anti-intellectual and anti-establishment, celebrating religion, myths and nationalistic ideologies. Populism can also be eclectic: Germany’s Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance  – Reason and Justice (BSW), for instance, is a left-wing nationalist, populist, Eurosceptic and socially conservative German political party with clear nationalist positions for controlling immigration more robustly. Formed in early 2024, it already enjoys high support and popularity in parts of Germany – particularly among anti-establishment and right-leaning voters – and threatens to compete with the country’s other rising populist party, the right-wing AfD.

Outside Europe, some analysts are alarmed at what they see as the crisis of democratic political legitimacy and emerging nationalist populism in Africa. As examples, they cite the recent former Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari, Pastor Evan Mawarire’s This Flag movement in Zimbabwe and Senegal’s populist opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, whom the new president has recently promoted to prime minister. In South Africa, two populist parties have dented the ANC electoral majority (arguably, a populist party itself): Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) and Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – who both did well in the 2024 elections. The level of anti-migrant xenophobia (more correctly, afrophobia) displayed across all parties in South Africa this year has been of concern to rights organisations. Some cite popular nationalist movements manifesting themselves in successful or attempted coups across the Sahel (West Africa’s ‘coup belt’) pointing to an increasingly populist civil society.

Populism has also been a significant force in Latin America, but often manifesting on the political left with promises of extensive socialist changes – as seen in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, in Bolivia under Evo Morales, in Mexico under Andrés Manuel López Obrador and, previously, in Brazil under Lula da Silva. Far-right former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is regarded as also having had populist tendencies. Javier Milei, who was elected president of Argentina in late 2023, has been described as a right-wing, ultraconservative populist. Nayib Bukele in El Salvador is the much-supported populist enjoying at least 85 percent of the national vote.

Elsewhere, Narendra Modi, prime minister of India since 2014, is the longest-serving prime minister outside the (establishment) Indian National Congress Party with top populist appeal. He has membership in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a right-wing Hindu nationalist paramilitary volunteer organisation.

Arguably, voters in the Philippines have chosen populist leaders for decades, voting repeatedly for candidates like Ferdinand Marcos Sr, Rodrigo Duterte and now (since 2022) Bongbong Marcos, despite – or because of – their promise of ‘strongman rule’. There are many more examples of populist leaders globally, not least the US former president Donald Trump, whose past and present political campaigning is a jumbled collection of archetypal right-wing populist themes. Populist experts even describe China as a populist authoritarian regime.

Populism: rising from the ashes of the failure of multiculturalism?

In Europe, a significant portion of the public increasingly views diversity as a threat to social, cultural, religious and economic security. This sentiment has led to growing resentment against multiculturalism, which was initially seen as promoting conciliation, tolerance and universalism to create an ‘intercultural community’. Over time, however, multiculturalism has been perceived as institutionalising differences, and its supposed failure has been criticised not only by extreme, right-wing populist parties but also by centrist ones. In 2010 and 2011, leaders like German chancellor Angela Merkel, UK prime minister David Cameron and French president Nicolas Sarkozy all criticised multiculturalism. Contemporary populism has popularised nativism, which favours indigenous inhabitants over immigrants and refugees. Nativism is arguably a thin-centred ideology that protects the interests of locals against those of newcomers. The term ‘nativism’ has gained traction among Brexiteers, Trumpists, Le Penists and other right-wing populists who want to distance themselves from accusations of racism and xenophobia. Nativist European populism pits ‘ordinary’ people against cosmopolitan elites and immigrants. It instrumentalises anxieties and fear, accusing the political system of betraying ethnocultural and territorial identities.

Migration: populism’s convenient scapegoat

In this age of migration, and as the salience of this issue is so evident in political discourse and the media, a few key questions arise. Is the public seduced by vote-seeking political rhetoric supported by the media in a context where they would normally not prioritise the subject? What is the line of causality in the relationship between populism and the anti-migration agenda? Does a rise in the number of refugees or immigrants in destination countries inevitably trigger right-wing populist reactions? The answers to these questions are far from clear-cut. After all, migration and periods of high international mobility have existed for centuries, and the current brand of migrant-focused populism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Furthermore, countries like Ireland, Canada and even so-called ‘overwhelmed’ Malta or Cyprus have not seen the rise of right-wing populism witnessed in many other refugee- and migrant-receiving countries.

It is likely, therefore, that populism emerges in situations that have particular preconditions that enable or nurture populist political options. The visibly high proportion of foreigners in any society at the same time as economic and societal problems turns migrants into scapegoats for a raft of other failings. However, once immigration is put high on the media agenda and framed in a way that advances populists’ interests, it becomes difficult to promote a different framing. Immigration becomes the scapegoat for many of the preexisting or independently occurring conditions. Part of populism’s mass appeal, especially among the economically disadvantaged or those harbouring a sense of being marginalised, is its promotion of simplistic and scapegoating narratives to explain complex socioeconomic conditions and deficits. Not only are migrants used as scapegoats, but it may be entirely in the interests of populist parties – when in government or close to power – to actively obstruct reforms or instigate new policies which exacerbate a sense of crisis around immigration and asylum. In this context and with these dynamics, it is hardly surprising, therefore, that the salience of migration in Europe after the 2015-2016 mass movements of migrants and refugees into the bloc also coincided with the rise in anti-migrant populist parties.

In a similar vein, countries that had previously been welcoming of those looking for a better life after fleeing disaster and/or persecution have cooled their welcome and, to different degrees, have recently introduced more restrictive policies against migrants and refugees, often catalysed by political groups. This has been the case, for example, in Lebanon with its Syrian population, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador with Venezuelans, and South Africa with Zimbabweans, Somalis and those from Mozambique. Even the current reactions in Sweden and Denmark, the protests and incidents in Germany, France and Italy, and the August 2024 protests in the UK illustrate a higher level of public discontent.

A clear example from elections around the world this year, and particularly in Europe, is that highlighting immigration and problematising it as a central issue of political choice pays off. Even when the economic realities suggest increased migration is a significant opportunity, if not a necessity, the scapegoating argument requiring reduced migration normally wins. The results of the EU parliamentary election in June epitomised what was occurring in many individual nation-states. European Union parliamentary elections saw far-right parties make gains at the expense of centrists, but their victories were not enough to win a command of the parliament. However, in some countries, populists’ electoral gains successfully overshadowed the centrists and either placed them in leadership roles or close to them as kingmakers in coalitions or powerful players difficult to ignore going forward.

The widespread instrumentalisation of migration

The rise of the anti-migrant populist phenomenon that continues to this day, arguably with greater support than earlier, represents a highly effective instrumentalisation of immigration issues in politics by those who stand to benefit from it – which is then echoed and copied by other political players fearful of missing out. This instrumentalization of mixed migration concerns in politics is gathering pace around the world, not only because of the political engineering that drives it but also because of the high numbers of people moving internationally and their increased presence and visibility in the media.

Even if the global proportion of international migration has remained relatively stable (around or below 3 percent of the global population) in recent decades, the absolute number has risen significantly and, when added to past migration, the level of multiculturalism in many countries has become more visible. This was even more the case during a period of perceived polycrisis with rapid cultural and social changes afoot, the impact of a global pandemic, economic precarity and inequality, as well as the uncertainties of both AI technology and climate change. Additionally, the relatively limited number of those moving irregularly (except at the US-Mexico border, where numbers are exceptionally high) repeatedly attract headline news creating a sense of crisis and absence of control which plays directly into the populist political playbook.

Populist right-wing parties and political parties of other persuasions are not alone in instrumentalising migration for their own interests. In their own way, migration-focused international agencies including UNHCR and IOM as well as various NGOs benefit from keeping mobility in the news and the rising level of needs of migrants and refugees high on the international agenda – and, thereby, as a funding priority. Other advocates, seeking more urgent action to mitigate climate change also raise the threat and impending crisis of mass climate migration to focus the minds of policymakers. Inadvertently, their contributions to the migration crisis narrative not only assist right-wing populist parties but also allow any governing authority to make harsher policies against migrants and refugees more palatable – when not necessary.

Arguably, the media has been part of the radicalization of the ‘growing aversion to immigration worldwide’. All media, including the so-called liberal press, has played a critical role in the instrumentalisation of migration as ‘news’ and ‘crisis’, and increasingly continues to do so, particularly through social media platforms where fierce battle lines are drawn. On these channels, especially, sensational stories that grab attention, trigger readers’ emotions and maintain a febrile discourse around migration act as powerful news selling clickbait.

Elsewhere, commercial companies and security interests have instrumentalized immigration, and especially the relatively small levels of irregular migration, as security threats. Analysts have documented the emergence of border security (personnel, infrastructure and equipment) as a fast-rising, lucrative sector catalysed by well-positioned professional lobbyists from the defence sector. In recent years, many countries have significantly beefed up their border security systems, massively increasing their budget allocations and militarising their external borders as if protecting them from an armed invasion. States engaged in increased spending on wall building and/or border security are wide-ranging, including countries such as the US, Australia, the UK, Finland, Saudi Arabia, Hungary, Greece, Türkiye and the European Union itself, where Frontex is experiencing a major expansion.

A final example of the instrumentalisation of immigration is in cases of so-called migration diplomacy and inter-state disputes. Far from being a monopoly of populist politics, the weaponising of migrant movement can be used by any government for international diplomacy: exacting payment from one state or bloc to another state (Türkiye from the EU), score-settling (Belarus against Poland/ the EU), irritating an enemy (Nicaragua against the US), twisting arms (Libya against Italy), punishing (Morocco against Spain) and offering conditional aid (the US with Central American states and the EU with North Africa and others).

Future direction

In 2023 and 2024, the dynamics illustrated in this essay have continued to influence elections worldwide, with populist parties gaining traction as they address grievances related to mixed migration and socio-economic inequalities.

Arguably, right-wing populism has risen due to long-standing structural inequalities and the failure of mainstream political parties to address these issues during the neoliberal era. Populist parties have increasingly attacked multiculturalism, diversity, migration and Islam, contributing to polarizing governance discourses. In Europe, liberal democracies are being challenged by illiberal populist parties that capitalise on the resulting alienation.

Research and polls from 2024 indicate that European youth are increasingly voting for far-right populists, such as in countries like France, Germany and in the EU parliamentary elections as a whole. Even if there is also strong evidence of polarisation among young voters, a new generation of voters appears to be drawn towards more extreme parties as they deem traditional ones unable to solve problems. As mentioned, the popularity of populist parties outside Europe is on the rise too and the importance of youth support remains high. Unless the values of this portion of the electorate change, or they become disillusioned and disappointed in populist politics, they might continue to represent a sustaining force that keeps populist – and, within the context of this analysis, anti-migrant – positions dominant. At a minimum, nativist anti-migrant populist parties of all political sides are creating a normalization around exclusion, restriction, deterrence, detention and deportation that is a far cry from earlier international expressions of solidarity, inclusion, more open borders, burden sharing and mobile labour.

Populist parties emphasise direct democracy and exploit emotions like fear, anger and frustration, which stem from perceived democratic deficits and disillusionment with representative democracy and can be harnessed by populist messaging. Clearly, as a direction of travel, the global populist trends are troubling as they offer a counterfactual to both representative democracy as well as some of the values and normative expectations of international relations.

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