On 8 December 2024, after less than two weeks of continuous fighting across the northwest area of Syria, rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the capital Damascus, prompting the sudden flight of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Moscow and sealing the end of the notorious Assad dynasty.
The remarkably fast collapse of the brutal Assad regime, after almost 14 years of a destructive civil war, was met with widespread celebrations, both within Syria and among the millions of Syrian refugees living in exile. While the future of Syria remains highly uncertain, many Syrian refugees have already begun expressing a desire to return to Syria with a strong commitment to rebuilding their country. Others in neighbouring countries have already rushed to Syria’s borders eager to return home and reunite with family, along with the return of many Syrians who have been internally displaced for over a decade.
In Europe, states have not only welcomed the fall of the Assad regime, but in a very premature move also rushed – within 24 hours of the collapse of the regime – to announce suspending decisions on all pending Syrian asylum claims, with some countries, as well as certain politicians from across many countries, calling for the repatriation of all Syrian refugees.
But what will the future hold for Syria? What to expect in terms of returns and the reality that refugees and internally displaced populations might face upon return? How might this current transition of power impact further displacement within and from Syria? This article explores the potential short and long-term outcomes these dramatic, largely unexpected and sudden events on Syrian displacement and mixed migration dynamics.
The unfolding events
Since the start of the civil war in 2011, the Assad regime was able to hold on to power largely due to the support from foreign allies Russia and Iran. However, with both Iran and Russia’s attention increasingly pulled elsewhere, rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamic faction stemming from Syria’s branch of Al-Qaeda and with backing from Turkey, succeeded in toppling Assad and his regime where others have failed.
Since the rebel group’s quick accession to power, its leader, Ahmad al Sharaa, has preached a message of unity for Syria, and has been quick to paint himself as open and tolerant posing no threat to minorities within Syria, or to the West. However, HTS remains a designated terrorist group according to the UN, the US, the UK and various EU countries. While many countries started paving the road to restoring diplomatic ties with Syria, many remain cautious at best, and fearful at worst, about how this transition will fare for the country. This includes whether HTS will implement its message of unity since the fall of the Assad-regime, and be strong enough to effectively stabilise the country, or whether IS or other armed jihadist groups may take advantage of the current power vacuum in the country.
In the immediate wake of the regime’s fall, several global players have been quick to intervene, with Israel immediately launching a military offensive bombing Syria’s key infrastructure, military bases and weapons centres. On the ground, Israel also sent troops into the occupied territory of Golan Heights, advancing beyond the established demilitarised, “buffer” zone for the first time since the war in October 1973, and already approving a plan to encourage the expansion of illegal settlements in the area. Türkiye too, has been carrying out bombing raids, concerned about Kurdish influence along its border. The United States has also launched at least 75 airstrikes in Syria to prevent IS forces from seizing weapons and territorial power during this vulnerable transition phase for the country.
In short, the combined effect of what many are calling the continued ’seismic shifts’ in Middle East geopolitics is resulting in fast-changing and global spheres of power and influence will likely have a huge impact on future Syrian migration and displacement dynamics.
The Syrian displacement crisis until now
Since 2011, the civil conflict caused one of the largest humanitarian and displacement crisis in the world, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians, displacing over seven million inside the country and forcing another 6.4 million to flee abroad – 80 percent of whom reside in neighbouring countries.
Despite the initial welcome and continued hosting of millions of people offered by Syria’s neighbours, Syrian refugees in the region – particularly in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Türkiye – have since contended with increasingly difficult conditions, rising discrimination, forced returns, and exclusion from host societies and more recently, exposed to Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.
• Lebanon: 774,697
• Germany: 716,728
• Jordan: 628,135
• Iraq: 286,099
• Egypt: 156,465
• Austria: 97,939
• Sweden: 86,956
• Netherlands: 65,622
In Europe, the mass arrivals of Syrians in 2015 escalated to become a political crisis, and has been seen as a major part of the origins of the current strengthening of populist anti-migrant movements in Europe and elsewhere, again illustrated by the 2024 national and EU parliamentary election results. Given the momentous and lasting impact of the Syrian refugee arrivals from 2015 on Europe’s refugee and asylum policies and debates continuing up to today, the significance of what’s currently happening in and around Syria for the future of the European migration and asylum discussions should not be underestimated.
Potential future outlook for mixed migration
Syria’s new HTS appointed transitional prime minister, Mohamed al-Bashir, has stated that his main priorities are restoring security and stability, facilitating the return of refugees, and addressing poverty and essential services in order to rebuild the country.
However, the challenges are immense: Syria remains a diverse, fragile and impoverished nation, worn out by over a decade of civil war that caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, the displacement of millions inside the country and abroad and widespread destruction of infrastructure. While the collapse of the Assad regime raises hopes of ending corruption, tyranny, and human rights abuses, the transition may not be smooth.
The situation in Syria is changing rapidly, but there are two likely and, importantly, not mutually exclusive, scenarios for mixed migration, each with further (political) consequences for stability in Syria, the wider region and beyond. Syria might witness large-scale returns of Syrian refugees from different parts of the world; but also new displacements both inside and outside Syria might take place. Perhaps most likely at this stage, it will be a combination of the two, generating a complex mixed migration outlook for the months and years to come.
Returns of Syrian refugees abroad
Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, more than half of all displaced Syrians interviewed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon were expressing a wish to one day be able to return home. Since the fall of the Assad regime, thousands of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries have already started making their way back to their homeland, particularly from Lebanon and Türkiye. In countries like Germany, Greece, Serbia, and Türkiye many Syrians living in exile have expressed cautious optimism, and have voiced initial interest in returning to rebuild their country.
Pushed and pulled…
While many Syrian refugees are beginning to express a wish to return they also face two types of pressure to do so.
On the one hand, as mentioned above, the new transitional government is calling for the return of refugees. Al-Bashir mentions the return of Syria’s “human capital and experience” in the form of Syrian refugee students and high-skilled professionals, as these individuals are considered to be instrumental in helping rebuild the country.
On the other hand, there has been mounting pressure to return coming from the countries hosting Syrian refugees. For some time, countries such as Lebanon and Türkiye, have been returning Syrians amid rising anti-migrant sentiment, and the fall of the Assad regime might further enable this push. Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, is already pushing for the return of Türkiye’s three million Syrian refugees to their homeland, stating that their “time has come to unify and rebuild the country.”
In Europe, several countries have suspended asylum claims from Syrians following the fall of the Assad regime including Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This means that both new and pending asylum claims from Syrians are currently not being processed, potentially leaving thousands of asylum seekers in limbo for a long time. The claim is that, with Assad and his fleeing henchmen now gone and prisoners liberated, Syrians no longer have the right to claim asylum on the basis of fleeing his regime. Some countries, Austria in particular, as well as conservative politicians across Europe, are going a step further and are announcing plans to repatriate Syrians who have already been granted status in the country.
However, it is still premature to consider Syria a safe country for returns, pointing to the ongoing need to keep protecting their rights as refugees as well as emphasising the reality on the ground: 90 percent of Syrians still rely on humanitarian aid as they no longer have their former homes or jobs in the country. The nation is ‘utterly shattered by war’ and the impact of the devastating earthquakes of 2023, and assurances for the protection of minorities are yet to be fully realised in action. The Council of Europe also warned that hasty repatriation should be avoided, while the European Commission also said Syria is not yet safe for the return of refugees.
A new scenario, to be carefully assessed
Obviously, the circumstances have massively changed, now that Assad’s regime is gone, as his regime was a major reason for protecting Syrians who fled their country. Clearly, the grounds on which many Syrians received international protection has changed. Asylum decisions are based on country-of-origin information and when there is a major change in the situation of the country of origin, it is normal that a re-assessment take place. However, such an assessment should be carried out with precision and be based on facts, rather than on a political desire to return Syrian refugees. That takes time and – not least when the situation is still so uncertain and so rapidly evolving – it is impossible to conduct such an assessment within days after the fall of the regime. For the so-called cessation clause – where due to a change of circumstances in their home country, refugees no longer require international protection – to be applicable there must have been a change in the refugee’s country of origin, which is fundamental, durable, and effective. A situation which has changed, but which also continues to change or shows signs of volatility – which clearly applies to the current situation in Syria – is, according to the UNHCR not stable by definition, and cannot be described as durable.
Understandably, many Syrians in Europe have now felt a mixture of joy over Assad’s fall, quickly followed by worries about their future and disappointment with the speed at which politicians in their countries of residence expressed the need for them to leave.
Further instability, displacement and cross border movement
The consequences of a hasty, premature and large-scale forced return of Syrian refugees would be severe and would likely backfire, increasing the pressure on public services, limiting the possibility for sustainable reintegration, exacerbating social tension and undermining the chances of a successful and peaceful transition. This could ultimately even lead to renewed refugee movements out of Syria, further destabilising the country and region.
This not only applies to returns from abroad, but also returns within Syria. Before the fall of the Assad regime, there were approximately 7 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Syria. While there are indications that IDPs have started to return to areas of origin, including Aleppo, until now many more – an estimated 800,000 to 1 million – have actually been newly internally displaced since an escalation of the fighting from late November. These large-scale internal movements, in addition to potential refugee returns from abroad – might further add to instability and tensions. Indeed while return movements to Syria have been seen since the fall of Assad’s regime, movements out of Syria into Lebanon are also being observed.
Further, it remains to be seen whether promises of inclusion by the transitional government will materialize for the various minority groups within Syria including Christians and Shi’a sects. Out of fear some already started fleeing to Lebanon and if calls for unity and inclusion not transpire, many more may be left with no alternative but to leave. In particular, the Alawite minority, historically close to the Assad family and occupying key positions in government and security, now also faces an uncertain future.
If the HTS regime fails to unite Syria and bring the promised peace and stability so many are desperately hoping for, other groups will likely try to seize power leading to widespread armed conflict, resulting in more Syrian civilians having to flee the country, adding to the millions already displaced since 2011. This would obviously represent a problem for neighbouring countries, particularly those going through their own crisis, like Lebanon. Further afield, host countries might change their asylum application processes and resettlement quotas, and possibly even strengthen their borders fearing a repeat of the 2015 mass movements and the political and refugee management it caused. Having seized the argument that Syrian refugees should now return to their country, anti-refugee forces might be pressurising more mainstream political parties to be seen to agree or risk being punished by voters. The narrative depicting migration, especially Syrian migration, as a ‘crisis’ – a framing that was pervasive during this year’s elections in many parts of the world – could remain prominent, and with it anti-migrant, anti-refugee and anti-Muslim attitudes.
Another particular dynamic to watch is what will happen with Syria’s Kurdish population, who carved out a largely autonomous region in the North-East of Syria. The Turkish backed HTS rebels now controlling Syria could seek some kind of agreement with the Kurds to incorporate them into the post-Assad order. However, the Kurds might not want to give up Kurdish autonomy in the east and this would risk angering Türkiye who fear a powerful Kurdish force at their border. While the US has been supporting the Kurdish forces and maintains troops in the Kurdish region as part of fight against IS, this might change once Trump starts his term, as he has already been clear.
Conclusion: a mixed scenario and learning from history
The current crisis in Syria is evolving rapidly, making predictive analysis complex. Most likely a combination of Syrian refugee and IDP returns but also new displacements might take place, alongside the choice of many Syrian refugees not to move back yet until there is more certainty about the stability of the country in the longer term.
Geopolitical events all add to the uncertainty facing Syria, such as the fall out of the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel; the highly militarised responses to Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran and now Syria by an emboldened Israel; uncertainties around the present state of Iran and its intentions; the imminent presidency of Donald Trump in the US; the implications for Russia of the war in Ukraine going forward and the widespread resistance to increased Syrian cross-border displacement. This all suggests a mix of forces that are difficult to frame as offering an immediate sense of stability and peace to Syrian people.
Additionally, as also mentioned by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, recent examples of regime change and the fall of dictators show that post-regime-change stability is far from certain and takes time. Removing Saddam Husein’s brutal regime in Iraq has led to two notorious decades of violence and instability with an accompanying high level of displacement and migration. In Afghanistan, the Taliban regained control in August 2021, 20 years after they were ousted by the US. Pledged to be respectful of women and religious and ethnic minorities did not materialise and since the Taliban came into power again, Afghanistan has plunged into another humanitarian crisis, characterised by extreme poverty and human rights abuses, with more than 6.3 million people displaced and millions living abroad as refugees. The fall of Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 was followed by years of instability in Libya and a strong increase in transit migration through Libya towards Europe.
However, paradoxically, or hypocritically, European countries seem to be simultaneously concerned about Jihadist movements seizing the opportunity to grab power in Syria while declaring the country safe for returns, and Syrians no longer in need of international protection now that Assad is gone. This while only weeks ago several European countries were also exploring normalising relations with the Assad regime, to explore the possibility of Syrian returns while Assad was still in power. In short, no matter the circumstances, returns as quick as possible
Instead, European countries should be patient and learn from past mistakes. The political pressure to stop processing asylum claims and return Syrians should not stand in the way of a careful and proper assessment of the rapidly evolving situation in Syria, of the protection needs of those outside of Syria and of whether the circumstances allow for safe, dignified and sustainable returns. Syrians who are still in doubt what the future will hold in Syria need to know they can count on ongoing international protection.
European leaders should carefully think about the large Syrian diaspora who have been in European countries for many years, have become European residents and contribute to European societies and economies. Those who decide they want to stay as they have built their future in Europe, should feel welcome to stay and should not feel the pressure to go back to Syria. Those who do decide to voluntarily return, should be supported as much possible, which means funds need to be mobilised for reintegration, both of IDPs within Syria and of returning refugees.
And finally, there should be support from the international community to contribute to a peaceful future and stability in Syria, learning from mistakes in the past and placing the interest of the country and its people at the centre.