Fake News-Driven Anti-Migrant Riots and Protests in the UK

The extraordinary case of fake-news-driven ‘populist’ street violence:

Anti-migrants summer riots & protests in the UK

The following article has been published online as a sneak preview to the Mixed Migration Review 2024  “Migration Politics, Migration Narratives and Public Opinions”.  Register here to join us on December 5th for the launch of the Mixed Migration Review.

This summer’s protests and violence in the UK were an extraordinary case of a multi-locational, anti-migrant fire, where fake news and toxic social media were both the spark and the incendiary fuel. Arguably, though, they were also the result of a complex interplay of factors, including economic and social grievances, political discontent and social tensions. While not the sole cause, the impact of digital platforms in spreading and amplifying divisive content as well as mobilising protesters was a critical element in the dynamics of the riots.

Anti-immigration protests and riots sweep 27 UK cities and towns

Between 30 July and 7 August 2024, an estimated 29 anti-immigration demonstrations and riots took place across 27 towns and cities in the UK. Many, but not all, of these were violent, with participants attacking mosques and hotels housing asylum seekers and clashing with the police. By the end of August, the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) confirmed that 1,280 people had been arrested for their involvement, with 796 people charged, and that the police had identified hundreds more suspects in connection with the disorders and who may be arrested in the future.

Despite a pre-existing judicial crisis in terms of lengthy court delays in the UK, as a deterrent to further street violence, the government deliberately fast-tracked court cases with unprecedented speed. By 8 August, over 200 people had already been sentenced and by 2 September the government said 570 people had been brought before the courts, many receiving considerable custodial sentences. The UK had not seen disorder of this nature or magnitude since riots in 2011, in which at least 4,000 people were arrested (within one month of the event) and 1,984 prosecuted (within two months).

A tragic event became the catalyst for these public eruptions of protest. Axel Muganwa Rudakubana, born in Cardiff, Wales, and of Rwanda parentage was charged with a stabbing attack which killed three young girls and wounded others in Southport, Merseyside, on 29 July. However, the spark that lit the fire of protest was the misinformation spread online and claiming that the 17-year-old male suspect was called Ali Al-Shakati and was an asylum seeker who had recently come to the UK on the infamous ‘small boats’. “Save our kids. Stop the boats” was a chant frequently used by some of the protesters in some locations.

Misinformation spread like wildfire on social media.

The misnaming of the stabbing suspect and other misinformation rapidly lit up social media like wildfire, as public and behind-the-scenes influencers, as well as so-called news sources, shared fake news with millions of viewers, some with calls to action. Known far-right activists promoted and attended the riots, including, reportedly, Patriotic Alternative and members of the English Defence League (EDL). The Merseyside police publicly identified the EDL as a key factor, although the organisation ceased to exist in any formal sense after its founder, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon—who uses the alias Tommy Robinson—focused on spreading his message on social media platforms.

The speed and extent of the spread of misinformation at the end of July and early August offer an alarming example of mobilised and radicalised events occurring without direct leadership or formal organisation. Analysts concur that it is not possible to pinpoint who started the calls for protests, but there was a clear pattern of multiple influencers and conspiracy theorists who, together, amplified false claims about the identity of the attacker through various echo chambers of social media. Some analysis indicates that the misnaming of the attacker started with an influencer called Artemisfornow and a separate source called Channel 3 Now. These claims, alongside additional provocative content, also reached people without any connection to far-right individuals and groups.

An organic, decentralised organisation behind the riots.

The NGO Hope Not Hate described the protests and riots as having “no single organiser. Many have the support of the organised far right but appear locally led […] Most of the planned events are more broadly focused, expressive of a wider hostility to multiculturalism, anti-Muslim and anti-migrant prejudice, as well as a visceral streak of populist, anti-government sentiment.” A key issue identified by Hope Not Hate was that “most of these protests are being planned organically, often by local people who are plugged into decentralised far-right networks online”. The “shared slogans, language and iconography owes to the fact that their organisers are often active in overlapping online spaces”. These statements reflect how some are describing the nature of the contemporary far-right in the UK, where relatively large numbers of people are engaging in activity online but there’s no membership or structure.

Socio-Economic, Political, and Social Tensions.

Similarly, they also reflect that the protests occurred in a context of three groups of underlying concerns, including:

  1. Socio-economic issues, such as rising inflation, cost of living crises, rising inequality, unemployment and dissatisfaction with government policies.
  2. Political discontent and widespread frustration with political leadership and policies, including those related to immigration, public services and economic management.
  3.  Long-standing social tensions, particularly in communities experiencing rapid demographic changes or economic hardship. The UK has experienced increasing polarisation on issues such as Brexit, national identity and immigration. These divisions have been exacerbated by a perceived lack of integration and resources to support communities—especially low-income ones—with high numbers of migrants.

Government failure to address immigration.

The protests also highlighted the government’s failure to address issues of immigration. The timing of the protests was interesting insofar as they occurred just after the end of 14 years of Conservative government rule—the party that repeatedly claimed to be reducing migration and be tough on irregular migration, but proved to be unable to materialise either ‘promise’. On the contrary, the numbers of irregular and regular migrants have risen significantly in recent years, despite the Brexit promise to ‘take back control’ of the UK’s borders. So, these protests also highlighted the government’s failure to address issues of immigration and, specifically, the ‘small boats’ phenomenon. Statistics from the first months of the new Labour administration illustrate that the new government, too, is struggling to control the situation. In August, for example, the number of people crossing the Channel in small boats sometimes reached record levels of over 800 per day.

Government response to the anti-immigration riots.

Reassuringly, this summer’s protests and disorder were met with robust police response, rapid judicial processing of those arrested and mass-organised counter-demonstrations, especially from anti-racist groups. The government’s reaction echoed by many analysts and commentators is that the street violence was the result of thuggery and criminality with virtually no reference to any of the direct concerns (child safety, immigration, asylum policies etc.) or any underlying causes. The new UK Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, repeatedly referred to the protesters as “thugs”, condemned their actions as “far-right thuggery” and promised they would all face the full force of the law. This reaction, along with the speedy prison sentences, appears to have worked as a deterrent as no further protests have taken place.

The short-lived nature of the eruption of the UK summer protests may be an indication of the somewhat ephemeral and passing nature of fast-paced sensationalised social media. It may question how deep and real the underlying causes are, and whether people feel sufficiently motivated to demonstrate in any sustained manner. In France, the Yellow Vest populist, grassroots movement for economic justice (Mouvement des gilets jaunes) offers a contrasting example. Opposing what it saw as the wealthy urban elite and the establishment (but, noticeably, not anti-immigration), the movement involved an estimated three million people and held hundreds of demonstrations between 2018 and 2022. These protests sometimes developed into major riots, described as the most violent since those of May 1968 and continued despite strong police action.

Either way, the main responsibility for the remarkable flare of populist-style disorder in so many cities across the UK this summer appears to rest with the irresponsible misuse of social media more than anything else.

Nevertheless, there are those calling for a public inquiry who consider writing off the UK riots merely as racist, Islamophobic, anti-migrant scapegoating by right-wing “thugs” as unwise, because “rioting is generally an indicator that all is not well in the body politic. We ignore this at our peril”. Others agree that the causes of the protests were not only about migrants or asylum seekers but about economic inequality in the UK, which is well known and requires urgent remedial action and no public inquiry. Either way, the main responsibility for the remarkable flare of populist-style disorder in so many cities across the UK this summer appears to rest with the irresponsible misuse of social media more than anything else.