Lebanon is once again in the throes of a deepening humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by a surge in hostilities stemming from the rapid escalation after October 2023 and Israel’s attacks in Gaza and elsewhere. Since September 2024, intensified airstrikes on Lebanese territory, particularly in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut have caused widespread destruction and loss of life. Over one million people are estimated to have already been displaced, forced from their homes as the country teeters on the edge of even greater conflict. Against a backdrop of chronic economic collapse and political paralysis, Lebanon’s fragile state is further deteriorating, with civilians bearing the brunt of the crisis.
A crisis of many layers: Lebanon’s precarious situation
Lebanon’s internal crises—its political deadlock, economic collapse, the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lingering scars from the Beirut blast—have created a volatile environment. The ongoing financial crisis, one of the worst globally since the mid-19th century, has driven an estimated 80% of the population into poverty, with food insecurity and unemployment becoming rampant. In this atmosphere of desperation, tensions have escalated, leading to rising xenophobia, particularly against migrant and refugee communities, most notably Syrian refugees.
As resources become scarcer, some segments of the population view migrants and refugees as competitors for jobs and essential services, further intensifying hostility. This tension escalated in April 2024 with widespread xenophobic violence and calls for – and implementation of – forced returns of Syrians. Syrians face heightened risks of detention, mass deportations, and violence as communities grow more protective of dwindling resources.
Since October 2023, skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli forces have kept the region on edge. Now, the conflict has reached unprecedented intensity, spreading fear and uncertainty across the country. Lebanon is now grappling with its largest displacement crisis in decades, raising concerns over the country’s capacity to cope with such an overwhelming rise in the number of acutely vulnerable people. On October 8, 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that Lebanon could face destruction similar to Gaza if the situation continues to escalate, further amplifying concerns about the country’s future stability.
This article explores the potential mixed migration consequences of the escalating conflict in Lebanon and the wider region and how it impacts on different population groups that make up the Lebanese ‘mixed migration landscape’.
The Lebanese people: displacement, forced immobility, and onward movement
Lebanon’s citizens are facing an intensifying crisis of displacement and immobility. Families in targeted areas have fled to “safer” locations in the north and central parts of the country. According to UN OCHA estimates, as of 07 October 2024, over 600,000 people have been internally displaced, while the Lebanese government estimates the number exceeds 1 million. Many of the displaced are living in overcrowded shelters, while others are forced to live in the open air, such as in Martyr’s Square in Beirut. However, the escalation of violence has made even these movements perilous. In many areas, roads and critical infrastructure have been targeted, including the Beirut-Damascus highway, cutting off access to safety and complicating humanitarian relief efforts. Adding to these challenges, there are growing concerns that Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport could become a target of Israeli attacks, as the airport is located next to a Hezbollah stronghold in southern Beirut. If this occurs, it would leave Lebanon even more isolated, forcing those wishing to leave the country by air into situations of involuntary immobility or requiring them to take more dangerous overland or sea routes.
Some Lebanese citizens have sought refuge abroad, particularly in Syria and Iraq. Reports from 08 October 2024 indicate that approximately 75,000 Lebanese have crossed into Syria, albeit under difficult circumstances due to the deteriorating security situation there. While many Lebanese are renting accommodation in Damascus and Rural Damascus, a smaller portion is being hosted across 16 collective shelters in Homs, Hama, and other regions. These shelters, however, are in disrepair and face severe shortages of food, hygiene products, and adequate sanitation facilities. In Iraq, over 6,500 Lebanese have arrived since the escalation began, entering through key points like the Al-Qaim border crossing and the airports in Baghdad and Najaf. The journey through Syria has been particularly difficult, taking 1-2 days by bus or taxi, with others opting for costly flights out of Beirut. Many Lebanese refugees in Iraq are currently being hosted in cities such as Najaf and Karbala, where local authorities have designated residential buildings for their accommodation. Others sought refuge in cities like Erbil, where there is an established expatriate community, staying with friends or family. Apart from Iraq and Syria, reports also suggest that some Lebanese are reaching Jordan.
At the same time, many of those with foreign passports have been evacuated through expatriation flights organised by their home governments or via private charter or commercial boats and flights, in stark contrast to the many Lebanese citizens and other populations who remain stranded. This discrepancy in evacuation efforts highlights the stark inequalities in who is able to leave Lebanon, with wealthier citizens and foreigners prioritised while the majority, including those most vulnerable, are left behind.
If the conflict continues to escalate, Lebanese citizens already displaced from targeted regions may face further difficulties moving within the country as infrastructure is destroyed and safe passage becomes increasingly rare. In this scenario, many Lebanese could continue to seek refuge in countries in the region, particularly Iraq and Syria, despite the challenging conditions there. However, with Syria already facing its own internal challenges and Iraq’s limited capacity to absorb more displaced populations, the options for Lebanese citizens fleeing violence are severely constrained.
Finally, although numbers are likely to remain relatively low at least in the near future, some Lebanese leaving the country might try and move onwards to destinations further afield, such as Türkiye, the Gulf States as well as the European Union, via Cyprus and Greece.
Syrian refugees: stranded between crisis and unsafe returns
For Syrian refugees, the choice is no less difficult. Around 1.5 million Syrians currently live in Lebanon, making it the world’s largest host country for refugees relative to its population size. Since the recent escalations began, over 150,000 Syrians have attempted to flee back to Syria, despite the risks awaiting them. Many are heading to areas under government control or less affected by active conflict, but they continue to face inadequate housing, limited employment opportunities, and scarce access to healthcare and other essential services. Despite the scale of the refugee population, the Lebanese state’s National Emergency Plan announced on 31 October 2023, made limited reference to migrant and refugee communities. Instead, organisations like IOM, UNHCR, and UNRWA have been delegated the responsibility of supporting these vulnerable populations, leaving them without direct state support.
The decision to flee back to Syria is further complicated by the fact that conditions in Syria don’t support large-scale returns. This leaves many Syrians in Lebanon facing an impossible choice – remaining in unsafe, deteriorating conditions or facing the situation in Syria.
Prior to the recent intensification of violence, many Syrians were already seeking to escape Lebanon’s deteriorating economic and social situation by attempting irregular crossings to Europe. As resources have grown scarcer in Lebanon, Syrians have been scapegoated for the country’s socio-economic challenges, such as unemployment and pressure on infrastructure. This tension was further exacerbated in April 2024 by the murder of Pascal Sleiman – a senior figure in the Christian Lebanese Forces party – which sparked widespread xenophobic violence and outrage among some communities in Lebanon. While Syrians had already been facing calls for forced deportations, the incident intensified these efforts, heightening the risks of detention, mass deportations, and violence. Similarly, Lebanon’s northern coast, long a hub for smuggling networks, saw an uptick in dangerous sea journeys, particularly to Cyprus, following the escalation of hostilities towards Syrians. In 2024 alone, the first four months saw over 54 attempted crossings, carrying 3,200 individuals, mostly Syrians. Smugglers took advantage of worsening conditions, offering perilous routes across the Mediterranean for exorbitant prices. However, with recent efforts by the EU and Cyprus to curb these movements, the numbers have decreased. As the conflict in Lebanon intensifies, it remains to be seen whether these routes will experience another surge. Given the current instability, Cyprus has begun preparing for potential further arrivals, reinforcing its maritime defences and border controls. While Cyprus announced it would be on standby to assist evacuations from Lebanon of third-country nationals, this generous response is likely to stand in sharp contrast to the response to an increasing number of Syrian refugees trying to reach Cyprus.
For Syrian refugees, the conflict in Lebanon may result in even more restricted movement. While some have already crossed back to Syria, the harsh realities of life there, make this a fraught option. If the situation in Lebanon worsens, many Syrians will be left in a precarious position and face the impossible choice of either staying in an increasingly unsafe situation in Lebanon, returning to Syria amidst the risks that would entail, or attempting dangerous onward migration journeys towards Türkiye or Cyprus.
Migrant workers: extreme vulnerability in conflict
Migrant workers in Lebanon work under the kafala system – a system that ties migrant workers’ legal status to their employers, leaving them highly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse with little recourse. Many work as domestic workers, excluded from Lebanese labour laws. There is also a culture of impunity surrounding the abuse of migrant workers in the country, as legal protections are weak and enforcement is rare, allowing exploitative practices to continue unchecked. Many of these workers come from African and Asian countries, such as Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Sudan, and are now among the most marginalised groups in Lebanon. The number of migrant workers in Lebanon exceeds 175,000, highlighting the scale of the crisis for this community.
Since the escalation began, many employers have fled the country or abandoned their migrant workers without pay, shelter, or food, leaving them stranded. This is a situation which has been reminiscent of how migrant workers were treated during COVID-19 and in the aftermath of the Beirut blast. Since the recent escalations began, reports indicate that numerous migrant workers have been left sleeping on the streets, with no access to basic necessities or humanitarian aid. Reports have also emerged of migrant workers being evicted from official shelters, as well as from parks or other public spaces where they are taking shelter. Those trapped in conflict zones are often without access to humanitarian aid, as most shelters only permit entry for Lebanese citizens. Many migrant workers lost access to their passports and other vital documents because employers, fleeing the conflict, left without returning them. Inconsistent support from their embassies or consulates further complicates their situation, with many unable to secure safe passage out of the country. For those who wish to leave, the financial burden and lack of documentation make their escape nearly impossible. Many migrant workers are also the primary breadwinners for families back home, making the decision to leave Lebanon even more difficult, despite feeling deeply unsafe.
Migrant workers will continue to be some of the most vulnerable in the unfolding crisis. Many are likely to remain trapped in Lebanon, unable to leave due to a lack of documentation, finances, or safe evacuation routes. As international organisations increasingly focus on refugee populations, migrant workers are falling through the cracks of humanitarian assistance. This could lead to significant exploitation and abuse, with many forced to remain in dangerous conditions or undertake hazardous journeys to leave the country.
As described by the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC) while migrants are resilient and resourceful, a variety of factors create particular vulnerability for migrants in the face of such crises. Language barriers, restrictions on mobility, irregular immigration status, confiscated or lost identity or travel documents, limited social networks, isolation, and attacks and discrimination are some of the factors that hinder the ability of migrants to access protection, move out of harm’s way, or otherwise ensure their own safety and wellbeing. The escalating conflict in Lebanon is a prime example where the lessons learned and approach of MICIC can and should be applied to ensure migrants caught up in the conflict are not forgotten and receive adequate support.
Palestinian refugees: a protracted crisis
Lebanon is home to over 470,000 Palestinian refugees, many of whom were displaced or are the children of those displaced since the 1948 Nakba, and have been living in the country for decades, often in dire conditions. The Palestinian camps in Lebanon have long been underfunded and overcrowded, and the current crisis has only worsened their situation. Palestinians in Lebanon have limited legal rights and face numerous barriers to accessing services and employment. As the violence intensifies, reports suggest that Palestinians are increasingly vulnerable to forced displacement both within Lebanon and beyond its borders. Many Palestinian refugees have already been displaced multiple times over the course of decades due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they are now facing renewed threats of additional displacement within Lebanon or to other areas as violence intensifies. Their precarious legal status means they have little recourse for seeking protection or aid, making them one of the most at-risk populations in the country.
Palestinian refugees may find themselves further marginalised as resources in Lebanon become scarcer and access to basic services dwindles. Palestinian camps, already under pressure, may struggle to support a growing population of displaced persons. Without stronger legal protections and targeted assistance, Palestinians may face new displacement within Lebanon or attempts to cross borders in search of safety, compounding their long history of forced migration.
International response: humanitarian assistance and migration policies
The international community has responded to Lebanon’s protracted humanitarian needs with a mixture of humanitarian aid and containment measures. Like some governments, the European Union has pledged an additional €30 million in aid to support displaced populations in Lebanon, bringing the total EU humanitarian assistance to Lebanon in 2024 to over €100 million. However, critics argue that the EU’s response is more focused on preventing the movement of displaced people to Europe than on addressing the root causes of displacement.
Migration deals, like the €1 billion aid package signed between the EU and Lebanon earlier this year, are aimed at curbing irregular migration to Europe, particularly through routes like Cyprus. The Lebanon-Cyprus route has seen a surge in activity, with more than 60 times the number of people attempting to cross in 2024 compared to 2023, even though absolute numbers remained small. This migration diplomacy has drawn criticism for its emphasis on containment rather than protection, particularly given the EU’s more open response to refugees from Ukraine.
Finally, there is a risk that the fact that both Lebanese and Syrian refugees are now out of desperation crossing the border into Syria will be used against Syrian refugees. European countries could use this to justify revising their positions on whether Syria is safe for large-scale returns from Europe and become more restrictive in assessments of Syrian asylum applications. Additionally, Syrian refugees who have fled to Lebanon to escape conflict may not be allowed to come back by Lebanese authorities when conditions there improve, even if they continue to be in need of asylum.
Operational challenges: reaching those in need
Humanitarian organisations are struggling to respond to the crisis, facing significant challenges in accessing conflict zones and delivering aid. The destruction of infrastructure and the ongoing violence have made it increasingly difficult to reach those most in need. Aid workers are calling for a ceasefire and greater international support and coordination to ensure that assistance reaches displaced populations in both urban and rural areas.
In spite of these challenges, there have been strong displays of solidarity from local communities. Across Lebanon, people have stepped up to provide accommodation and food to those displaced by the conflict. However, even with these grassroots efforts, the scale of the crisis is overwhelming, and many people are still forced to sleep on the streets due to the lack of adequate shelter.
Conclusion: broader implications for the region and migration governance
The escalation in Lebanon is part of a broader regional conflict, with the potential for a wider war involving Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran looming large. This threatens not only Lebanon but also neighbouring countries, particularly in a region already hosting vast numbers of refugees. Should the conflict spill over, it could trigger even more displacement, further straining already overstretched humanitarian resources and host country capacities.
The priority for the international community should be to broker an immediate ceasefire to halt the escalation and protect civilian lives. An urgent cessation of hostilities is crucial to prevent further forced mobility and ensure humanitarian aid can reach those most in need across the region.
As Lebanon’s crisis intensifies, addressing the immediate protection needs of vulnerable populations – including refugees, internally displaced people, and migrant workers—must be a priority. Ensuring their access to essential services and critical aid, while addressing their pre-existing vulnerabilities, are crucial steps to safeguarding their dignity and safety. This requires a coordinated international response, with humanitarian channels strengthened to guarantee that aid reaches those most in need.
With migration consistently high on political agendas and remaining such a sensitive subject in Europe, and the recent memory of the 2015/16 arrivals of large numbers of refugees and migrants from the Middle East to Europe, concerns about increasing onward movement from the region to Europe will be high in Brussels and many European capitals. While an increase in onward movement towards Europe is a likely scenario, especially if the situation in the region continues to further escalate, it is important that human rights, a peaceful resolution of the conflict, assistance to and protection of vulnerable groups of trapped and displaced people should all have primacy over the relatively smaller issue of (potential) migrant and refugee arrivals to Europe.